Significance of the Battle of Midway

[Balljoint]

Learned a lot here. But I suspect that a more (how much?) favorable to IJN outcome at Midway would not change the actual following history all that much largely because the IJA was calling the strategy. The battles would still be Kokoda Trail, July 42 and Guadalcanal, August, 42. The IJA had, I would think, committed to these actions well before Midway with Australia rather than targeting US positions. On paper, and by a reasonable standard, the IJA should have prevailed in both efforts. The locals and the US Marines somehow decided that they shouldn't, and they didn't.

So, to my mind, the new element would be one or more of the Japanese carriers surviving and fewer USN carriers. As to the latter, the USN carriers did not significantly participate in these following actions other than ferrying aircraft and being sunk by IJN subs and at actions at Santa Cruz and the Eastern Solomons. Since the Japanese forces had an unsinkable carrier at Rabaul with Bettys the risk/reward would probably discourage exposure of the IJN carriers in these battles. An impromptu blockade of Australia would be difficult though Nagumo could no doubt inflict a good deal of logistics pain or perhaps even another HI raid.
The IJA strategy was committed to the hilt to these two campaigns and they lost both. Even if the IJN had prevailed at Midway it would be at best a decisive victory against the USN that would not have altered the overall resolve at Kokoda Trail or Guadalcanal a bit. What actually decided these battles doesn't show up on paper.

 

[parsifal]

Do you realize if they advanced even 40 miles in the first day ( depending on where they landed) on Oahu, they'd be back in the water.

no, i didnt check , but its about 8 miles north South and about 14 miles east west. The area of the island is, i believe about 14 square miles, compared to 30 square miles for Saipan. Maximum elevation is about 4500 feet. importantly it is just one of the islands in the group, though it is the main naval base

If they landed on the most likely northwest coast, it was only about 6 miles to Schofield Barracks down the central valley.

okay, and after several days of unloading they should be able to make a move for it. Amphibious invasions dont hit the beach running, much as we would like to think otherwise. even against light opposition its most critical and slowest rate of advance is immediately after the land force has gone in. The attackers simply need time to consolidate organise their base of operation and then move off the beaches

If this fictional invasion caught them unaware as the actual air attack did, just how effective a defense would they have mounted ?

Therein lies the problem. Nagumos Task Group for Pearl was about 20 ships, and got to about 200 miles from the island before launch. The approach speed was quite rapid and there was no delay once the aircraft was in position. They approached the island at the fleet speed from memory...about 25 knots, steaming flat out on the last night. that means on that last night for at least 8 hours, the fleet was last in daylight before the attack about 400 miles away from the island.

For this amphibious fleet, because it has to be so large, it approach speed is going to be around 10 knots. unlike the carriers, the amphibious will need time to organize itself once it arrives off Oahu, It probably need to be on station from around 0200. That gives the fleet about 6 hours of night steaming. buty its worse than that. Nagumos carriers dispense with zig zag movement to save fuel and the japanese were confident they would not be attacked in their approach. That might also be the case for an amphibious force, but I doubt it. Almost certainly this formation would have to approach cautiously, using standard zig zag patterns of approach. Zig Zaggng merchant shipping slows you down, a lot. Along your MLA you rate of advance might be 7 knots for a fleet travelling theorugh the water at 10 knots. So, the Japanese last position before nightfall, might be somewhere between 40 and 80 miles. think about that. What is the different risk of detection for a fleet of 300-600 warships last seen 40 miles offshore, and a fleet with a last possible detection at 400 miles from target. i would say there is a huge difference in the chances of detection.

So if the Japanese arew detected, less than 100 miles from the Hawaiian coast, what might the US response be. I would say they would go hell for leather to prepre for an attack

 

[oldcrowcv63]

... Because they never fully grasped that, that bought us time. ...

I concur in the main, but believe that it was more IJ's perception of the apparent significant risk and the difficulties of securing both their strategic objectives in SEA AND neutralizing the US fleet that made a HI invasion too big a mouthful to digest. I tend to concur with Pars that a smarter move would have been to not raid PH but rather confine their activities to acquiring SE Asian oil and resources and aggressively pursue the isolation of Oz. All while awaiting the inevitable arrival of the US battle fleet in home waters. Sic transit the US Pacific fleet and US Far Eastern forces... I expect.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Good summary of amphibious ops Pars...

 

[VBF-13]

I concur in the main, but believe that it was more IJ's perception of the apparent significant risk and the difficulties of securing both their strategic objectives in SEA AND neutralizing the US fleet that made a HI invasion too big a mouthful to digest. I tend to concur with Pars that a smarter move would have been to not raid PH but rather confine their activities to acquiring SE Asian oil and resources and aggressively pursue the isolation of Oz. All while awaiting the inevitable arrival of the US battle fleet in home waters. Sic transit the US Pacific fleet and US Far Eastern forces... I expect.

The Japanese had a good plan. Think about it. On 7 December 1941, were they thinking Midway? That wasn't even in their plan. Those resources were to be devoted to their plan in the Western Pacific. Midway turned out to be a sucker play for them because it was going off on a frolic of their own that wasn't in their plan. How would the course of the war had gone differently had they stuck-out their plan? If we're weighing it against a Pearl plan, that's how it should be weighed. Throw out Midway, it never happened. They didn't grasp the significance of Pearl, I think, because they already had a good plan.

 

[Shortround6]

I would add to the Japanese plans for a closely timed invasion that they would be very lucky to get an invasion fleet capable of 10 knots as not only do you need several hundred ( or as Parsifal has said 600) that can TOP at 10kts you need ships that can cruise at 10kts. Many/most of these transport ships are using reciprocating steam engines that do NOT take kindly to 24 hours plus of thrashing at full speed.

While the defenses in 1941 were nowhere near what they would be later there were a small number of 240mm howitzers around the Island.

A quick listing of Fortifications.

Hawaii Forts

I am not sure if there were any 155mm guns on Oahu in Nov/Dec 1941 or if there were any railroad guns. But the 240mm how are a far cry from the 3.7in mountain how the British used in Malay.

Please note MG pill boxes and fire control stations dating from early 30s. Also note than many "beaches" have out lying coral reefs making actual landings with sizable boats a bit of a problem.

Of course landing troop carrying small craft on parts of Oahu's north coast presents a few other problems

Actual practical landing sites were probably well known and pre zeroed in by existing defensive batteries.

 

[davparlr]

The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.

The strike force was over 280 miles away when they launched to avoid detection. Sending in a large landing fleet would have increased significantly the risk of alerting the Americans. As it were, the fleet would have been spotted by 0600 off the coast even if it was caused by gun fire. This would have given the AAF over one and a half hours to alert their crews and prepare their aircraft.

With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results.

The air attack commenced at approximately 0750.

The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.

Wheeler airfield and Schofield barracks are in the middle of the island 10-15 miles away from the sea shore.

The Japanese multiple landing zones would most likely be along the western, northern and eastern shorelines and the IJA was no strangers to rough tropical terrain.

Two mountain ranges with limited easily defended passes, like Pali Pass, running from north to south along the east and west coast of Oahu would make invasions here risky due to limited maneuver room and overlooking high ground. This would be similar to the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby. The only viable invasion route would be on the north shore and down through the middle. But, this route takes the Japanese directly into the strength of the defending forces. See pix (from wikipedia) of east coast, west coast, and topological.

If Nagumo follows through with the three attack waves that were planned, then carry on with follow up strikes while the battleship/cruiser force closes to offer close support while the U.S. fleet was being neutralized, the situation would be very difficult for the U.S. forces.
As poor as communications actually were, it seems to me that trying to muster defenses against Japanese landing forces to the north, east and west would have been nearly impossible, especially while everyone was keeping their heads down during the initial air attacks.

General Short, while being out to lunch as far as airborne attack, was apparently very diligent in preparing for an invasion and rehearsed defensive tactics often.

Within minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs struck at Pearl Harbor, General Short issued orders that put the Hawaiian Department on a full war footing. By 8:45 a.m. his headquarters had begun to operate a forward command post located in tunnels at the Aliamanu Crater, three miles west of Fort Shafter. Between 8:20 and 9:00 a.m. the major ground commands-the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions-received word to deploy and take the actions required under a No. 3 Alert. Actually, all three had begun so to act before they got the formal word. The 24th Division had a battalion of infantry on the road from Schofield Barracks to its assigned battle position by 9:00 a.m., and thereafter other divisional units left Schofield as soon as they had drawn and loaded their ammunition and otherwise prepared for action. By late afternoon, all divisional elements were digging in at their assigned field positions, with all weapons except heavy howitzers at hand and ready to fire. As General Short put it, in the deployment "everything clicked," one of his junior officers explaining: "We had gone so many times to our war positions that it just seemed like drill when they were firing at us." 57 The deployment showed clearly enough that the Hawaiian Department was thoroughly prepared to resist invasion, however unready it was against the peril of surprise air attack.

Chapter VII: The Pearl Harbor Attack para. 192

Only in retrospect, with the advantage of hindsight can we see that the US defenses were a relatively hollow shell against the skill and might of Kido Butai. A comparison with the PI campaign provides a hint of the ultimate outcome. defending the PI were some 90 P-40 fighters and 34 B-17 bombers (ineffective in a tactical role) with roughly 30 thousand ground troops (12,000 US Philipine Scouts ~20,000 PA). Against the larger number of US troops and A/C on Oahu was the absence of a pre-planned natural redoubt like the Bataan peninsula and Corregidor. Against the concentration of US airpower on Oahu was the large number of aircraft on Kido Butai carriers (>400 A/C).

I think you are underestimating the quality of forces on Oahu verses PI. There were about 17000 US forces in the PI, some were guard units(Wikipedia) vs about 43,000 Army troops in Hawaii, and these were apparently well trained on counter-invasion activities by Gen. Short, who had no concept on defense from air attack. If I remember correctly, most of the new pilots at PI were right out of flight training. I suspect the pilots at Oahu were much better and indeed the few that got into the air performed bravely and effectively. Only about 10 AAF planes got aloft and they shot down as many as 6 Japanese. The Japanese two raids only consisted of 43 and 35 A6M respectively. I suspect that if these raids had been met by 40-60 P-40s with this quality of pilots the air battle would have changed considerably.

no, i didnt check , but its about 8 miles north South and about 14 miles east west. The area of the island is, i believe about 14 square miles, compared to 30 square miles for Saipan. Maximum elevation is about 4500 feet. importantly it is just one of the islands in the group, though it is the main naval base

??? Oahu has an area of almost 600 square miles.

 

[parsifal]

is there a lee side for the island. generally in the pacific, there are islands with more shelter on one side, and it was from these directions that most invasions would be planned. The famous surf at oahu might pose more of an issue over just being great surf....

 

[GrauGeist]

Originally Posted by GrauGeist: The element of surprise is absolutely key in this situation, however, as historically happened, the Japanese were able to close their taskforce within striking range unchallenged and delivered a series of attacks while everyone on Oahu were enjoying the start of a relaxed Sunday.

The strike force was over 280 miles away when they launched to avoid detection. Sending in a large landing fleet would have increased significantly the risk of alerting the Americans. As it were, the fleet would have been spotted by 0600 off the coast even if it was caused by gun fire. This would have given the AAF over one and a half hours to alert their crews and prepare their aircraft.

And yet the Island's defenses didn't spring into action as the Japanese aircraft passed overland but virtually as the bombs were falling...

Originally Posted by GrauGeist: With this in mind, assault forces closing under the cover of the night/dawn to coincide their approach during the air attacks (on or before 7:00 a.m. OR as originally occurred) would certainly offer positive results.

The air attack commenced at approximately 0750.

Yep, you found one of my many typos...

Originally Posted by GrauGeist: The bulk of U.S. forces were in and around the vicinity of Pearl with a few auxillary fields and air stations about the island. These smaller fields did not have a large amount of first line aircraft that would have been able to muster more than token resistance.

Wheeler airfield and Schofield barracks are in the middle of the island 10-15 miles away from the sea shore.

And the initial airstrikes pass right over Schofield Barracks...along the highway the that attack flights followed, leading them right to Pearl. And Schofeild Barracks took a beating in the air attack as it was. As did Bellows, Wheeler, Hickam and Kaneohe fields. The Japanese did miss the auxillery fields at Kahuku, Haleiwa and Mokuleia. Haleiwa was where several P-40s were able to get up and engage the Japanese, downing several.

Two mountain ranges with limited easily defended passes, like Pali Pass, running from north to south along the east and west coast of Oahu would make invasions here risky due to limited maneuver room and overlooking high ground. This would be similar to the Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby. The only viable invasion route would be on the north shore and down through the middle. But, this route takes the Japanese directly into the strength of the defending forces. See pix (from wikipedia) of east coast, west coast, and topological.

General Short, while being out to lunch as far as airborne attack, was apparently very diligent in preparing for an invasion and rehearsed defensive tactics often.

I think you are underestimating the quality of forces on Oahu verses PI. There were about 17000 US forces in the PI, some were guard units(Wikipedia) vs about 43,000 Army troops in Hawaii, and these were apparently well trained on counter-invasion activities by Gen. Short, who had no concept on defense from air attack. If I remember correctly, most of the new pilots at PI were right out of flight training. I suspect the pilots at Oahu were much better and indeed the few that got into the air performed bravely and effectively. Only about 10 AAF planes got aloft and they shot down as many as 6 Japanese. The Japanese two raids only consisted of 43 and 35 A6M respectively. I suspect that if these raids had been met by 40-60 P-40s with this quality of pilots the air battle would have changed considerably.

The Japanese had over 400 aircraft at their disposal (from 6 CVs) although (obviously) not all were committed. And as we have seen, the air raids did indeed catch the U.S. forces off guard and the U.S. fighters that did get up, made a phenomenal effort, but came up short.
We also might be underestimating the quality of the IJA troops. Since Japan has been already at war and an invasion of this caliber would not be seeing green troops committed, but rather combat seasoned troops rotated out of other areas for this operation. That being considered, how well would the U.S. troops perform, the vast majority having never been in combat? Also, Japanese have severely weakened the Naval and Army air assets, which establishes air superiority or soon will, with successive air attacks and CAP sweeps. Like I mentioned before in this possible situation, the assets intended for the invasion of Alaska would be diverted to the invasion of Hawaii and augmented as much as possible to ensure success.

If the air attack commenced prior to the landings, the U.S. defenses would be on high alert (as they were) but how well would they be ready to deal with the landings? Add to this, the fact that the bulk of the U.S. 7th fleet is burning and sinking in the harbor as the IJN battleships and cruisers are closing in to assist the landing forces?

Some good maps showing the military bases and the highway system along with the 2 Japanese attack waves:

So the bottom line here, is that if everybody was enjoying a lazy Sunday morning and looking up and waving at the passing Japanese aircraft as they were inbound, why should they think anything different about ships on the horizon? As many were used to the comings and going of U.S. naval assets and aircraft in the area, why would they suddenly be alarmed at the sight of distant ships and not aircraft?

Even after the USS Ward caught the IJN mini sub and sank it at the harbor entrance, no one reacted with any alarm.

So this scenario is calling for the same relaxed attitude on that morning, the same failure in communications, the same failure in radar recognition (and again, communications), the same failure in aircraft dispersal, the same failure with locked ammunition access, the same failure in active command, the same capital ships with cold boilers and on and on....so many mistakes were made that morning. These is the conditions that I am proposing that exist when the Japanese come not only with aircraft, but an invasion.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Great information on PH defenses davparlr SR6! Good source materiel. I had no idea Short had planned, prepared or responded to the possibility of an invasion in that manner or that there was much in the way of significant coastal defense batteries. Truly, I assumed he was only interested in polo and morning rides on his horse. Jason Robards portrayal in Tora Tora Tora appears to do him a bit of a disservice whereas Kimmel is portrayed with a fair amount of sympathy by Martin Balsam. While I agree that I did indeed underestimate the level of US preparedness, the one vulnerability factor that may be decisive is the peacetime mind set of the defenders. I expect the shock factor would be substantial and endure for at least a few days after the aerial attack due to the damage inflicted upon the island's air force and fleet and hard to evaluate how it might degrade the island's defense. I can imagine significant demoralization of the defenders if the invasion fleet had appeared AFTER the aerial raid when IJN air power had destroyed the recon assets of the USN A. At sea, any IJN confrontation with USN carriers is likely to compound the general demoralization.

IJ invading Oahu might not be a walk over, but I can imagine one gigantic Cluster Muck on the part of the defenders. Of course, under ideal circumstances, amphib ops by any military are pretty much always a C-F to some degree. The lead-time factor in alerting the defenders to the approach of the invasion fleet scheduled to land simultaneously with the attack may make the scenario far less a US disaster. the P-40s may indeed have done much better in defense against the approach of an air fleet at medium altitude… Just the P-40's preferred diet. Bad news for the IJN…. I agree with Balljoint, this has been an educational thread for me.

late edit: added kudo to SR6 for coastal defense battery info. and roll-eye face..

 

[Shortround6]

a dozen (or a couple dozen) aircraft visible from any observation point at a time might not create alarm. Several hundred ships would certainly arouse somebodies curiosity, being the largest fleet/convoy in modern times at least up until that point in time.

And remember the time difference. The transports have 28 hours steaming (at 10kts) from the point the planes launch OR have to be less than 100 miles from Oahu at sundown of the 6th. Give the game away at Sundown on the 6th and there is NO surprise on Sunday morning. Trying to land on Monday morning might be just a little difficult, too.

The Japanese carriers could certainly have done much more damage but the Japanese have a problem, they are thousands of miles away from any supply points and unless they can capture (not destroy) the fuel storage at Pearl they only have a few days to operate in Hawaiian waters. The Carriers also only have limited bomb storage and the US carriers are at large. They cannot expend all of their aviation ordnance on land targets until the US carriers are dealt with. Underway replenishment of of ordnance is not well developed yet.

 

[VBF-13]

I agree with Balljoint, this has been an educational thread for me.

That's an understatement, I feel like I'm in the planning room! Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...

 

[tyrodtom]

If we didn't already know of the mistakes that really did happen in the actual attacks on PH and the PI, most of us would argue that they would never have happened .

The mistakes a unblooded, inexperienced, peace time based Army, Navy, or USAAF can make are infinite, the debacles at the HI and PI show that.

I think if the Japanese had chose a different method of attack, it would have just exposed more faults.

 

[Shortround6]

You are assuming the Japanese make no new mistakes of their own and the US Forces do nothing right.

Mistaking the Initial Japanese air attacks for US training flights for a number of minutes is a bit different than ignoring a an armada of dozens if not hundreds of ships for hours if not a full day or more.

American forces had years to figure out likely attack routes/landing sites and even if money was short (very short) at least put a few defenses/observation posts covering the likely sites. Some of the pill boxes date from 1934. Granted they are few and far between in the 30s but assuming massive incompetence for around a decade preceding Pearl Harbor is going a bit far.

Japanese amphibious capability is woefully lacking compared to what the US would display a few years later, even if the US took several years to learn. What do the Japanese have for landing craft in numbers and types? Are they used to combat loading of the supply ships? What do the Japanese have for shore to ship communications for fire support?

Landing on hostile shores, even sparsely defended, is a lot different than unloading in port.

For the Japanese it is really an all or nothing gamble. The resources needed to invade Hawaii are not available for the invasion of the Philippines and Malaysia meaning the Japanese cannot secure the Dutch East Indies (oil) and their supply line for weeks if not months longer even if the Hawaii invasion works.

It is about 2400 miles from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor and about 3850 miles from Tokyo to Pearl Harbor. It is 2250 miles from Kumamoto ( South Island) to the port of Miri in Borneo and that is by flying over Luzon.

The Dutch damaged/destroyed a number of the oil fields as it was. Giving them another few weeks?

 

[GrauGeist]

Looking back at the events that unfolded during WWII, we have the luxury of seeing how each action had not only a direct action, but how each action played out in it's entirety.

We also know that war between the U.S. and the Empre of Japan was going to happen and we know when and where it started. However, on Sunday morning, 7 December, the folks at Pearl (and the U.S. at large) didn't.

What did actually happen that morning at Pearl Harbor, was that Japan approached a resting Tiger and beat it about the head and neck with a stick, then shortly afterwards at the Phillippines they poked it in the eye several times. At Midway, they tried to grab this dazed and seriously pissed-off Tiger by the tail and it turned on them and gave them some real hurt. From that point onwards, the Tiger hunted them and gave them a serious mauling all the way home.

Using this same analogy, the idea is to surprise and contain the Tiger before it is fully awake, and thus avoid the invitable ass-kicking.

By the way, I apologize to anyone for the brutal hijacking on the Midway thread. But between the Midway content and the Hawaiian content, there's some great info discussion

 

[tyrodtom]

I'm not saying the Japanese were perfect, but the mistakes they made that were of a smaller degree, except for the greater mistake of the attack itself.

If they were going to attack PH, they should have went all out to do maximum damage and take maximum advantage.
There are different degrees of a all or nothing approach.

 

[davparlr]

is there a lee side for the island. generally in the pacific, there are islands with more shelter on one side, and it was from these directions that most invasions would be planned. The famous surf at oahu might pose more of an issue over just being great surf....

The west side of the Hawaiian islands is the leeward side but, as you can see from the topological map there is a mountainous ridgeline, as shown in the last photo, that only has two very small access points to the interior, one in the middle and one along the southern beach, both easily defended.

And yet the Island's defenses didn't spring into action as the Japanese aircraft passed overland

At the start of any surprise attack, confusion reigned. However, once the bombs fell reaction was immediate and well organized by the Army whose ground forces were not attacked.

And the initial airstrikes pass right over Schofield Barracks...along the highway the that attack flights followed, leading them right to Pearl. And Schofeild Barracks took a beating in the air attack as it was. As did Bellows, Wheeler, Hickam and Kaneohe fields. The Japanese did miss the auxillery fields at Kahuku, Haleiwa and Mokuleia. Haleiwa was where several P-40s were able to get up and engage the Japanese, downing several.

Only because of the surprise. Had the invasion fleet been off shore, the Army and Navy would have had an hour and a half to prepare before the Japanese aircraft arrived, plenty of time to crew up and be ready to engage the enemy. The ground pounders would have already been on the march to positions and the sailor boys would have been at stations with armament ready on ships buttoned up for combat some under way (Nevada) or building steam. The Enterprise would have been alerted and would be preparing for war combat.

We also might be underestimating the quality of the IJA troops. Since Japan has been already at war and an invasion of this caliber would not be seeing green troops committed, but rather combat seasoned troops rotated out of other areas for this operation.

No doubt these would have been crack troops

That being considered, how well would the U.S. troops perform, the vast majority having never been in combat?

Don't confuse the ineptitude of high command with the grit of the US service men. Yes they had not experienced combat but when outnumbered and their backs against the wall, they fought ferociously. Just look at the defense of Bataan, Wake Island, and the second wave at Pearl Harbor, where even the Japanese was surprised at the intensity of the defense. If well led and trained, which is quite reasonable given the reactions after the attack, and armed with the M1 rifle, giving the American soldier fire power the Japanese had never encountered, I would not bet against the American soldier or sailor.

Also, Japanese have severely weakened the Naval and Army air assets, which establishes air superiority or soon will, with successive air attacks and CAP sweeps.

Only if surprised which they would not have been with an invasion fleet off shore.

Like I mentioned before in this possible situation, the assets intended for the invasion of Alaska would be diverted to the invasion of Hawaii and augmented as much as possible to ensure success.

Alaska? I don't know of any diversion to Alaska for Pearl Harbor. Midway, yes.

If the air attack commenced prior to the landings, the U.S. defenses would be on high alert (as they were) but how well would they be ready to deal with the landings? Add to this, the fact that the bulk of the U.S. 7th fleet is burning and sinking in the harbor as the IJN battleships and cruisers are closing in to assist the landing forces?

The air attack could not have occurred before it did due to daylight. Where were all the ships lurking undetected? As already stated, by the afternoon Army forces were already in their defensive positions.

So this scenario is calling for the same relaxed attitude on that morning, the same failure in communications, the same failure in radar recognition (and again, communications), the same failure in aircraft dispersal, the same failure with locked ammunition access, the same failure in active command, the same capital ships with cold boilers and on and on....so many mistakes were made that morning. These is the conditions that I am proposing that exist when the Japanese come not only with aircraft, but an invasion.

The primary reason the attack was so successful was because of the surprise attack. If an invasion fleet was spotted before the air attack, all bets are off.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

That's an understatement, I feel like I'm in the planning room! Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...

Possible PH invasion scenario...As at Midway, the transports lag the arrival and strike by KB, but in addition to the mini-sub attack, one or more IJN fleet subs is positioned on the approaches to the harbor entrance to await the sortie of any combatants that might have survived the surprise air attack or the return of any USN fleet units that might have been on operations. (such as the Enterprise group the evening of Dec. 7). Trouble is, that's the one part of the PH defense that appears to have been well organized and maintained so it's quite possible that tactic would not be effective. I don't know what specific efforts (besides regular DD/DE patrols) were made to effectively delouse the harbor approaches but history suggests such efforts were made and were at least somewhat effective....

As argued well by others, if the transports arrive with KB, the US forces have early warning and are prepared. I think the IJN will face a much more challenging situation. They are likely to lose a substantial portion of their CV-based air force over Oahu and probably are much more vulnerable to attack by even the admittedly inexperienced USN CVs.

 

[VBF-13]

If an invasion fleet was spotted before the air attack, all bets are off.

Not necessarily. Consider this. Consider their splitting the forces and the timing. They're closing in from different directions. The carriers strike first along with the subs. The subs are going for the mouth of the harbor and they're undetected until they're pretty much there. They draw out the destroyers in single file and torpedo just one as it's making its way out and they close up that channel like a vault. At the same time the planes are coming in and wreaking havoc. The pressure is taken off the invasion forces as they're landing at any number of selected beaches as we're forced to split our forces to oppose them. Consider this a rough draft.

 

[GrauGeist]

Let me just throw this out, what about the neck of the harbor? Would it be possible to bottleneck that? That would at least "contain" the fleet. That really wasn't necessary in the surprise attack, but now that they're invading, I'd think they're thinking of that...

They very nearly succeeded with the USS Nevada as it was making a run for the open sea, but the skipper kept a cool head as it was coming under serious attack and ran her aground near Hospital Point to prevent her from blocking the harbor