Significance of the Battle of Midway

[The Basket]

With respect, the battleships could have provided flak support.
Because they still had guns which go bang and shooting down only part of it.
Deterrence is also part of it. why Kamikaze is so scary. You really do have to shoot down the airplane.

The battleships couldnt bombard Midway until the airpower on Midway was defeated. The Japanese demonstrated that even a modern battleship is no match for airpower. Flak or maneuvers dont matter.

 

[parsifal]

The 1.1 in US gun is one of the most hotly debated weapons around, and opinion remains vey sharply divided as to whether it was effective or not. Some would argue that its replacement by the 20mm oerlikon was not due so much to its shortcomings as a gun, but more to do with its cost. Im not sure either way to be honest, but here is a discussion i found regarding its effectiveness

Was the USN 1.1" AA gun good for anything? in Battleship Vs Battleship Forum

Regarding the criticisms of the 25mm, unquestionably it was a weapon that at the end of the war, was considered to have some serious failings. Further, one only has to look at the results that the overall efforts of the Japanese AA, to know that it was far less effective than US efforts. Or so it might appear. Even on that score there is sharp debate, with some knowledgeable people in this place arguing it was only fractionally as effective as the claims made for it (particularly the 5/38). I dont fully buy those arguments, but neither do I fully accept the stuff about the effectiveness of the 20mm. It was considered obsolete by 1946, less than 5 years after service entry, and that speaks volumes about its true effectiveness to my mind. The bofors, by comparison, is stil going pretty strong 70 years later.

Nav Weaps makes the following comment with respect to the US 1.1 inch gun

"In retrospect, it would appear that these defects were little more than teething problems and that the basic design was sound. However, this weapon still lacked the range and larger bursting charge of the Bofors"

 

[Francis marliere]

Right! But the battleships could have bombarded Midway rather than doing so with carrier planes. Had the IJN carriers been positioned somewhat away from Midway and tasked only with CAP and dealing with the expected US carriers, there would have been a much better chance for Japanese success. As it was the IJN carriers had to deal with Midway air attacks as well as well as the Devastators. With both bombs and torpedoes littering the hanger decks as well as overstressed CAP, the IJN carriers were overexposed and overextended.
The battleships could (and should) have shouldered the major part of the load prior to the USN carriers showing there hand.

Balljoint, all relies on what you mean by "could have".
Battleships had the physical capacity to shoot at Midway, hence could have bombarded Midway (if not sunk or damaged by planes during their progression toward the island, but that's another story).
But that was not part of Japanese mindset and doctrine. Battleships were designed, build and used to fight battleships. They were not expected to waste their ammunition and wore their gun against what was thought to be a secondary target. It was not after the disasters at Midway and in the Solomons that the IJN reluctanly accepted to send 2 battleships shelling Guadalcanal in October 42. And these battleships were Kongo class ships, which were never used as true battleships but as 'big' cruisers.

Best,

Francis Marliere

 

[Francis marliere]

ah, not quite corect.

The Battlecruisers escorting the fast carriers were each equipped with 5 x 5in/40 DPs, 4 x 40mm AA and either 8 13.2mm plus 20x 25mm AA or 28 x 25mm (Ive got conflicting specifications). Yamato went into Midway carrying 12 x 5in and 34 25mm plus 4 13.2mm MG. The carriers were generally fitted with 12 5/40s and typically 24 x 25mm AA plus 22 x 13.2 AAMG

The 5/40 was an older gun than the 5/50 fitted to most of the escort destroyers. it was a reasonably effective AA gun, unlike the 5/50, which had insufficient training and elevating speeds to do this job adequately. The USN 5/38 was far superior in that regard to both guns

The Japanese made the right decision to disperse their task forces and rely on manouvre over massed defensive fire. in order to derive benefit froma mutual fire of their escorts, the Destroyers needed to be carrying an effective DP wepon, and this they simply did not possess. Whereas the 40mm Bofors could also offer some cover fire over the carrier from a normal tactical distance (about 800yards for a Destroyer, roughly 2000 yards for a Battlship) the 25mm was not really effective at those ranges.

The 25mm never was competitve to the bofors, but it was better than the 20mm fitted to most US ships in 1942.

Given the limitations of the armament, it made sense to disperse the TF when under attack and rely on manouvre over fire.

Yes, you're right, I wrote too fast (as always) and made the confusion between the 5"/50 (DD SP gun) and the 5"/40 (BB CA DP gun). I also mixed the CA and BB for light guns. My bad. Anyway, we agree that Japanese AAA was not very effective and that IJN relied more on evasive maneuvers than gunfire. Hence a rather large distance between ships in their task forces.

Best,

Francis Marliere

 

[Francis marliere]

You know, Parsifal, the Japanese might have done better had they retained this gun for their destroyers instead of going to the 5"/50. Or at least made some modifications to the 5"/50, like turrets with better train/elevation, power ramming ability, and ability to be loaded at higher elevations.

I fear that it would not change much things, because the main problem is the absence of effective fire control for AAA aboard DD.

 

[Balljoint]

Yes, my thought is from the whole cloth with a healthy helping of hindsight. The IJN objective was the decisive battle which means taking out the remaining USN carriers. While the four carriers should have been able to accomplish this, a series of miscalculations and bad luck –primarily the USN intelligence coup- overcame the IJN advantage.
The B-17s, B-26s and obsolete Marine planes on Midway wouldn't have been much of a threat to the battleships. A couple of smaller carriers would suffice for CAP. Planes from the USN carriers would have flushed out the Japanese quarry. With the object being to take out the USN carriers, Nagumo's First Carrier Force would have been better used towards that end. Dividing your force should be a major error in any military engagement whether the strategy is carriers supporting battleships or vice versa.

For the USN, Coral Sea was the inflection point in the struggle. Midway was the first significantly positive trend. But there was at that point a long way to go.

 

[Garyt]

Francis marliere wrote:

The B-17s, B-26s and obsolete Marine planes on Midway wouldn't have been much of a threat to the battleships. A couple of smaller carriers would suffice for CAP.

Absolutely right here.


The Basket wrote:

The battleships couldnt bombard Midway until the airpower on Midway was defeated. The Japanese demonstrated that even a modern battleship is no match for airpower. Flak or maneuvers dont matter.

I'd say a flotilla of battleships and some support vessels would not have had much to fear from Midway's land based air. And the best anti battleship weapon a plane has is a torpedo - the armor can withstand bomb damage fairly well. And the US torpedoes and torpedo planes were lacking at this point. Plus with some CAP from the light carriers, the battleships would have been fine. The carrier aircraft could have done some damage I'd think though, a lot having to do with sheer numbers.

But the battleships would have been to a point "bait" for the US carriers. Interesting to see how Midway would have turned out if the US spent it's strike bombing a Japanese battleship flotilla, then allowing the Japanese fleet carriers to get the first strike against the US carriers.

But of course, Japan was far above using the Yamato as "bait", though this might have been the best use of Japan's dreadnoughts at this point.

Regarding the criticisms of the 25mm, unquestionably it was a weapon that at the end of the war, was considered to have some serious failings. Further, one only has to look at the results that the overall efforts of the Japanese AA, to know that it was far less effective than US efforts. Or so it might appear. Even on that score there is sharp debate, with some knowledgeable people in this place arguing it was only fractionally as effective as the claims made for it (particularly the 5/3. I dont fully buy those arguments, but neither do I fully accept the stuff about the effectiveness of the 20mm. It was considered obsolete by 1946, less than 5 years after service entry, and that speaks volumes about its true effectiveness to my mind. The bofors, by comparison, is stil going pretty strong 70 years later.

I'm not an overly strong critic of the 25mm either. I think it had 2 major shortcomings, rate of fire (magazine issue), and slow traverse/elevation. It's other problems seem to be similar to problems most WW2 naval light AA had, such as excessive vibration which was more of a problem in the trip mounts. As you mention, the Oerlikon had a similar problem when mounted more than 1 to a mount. I think the 20mm was a solid short range weapon, very high rate of fire, and shot down a good amount of planes. It's effectiveness against kamikazes maybe lift a bit to be desired, but that was not a standard threat. And it was obsolete by '46, but so was almost anything to do with military aviation, it changed rapidly during this time. The Bofors indeed stayed around longer, though I think a good portion of it's staying power had to do with it being of a heavy enough round to be effective in a dual purpose role on smaller vessels, even though it's performance as an AA weapon was not overly effective post WW2.

 

[parsifal]

Issues about fire control, or the lack of it in IJN ships are overblown. This certainly had an effect on their HAA, but no effect on their LAA. Fire control also did not effect USN LAA, excluding the 40mm bofors, which did benefit from fire control. US fire control was, however, not nearly as effective as is popularly reported in available literature. you have to dig a lot, but until the latter part of 1944, the fire control directors were not working nearly as well as they should have.

For the Japanese the mainstay of their AA efforts were their LAA weapons, and perhaps medium calibre AA. The best example of their medium calibre weaponry was the 3.9" gun fitted to their Akitsuki DDaa destroyers (they referred to it as their Type 98 100mm gun)> this gun was probably the best all round ship borne AA weapon of both sides during the war, though the 5/38 was far more numerous, and it is quite arguable as to which gun was actually better. .

The main issue affecting Japanese AA effectiveness for their LAA however, was not technological. The 25mm was considered a good weapon by the Japanese, and as the following analysis suggests, they were probably justified in saying that. I must say im still sceptical, but it is what it is.......

The biggest single problem affecting the Japanese AA effectiveness later in the war was actually acute ammunition shortages.

Some aspects of the 25mm debate I dont fully understand. In interviews conducted by the U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan after the end of the war, Japanese military personnel cited the Type 96 as the most reliable Japanese anti-aircraft weapon, but second in effectiveness to the Type 98 100 mm anti-aircraft gun .

The Type 96 was most effective when used at ranges of 1,000 meters or less, but had a listed effective range of 2000m. Japanese military stated that the estimated ammunition expenditure required for a kill was an average of 1,500 rounds to down an aircraft at a height of 1,000 meters and a range of 2,000 meters and that fire beyond that range was completely ineffective. Against a torpedo bomber travelling at 200 mph (with torpedo), and an estimated launch distance of 800 yards for the torpedo, each firing 25mm has 9.8 seconds firing time, during which time it can fire off 20.5 rounds of ammunition. On average, and by extrapolation, it would take about 70 guns firing continuoulsy for the full 9.8 seconds to ensure a kill of a single aircraft.

From ranges below 1000m , the Japanese estimated the rounds per kill dropped to about 500 rounds. Moreover, USN usage of torpedoes was quite limited.....they prefrred diving attacks and direct bombing, which can be undertaken higher and at higher speeds. i dont have the estimates of 25mm AA effectiveness at higher altitudes (typically D/B attacks were from about 5000 feet, divespeed could vary, slower for more accuracy, faster for more safety).

So, allowing for increased accuracy at lower ranges, and firstly returning to the above example of a torpedo attack delivered at 800m. I have to make some gusstimates here, because there really isnt a complete dataset to work from. We know the estimated lerthality at 2000m for the Type 96 was 1500rpk, and the estimate for 1000m is about 500rpk. that would suggest the average rpk from between 2000m to 1000m was about 1000 rounds. From 1000m to 800m we can assume 500rpk. going back to that hypothetical attack run, the number of guns needed to bring down the TBF attacker can now be revised and refined. In the 2000 to 1000 m range, the 25mm gun has a firing cycle now of 8.1 seconds, and will fire off 17.1 rounds (ie one magazine clip....if it was not a magazine fed wepon, it would fire off twice that many rounds). From 1000 down to 800m there will be a further 3.4 rounds fired. The odds of a kill are 17.1/1000 and for the last 200m of the TBFs run 3.4/500. these odds calculate out to 0.0171 +0.0068 = 0.0239, meaning continuous fire for about 42 guns to bring down one TBF.

Divebombing was an inherently safer attack method for the American, and suspect the reason might be higher approach speeds. Typical approach altitude for US D/B can be assumed to be 10K, and release altirudes around 5000K . Max effective firing altiude of the Type 96 was 9800 feet, and i think thats pusshing it to be honest. Max elevation was 85 degrees, so ther is no way to avoid being shot at in the dive. however USN D/B could position over the target with relative impunity.

If the distance (altitude loss) between approach and release is 5000 feet, that equates to 1530m. If the dive sppeed is the same as the TBF (I dont really know what typical divespeed for an SB2U might be) then its exposure to 25mm fire is about 40-50% less than for a level bomber. the level bomber might have advantages in terms of getting some cover from sea state but the D/;B might, conversely derive benefit from cloud cover

These figures compare very well to the 20mm batting averages, but are rather poor compared to the 40mm averages. however ther were major constraints placed on the effectivemess of the Type 96 that had nothing to do with the gun.

From early 1944 severe constraints were placed on ammunition expenditure. Orders were issued throughout the fleet, not to engage except against targets under 1000m. some sources say 800m. Thgis immediately reduces the odds for a kill from 0.0239 to 0.068. Because the firing cycle is so drastically reduced, you now need 147 guns firing continuously for 3.5 secs to make a kill probable. This is far worse than for both the 20mm and of course the 40mm.

There is a wide divergence of opion on the actual effectiveness of the 20mm gun. Some sources do suggest it to be an absolutely deadly weapon, others not somuch one source I do find quite convincing

HyperWar: Antiaircraft Action Summary--Suicide Attacks [Chapter 2]


This report states that late in the war, against Japoanese suicide attacks, 560000 rounds of 20mm ammuntion was expended, to achieve 62.5 kills. Thats an ammunition expenditure rate of about 9000 rounds per kill. Surprising, given the competing Japanese estimates, but it does bring into focu its effectiveness as a gun system. i highly suspect that the vast majority of ammunition was expended firing at ranges well beyind the effective range of the 20mm gun.

 

[Garyt]

this gun was probably the best all round ship borne AA weapon of both sides during the war, though the 5/38 was far more numerous, and it is quite arguable as to which gun was actually better. .

I'd say very close, but would give the nod to the 5"/38. Similar rate of fire, the 100mm might have better accuracy at range. Of course the 5"/38 fires a shell with a better burst to it.

The only issue with the 100mm was the barrel wore out quickly and had to be changed often. I guess that and the proximity fuse, though that is not an issue with a gun but a technology issue.

i highly suspect that the vast majority of ammunition was expended firing at ranges well beyind the effective range of the 20mm gun.

I think that is a huge issue when computing accuracy or how many shells were needed to bring a plane down. And a gun with higher ROF is going to expend more shells when out of range. Also, have a shorter effective range is going to make you extend a lot of shells for nothing. The US (with their wonderful logistics making ammo plentiful) would have as their doctrine to open up fire while still out of range and walk the shells to the target.

Another thing to that is not really fair when evaluating Japanese AA - assuming all weapons were equal, you are going to need more shells on target to knock out about any american plane than it will take to knock out most Japanese planes. Something to do with the plane becoming a fireball

But seriously, Japanese planes pretty well throughout the war were far easier to bring down. Army fighters from maybe late 43 or 44 would fare better, but even the late model Judy attack craft was a fireball waiting to happen. I think this needs to be taken into account when comparing AA effectiveness and rounds required to do the job.

The other thing that makes Japanese AA ook worse when comparing numbers is something you hint at, Parsifal. The Japanese made more extensive use of torpedo planes, which flying slower and level were more vulnerable to AA fire than dive bombers. With a dive bombers greater speed and vertical attack plane, it was tougher to put rounds on target.

 

[snelson]

if the IJN took midway, did they have a bomber that had the range to reach pearl?

 

[GrauGeist]

if the IJN took midway, did they have a bomber that had the range to reach pearl?

The distance from Midway to Hawaii is about 1,200 miles. The G4M "Betty" had a range of about 1,700 miles.

To try and bomb Hawaii from Midway would be stretching it...

 

[snelson]

The distance from Midway to Hawaii is about 1,200 miles. The G4M "Betty" had a range of about 1,700 miles.

To try and bomb Hawaii from Midway would be stretching it...

wow it would seem to be a one way mission unless they could get more fuel in their planes. but if they did bomb pearl the carriers would have to come out and play

 

[GrauGeist]

Any attempted attack on Hawaii after 7 December 1941 would be a difficult chore.

They got caught with their pants down once, but they were determined to never let it happen again.

 

[parsifal]

It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Getting back to Tomo's original query regarding whether Midway could be characterized as a tactical or strategic victory. I'd argue, despite my agreement with all Parsifal has said, that it was indeed both a tactical and strategic victory. Or perhaps it might be most accurate to say it was a tactical victory with strategic implications.

Pars, I think you are spot on, in your describing the battle from the Japanese perspective as coming near to being a pyrrhic victory for the USN. With their belief in having traded 4 IJN for 4 USN fleet carriers (after sinking 2 others at Coral Sea) allowed them to retain a commitment to a continued strategy of expansion. However, the US, with perhaps a clearer understanding of the actual changed balance of carrier-based power was sufficiently emboldened to seize the window of opportunity the battle afforded to hastily mount its first pacific offensive leading to the strategic victory at Guadalcanal.

To be sure, USN carrier admirals retained a healthy appreciation for the threat and capabilities of the remaining IJN carriers. Prior to the Solomon campaign, being ignorant of the IJN's Long Lance and night fighting skills, the USN could hardly imagine the debacles that would characterize the coming surface actions that would make the campaign so bloody.
In the aftermath of Midway both sides seem to have been afflicted with a misperception of the other's real capability, but in the end, the USN's was perhaps a bit more accurate.

 

[GrauGeist]

It was never intended to develop midway for japanese bombers. however they did intend to base long range seaplane recon aircraft and maintain survellance of Pearl more or less continuously

That's actually the original use for Midway and many other small atolls across the Pacific.

Way stations for the Pan Am Clipper flying boats and other trans-Pacific travellers.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The idea that BB's could simply steam up and have their way with Midway is seductive but at best, I suspect unrealistic as a practical course for the IJN. First, using IJN escort carriers to provide bombardment force cover may be more or less problematic, depending on how many are dedicated to the task. Unless the Aleutian campaign is abandoned, only the 24 aircraft on Zuiho and 8 on Hosho are available. Even throwing in the numbers provided by Junyo (20 VF 19 VB) and Ryujo (16 VF 20 VT) (assuming all aircraft operational) will not necessarily provide overwhelming numbers. The former small carriers provide only 6 modern VF (A6Ms) (plus 6 more obsolescent A5Ms) providing little to protect the small number of VB (8 obsolescent biplane bombers) and VT (12 Kates) if employed in a fruitless attempt to neutralize Midways airfield. The total of 12 VF are unlikely to have provided effective CAP over the IJN battleships and cruisers during their approach to Midway island. Presumably, IJN intelligence had information on the basing of one VF squadron of about 20 fighters and 20 dive bombers on Midway which would have been more than the light carriers (Hosho and Zuiho) could have handled but nothing like the greater numbers actually present.

Combining all the light and escort carriers together, they would have provided air assets approaching half Kido Butai's available air force or equivalent to that used to assault the island in the morning attack. However, the 42 available VF would probably have been split in half to cover both the fleet and the strike force. How a roughly 33% reduction in escort and 50% reduction in CAP would have altered results of the battle's first phase is uncertain and probably too big a risk to contemplate as a viable application of force. We only know in hindsight how badly the F2A's and Midway's available attack aircraft performed against the opposition they actually faced.

In any case, the Aleutian plan was apparently not a diversion but designed as an independent albeit simultaneous operation with its own objectives, so reassigning its carriers to the Midway operation was not an option.

It's clear that the transports were at grave risk to Midway's air forces and could not approach to launch an invasion until the airfields were neutralized by naval air or surface bombardment forces. So, the question remains, against the actual undiminished US air power deployed at Midway, what risk did the larger combatants face during their approach to the island?

While heavily armored the BBs and CAs were probably not in actual danger of being sunk unless one or other of the 4 B-26s and 6 TBFs got lucky with their Mk-13s. While the USN torpedo is justly considered to be an ineffective weapon it did enjoy some early if limited success even at Midway. One source

TBD Devastator Units of the US Navy by Barrett Tillman

indicates 10 hits were scored from 95 drops from February to June 1942 for a 10% reliability. So, we have a probability of perhaps one effective hit from the ten torpedo carrying planes at Midway. That's not counting the 31 PBYs and the four radar equipped black cat PBYs.

The roughly 40 marine dive-bombers are another problem. Harassing attacks by USN FMs and TBMs on a group of battle ships and cruisers at Leyte Gulf contributed to Kurita's decision to break off the action and retire. Gun laying optical devices and communications equipment may be particularly vulnerable to attack by relatively modest sized ordnance. Even relatively light bombs (~500 pounders) can do much to diminish the fighting effectiveness of even large naval combatants short of outright sinking them. Of course, the number of USN attack aircraft on CVEs was far larger off Samar (over 5 times more bomb-carrying TBMs than Midway's VBs) so it's a poor analogy for a number or reasons. However, the IJN also had the example of its own experience with the Prince of Wales and Repulse to demonstrate how deadly could be attacks by relatively limited numbers of aircraft on surface ships without air cover. On that occasion, only about 25 Nell bombers put an end to one modern capital ship and a later attack by a similar number sank Repulse. Without precise knowledge of what it was actually facing, a similar possibility was probably too high a price to contemplate, especially when the IJN was anticipating a war-deciding battle between capital ships in its immediate future.

The trouble with hindsight conclusions is that it's easy to ignore the uncertainty that attends decisions made during real conflict.

 

[tomo pauk]

In case the Japanese are willing to deliberately close with their heavy units close to Midway to shower it with shells, perhaps the four of the listed carriers (Zuiho, Hosho, Junyo, Ryujo) should be outfitted only with fighters? That would give them 100+ fighters combined - should be enough to protect both 'artillery' ships and CVs from anything that can emanate from Midway? That, of course, assumes that Japanese have enough both fighters and pilots available.
The 4 fleet carries can steam maybe 50-70 miles behind those 4 'other' CVs, and 100 miles behind Midway-bound BBs and CAs? Fleet CVs are there in case USN decides to commit it's CVs and/or BBs.

Though, I'm not sure that shelling of ground forces and facilities by BBs and CAs was exactly favored as part of IJN doctrine.

 

[parsifal]

Japan lacked the fighter reserves to jam nothing but fighters onto her light carriers. these airgroups were, for the most part, hastily put together green horn pilots, that in many respects consituted major comb outs of the training schools. There were also insufficient airframes to kake such a conversion They could possibly have called on their reserve parks, and could have diverted all of the pre-battle reserve pilots to fighter conversion, stripped out the LBA units of fighter pilots. They could also have called on the AVS (seaplanes carriers) for maybe 20-30 pilots and seaplanes to further increase the air umbrella, but Im highly doubtful that any of this was really possible. Stripping out the LBA units would mean even thinner defence of the empire's frontiers. eating into the reserve parks would probably mean usihng clapped out A5Ms, Diverting all pilot trainig befopre midway would have wrecked the aircrew rteplacement programs, and required a level of foresight that elevates the IJN to supermen.

One further option might be to send carrier Zuikaku into battle with an inclomplete air group , and to use the fast carriers in a more direct and defensive fashion with the battleships. in the case of the former, this would completely wreck Japans pilot training programs (though they could use carrier transport Taiyo and Chuyo if they wasnted to curtail transport operations....none of the choices here are good). Using the fast carriers in a more direct support role (ie defensively) makes a lot of sense, except it defeats the purpose of the whole operation in the first place......they were position and intended as an ambush force to bushwack the pacific fleet as it sallied forth to destroy the invasion forces.

Another option worth considering would be to simply transfer the CAGs of the smaller carriers to to the five fleet carriers. there was more than enough capacity to do that and then the smaller carriers could be used as bait forward of the Japanese main carriers. This might work, as it did at eastern Solomons, but boy, is it an expensive option or what, and again overrides some of the fundamental thinking behind the whole operation. the idea was to surprise the pacific fleet, not offer carriers as bait.

The Japanese didnt really have the option of using their carriers as defensive fighter platforms in the same way as say the RN could. They lacked the readar and radio technology to do that. They would need to operate Constant Air Patrols during daylight, close to the carriers, with surface pickets at the extremities, and be prepred to break radio silence at the first threat that arose. Not a likley outcome

 

[VBF-13]

Here's an interesting question. To what degree did Midway show inexperienced pilots can accomplish their objectives against experienced pilots?