Soviet vs. Japanese Fighters

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The Soviets were in a bad way after Germany's offensive and scrambling to get everything they could to the Eastern Front to slow the German advance.

So I can't see Stalin keeping any top-line fighters or substantial numbers in the far East. This in turn, would have given Japan the edge had they launched an offensive.
There's nothing in the Soviet Far East for the Japanese, no oil, only trees.
 
Japanese defeat vs USSR in 1939 seems entirely due to the USSR full government support and large deployment of motorised transport to build up their forces, completely opposite the Japanese forces were basically acting against orders in starting the fighting (and lacked mass motorisation or tanks of even soviet 1939 class). At the unit level the Japanese actually performed quite well but were simply overwhelmed.

Its an interesting scenario if Japan invading eastern USSR could have helped knocked USSR out of WW2 in 1941, certainly "safer" than attacking USA at Pearl Harbour I think!
 
I totally agree with GG, Russia was fighting for it's life in Europe. Add a 2nd front and it gets even worse for them. Yes they didn't fair well in Khalkhyn Gol in 39, but its also two years later with better technology and pilots with 2 more years of experience. Russia was still fielding a lot of obsolete hardware and tactics. With Japan in the mix, Russia advantage in numbers drops and they only thing they have left is space. They also loose the Pacific ocean supply line.
 
There's nothing in the Soviet Far East for the Japanese, no oil, only trees.

Oil fields in Northern Sakhalin - Kita Karafuto Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha working under the concession agreements has reached an annual output of 180,000 metric tons in the middle of the 1930s.
This article is in Russian but pictures are telling:
О японской нефтяной концессии на Северном Сахалине - Добыча нефти - История нефтяной промышленности - Каталог статей - НефтеПро
Сoal - in Sakhalin (over 1 mln t p.a.) and in the Primorskiy region.
A lot of timber, of course.
A lot of fishery.
Huge deposits of various ores, yet in the 1940s most of them probably too costly to develop.
However, there was already a network of GULag controlled mines and supporting infrastructure. For example, the infamous Sevvostlag. Kolyma gold and tin mining region could be reached through the port of Magadan. NKVD troops were there but they would find themselves between a rock and a hard place: Japanese invasion force and thousands of prisoners.
 
There's nothing in the Soviet Far East for the Japanese, no oil, only trees.
Dimlee's reply hits the nail on the head.

The Soviet Union had considerable resources AND knocking the Soviets out of the fight further protects Japan's back, which historically was only protected by treaty (which was why Japan concentrated it's defenses on it's Eastern and Southern borders against the Allies).
 
I think we can all agree that Japan would be insane to declare war on the USSR in support of the Germans, especially after the Soviets soundly beat Japan in the 1930s. But let's put that aside, I want to compare the fighter aircraft. Let's assume the Japan army and air force attacks the Soviet Union in early spring 1942, during the German's apparent huge success in the USSR, and Japan's own Army and AF climax of success in the SEA and whilst jealously watching the IJN's successes (before Midway rattles their confidence).

I'm afraid I can not agree. Neither that Japan would be insane to declare the war on the USSR (war vs the USA was more insane, in my opinion), nor that it was soundly beaten by the Soviets in the 1930s. But let's put that aside :)

I think that in early spring 1942 it did not matter what fighter aircraft could VVS use. Pre-war Soviet air force was in shambles and new VVS was just in the process of forming through painful combat learning. If USSR has to fight in 1942 on two fronts, which one is to be prioritized? The rhetoric question, IMO.
I'm afraid that most of the fighter pilots (and other VVS personnel) sent to the Far East to repel new invasion would have little or no combat experience and just a shortened training of a kind which was called vzlyot-posadka (take off - landing) informally. 20 to 40 hours total, under 10 hours on combat aircraft - a typical situation in that time.
And those fighter regiments deployed thousands of kilometers from main industrial centers would have to compete for deficit war materiel. Lend Lease is not yet in the full swing and aviation gasoline production in that region non-existent and any merchant ship in the Sea of Japan is now a legitimate target...
 
I thought the soviets had a huge army in the east being held in reserve in case the Japanese attacked? I thought this army was finally brought west to fight Germany some time after Pearl Harbor when the Russians decided japan was too busy with the US to invade Russia?
 
The Soviets were in a bad way after Germany's offensive and scrambling to get everything they could to the Eastern Front to slow the German advance.

So I can't see Stalin keeping any top-line fighters or substantial numbers in the far East. This in turn, would have given Japan the edge had they launched an offensive.
Good points. Does the same apply to the IJAF in 1942, since they're fighting across the Pacific?
 
Good points. Does the same apply to the IJAF in 1942, since they're fighting across the Pacific?
It seems to me that if Japan went to war with the Soviet Union both to help the European Axis and for the gain of natural resources, it might have altered their position both with the East Indies and the U.S. raw materials embargo.

In either case, Japan securing raw materials from Soviet sources would have made interdiction by Allied forces nearly impossible, as it was the sinking of their tankers, freighters, etc. that crippled Japan's ability to wage war.
 
Also having the Japanese occupying the Eastern reaches of the Soviet Union denies the US and Canada from ferrying lend-lease aircraft from Alaska.

Also shipping.
Map_US_Lend_Lease_shipments_to_USSR-WW2.jpg
 
I thought the soviets had a huge army in the east being held in reserve in case the Japanese attacked? I thought this army was finally brought west to fight Germany some time after Pearl Harbor when the Russians decided japan was too busy with the US to invade Russia?

There were several (5 or 6) armies organized in Dalnevostocnyi (Far Eastern) Front. A figure of 500,000 personnel in early 1941 is mentioned usually in official Soviet publications, but when one goes down to divisional and regiment levels, numbers look considerably smaller. Probably not more than 20-25 divisions of RKKA (not including NKVD). What was undoubtedly huge - the territory this Front (with HQ in Chita - about 3,000 km by rail from Vladivostok) was supposed to defend. Yes, according to official history, Moscow became convinced in lack of immediate threat in Nov-Dec 1941. Yet reserves were sent from the Far East since the summer 1941 and shipments of ammunition to the west began at least one week before the German invasion in June.
 
Last edited:
Japan would most likely not start an offensive with the Soviet Union after they committed to war with the U.S. - so the window for war with the USSR closes in fall of '41.

I should add that the USSR was still not an Allied nation by summer of '41, so attack on them by Japan would not obligate the U.S. (or Britain) at that point in time.
 
Good points. Does the same apply to the IJAF in 1942, since they're fighting across the Pacific?

It would be interesting to analyze IJAF possibilities in early spring 1942. What force could they afford to deploy to cover landings in the Soviet Far East?

As for the Soviet Air Force, it's difficult to find figures related to the Far East in early 1942. The best and closest to that period I have from two sources:

Полный текст Соображения Генерального штаба Красной Армии по плану стратегического развертывания Вооруженных Сил Советского Союза на случай войны с Германией и ее союзниками, не ранее 15 мая 1941 г. / Баварская государственная библиотека (БСБ, Мюнхен)
VVS (not including Navy) of both Far Eastern and Zabaykalye regions, plan of deployment in May 1941:
33 regiments, including 14 - fighter, 14 - bombers, 5 - shturmoviks/close support.
A regiment was from under 50 to 60 a/c. Total, probably, 1600-1700 aircraft based on the territory from Lake Baikal to the Sea of Japan.

Военно-воздушные силы Тихоокеанского флота — Википедия
VVS of Pacific Navy at the end of 1942:
803 aircraft, including
289 fighters (16 MiG-1, the rest I-16, I-153, I-15bis)
186 bombers (DB-3 and SB)
179 recon (mostly MBR-2)
21 transport
123 other types (training, liaison, medevac, etc.)

It's hard to say how large was combined VVS/Navy VVS force in spring 1942.
Let's assume that May 1941 deployment plan was accomplished but 50% of VVS would be sent to the German front later, while Navy VVS would stay without changes.
So the total would be: 600-700 fighters, 500-600 bombers, 100-150 close support (most probably without Il-2). Recon and others according to Navy VVS figures of 1942.
 
Japan would most likely not start an offensive with the Soviet Union after they committed to war with the U.S. - so the window for war with the USSR closes in fall of '41.

Most probably...
But Admiral Yamamoto Beez has already ordered to start an offensive in early spring 1942. As a mere captain-lieutenant (retired), I can not overrule the Admiral. :)
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back