parsifal
Colonel
What part are you claiming is pure speculation and what evidence do you have, in English (no partisan pro-gemran apologies please) that can verfy your claims that what im saying is bogus.
Stalingrad, Paulus and the 6th Army?
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DonL
Banned
I have presented my sources in an other (older) thread.
Prominent and respected military commanders like Hoth, von Weichs and von Richthofen (which were all on location) gave assessments (20-23 November) for an instantly break out of the 6th Army south west and to their opinion, which I highly respect, the 6th Army could have been saved through such a breakout.
Till this point in time the Red Army had not achieved any primary goal at a moving operation against the Wehrmacht. The Red Army achieved good results at attrition battles, but not on operations where the red army was at the initiative.
After Stalingrad the red army lost every self initiative operation (Rostow, Charkov etc...)till Kursk from their primary goals.
So where are the arguments the red army could win a break out battle against the 6th Army with the total loss of the 6th Army.
Highly respected commanders had an other opinion and they were on location at the battle.
PS: Is this a new personal battle between us because I'm not your opinion?
Why do you make personal insults against me?
Prominent and respected military commanders like Hoth, von Weichs and von Richthofen (which were all on location) gave assessments (20-23 November) for an instantly break out of the 6th Army south west and to their opinion, which I highly respect, the 6th Army could have been saved through such a breakout.
Till this point in time the Red Army had not achieved any primary goal at a moving operation against the Wehrmacht. The Red Army achieved good results at attrition battles, but not on operations where the red army was at the initiative.
After Stalingrad the red army lost every self initiative operation (Rostow, Charkov etc...)till Kursk from their primary goals.
So where are the arguments the red army could win a break out battle against the 6th Army with the total loss of the 6th Army.
Highly respected commanders had an other opinion and they were on location at the battle.
PS: Is this a new personal battle between us because I'm not your opinion?
Why do you make personal insults against me?
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parsifal
Colonel
And in any event this whole sub-debate is based on the false predication that the germans were able or capable of an effective breakout. They were not. manstein was only able to commence his attempted relief of 6A December 12 (Winter Storm), but this had stalled, almost as soon as it had begun. Four days later the Soviets launched "Little saturn" which further consolidated and deepned the ring surrounding the city. if Pauluis had attempted a breakout, ther would have been the opportunity for the Soviets to decrease pressure in certain parts of the encirlcment and increase forces committed to the envelopment prongs. And that is without taking into account the huge reserves that remained uncommitted.
There was never any chance for the Germans to relive Stalingrad, and even less chance of 6A effecting a breakout from the city. 6A was doomed once they became enmeshed in the urban fighting
There was never any chance for the Germans to relive Stalingrad, and even less chance of 6A effecting a breakout from the city. 6A was doomed once they became enmeshed in the urban fighting
DonL
Banned
That's your opinion.
The opinion of von Weichs, von Richthofen, Hoth and Paulus was an other at 20-23 November. You can read their opinion in their assessments.
The opinion of von Weichs, von Richthofen, Hoth and Paulus was an other at 20-23 November. You can read their opinion in their assessments.
parsifal
Colonel
Ther was no effective counterrattack force as at 20 November, and no preprations were ready before 12 December. Manstein was the man on the spot, and he initially did not support a breakout, because of the expected losses ^A would suffer in men and equipment, also because he believeed that the forces were at hand to effect a relief operation fromoutside the pocket. There were no such forces, and as Manstein rightly points out, there was insufficient transport resources within the pocket to undertake the operations proposed by Paulus and his mates. Mantein was right to hold back on the relief effort and order ^A to remain where it was, until he was better prepared. In the finish, of course Mansteinunderestimated the depth and strength of tyhe Red Army reserves, and the effects of the weather. That makes him wrong too, but less so than the men you mention. a breakout by 6A unassisted, or with minimal assistance was liklley to transform a statis battle into a mobile battle, which the russians were bound to win, which was their assessment and contingency planning.
in any event I am not relying on "opinion so much, as the opinions by men which at that stage were better placed and more rational in their appraisal than those men you are referring to. i have the greatest respect for Richthofen in particular, but, he, like many in the German command system were losing touch with reality by that stage. The aqssessments and capabilities put forward by Stavkha were far more realistic, and pointed to them making contingency plans in the event of an attempted breakout early on. By the time Manstein was ready, it was all too late anyway. if the 6A had broken out, it would have lost its heavy equipment in the process, and then be hunted down in the open steppes as Stavvkha predicted.
There was no escape.
in any event I am not relying on "opinion so much, as the opinions by men which at that stage were better placed and more rational in their appraisal than those men you are referring to. i have the greatest respect for Richthofen in particular, but, he, like many in the German command system were losing touch with reality by that stage. The aqssessments and capabilities put forward by Stavkha were far more realistic, and pointed to them making contingency plans in the event of an attempted breakout early on. By the time Manstein was ready, it was all too late anyway. if the 6A had broken out, it would have lost its heavy equipment in the process, and then be hunted down in the open steppes as Stavvkha predicted.
There was no escape.
DonL
Banned
You are telling not the truth Parsifal.
After the assessments of von Weichs, von Richthofen and Hoth no counterrattack force was needed, to their opinion the 6th Army could break out, right on their own with air supply.
Also von Manstein wasn't the man on the spot (20-23 September) and you knew this very well. Manstein was on the spot 26 of September and before (till 24 September) at the Leningrad frontline thousand miles away.
After the assessments of von Weichs, von Richthofen and Hoth no counterrattack force was needed, to their opinion the 6th Army could break out, right on their own with air supply.
Also von Manstein wasn't the man on the spot (20-23 September) and you knew this very well. Manstein was on the spot 26 of September and before (till 24 September) at the Leningrad frontline thousand miles away.
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parsifal
Colonel
According to Otto Chaney ("Zhukov") one of the briefing sessions given by Zhukov and Vasilevski (the principal architects of "Uranus") on November 13. At that briefing, attended by Stalin, "Zhukov and Vasilevski advised that it was expected that the 6A would attempt a breakout and the germans would amass as much of the locally available forces as possible to effect a breakout. This was expected and anticipated, and in some regards was greeted with some relish as fully 40% of available forces were to be kep back to cover such an eventuality. An attempted breakout by 6A would, in the opinion of Zhukov only serve to expedite the demise of that army, as operations would transform from a static battle to a mobile situation.
It was expected that the Germans would transfer part of their r4eserves fro around Vyazama to form a relief force for the southern group of armies. Though sufficient reserves were ready for such an eventuality, It was agreed that to prevent or diminish such reinforcement, the Soviet Kalinin and Western Fronts….'
Zhukov stated" the Stalingrad operation, in all respects, and for all eventualities is adaptable and ready for all reasonable eventualities that the Germans are capable (of )…
Stalin was in full agreement, and very happy with the preparation report. But he gave the following instructions "Fly to Stalingrad tomorrow. Check one more time on the readiness preparations".
Zhukov did this, and as expected was satisfied. There were no major changes, though the commander of the lead 4th Mech Corps did write a letter expressing his concerns about the offensive. This letter was shown to Stalin, who was so confident in the operation, that no changes were proposed. Volsky kept his life and his job, despite his public concerns. He was later decorated for his role in the operation.
On the conduct of the offensive operations themselves, Chaney makes a number of illuminating observations.
"On the morning of November 19, soviet artillery began to Soviet offensive. The attacks were led by elements of the SW and Don Fronts (committed to the offensive at this stage were 18 Inf Divs, 8 tank Brigades , 2 Mech Brigades, and 9 Cav Divs supported by at least 10 Artillery Divs.; In reserve were more than 60 Divs). Just before 9am, the supporting artillery shifted to deep targets and the assaults began. SW Front, led the attack and penetrated the defences of Rumanian 3A in 2 places, virtually destroying two divisions at the critical point of breakthrough before lunch.
By days end, the Rumanian 3A sector almost in its entirety was in deep crisis and Soviet breakthrough formations were clear of the front area and quickly on the move. The attacks were so swift and so successful that only three of the 18 divisions were needed for mop up operations. In the meantime, Major generals Rodin's 26 tank Corps broke through at Perelazovski, inflicting a huge defeat on the Rumanian 53 Corps. Once Perelazovski had been captured 26 corps wheeled south to link up with elements of the Stalingrad Front which were exploiting the outstanding breakthroughs and allowing the lead assault elements a short respite. The next day the first significant German elements were soundly defeated as they attempted a counterattack. In a bold move, 26th Corps, took advantage of darkness to seize a vital bridge across the Don, intact, near Kalach. The germans mistook the Soviet flying column as their own, local commanders having completely under-estimated Soviet grasp of mobile operations. The Soviets crossed this vital bridge unopposed, consolidated, fanned out and signalled for the remainder of the main force to cross. The Germans retreated in complete disarray, and with heavy losses.
21st Army having ripped into Rumanian 13th and 15th Divs at the frontier, sent its mobiles groups (consisting of 4th Mech and 3rd Gds Cav XXX, poured through the hole that had been formed and exploit the penetrations that had been made. – 'just as as we had taught them to do" wrote Manstein. In co-ordionation with 5th Tank Army, the breakthrough group was ordered to destroy the gathering enemy (German) reserves HQ and rear area units, cut off their withdrawal routes to the west and southwest and block the routes of the expected deep reserves. By 22 November, the Group was to link with the Stalingrad front near Sovetski, SE of Kalach, and from there o await further orders.
On 23 November 4th mech spearheaded an increased tempop of operations by leading a further assault against further gathering of german reserves readying for counterattack. Soviet reserves were now puring into the salient in anticipation of an expected 6A breakout attempt, and/or German attempted break in. The Soviet high command was determined that such attempts would fail. 26th corps attacked the Germans at Kmayshin, who were prepring for a counterattack, and defeated them heavily. In four days the Soviets had closed the ring and heavily reinforced their positions. They were ready and able to meet any possible German reaction to the encirclement, such that such attempts at relief were likely to fail.
Stavkha fully expected the germans to mount some form of counterattack, and had organised their forces and their reserves to meet such an eventuality. Mansteins assessment was that in the critical days of late November the Soviets had the strength, the training and the organization to defeat the entire Army Group A. and 6A with a quick thrust to Rostov."
I would suggest that the reason that the Soviets did not unleash this additional offensive until 16 December was firstly because 6A remained in place and resisting, and secondly for four days after December 12, they had to contain and defeat the German break in attempts.
I fail to see how, on the basis of the above, anyone can seriously argue that breakout, or break in attempt(s) could have any real chance of success. The Soviets were too well prepared, too numerous, and too well deployed and led to be defeated in this operation. A breakout attempt was what they expected, and wanted. If it had been attempted, it would have been a disaster for the whole of AGS
It was expected that the Germans would transfer part of their r4eserves fro around Vyazama to form a relief force for the southern group of armies. Though sufficient reserves were ready for such an eventuality, It was agreed that to prevent or diminish such reinforcement, the Soviet Kalinin and Western Fronts….'
Zhukov stated" the Stalingrad operation, in all respects, and for all eventualities is adaptable and ready for all reasonable eventualities that the Germans are capable (of )…
Stalin was in full agreement, and very happy with the preparation report. But he gave the following instructions "Fly to Stalingrad tomorrow. Check one more time on the readiness preparations".
Zhukov did this, and as expected was satisfied. There were no major changes, though the commander of the lead 4th Mech Corps did write a letter expressing his concerns about the offensive. This letter was shown to Stalin, who was so confident in the operation, that no changes were proposed. Volsky kept his life and his job, despite his public concerns. He was later decorated for his role in the operation.
On the conduct of the offensive operations themselves, Chaney makes a number of illuminating observations.
"On the morning of November 19, soviet artillery began to Soviet offensive. The attacks were led by elements of the SW and Don Fronts (committed to the offensive at this stage were 18 Inf Divs, 8 tank Brigades , 2 Mech Brigades, and 9 Cav Divs supported by at least 10 Artillery Divs.; In reserve were more than 60 Divs). Just before 9am, the supporting artillery shifted to deep targets and the assaults began. SW Front, led the attack and penetrated the defences of Rumanian 3A in 2 places, virtually destroying two divisions at the critical point of breakthrough before lunch.
By days end, the Rumanian 3A sector almost in its entirety was in deep crisis and Soviet breakthrough formations were clear of the front area and quickly on the move. The attacks were so swift and so successful that only three of the 18 divisions were needed for mop up operations. In the meantime, Major generals Rodin's 26 tank Corps broke through at Perelazovski, inflicting a huge defeat on the Rumanian 53 Corps. Once Perelazovski had been captured 26 corps wheeled south to link up with elements of the Stalingrad Front which were exploiting the outstanding breakthroughs and allowing the lead assault elements a short respite. The next day the first significant German elements were soundly defeated as they attempted a counterattack. In a bold move, 26th Corps, took advantage of darkness to seize a vital bridge across the Don, intact, near Kalach. The germans mistook the Soviet flying column as their own, local commanders having completely under-estimated Soviet grasp of mobile operations. The Soviets crossed this vital bridge unopposed, consolidated, fanned out and signalled for the remainder of the main force to cross. The Germans retreated in complete disarray, and with heavy losses.
21st Army having ripped into Rumanian 13th and 15th Divs at the frontier, sent its mobiles groups (consisting of 4th Mech and 3rd Gds Cav XXX, poured through the hole that had been formed and exploit the penetrations that had been made. – 'just as as we had taught them to do" wrote Manstein. In co-ordionation with 5th Tank Army, the breakthrough group was ordered to destroy the gathering enemy (German) reserves HQ and rear area units, cut off their withdrawal routes to the west and southwest and block the routes of the expected deep reserves. By 22 November, the Group was to link with the Stalingrad front near Sovetski, SE of Kalach, and from there o await further orders.
On 23 November 4th mech spearheaded an increased tempop of operations by leading a further assault against further gathering of german reserves readying for counterattack. Soviet reserves were now puring into the salient in anticipation of an expected 6A breakout attempt, and/or German attempted break in. The Soviet high command was determined that such attempts would fail. 26th corps attacked the Germans at Kmayshin, who were prepring for a counterattack, and defeated them heavily. In four days the Soviets had closed the ring and heavily reinforced their positions. They were ready and able to meet any possible German reaction to the encirclement, such that such attempts at relief were likely to fail.
Stavkha fully expected the germans to mount some form of counterattack, and had organised their forces and their reserves to meet such an eventuality. Mansteins assessment was that in the critical days of late November the Soviets had the strength, the training and the organization to defeat the entire Army Group A. and 6A with a quick thrust to Rostov."
I would suggest that the reason that the Soviets did not unleash this additional offensive until 16 December was firstly because 6A remained in place and resisting, and secondly for four days after December 12, they had to contain and defeat the German break in attempts.
I fail to see how, on the basis of the above, anyone can seriously argue that breakout, or break in attempt(s) could have any real chance of success. The Soviets were too well prepared, too numerous, and too well deployed and led to be defeated in this operation. A breakout attempt was what they expected, and wanted. If it had been attempted, it would have been a disaster for the whole of AGS
"Pour encourager les autres" To encourage the others.
It's good to execute a senior commander from time to time! Remember poor old Admiral Byng,executed after the Battle of Minorca,technically for breaching "The Articles of War". Basically he was over cautious and didn't do the job he was sent to do.
For that he would be shot,not hanged,on HMS Monarch in Portsmouth harbour.
As Voltaire wrote (in Candide) referring to the incident.
"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres..."
Cheers
Steve
It's good to execute a senior commander from time to time! Remember poor old Admiral Byng,executed after the Battle of Minorca,technically for breaching "The Articles of War". Basically he was over cautious and didn't do the job he was sent to do.
For that he would be shot,not hanged,on HMS Monarch in Portsmouth harbour.
As Voltaire wrote (in Candide) referring to the incident.
"Dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres..."
Cheers
Steve
IMHO the question is much more complicated, German troops NW of Stalingrad were under very heavy pressure and needed time to withdraw even close to Stalingrad, also the panzer reserves of 6th A were committed there (most of 14th and parts of 16th PzDs). Many German officers thought that it would have been too "Napoleonic" not to wait them and of course those mechanical troops operating there used much of 6th A's meager fuel reserves there. And while 29th Inf(mot) was fully eguipped, 16th was not, its PzBatt was clearly understrenght, 34 modern tanks (Pz III lg and 75 and IV lg) + 8 Pz II an 1 BefPz vs 50 modern + 7 Pz II and 2 BefPz in 29th. Soviets were clearly better than Germans had predicted as shown in the NW of Stalingrad, 22., 14. and 1.Rom.PzDs made far less impact on the Soviet northern pincer than Germans had counted for. 29th Mot stopped, at least according to Germans, the inner part of Soviet southern pincer but there is no certainty that 6th A would have been able to retreat some 80km through mostly open steppe.And on fuel IIRC even just before Christmas Paulus complained that he didn't have enough fuel (after 1 month of air supply) for a breakout towards Manstein's relief force, in other words much shorter distance.
Juha
PS, on Rommel vs Paulus. Now Rommel was one of Hitler's favorite, ex-commander of his Heer life guard. He was also one of those generals whom Goebbels had made an all German hero, so even from propaganda/moral reason he had more leverage than Paulus. Secondly, NA was a sideshow, Eastern Front was the main front and Hitler was very very keen on the Southern part of it in 42, so much that after sacking the commander of AG A in early Sept 42, he remote control it by himself up to Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad.
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vinnye
Senior Airman
I agree - Rommel was well liked by Hitler and had been used as a figurehead for propoganda purposes - Von Paulus was not either as far as I know. This and Rommel's shrewd use of the un-clear chain of command and orders - meant he would in all probability get away with a retreat.
Didn't Sepp Dietrich disobey Hitler and get away with it?
Didn't Sepp Dietrich disobey Hitler and get away with it?
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On those retreats, much depended on the commander.
Early Feb 43 Hitler gave an order that Kharkov must be held at all cost against the objections of th CG of Armeeabt. Lanz, Mountain Troops Gen. Lanz. In mid Feb. 43 the CG of SSPzCorps, Hausser, anyway withdrew his Corps out of city against a direct order from Lanz, to whom the Corps was subordinated. Now Hitler went ballistic but he didn't sack Hausser but he sack Lanz.
Juha
Early Feb 43 Hitler gave an order that Kharkov must be held at all cost against the objections of th CG of Armeeabt. Lanz, Mountain Troops Gen. Lanz. In mid Feb. 43 the CG of SSPzCorps, Hausser, anyway withdrew his Corps out of city against a direct order from Lanz, to whom the Corps was subordinated. Now Hitler went ballistic but he didn't sack Hausser but he sack Lanz.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
manstein was not too popular over that incident either, but he survived as well....for the moment
