- Thread starter
- #21
Many thanks Adler. Also looks very nice, been to many places in Italy including Venice but for some odd reason never Rome.
Stalingrad
- Thread starter Soren
- Start date
Many thanks Adler. Also looks very nice, been to many places in Italy including Venice but for some odd reason never Rome.
Ziemke Bauer: Moscow to Stalingrad NY 1988 p. 475 on 24 Nov 42 v. Manstein reported to OKH "he could not concur at present with AG B's stand in favour of breakout."
True, on 19 Dec42 he informed Hitler that because LVII PzCorps probably could not achieve contact with 6th A … he believed the only answer was to order the army to break out…That, he maintained, would, at least, save most of the troops and whatever equipment could still be moved…To Paulus he sent advanced notice of breakout order. But the message ended that the army was to get ready but not start until ordered. Hitler , encouraged by LVII PzC recent success, refused to approve. Instead he ordered PzGrD Viking from AG A to 4th PzA and insisted that 6th A was to hold out until firm contact was established and a complete, orderly withdrawal could be accomplished.
Note Hitler was ready to evacuate Stalingrad on 19 Dec but wanted to play "safe" which is often fatal in fluid situation. Typical best is the worst enemy of good –decision.
In the meantime, enough supplies were to be flown in, particularly gasoline, to give the army 30mls' mobility, he had heard that the army's vehicles had fuel for only 18mls (the gap between 6th A and LVII PzC was 35mls) In fact COS of 6th A reported on 21. Dec that the army had fuel only for 12mls, so only 1/3 of the distance between 6th A and LVII PzC.
So, as often, good sources spoils a good old black and white stereotypes. Manstein didn't try to "to convince Paulus to move out but Paulus refuses until he receives orders from Hitler." on 19 Dec. But on 21 Dec his COS contacted COS of Paulus and they talked on possible break out, COS of 6th A said that the breakout could began on 24 Dec but added that he and Paulus regarded the evacuation under any circumstances as an act of desperation to be avoided until it became absolutely necessary. The conference ended on that indeterminate note.
Personally I have much more trust on professionals like Kehrig and Ziemke than a book which title is "Hitler: The Pathology of Evil".
Juha
True, on 19 Dec42 he informed Hitler that because LVII PzCorps probably could not achieve contact with 6th A … he believed the only answer was to order the army to break out…That, he maintained, would, at least, save most of the troops and whatever equipment could still be moved…To Paulus he sent advanced notice of breakout order. But the message ended that the army was to get ready but not start until ordered. Hitler , encouraged by LVII PzC recent success, refused to approve. Instead he ordered PzGrD Viking from AG A to 4th PzA and insisted that 6th A was to hold out until firm contact was established and a complete, orderly withdrawal could be accomplished.
Note Hitler was ready to evacuate Stalingrad on 19 Dec but wanted to play "safe" which is often fatal in fluid situation. Typical best is the worst enemy of good –decision.
In the meantime, enough supplies were to be flown in, particularly gasoline, to give the army 30mls' mobility, he had heard that the army's vehicles had fuel for only 18mls (the gap between 6th A and LVII PzC was 35mls) In fact COS of 6th A reported on 21. Dec that the army had fuel only for 12mls, so only 1/3 of the distance between 6th A and LVII PzC.
So, as often, good sources spoils a good old black and white stereotypes. Manstein didn't try to "to convince Paulus to move out but Paulus refuses until he receives orders from Hitler." on 19 Dec. But on 21 Dec his COS contacted COS of Paulus and they talked on possible break out, COS of 6th A said that the breakout could began on 24 Dec but added that he and Paulus regarded the evacuation under any circumstances as an act of desperation to be avoided until it became absolutely necessary. The conference ended on that indeterminate note.
Personally I have much more trust on professionals like Kehrig and Ziemke than a book which title is "Hitler: The Pathology of Evil".
Juha
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- Thread starter
- #23
Well Juha, I'm just citing what Manstein said himself. In his own biography he says that he desperately tried convincing Hitler to allow Paulus's 6th Army to retreat outside the city. Hitler refused.
And all the books I have seem to support this:
The book 'Stalingrad' by Athony Beever:
At this point, von Manstein recommended Paulus to break out of the city, despite Hitler's refusal to allow a break out attempt. Erich von Manstein did however not dare to give the break out order himself, even though he could have, since he was Paulus's superior.
Anyhow the fact remains that is was Hitler, and not Manstein, who wanted to fight inside the city, and it was also Hitler and NOT Manstein who refused to let Paulus retreat and doomed the entire 6th Army.
But you can ofcourse believe what want, I could care less.
And all the books I have seem to support this:
The book 'Stalingrad' by Athony Beever:
At this point, von Manstein recommended Paulus to break out of the city, despite Hitler's refusal to allow a break out attempt. Erich von Manstein did however not dare to give the break out order himself, even though he could have, since he was Paulus's superior.
Anyhow the fact remains that is was Hitler, and not Manstein, who wanted to fight inside the city, and it was also Hitler and NOT Manstein who refused to let Paulus retreat and doomed the entire 6th Army.
But you can ofcourse believe what want, I could care less.
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Ramirezzz
Senior Airman
once again, Soren - the german advance has already been halted after the operation "Uranus" has begun and even at that time Germans had no problems with the winterclothing supplies until early December.
And at that time they hadn't any strength for a further advance because of the russian encirclement. If there wasn''t any russian encirclement operation , Germans would probably take the few russian pockets of resistance in Stalingrad already in November.
Saying that we come to the fairly simple conclusion that the wintercloting issue was not a factor which halted the german advance (too) unlike year ago . Moreover, lack of the winterclothing would not affect german attempt to breake out in December if it has been in fact conducted, since the russian outer encirclement lines were pretty tiny at the moment and the operation "Winterstorm" strenghted them even more.
your numbers are not correct. Even in December 1941 there wasn't such a mortality rate due to the frost related factors.
Soren
This maybe too complicated to you, but I, as at least vast majority of trained historians, prefer documents over memoirs, especially if the writer of memoirs is telling on some controversial decisions he was participated.
Ziemke's source is not some memoirs but Ob. Kdo. H. Gr. Don. Ia Nr. 0369/42, an 6. Armee, 19.12.42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file.
Juha
This maybe too complicated to you, but I, as at least vast majority of trained historians, prefer documents over memoirs, especially if the writer of memoirs is telling on some controversial decisions he was participated.
Ziemke's source is not some memoirs but Ob. Kdo. H. Gr. Don. Ia Nr. 0369/42, an 6. Armee, 19.12.42, H. Gr. Don 39694/5 file.
Juha
- Thread starter
- #26
Sorry Ramirezz but the Germans lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the cold alone, and over a million frost related injuries were registered. Over 100,000 German soldiers had to be evacuated from the frontlines due to serious frostbite in the winter of 42 alone, and over 500,000 German soldiers suffered from cold related sicknesses, many of them eventually dying.
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- Thread starter
- #27
So you claim to be a trained historian ? Yeah ok, what'ever
As for complication, well you seem to struggle more than me in this matter, esp. seeing that you don't even know that reports far from always relate things as they really are/were.
I think I'm gonna have to trust Manstein himself and not in some report Hitler no doubt had full access to and therefore contained nothing in defiance with Hitlers orders.
On Stalingrad one must remember that on 24 dec the question was not anymore on 6th A but on the survival of both AG Don and A because Soviet attacks had smashed the front further NW and Manstein was forced on 24 Dec to take 6th PzD, the most powerful div of the Corps away from LVII PzC and Soviet began to push LVII PzC backwards so that the gap between it and 6th A began widen first slowly but after a couple days fast. And, maybe a surprise to Soren, docus shows that on 23 Dec Manstein and Paulus tossed back and forth the responsibility of making the first initial preparational moves for break out. In the end neither was ready to take it. Paulus said that he needed 6 days and the delivery of 300 000gal fuel and 500 tons of rations to be ready. And 3 days later Paulus informed Manstein that his army could not execute breakout and evacuation unless supply corridor was opened first. So in the end it was Soviet soldiers who spoiled the opportunity of 6th Army break out. One can argue that Hitler should had taken more risks and move more divisions from AG Centre and from AG A to help AG B/Don and at least with help of hindsight that is difficult to argue against. But that would have meant overruling the GCs of those AGs of which at least AG Centre was under heavy pressure at that time and also AG A was harassed.
Juha
Juha
Glider
Major
So you claim to be a trained historian ? Yeah ok, what'ever
To be fair Soren, your the one who seems to think that the USA didn't participate in the war until December 1941.
The fact that the USA took responsibility for escorting Atlantic convoys across a good chunk of the Atlantic in mid 1941 seems to have escaped you. By the way you never did reply as to what you would have told the relatives of the crew.
Juha, Soren don' let this get out of hand...
Frostbite from Müller-Hillebrand's study "Statistische System"
Frostbite:
228,000 cases in the Feldheer winter 41/42.
Average treatment time:
1st Degree: 29 days
2nd Degree: 78 days (52% of total)
3rd Degree: 122 days (42%)
Average for wounded was 98 days, Lazarettkranken 41 days. Frostbite mortality rate 1.55%.
the 1.55% mortality rate for 228,000 is 3,534 deaths in 1941/42. Even at the worst point it killed very few.
parsifal
Colonel
Hi MK
I dont support Sorens statement either, which is essentially that irt was the weather that defeated the Germans and on his figures, virtually no casualties due to Soviet action.
Having said that, the attrocious weather was a major factor in the defeat of the Germans. And frosbite is not the only form of casualty due to the cold. Do you have figures for the number of casualties due to exposure, and also the what percentage of the casualties you mention actually could return to front line combat. The third degree casualties, for example are likley to have suffered the loss of at least one of their limbs.
My figures are that the Germans overally suffered 590000 casualties, from all causes, and that at least half od this number were non-returnable casualties, killed, MIA, POW or wounded and subsequently discharged as medically unfit. The average rate of return for these casualties, according to Halder was about 12000 per month, according to his diary, which is very slow.....
Hello Adler
I noticed myself that I have used too sharp language. I'll try to behave better.
Why Paulus became more pessimistic between 19 – 26 Dec is easily to see from inflown supplies, 19 - 21 Dec were good days from 215 to 362 tons per day but 22 Dec only 142 and 23 Dec only 84tons. 24 Dec 6th A got nothing and 25 dec only 7 tons and 26 Dec 78 tons. So it didn't got the fuel and rations it needed for a break out attempt. 6th A also noticed the strengthening of Soviet positions and weather had became colder, Paulus reported -15 dec F.
LVII PzC position had became impossible and both of its remaining PzDs lost a PzGrBn around 25.12., those were simply overrun while the divs tried to kept a bridgehead across Aksai? River, already some kms south of were they had got on 19 Dec. And that besides other heavy losses and the divs had almost no panzers left.
Juha
I noticed myself that I have used too sharp language. I'll try to behave better.
Why Paulus became more pessimistic between 19 – 26 Dec is easily to see from inflown supplies, 19 - 21 Dec were good days from 215 to 362 tons per day but 22 Dec only 142 and 23 Dec only 84tons. 24 Dec 6th A got nothing and 25 dec only 7 tons and 26 Dec 78 tons. So it didn't got the fuel and rations it needed for a break out attempt. 6th A also noticed the strengthening of Soviet positions and weather had became colder, Paulus reported -15 dec F.
LVII PzC position had became impossible and both of its remaining PzDs lost a PzGrBn around 25.12., those were simply overrun while the divs tried to kept a bridgehead across Aksai? River, already some kms south of were they had got on 19 Dec. And that besides other heavy losses and the divs had almost no panzers left.
Juha
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As anyone have read "Voices from Stalingrad" from Jonathan Bastable ? Compilation of letters from russian and german soldiers letters available from russian archives. Fascinating and terrifying.
As for the 6th Army situation it's a mix of many things. Not enough men and firepower to do what they were suppose to achieve. Not enough air support after Uranus. And not strong enough LVII PzC.
Just that means russian forces were everywhere and overwhelming. The 1942 summer offensive had too many goals for already too weak german forces.
Winter temperature and starvation were the last straw for the 6th A. it is impossible to argue the terrible effects on the 6th A. reducing combat effectiveness to almost nothing at the end.
The failure of the Luftwaffe (and the success of the russian air force) to deliver brought chaos. Even ammunitions supply were next nothing. (Couple of rounds per day allowed per artillery gun at the end).
I'm afraid that if breakthrough had been tempted these 50 miles would have been just slaughter.
My grandfather (mother's side) was in the ostfront during WW1 (Alsace was german during WW1) and russian winter was his most terrifying moment. At the time Hitler launched Barbarossa just after listening to the radio the news his first words were "Germany is finished".
3 cousins of my mom were sent in the east (Alsace went back to Germany in WW2). Only one came back. Panzer crewman in Army North (Leningrad Front). Badly wounded in the head with constant migraines for the rest of his life.
When he would open up about it which was very rare, freezing winter was an obssession. And the endless never ending number of russians !
My two cents.
As for the 6th Army situation it's a mix of many things. Not enough men and firepower to do what they were suppose to achieve. Not enough air support after Uranus. And not strong enough LVII PzC.
Just that means russian forces were everywhere and overwhelming. The 1942 summer offensive had too many goals for already too weak german forces.
Winter temperature and starvation were the last straw for the 6th A. it is impossible to argue the terrible effects on the 6th A. reducing combat effectiveness to almost nothing at the end.
The failure of the Luftwaffe (and the success of the russian air force) to deliver brought chaos. Even ammunitions supply were next nothing. (Couple of rounds per day allowed per artillery gun at the end).
I'm afraid that if breakthrough had been tempted these 50 miles would have been just slaughter.
My grandfather (mother's side) was in the ostfront during WW1 (Alsace was german during WW1) and russian winter was his most terrifying moment. At the time Hitler launched Barbarossa just after listening to the radio the news his first words were "Germany is finished".
3 cousins of my mom were sent in the east (Alsace went back to Germany in WW2). Only one came back. Panzer crewman in Army North (Leningrad Front). Badly wounded in the head with constant migraines for the rest of his life.
When he would open up about it which was very rare, freezing winter was an obssession. And the endless never ending number of russians !
My two cents.
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Removed from SU and Japan thread to here
Soren
The parkas in your messages #211 and #213 had clearly padding between their camo sides but that in your message # 193 is clearly thinner. And even the #211 213 were clearly thinner than the Soviet padded winter dress.
And as I wrote in my message #217 "using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo.". I still really think thet Germans would not have been so stupid that they would make their spring/autumn camo dress so warm that it would have been essential to keeping warm in winter. Temperature might well be over +15 in autumn/spring and – 40deg C in winter.
Juha
Soren
The parkas in your messages #211 and #213 had clearly padding between their camo sides but that in your message # 193 is clearly thinner. And even the #211 213 were clearly thinner than the Soviet padded winter dress.
And as I wrote in my message #217 "using their warmest cloth also as summer camo suit or at least spring/autumn camo.". I still really think thet Germans would not have been so stupid that they would make their spring/autumn camo dress so warm that it would have been essential to keeping warm in winter. Temperature might well be over +15 in autumn/spring and – 40deg C in winter.
Juha
- Thread starter
- #37
Sorry but you are just making a lot of incorrect assumptions at this point Juha. The German Wintertarnanzug series of Parka's are just as thick as the Soviet winter clothes, they are infact copied after them. And they were NOT worn in the summer, and I don't know where'ever you got the idea from that they were. Have you ever even tried any of this clothes on? In the summer camoflaged smocks were worn, either that or the std. Wehrmacht Waffen SS summer tunics.
Also as a former soldier you should know that not all place are covered in snow during the winter, and that there are still plenty of green, redbrown brown elements in the forests during that time of year, often nessicating the need for a vegetation camoflage pattern. Hence why the winter Parka's feature TWO camo patterns, one for snowy conditions and one for non-snowy conditions.
Soren
Finns and Soviets seems to have understood that camos are for camouflage, so one could use suitable camo irrespective the temperature. If German 42 camo parka is so thick and warm as you claim it would have been much too hot for use on warm autumn day during advance over a difficult terrain, for ex while crossing a wet swamp in full battle gear. Might well have been too hot for marching trough deep snow in + 4 deg C. Difficult to believe but of course Germans were still learning the winter warfare at that stage.
Juha
Finns and Soviets seems to have understood that camos are for camouflage, so one could use suitable camo irrespective the temperature. If German 42 camo parka is so thick and warm as you claim it would have been much too hot for use on warm autumn day during advance over a difficult terrain, for ex while crossing a wet swamp in full battle gear. Might well have been too hot for marching trough deep snow in + 4 deg C. Difficult to believe but of course Germans were still learning the winter warfare at that stage.
Juha
- Thread starter
- #39
Juha why do you think they'd wear them on a warm autumn day, seriously ? They were meant to protect you against the cold in the winter.
Also why is it you keep ignoring the facts presented? I told you that the German padded Parka was a a direct copy of the Soviet padded winter uniform. Are you saying the Soviets would wear those on a warm autumn day as-well ?
Btw you were meant to wear clothes underneath both as-well, as with all winter uniforms.
The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world (The elite mountain troops), so that wasn't the problem, the problem was that not the whole German army was equipped with proper winter clothing from the beginning of the invasion. And even 1½ years into the invasion they still hadn't all recieved the proper winter clothing laying ready in Germany, and that goes esp. for the 6th Army which was left only with the std. uniforms they had recieved at the beginning of the invasion 1½ to 2 years earlier.
Also why is it you keep ignoring the facts presented? I told you that the German padded Parka was a a direct copy of the Soviet padded winter uniform. Are you saying the Soviets would wear those on a warm autumn day as-well ?
Btw you were meant to wear clothes underneath both as-well, as with all winter uniforms.
The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world (The elite mountain troops), so that wasn't the problem, the problem was that not the whole German army was equipped with proper winter clothing from the beginning of the invasion. And even 1½ years into the invasion they still hadn't all recieved the proper winter clothing laying ready in Germany, and that goes esp. for the 6th Army which was left only with the std. uniforms they had recieved at the beginning of the invasion 1½ to 2 years earlier.
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Soren
if they didn't wear them, they didn't have camo, did they? Not so bad in autumn because their other cloths were not entire unsuitable to that backgroud. But +4 deg C crossing open covered deep snow one's choices were sweat very heavily, always very bad in winter or took away their camo and stick out of enviroment very clearly, stupid tactically. Soviets understood that, as did the Finns, they could took of their thickly padded overcoat but but keep the white thin winter camo suit on.
Quote:"The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world"
Can you then explane why Finns had to sent small teams of officers and NCOs along the eastern front to teach Germans all those small tricks which are essential for staying combat ready during winter?
Not that Finns were overly impressed even by the Mountain troops ability to operate in tundra. Saying nothing on 6th SS or ordinary Heer div to cope the situation a little more south. No doubt German and Austrian Mountain troops were better trained than Finns for fighting on for ex Alps but in Northern Lappland situation was reversed. Probably they were no better than local Soviet troops, maybe even worse.
Juha
if they didn't wear them, they didn't have camo, did they? Not so bad in autumn because their other cloths were not entire unsuitable to that backgroud. But +4 deg C crossing open covered deep snow one's choices were sweat very heavily, always very bad in winter or took away their camo and stick out of enviroment very clearly, stupid tactically. Soviets understood that, as did the Finns, they could took of their thickly padded overcoat but but keep the white thin winter camo suit on.
Quote:"The Germans knew how to fight in the winter, they had some of the best winter troops in the world"
Can you then explane why Finns had to sent small teams of officers and NCOs along the eastern front to teach Germans all those small tricks which are essential for staying combat ready during winter?
Not that Finns were overly impressed even by the Mountain troops ability to operate in tundra. Saying nothing on 6th SS or ordinary Heer div to cope the situation a little more south. No doubt German and Austrian Mountain troops were better trained than Finns for fighting on for ex Alps but in Northern Lappland situation was reversed. Probably they were no better than local Soviet troops, maybe even worse.
Juha
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