Strategies for defense 1944-45

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Hello Parsifal
I didn't write that Germany abandoned offensive operations. OKH stopped, IIRC, long term strategic studies. Kursk wasn't an offensive of strategic portitions, it was a limited offensive, which aim were to shorten front, so that it would have been possible create reserves and cut off sizeable Soviet forces inside the bulge. A spoiling attack of massive scale, so to speak. And Zitadelle wasn't Germany's last big offensive, again however limited. The last one was mounted in early 1945 in Hungary. Aims were liberate besieged troops in Budapest and recapture some minor Hungarian oil wells.

But those were not offensives with aims to win the war.

And Germany carried also skillful retreats, Operation Buffel for ex. The emptying of Rzev bulge.

Juha
 
Rzhev salient wasnt a reteat as such, it was a withdrawal, wasnt it. a straightening of the line to free troops for fall blau IIRC. What I am talking about is a retreat whilst under fire. The retreat to Bataan was just that, and it was done in a near perfect manner by Mac, once he finally realized he was losing the battle at Lingayen

I agree from the position that we can view things Kursk was not a war winner, but neither was the offensive in '42, more importantly, the Kursk offensive at the time WAS seen as the decisive battle. The Germans were convinced that the battles of 1941, 42 and early 43 had sucked the USSR dry of all excess manpower and materiel. They knew that they themselves were starting to hit bottom manpower wise, and that the russians had taken so many more casualties than themselves. On that basis they believed that one more push would break their back of resistance. Whilst it is true that there were some mutterings of protest about attacking for the third year, these were largely quashed by the promise of the new technology being introduced...the tanks, the aircraft and so on. The majority of German officers, as usual supported Hitlers decisions, though this was the period postwar when most of them cried foul and tried to say "I told him not to....i told him not to"
 
Hello Parsifal
IMHO we should continue this on WWII General section but a couple short comments
Retreats, to Panther-Stellung early 44 after collapse of the siege of Leningrad, through swampy terrain with many partisans around and under heavy enemy pressure.
retreat up to Rhône valley after Dragoon/Anvil Aug 44 under heavy enemy pressure and under total enemy air superiority.

On Kursk, was it? Haven't see that claim in German books only in one old Soviet one. So have you German source/sources of the widespread German beliefs that Kursk offensive would turn the course of war. I mean other than Orders of the Day because they were meant to inspire to common soldiers to make "one more superhuman effort and then the victory will be ours!"

IIRC von Manstien had a reserve of only one PzD (23rd) and one SSPzGrD (5th Wiking) and they were not so lavisly equipped and powerful than the attacking divs. Not much when one remembers that the Soviet reserves , if we counted only those East of bulge consisted one Front (Army Group), incl 5th Tank Army and Germans have at least some idea of that.

Juha
 
Something I found wrt to bombing effects on production of single seat fighters. It was investigated to show a reasonable drop in production. On both graphs (US intellegence forecast of german single seater production and german production charts) You can compare how far the projections differ:
 

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Kurfurst

The figures seem a bit odd to me, but I am quite sure that cause for variation in fighter strenght was not production - see the monthly production below, it seems to me unlikely that in mid-1943, when production was at peak at 1000+ 109s/190s a month, they would be loosing more and production was not covering the losses.

Can you give the source/more detail on the graph you posted with Fw-190/Bf-109 production? the data are different to the one I saw in Luftwaffe combat aircraft, Development, Production, Operations, 1935-1945, from Griel and Dressel. See below:



Note mistake in December, production being 16 Bf-109!

Delycros

both graphs (US intellegence forecast of german single seater production and german production charts) You can compare how far the projections differ:

Do you have the title of the report? looks interesting.
 
Thanks Juha, but first I need to get an English / German dictionary.

Had them translated for me once

intbestand monatserster - total strength, month start
anzahl - number
muster - type
zugang - received
insgesamt - sum total
neufertigung - newly completed
reparatur - in repair
von andere verbande - from other units
abgang - sent out
durch feindeinw - (loss) due to enemy action
ohne - feindeinw. - (loss) not due to enemy action
uberholung - overhaul
istabestand monatstletzer - total, month end
 
Only because JG 1 is the first unit.

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, I./JG1

On Dec 1 I./JG 1 had 27 Fw190A-8s. During Dec they received 64 190A-8s but at month end only had 25 190A-8s.

If a Gruppe had an establishment strength of 48 a/c, then they are only at ~54% establishment strength. Not hard to get high serviceability percentage then.
 
i don't think that four staffeln gruppe was standard, i think common 3 staffeln so 36 plane + HQ unit (3?)
 
4 staffeln was standard in August of 44 onward for the day fighters, not so for the Nachtjagd. Also it was a 3 staffeln in JG 7 in it's I. and III. gruppen as II. gruppe was in paper name only and used for propaganda purposes to confuse Allied intel.
 
4 staffeln was standard in August of 44 onward for the day fighters, not so for the Nachtjagd. Also it was a 3 staffeln in JG 7 in it's I. and III. gruppen as II. gruppe was in paper name only and used for propaganda purposes to confuse Allied intel.

ty for clear
 
i don't think that four staffeln gruppe was standard, i think common 3 staffeln so 36 plane + HQ unit (3?)

It slowly changed from about mid 1944 forward .. not all Jagdgeschader did so but most of the 'old core' went from 3 staffeln Gruppe's to four staffeln's per Gruppe.

Erich was JG3 the first when IV./JG3 Strum) added in April 1944? Or JG26 when IV./JG54 added?
 
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it was written order for first-second week of August 1944.

the Sturm unit came into being in JG 3 in on May 16th 44. the rest of the 109 gruppen were in fact suppose to protect the SturmFw's upon their missions in July 44 onward if and only if they were in operational closeness. this of course changed as units from the Eastern front were brought back and re-strengthened then of course the Normandie battels really put a total hit on the LW day fighter units and the changes were then in effect to stabilize, build and re-new. .............. Ha ! that was the thought.
 

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