davebender
1st Lieutenant
How can you have a good pilot training program without plenty of fuel? It was already in short supply during 1941 to 1942 when Erich Hartmann took his flight training. I imagine things were a lot worse during 1943 to 1945.
Strategies for defense 1944-45
- Thread starter delcyros
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delcyros
Tech Sergeant
To my knowledge and Anthony Keys expertise, the Jumo-004H was no evolutionary step coming from the Jumo-004 but instead a resizied project directly deriving from the Jumo-012 jet engine. Comparable to the Nene-Dervent V relationship.
The soviets somehow continued to build BMW-003 and Jumo-004. It at least drove all of the first generation jet fighters (including the MiG-9). They even adopted the afterburner technology of the Jumo-004E and BMW-003D. They also did the best they could in continuing the Jumo-012 program but canceled the program when the RR NENE became aviable. The Nene was significantly lighter and less complicated but produced comparable thrust ratings.
(to be fair, the PTL-022 was a turboprop engine development of the Jumo-012 and Jumo-022, which eventually was produced for decades in the SU).
I think that Red Admiral has a reasonable position. For the ww2 timeframe, the radial engine simply offered more advantages. The axial driven ones were to heavy and produced less thrust at a higher degree of mechanical complexity. From my personal opinion, it took until the 5000 lbs thrust level that the axial became the technically preferable solution.
There is also evidence suggesting that Karl Prestel (BMW- jet engine development, BMW-works at Berlin-Spandau) was tasked by the soviets with the reengineering of remaining BMW-003C documentation. After completition of those, the soviets tasked Pretsel with works on the BMW-018 engine. They build a single prototype in 1946 under supervision of A.I.Issajew and tested the prototype in oct. and november 1946.
Production of RD-10 and RD-20 aircraft was quite extensive, beside other projects (Suchoi)
280 Yak-15 with Jumo-004B
480 Yak-17 with Jumo-004D/E
590 MiG-9 with BMW-003A/D.
were produced. A minimum of 1.350 Jumo / BMW- driven jetfighter were build in the SU before 1949.
HellToupee
Banned
- 90
- May 30, 2007
Yes their first generation jet fighters, they didn't really have an alternative engine to choose from, development didn't really lead anywhere, later axial engines they produced were new designs.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
But they did use the 003 and 004, far from giving up on it if it was fitted to over 700 aircraft.
Although new designs, their later engines were loosely tied to the 003 and 4
HellToupee
Banned
- 90
- May 30, 2007
No its not far from giving up, they gave up on the design as soon as an alternative was sourced aka the nene. Give up does not mean never used it just means they did not develop it further beyond german efforts, in some cases they were using captured engines on production fighters.
Glider
Major
Would it be fair to say that the key questions are
A) If you are comparing all the production of 109's and 190's then you should be looking at all the losses of the same types including GA, night fighting, recce etc losses including non operational losses.
I don't know what the Luftwaffe GA losses were, but every airforce found this to be a very dangerous type of mission and losses tended to be high. A good example being that RAF Typhoon losses, were significantly higher than fighter units.
B) There is a tendency in some quarters to look at the aircraft at the squadrons and not the servicable aircraft at the squadrons which are the ones that count.
A load of hanger queens will not do anyone any good.
C) There seems to be little doubt that the Luftwaffe servicable aircraft strength was not directly related to aircraft production. If all these aircraft were being built in excess of the attrition, then where did they go?
If anyone could help with this question a number of points may well be better understood.
A) If you are comparing all the production of 109's and 190's then you should be looking at all the losses of the same types including GA, night fighting, recce etc losses including non operational losses.
I don't know what the Luftwaffe GA losses were, but every airforce found this to be a very dangerous type of mission and losses tended to be high. A good example being that RAF Typhoon losses, were significantly higher than fighter units.
B) There is a tendency in some quarters to look at the aircraft at the squadrons and not the servicable aircraft at the squadrons which are the ones that count.
A load of hanger queens will not do anyone any good.
C) There seems to be little doubt that the Luftwaffe servicable aircraft strength was not directly related to aircraft production. If all these aircraft were being built in excess of the attrition, then where did they go?
If anyone could help with this question a number of points may well be better understood.
parsifal
Colonel
Previously I have theorised that the LW tended to produce "whole units", at the expense of producing spares. this arose at the behest of goring,who wanted to impress hitler with the numbers of fighters rolling off the production lines, rather than manage the LW in a respopnsible way. This in turn tended to keep LW serviceability rates low, and meant a lot of complete airframes had to be cannibalised in order to keep others flying. Also aircraft were not classified as "lost" in the LW until the end of each quarter, and it could be shown that the airframe had suffered more that 60% (IIRC) damage. That suggests to me lots of permanently grounded birds were left on the "aircraft available" lists, despite never having the slightest chance of ever flying again.
I should say that most of the people here did not accept that opinion all that well
I should say that most of the people here did not accept that opinion all that well
Glider
Major
I don't know if you are right or wrong but I do know that at the start of the war Germany had
1,125 single engined fighters on strength, of which 870 were servicable
At 28th March 1942 Germany had
1,257 single engined fighters on strength, of which 752 were servicable
So it could well be a contributing factor.
1,125 single engined fighters on strength, of which 870 were servicable
At 28th March 1942 Germany had
1,257 single engined fighters on strength, of which 752 were servicable
So it could well be a contributing factor.
davebender
1st Lieutenant
For the Me-109 this strategy makes sense as the aircraft was dirt cheap to manufacture. It was probably less expensive to produce replacement aircraft then to provide each airfield with extensive maintenance facilities.
Dear Kurfürst
I only noticed that while you accused others making logical error you yourself made IMHO a bigger one. If the fact that one needs to compare all 109/190 losses to all 109/190 production if one wants to know was the production sufficient to cover losses is beyond your comprehension, its your problem.
On those campaigns you called blah blah…. Because IMO a historical adequacy of a fighter arm can be measured from how well it was capable to carry out its principal missions, for ex. protect the ground forces of the nation, to create environment where other a/c types of one's airforce (bombers, transport planes etc) could perform their missions without unduly losses etc. I don't need to reinvent wheel I can only say that read a decent book on for ex. Spring 43 battles in Tunisia or on Summer 44 in Normandy and draw your own conclusions on how well Jagdwaffe succeeded.
Absolute numbers doesn't mean much. Jagdwaffe was adequate to the tasks asked from it from Sept 39 to June 40 and again from Spring 41 onwards up to sometimes in 42 even if overburdened when time went by. Even if late summer 42 it could not give adequate protection to Afrika Korps it could in Nov-Dec 42 combat effectively over Tunisia.
Juha
I only noticed that while you accused others making logical error you yourself made IMHO a bigger one. If the fact that one needs to compare all 109/190 losses to all 109/190 production if one wants to know was the production sufficient to cover losses is beyond your comprehension, its your problem.
On those campaigns you called blah blah…. Because IMO a historical adequacy of a fighter arm can be measured from how well it was capable to carry out its principal missions, for ex. protect the ground forces of the nation, to create environment where other a/c types of one's airforce (bombers, transport planes etc) could perform their missions without unduly losses etc. I don't need to reinvent wheel I can only say that read a decent book on for ex. Spring 43 battles in Tunisia or on Summer 44 in Normandy and draw your own conclusions on how well Jagdwaffe succeeded.
Absolute numbers doesn't mean much. Jagdwaffe was adequate to the tasks asked from it from Sept 39 to June 40 and again from Spring 41 onwards up to sometimes in 42 even if overburdened when time went by. Even if late summer 42 it could not give adequate protection to Afrika Korps it could in Nov-Dec 42 combat effectively over Tunisia.
Juha
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
I am afraid it is time to stop wasting any more time on you, Juha. You simply keep repeating yourself, as I predicted.
Please be aware that from now on, I won't bother reading your posts.
Please be aware that from now on, I won't bother reading your posts.
Hello Glider, if you want more info on a/c moving in and out of units.
Go to The Luftwaffe, 1933-45, select Air units, then Ground-attack units and then unit you want, scroll down and click Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen
for ex I./Sch.G. 1
Istbestand Monatserster Zugang Abgang Istbestand Monatsletzer
Datum Anzahl Muster Insgesamt Neufertigung Reparatur von andere Verbände Insgesamt durch Feindeinw. ohne Feindeinw. Überholung an andere Verbände Anzahl
7.43 52 Fw 190A-5 19 19 - - 43 16 14 8 5 28*
8.43 11 Fw 190A-5/U3 8 4 4 - 10 2 4 4 - 9
17 Fw 190F-3 18 16 2 - 19 8 6 5 - 16
0 Fw 190A-6 2 2 - - - - - - - 2
On recon units, you ought to go through at least NAGrs and x.(F)/AufkGrs.
But even counting those wastages doesn't give the whole picture because you still ought to find the losses caused by bombing of factories, losses during test and acceptance flights, and even in early 43 there were in addition of universal risks the risk of sabotage, Hermann Buchner tells in his memoirs that while he was doing his stint as a factory test pilot at Erla (it built Bf 109s ) he was badly injured when an explosive charge exploded in the engine compartment of the 109G-6 he was testing and tells also that he wasn't only Erla test pilot who experienced that on that day. Later there were those a/c lost in strafing attacks before they were accepted by units. Also there were losses during delivery flights, which in times were rather heavy. Helmut Lipfert tells in his memoirs that from his group of green pilots who where transferring new 109G-2s from Germany to near Stalingrad only 3 got there by the end of 1942, 10 more arrived by March 43 and 4 didn't arrive at all. That was most probably extreme case; Soviet winter, snow covered steppe and green pilots wasn't very promising combination. here was most probably other losses outside day fighter units and OTUs but those came first into my mind.
Juha
OK the table didn't came out well but go to the site.
Go to The Luftwaffe, 1933-45, select Air units, then Ground-attack units and then unit you want, scroll down and click Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen
for ex I./Sch.G. 1
Istbestand Monatserster Zugang Abgang Istbestand Monatsletzer
Datum Anzahl Muster Insgesamt Neufertigung Reparatur von andere Verbände Insgesamt durch Feindeinw. ohne Feindeinw. Überholung an andere Verbände Anzahl
7.43 52 Fw 190A-5 19 19 - - 43 16 14 8 5 28*
8.43 11 Fw 190A-5/U3 8 4 4 - 10 2 4 4 - 9
17 Fw 190F-3 18 16 2 - 19 8 6 5 - 16
0 Fw 190A-6 2 2 - - - - - - - 2
On recon units, you ought to go through at least NAGrs and x.(F)/AufkGrs.
But even counting those wastages doesn't give the whole picture because you still ought to find the losses caused by bombing of factories, losses during test and acceptance flights, and even in early 43 there were in addition of universal risks the risk of sabotage, Hermann Buchner tells in his memoirs that while he was doing his stint as a factory test pilot at Erla (it built Bf 109s ) he was badly injured when an explosive charge exploded in the engine compartment of the 109G-6 he was testing and tells also that he wasn't only Erla test pilot who experienced that on that day. Later there were those a/c lost in strafing attacks before they were accepted by units. Also there were losses during delivery flights, which in times were rather heavy. Helmut Lipfert tells in his memoirs that from his group of green pilots who where transferring new 109G-2s from Germany to near Stalingrad only 3 got there by the end of 1942, 10 more arrived by March 43 and 4 didn't arrive at all. That was most probably extreme case; Soviet winter, snow covered steppe and green pilots wasn't very promising combination. here was most probably other losses outside day fighter units and OTUs but those came first into my mind.
Juha
OK the table didn't came out well but go to the site.
Glider
Major
Thanks Juha, but first I need to get an English / German dictionary.
Hello Glider
it's rather simple, first is the month, then what the unit had at the beginning of the month (how many per type, for ex in Aug 43 I./Sch.G. 1 had 3 190 subtypes). Then incomes (altogether, new, from overhaul/repairs, from other units); then outgoing (altogether, because of enemy action, without enemy action, to overhauls, to other units); the last column gives what the unit had at the end of the month.
it's rather simple, first is the month, then what the unit had at the beginning of the month (how many per type, for ex in Aug 43 I./Sch.G. 1 had 3 190 subtypes). Then incomes (altogether, new, from overhaul/repairs, from other units); then outgoing (altogether, because of enemy action, without enemy action, to overhauls, to other units); the last column gives what the unit had at the end of the month.
drgondog
Major
Juha - like you I have found rationalizing LW Operational/In Service versus "In various stage of repair" with respect to LW inventories is extremely difficult to rationalize.
Dr Price's statistics as well as those published by Prien and recomposed say by Caldwell and Mueller imply pretty low In Service numbers but doesn't shed light on how many were in comparable local Service Groups (like USAAF) for wing replacement etc, or in some other form of damage - capable of sheet metal repair or new engine repair or replacing a main gear...
The actual "IN Service" versus Available statistics for the total number accounted for in the Inventory seems lower than USAAF/RAF Operational experiences in 1944.
Kurfürst
Staff Sergeant
Hi Bill,
Do you have any figures perhaps? There seems to be plenty of servicibilty data to go around in the literature and also in primary sources when it comes to LW units, but I have found very little about USAAF/RAF units.
One tidbit that may prove useful as a comparison, I have found that the 2nd TAF aircraft in December 1944 had apprx. 77-78% servicibilty rate.
At the same time IIRC Luftwaffe units possessed a servicibility rate of something like 70-75%, but I would have to re-check with Price. Still, the difference does not seem to me as Earth shattering. Naturally, some units had very low servicibilities at times on both sides, Typhoon units come to mind just before December, with a only 2-3 aircraft out of the establishment of twenty being ready for operations.
drgondog
Major
Hi Kurfurst - I suspect the devil is in definitions. Most of my recollections from Prien/Caldwell/Price were in high 60's to mid 70's - but one has to have serious operational statistics from all units. I suspect the completeness of historical records was more easily maintained say in 8th AF where the units were located on one base with Service Gropus and Depots close by. When a/c were emergency landed at other locations an not returned within 72 hours, 'ownership' transferred
For example in my 355th data I have developed a "Beginning Inventory - Changes to Beginning Inventory by category (MIA, Cat 3, Cat 5/E write offs, Return to Service from Prior month, Replacement aircraft during the month) to arrive at Beginning Inventory for final month.
This is the best I can do and arrives at different % month by month - ditto pilot status but more difficult to pin down (pilot on 48 hour pass, WIA, MIA, RTD after Evasion, Replacement but not yet completed indoctrination training).
So, the 355th looks like a sine wave around an average 'line' of 64 (Authorized Sep 1943) growing to 80 (max inventory April 30, 1945) for maximum total authorized and on hand versus Available for Ops.
The 8th was pretty good at keeping the inflow of a/c to match Authorized totals every month unless a greoup was particularly hard hit near the end of the month.
The biggest spikes in Ops/Avail occurred in Nov 1943, August 1944 when the group took hard losses near the end of the month.
I haven't finished final touches cross checking but the low was around 77% and the high was about 89%.
This subject requires SERIOUS details and data to be available on a month by month basis.
I have found a fair amount of errors in 8th AF daily summaries - not in aggragate but in category.
Hello Drgondog
yes, the serviceability rate tended to be a problem to LW at least during 1942 and also among KG 40 Fw 200 Condors at least from 1940 long into 1942. LW lived much "from hand to mouth" in 1942, it could get the serviceability rate reasonable level before a great offensive, for ex. at the beginning of the Operation Blau (Caucasus/Stalingrad) Luftflotte 4 had 1610 a/c of which 71% were combat ready. But long campaigns tended to cause a marked drop in a/c in hand and also serviceability rates tended to drop. On 31 Jan 43, when Paulus surrendered, Luftflotte 4 had only 624 a/c of which only 38% were combat ready. Of course LFl 4 was at the end of a long and difficult supply line, as Lipfert's experience shows.
Juha
yes, the serviceability rate tended to be a problem to LW at least during 1942 and also among KG 40 Fw 200 Condors at least from 1940 long into 1942. LW lived much "from hand to mouth" in 1942, it could get the serviceability rate reasonable level before a great offensive, for ex. at the beginning of the Operation Blau (Caucasus/Stalingrad) Luftflotte 4 had 1610 a/c of which 71% were combat ready. But long campaigns tended to cause a marked drop in a/c in hand and also serviceability rates tended to drop. On 31 Jan 43, when Paulus surrendered, Luftflotte 4 had only 624 a/c of which only 38% were combat ready. Of course LFl 4 was at the end of a long and difficult supply line, as Lipfert's experience shows.
Juha
As Delcyros' original question. IIRC at late 1942 OKH stopped all strategic long term planning because studies had showed that the war had became unwinnable. But how Germany would have been able to fight longer. If for ex. Herr Hitler had seen light after the Stalingrad catastrophe and decided that it would be better to leave military decisions to soldiers and decided that it would be better to give Göring a couple attractive helferinnen, a good stock of morphine, some very pompous titles and an area to loot and to make Milch as the head of LW, then LW would have given priority to fighter production much earlier and had been able to produce clearly more fighters in 43.
Other decisions, scrap Me 410 as a heavy fighter, use some fighters to attack escorts near the coast so at least some of them had to drop their droptanks early, more time to fighter pilots training, include blind flying to single-engine fighter pilots training.
Juha
Other decisions, scrap Me 410 as a heavy fighter, use some fighters to attack escorts near the coast so at least some of them had to drop their droptanks early, more time to fighter pilots training, include blind flying to single-engine fighter pilots training.
Juha
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Juha
As far as I know, Germany did not abandon the idea of offensive action until after Kursk, and even then the idea was to recommence offensive operations in 1945 or so. guderain was given the job of overhaulling the Panzerwaffe, new submarines were being worked on, artillery was being developed.
What did happen was that medium bomber production was curtailed. Even this was not a recognition of Germany's defensive position so much as more a bi-product of the Stalingrad debacle. So many of the advanced flying instructors for the bombers had been killed flying the transports, which also happened to be the airframes on which all blind flying and other flying instruction was carried out, that it would be many months before the schools could be put back into action again. By the time this had occurred, the Germans had indeed taken the decision to scale back medium bomber production, not least of which was the failure of their replacement programs for aircraft like the He 111.
Germany never really abandoned the idea of taking offensive action. The replacement army had eliminated retreat training (yes it existed) in 1936, on Hitlers direct orders, and it was never re-instated, why, because the wehrmacht as a whole (not just Hitler) was imbued with the idea of attack.
People often get the tenacious defensive efforts of the germans mixed up with good defensive planning. The germans were extremely well disciplined, and many soldiers were cross trained in various roles. this allowed cooks and pay clerks to fulfil the role of Infantry and the like in an emergency, however, this is not undertaken a strategic or tactical withdrawal in good order, its fighting fanatically to the last man. This is heroic, and honourable, but it is also wasteful in some situations. Hitler is often blamed for the "no retreat" policy, but in reality it was one manouvre that the Germans were not so good at , because of the lack of trainng in that area......compare it for example with Macs masterly withdrawal to bataan in 1942
