Not only launch speed but height too, the ability of the torpedo to keep straight and get itself to the correct depth had to be improved too.
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Not only launch speed but height too, the ability of the torpedo to keep straight and get itself to the correct depth had to be improved too.KNOTS!!...maybe that's what it was, and not mph.
90 kts is almost 104 mph, so that's a little faster.
From what I'm learning here, it seems the torpedoes had wood shrouds over the nose and tail that helped protect and stabilize the torpedo in the air. They sheared off upon impact, but they also slowed the torpedo slightly and that helped them home in on the target.
I guess it was this that allowed launch speeds to increase.
I think it was in the post, when there are many ways things can go wrong a single torpedo can fail in three or four ways at the same time. Statisticians have mysterious ways to perform their wonders. As a logical expression it is nonsense, but as a statistical expression it points to many big problemsCan someone tell me how you get a 130% failure rate?
Can someone tell me how you get a 130% failure rate?
Well that depends on your reasoning. There are many ways to present the results of an investigation. Saying there is a 130% failure rate on one of the two main weapons that the aircraft carrier fleet was built for will grab peoples attention. It says that a ship and crew and its pilots are taking huge risks at massive cost to fire something that statistically has no chance of working, the few that do hit the target and explode as planned are lucky quirks.They would probably get 130% failure rate by examining component failure modes, then adding them together. Failure analysis was, rather obviously, in its childhood as this is invalid reasoning.
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Thanks for the heads-up. I'll check that out.Hey SparrotRob,
If you can find it (and have not already seen it), there is a very good article on the serious problems with the US torpedoes in the early- to mid-war. It involved all of the new generation of torpedoes (ie the Mk 13 aircraft, Mk14 submarine, and Mk 15 surface ship). When testing was finally done in late-1943(?) it was found that there was a 130% failure rate of the Mk 13. This was due to multiple failure modes for multiple torpedoes. IIRC less than 20% of the torpedoes tested hit their target and exploded. I had a PDF copy of the article on my last computer that crapped out on me about a year ago, otherwise i would post it (it was originally published for government use so the majority of the article is public domain). If you want to search for it, I first ran across it in the Naval Institute Press magazine 'Proceedings' and it had the words "Torpedo Scandal" in the title of the article. There is another article online with the words"Great Torpedo Scandal" which covers some of the same info but is not (I think) the one in Proceedings.
The Mk 13 Mod 0 (the last of which were used up in the early-war battles) had fewer problems (during test pre-war) than the later mods, and the Mod 1 had fewer problems than the Mod 2, etc. . . until whatever Mod was the successful late-war variant.
Thanks for this, I always did tend to think of things simplistically.I think it was in the post, when there are many ways things can go wrong a single torpedo can fail in three or four ways at the same time. Statisticians have mysterious ways to perform their wonders. As a logical expression it is nonsense, but as a statistical expression it points to many big problems
KNOTS!!...maybe that's what it was, and not mph.
90 kts is almost 104 mph, so that's a little faster.
Can someone tell me how you get a 130% failure rate?
Number crunching throws up these things. using imaginary numbers, if you test 1000 guns and two fail due to jamming, one fails because of the feed, one because it didn't reload and one just didn't fire, then it wouldn't be seen as unreasonable to add them together and say 5/1000 or 0.5% were failures. Only when the numbers increase does it become a sort of nonsense. The quoted rate of 130% should be compared to RCAFsons post above where the actual rate in practice was 31% being successful. If you solve one mode of failure and run the test again you may well have more success but you could have less, with a different distribution of reasons to fail.Thanks for this, I always did tend to think of things simplistically.
That is exactly what the statistics mean, not 200% but two failures in the 100 torpedoes tested. A similar and more common expression concerns bomber crews and I have just read it in a history of 617 squadron. If bomber aircraft losses were on average 5% per mission then on a 30 mission tour a crew has a 150% chance on being lost. However 617 squadron was composed almost entirely of crews that finished a 30 mission tour. This shows that losses were not random, the best pilots, the best navigators engineers and gunners improved their chances of survival in many ways. Those lost were frequently on their first or early missions, and their replacements were lost in similar fashion, at the other end of the scale Guy Gibson had completed 3 operational tours before he joined 617 squadron.Let's say a torpedo's guidance fouls up and its detonator fails, too, would that torpedo have a 200% failure rate?
Had been the other way round, and all the Zeros were at HA beating the hell out of the SBDs and thus not noticing the approaching TBDs at LA, the Devastators may have scored crippling hits. The AA on IJN was apparently rubbish.
I'd also argue the TBD had success at Midway. Were it not for the Devastators drawing the Zeros down to LA it's not assured that the Dauntless strike from HA would have got into position unmolested over the KB to strike the killer blows. It's a team effort, each USN aircraft played a part.
If there's one thing the Kido Butai should have done is to operate all four carriers as an organic unit, by which I mean stop operating each carrier as a stand-alone combatant. Instead of each fighter having to return to its home carrier to replenish ammunition and fuel and thus block counterstrike launches, assign one carrier for fighter rotation and the other three carriers for strike launch. If the fighter carrier is disabled, rotate the fighter rotation to another carrier, whilst the two remaining continue strike prep.VT-8 was shredded an hour before the decisive SBD attack, and point out that their contribution was the same as VT-6 - "disrupting the counteroffensive activities of the Japanese carriers".
Although I totally agree with the bolded parts of your posts, it was a team effort, let's not forget the USAAF sent B-17's and B-26's out, which, while they may not have scored any hits, they also disrupted carrier operations prior to the killer strike.
You would loose some efficiency though, no? I mean, four carriers can assemble a strike force faster than three. And they also can bring up a bigger fighter screen in the same time.If there's one thing the Kido Butai should have done is to operate all four carriers as an organic unit, by which I mean stop operating each carrier as a stand-alone combatant. Instead of each fighter having to return to its home carrier to replenish ammunition and fuel and thus block counterstrike launches, assign one carrier for fighter rotation and the other three carriers for strike launch. If the fighter carrier is disabled, rotate the fighter rotation to another carrier, whilst the two remaining continue strike prep.