Swordfish vs Devastator

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You would loose some efficiency though, no? I mean, four carriers can assemble a strike force faster than three. And they also can bring up a bigger fighter screen in the same time.

The biggest issue the Kido Butai had was keeping the A6M's on CAP, the decks were kept clear so when they ran out of 20mm ammunition they could land and immediately rearm, as per shattered sword the pilots didn't seem to have much faith in the 2mg's so having one carrier with a clear deck landing and launching Zero's with the other three carriers having a strike on deck ready to launch sounds like a workable idea.
 
Torpedo bombing against ships protected by fighters sounds like a terrible idea unless protected by a strong fighter force which will fail on occasion. I wonder when it was realised it was a bad idea. The Germans seem to have almost given up on the idea and preferred to aim a time delayed bomb at the ships waterline to try and blow up beneath it. Except for night attack they were developing a Fw 190D variant that could carry a torpedo by virtue of an extended tail yoke.
 
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Torpedo bombing against ships protected by fighters sounds like a terrible idea unless protected by a string fighter force which will fail on occasion. I wonder when it was realised it was a bad idea. The Germans seem to have almost given up on the idea and preferred to aim a time delayed bomb at the ships waterline to try and blow up beneath it. Except except for night attack though they were developing a Fw 190D variant that could carry a torpedo by virtue of an extended tail yoke.
Yeah, but isn't that of any kind of bombing scenario?
Without fighter cover, they're just sitting ducks.
I think with torpedo bombing, it becomes a bit redundant, considering one sub can carry a bunch of torpedo and launch multiple strikes simultaneously.
With torpedo bombers, you need a whole squadron, supported by an aircraft carrier, to achieve the same end.
Seems like after Midway, you don't hear a whole lot about Torpedo bombing, although the practice remained though out the rest of the war.

Elvis
 
Torpedo bombing against ships protected by fighters sounds like a terrible idea unless protected by a string fighter force which will fail on occasion. I wonder when it was realised it was a bad idea. The Germans seem to have almost given up on the idea and preferred to aim a time delayed bomb at the ships waterline to try and blow up beneath it. Except except for night attack though they were developing a Fw 190D variant that could carry a torpedo by virtue of an extended tail yoke.
The torpedo armed version of the Beaufighter was just being introduced in 1942 after Midway took place. The carrier version of the "sea Mosquito" only started to be built after March 1944. There are many types of ship on the sea, torpedoes were very effective against them. Maybe not so effective against a battleship but did manage to cripple/damage Bismarck and Lutzow and also Gneisenau in Brest harbour. The Beaufighter acted as its own defence with fighter versions flying with torpedo versions as escort and flak suppression.
 
Torpedo bombing against ships protected by fighters sounds like a terrible idea unless protected by a string fighter force which will fail on occasion.

Or you take the RN's approach, fully developed by mid-1942, of pairing radar-equipped and torpedo-carrying Swordfish and operating them at night. AFAIK, the IJN didn't have any effective means of operating fighters at night from their carriers.

The Swordfish was anachronistic and absolutely a sitting duck in daylight ops. However, at night against an adversary that lacked radar, it would have been a difficult target to locate and engage. Just look at the results from Taranto which had decent-ish AAA and barrage balloons, and yet only 2 Swordfish were lost.
 
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If there's one thing the Kido Butai should have done is to operate all four carriers as an organic unit, by which I mean stop operating each carrier as a stand-alone combatant. Instead of each fighter having to return to its home carrier to replenish ammunition and fuel and thus block counterstrike launches, assign one carrier for fighter rotation and the other three carriers for strike launch. If the fighter carrier is disabled, rotate the fighter rotation to another carrier, whilst the two remaining continue strike prep.
It's been a while since I studied the Pacific War but didn't the USN do something along these lines later in the war? I think I remember reading where Enterprise came out of refit as the night fighter carrier tasked with just that, after hours protection of the fleet. She embarked an almost all Hellcat -N load out if my memory serves me correctly (which I doubt).

Please correct me if I'm wrong as I'd genuinely like to know, I'm off to Google this and see if my memory is good or if I'm ready for the home...
 
Seems like after Midway, you don't hear a whole lot about Torpedo bombing, although the practice remained though out the rest of the war.

The USN was not the rest of the world.
The USN after midway figured out that their aerial torpedo was defective in several different ways and until it was "fixed" there was little point in using it in combat.

Other navies aerial torpedoes were not defective (at least not anywhere near what the US torpedo was) and were effective weapons.
Delivering the torpedo in an effective manner is a somewhat different story. Low slow and daylight is not a good delivery method against fast armed ships even without fighter cover.

It is doubtful if the the Musashi and Yamato would have been sunk by bombs alone.
However by 1944 the US MK 13 torpedo was no longer running deep, the exploder was functioning correctly and it could be dropped at much higher speeds and higher altitudes than it could be dropped in 1942.
Post WW II the major navies had major changes in AA defences and the torpedo bomber was behind the curve again, although som eof th epromisied AA systems took a few years longer to get to work than promised.
 
Or you take the RN's approach, fully developed by mid-1942, of pairing radar-equipped and torpedo-carrying and operating them at night. AFAIK, the IJN didn't have any effective means of operating fighters at night from their carriers.
Out of curiosity, would that "mid-1942" have been concurrent with the battle of Midway?
 
Just wondering if mid-1942 could have been by July 1,1942. I did notice the phrase "well developed". Now if HMS Formidable had been there (stealing Admiral Beez's idea), that would've been interesting. I'm throwing in those radar equipped Stringbags.
 
Was the Swordfish not removed from torpedo bomber duties following the Channel Dash debacle? So it wouldn't have been carrying torpedoes at the time of the Battle of Midway?

I would imagine the Swordfish would be considered lacking the necessary endurance for service in the Pacific Ocean?
 
Was the Swordfish not removed from torpedo bomber duties following the Channel Dash debacle? So it wouldn't have been carrying torpedoes at the time of the Battle of Midway?

I would imagine the Swordfish would be considered lacking the necessary endurance for service in the Pacific Ocean?

Swordfish had a range of 522 miles with normal fuel and carrying a torpedo. Devastator range was 435 miles with a Mk13 torpedo. Also note the Swordfish could have a long-range tank installed at the expense of the third crewman, which would further increase the range.

Based on these figures, it would seem the Swordfish was appropriate for the Pacific.
 
Just wondering if mid-1942 could have been by July 1,1942. I did notice the phrase "well developed". Now if HMS Formidable had been there (stealing Admiral Beez's idea), that would've been interesting. I'm throwing in those radar equipped Stringbags.

Was the Swordfish not removed from torpedo bomber duties following the Channel Dash debacle? So it wouldn't have been carrying torpedoes at the time of the Battle of Midway?

I would imagine the Swordfish would be considered lacking the necessary endurance for service in the Pacific Ocean?

According to this link Admiral Beez posted earlier, Formidable had Albacores not Swordfish embarked by April 1942 but did have 1 Swordfish aboard. The Albacores were apparently radar equipped and capable of delivering a night torpedo attack. Now wouldn't THAT have been a nice surprise for the IJN about June 4, 1942.
 
According to this link Admiral Beez posted earlier, Formidable had Albacores not Swordfish embarked by April 1942 but did have 1 Swordfish aboard. The Albacores were apparently radar equipped and capable of delivering a night torpedo attack. Now wouldn't THAT have been a nice surprise for the IJN about June 4, 1942.
The Albacores could have also flown a similar dive bomber attack profile to the SBDs, with an even bigger bomb load.
 
KNOTS!!...maybe that's what it was, and not mph.
90 kts is almost 104 mph, so that's a little faster.
From what I'm learning here, it seems the torpedoes had wood shrouds over the nose and tail that helped protect and stabilize the torpedo in the air. They sheared off upon impact, but they also slowed the torpedo slightly and that helped them home in on the target.
I guess it was this that allowed launch speeds to increase.
Were there any allied air dropped homing torpedoes in WW2? I thought they were all unguided other than the depth and speed set before take off on board ship?
 
Were there any allied air dropped homing torpedoes in WW2? I thought they were all unguided other than the depth and speed set before take off on board ship?

Yes, the USN's ASW Mk 24 'mine', but no air dropped antishipping homing torpedoes, AFAIK.
 
I got the impression that torpedo bombers had a harder time hitting a ship compared to dive bombers but if they did, they could deal more damage. Maybe the explosive shock wave of a detonation is more powerful in water?
 

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