Tank commanders, who was best?

[Soren]

What some people seem to be missing here is that light vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers also were counted as kills in Propoganda papers.

What one needs to look at is Wittmanns own records of the occasion(s), and he makes it quite clear that he knocked out between 10 or 15 Allied tanks that famous day in Villers Bocage, which corresponds well with the actual losses. The loads of APC's trucks he also destroyed were all counted in the propoganda papers.

Parsifal,

The Battle of Kursk is an interesting one as the Soviets claimed they knocked out nearly 100 Tiger tanks there, while infact only 10 Tigers ever made it there and only 3 were lost.

Another interesting thing about Kursk is that the German claims were all cut in half or more by the German high command as they couldn't believe the figures. The Germans had destroyed so many Soviet tanks that the German high command found it impossible that the Soviets could've won, but infact the Germans DID destroy as many as they claimed, even more infact. Therefore the German records for Soviet losses are about 3 to 4 times lower than the actual Soviet losses as listed in Soviet records.

The Germans got 1,600 of their claimed Soviet tank kills confirmed, while the Soviets admitted the loss of ~6,000 tanks SPG's (Which was close to the original German claim)

The Soviets claimed 900 German tank kills, while in reality the Germans lost roughly 235 tanks in all, 3 of which were Tigers.

The worst case of overclaiming however happened in the air where the Soviets claimed 3,000 German a/c shot down... In reality only ~200 German a/c were lost. While at the same time the German high command again were very sceptical about the German claims, but nevertheless the Germans were much closer claiming roughly 1,000 Soviet a/c shot down, a little less than the 1,100 to 1,200 a/c that the Soviets admitted to have lost.

 

[Amsel]

Some very interesting info as usual, Soren.

 

[tomo pauk]

I've read it many times that for most of the (all) allied 'GIs' every tank was Tiger, every german soldier was a member of SS, every LW fighter was Messerschmitt (and the 190 was Fokker for w. Allies), and every SP ATG was Ferdinand for russians.

Perhaps that's why claim numbers had to be double checked.

 

[Soren]

Very true tomo.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

While I agree that over claiming was done on both sides, I find it very hard for anyone to argue that Whitman was not the best. I hate it when people discredit greatness on any side...

 

[syscom3]

Soren, how did the Russians and Germans figure their opponents loss's when many of the destroyed tanks were recovered and returned to service?

In fact, how did they count loss's? Blowing the turret off a tank is an indication of a permanent kill. But blowing out an engine, which could be replaced in good time, is not really indicative of a true battlefield loss.

 

[parsifal]

All I can say is that often a tank listed as "knocked out" is only knocked out temporarily. If that tank is recovered, and subsequently repaired, should it coult as a loss.

Also for the side actually losing the ground, the clear evidence is that its unrecoverable losses will go up disproportionately. This is why counting losses as a measure of efficiency is so poor as a measure...it depends on the battle situation. Clearly the germans were tactically superior to the Russians, yet the latest figures available to me, suggest that in battle tanks lost, the Soviets actually lost less tanks overall than the germans I know that is contentious, for some unbelievable, but it seems to be a fact, based on the best figures I have available.

Even if the figures arent accepted, they were certainly a lot closer than the mainly one sided accounts that we have had to rely on up to now would suggest...

But I repeat the question, the issue of "who is the best tank commander" becomes almost impossible to unravel, if more than half the "kills" get up after tney have been "knocked out" and start shooting again??? I wonder how many of wittmans 11 or 17 kills actually came back to fight ahagin after Villers Bocage. Etc Etc

 

[m kenny]

What some people seem to be missing here is that light vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers also were counted as kills in Propoganda papers.

What one needs to look at is Wittmanns own records of the occasion(s), and he makes it quite clear that he knocked out between 10 or 15 Allied tanks that famous day in Villers Bocage, which corresponds well with the actual losses. The loads of APC's trucks he also destroyed were all counted in the propoganda papers.

From his award citation for Villers Bocage:

He succeded in knocking out 15 heavy enemy tanks in a very short time. An additional six tanks were hit and their crews forced to bail out"

His kill total on leaving Russia was 117. His kill total on 14th June 1944 was given as138. Therefore he was awarded 21 kills for Villers.
There is no confusion. He did not knock out '15 heavy tanks' and did not hit 'an additional six'.

Another interesting thing about Kursk is that the German claims were all cut in half or more by the German high command as they couldn't believe the figures.

Slightly wrong. The Germans reduced ALL claims for EVERY battle because they knew the figures were inflated.

. Therefore the German records for Soviet losses are about 3 to 4 times lower than the actual Soviet losses as listed in Soviet records.

A source for this absurd claim?

The Germans got 1,600 of their claimed Soviet tank kills confirmed, while the Soviets admitted the loss of ~6,000 tanks SPG's (Which was close to the original German claim)

Those with a mind to find the real figures can do no better than consult page 127 of Zetterling's 'Kursk 1943' where they can see the Russian totals are in the area 1300 - 1905 tanks, depending on the dates you use.

While I agree that over claiming was done on both sides, I find it very hard for anyone to argue that Whitman was not the best. I hate it when people discredit greatness on any side...

As we know, the legend of the "Second World War tank commander with the highest number of kills" has been kept up to this day. This judgement is completely wrong, in terms both of the actual score and the tactics employed! A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made at Villers Bocage.
As the enemy's position was not clear, it was all the more necessary to work out a well-conceived counter-attack. On the basis of observation relying on an overall view of the situation, valuable intelligence could have been obtained before engaging. Such overhastiness was uncalled for, as the next company (1./SS-101) was in a favorable position further north-east, and it could have attacked the enemy forces when they advanced.
The hasty, single-handed attack on the large and powerful British force may seem brave, but it goes against all the rules (no centre of gravity, no concentration of forces, importance of the moment of surprise). The action that followed by the bulk of the 2nd Company and by Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive.
The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly.
Thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost the "tank commander with the highest number of kills" his life on August 8th 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

But I repeat the question, the issue of "who is the best tank commander" becomes almost impossible to unravel, if more than half the "kills" get up after tney have been "knocked out" and start shooting again??? I wonder how many of wittmans 11 or 17 kills actually came back to fight ahagin after Villers Bocage. Etc Etc

That is a very good point. How can you define a "kill" if the tank can be repaired and used again?

As we know, the legend of the "Second World War tank commander with the highest number of kills" has been kept up to this day. This judgement is completely wrong, in terms both of the actual score and the tactics employed! A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made at Villers Bocage.
As the enemy's position was not clear, it was all the more necessary to work out a well-conceived counter-attack. On the basis of observation relying on an overall view of the situation, valuable intelligence could have been obtained before engaging. Such overhastiness was uncalled for, as the next company (1./SS-101) was in a favorable position further north-east, and it could have attacked the enemy forces when they advanced.
The hasty, single-handed attack on the large and powerful British force may seem brave, but it goes against all the rules (no centre of gravity, no concentration of forces, importance of the moment of surprise). The action that followed by the bulk of the 2nd Company and by Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive.
The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly.
Thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost the "tank commander with the highest number of kills" his life on August 8th 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.

So you judge someone off of one engagement? I applaud you.

 

[m kenny]

So you judge someone off of one engagement? I applaud you.

Your applause is not warranted. They are he words of Wolfgang Schneider.
Schneider is famous for his writings about The Tiger tank, it's Units and actions.
The full section may be found on pages 154 to 160 of Henrie Marie's 'Villers Bocage. Normandy 1944 (Heimdal 2003)
Amazon.com: VILLERS BOCAGE: Normandy 1944: Henri Marie: Books

General Analysis
The action of the 1st and 2nd Companies of the schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 was everything but awe-inspiring. SS-Panzerkorps propaganda then gave a decisively misleading account of it. How can this be explained?
First, we have to remember that - unlike the Wehrmacht - the Waffen-SS did not have a experienced tank arm. Compared with the brilliant exploits of the «old» (Wehrmacht) panzer divisions, the Waffen-SS could not hope for similar successes. At a pinch, the II SS-Panzerkorps's action in Russia, in the southern sector, during Operation Zitadelle in July 1943, commands respect. So with Obersturmfuhrer Wittmann, Sepp Dietrich tried his utmost to manufacture a hero. On the Eastern front, the Knight's Cross was awarded for «kills», as were Oakleaves. This is all the more astonishing as, both in the Wehrmacht tank arm and among the tank destroyers, many soldiers had much higher scores
As we know, the legend of the "Second World War tank commander with the highest number of kills" has been kept up to this day. This judgement is completely wrong, in terms both of the actual score and the tactics employed! A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made.
1. The company commander knows exactly the technical status of all his panzers. He does not place a
vehicle which has engine trouble at the head of a stationary column; the risk of blocking all the other panzers is just too great.
2. A sunken lane can afford some protection, but it is not a suitable standby base when the enemy's position is unknown. The major concern is for the panzers to be disposed in such a way as not to hamper their freedom of movement.
3. In a concentration sector, all battleworthy panzers are placed in alert positions. These positions and the
roads leading to them have to be carefully reconnoitered. When placed on the alert or when the concentration sector is attacked, upon orders, the crews join them individually. But when the morning alert came,
none of the company's tank commanders knew what to do.
4. After the first intelligence of the enemy, the company should have been placed on the alert at once with orders to ready itself for battle as quickly as possible. Invaluable time would certainly have been saved
and it could have regrouped before engaging the enemy. Such action would have been more effective.
5. As the enemy's position was not clear, it was all the more necessary to work out a well-conceived counter-attack. On the basis of observation relying on an overall view of the situation, valuable intelligence could have been obtained before engaging. Such overhastiness was uncalled for, as the next company (1./SS-101) was in a favorable position further north-east, and it could have attacked the enemy forces when they advanced.
6. The hasty, single-handed attack on the large and powerful British force may seem brave, but it goes against all the rules (no centre of gravity, no concentration of forces, importance of the moment of surprise). The action that followed by the bulk of the 2nd Company and by Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive.
7. The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly.
Thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost the "tank commander with the highest number of kills" his life on August 8th 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

While it did seem foolhardy, Wittman saw a chance to catch the British off guard, and he took it. He was outnumbered, but his Tiger was more then a match for the Sherman's and Cromwell's the British had.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Your applause is not warranted. They are he words of Wolfgang Schneider.
Schneider is famous for his writings about The Tiger tank, it's Units and actions.
The full section may be found on pages 154 to 160 of Henrie Marie's 'Villers Bocage. Normandy 1944 (Heimdal 2003)
Amazon.com: VILLERS BOCAGE: Normandy 1944: Henri Marie: Books

General Analysis
The action of the 1st and 2nd Companies of the schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101 was everything but awe-inspiring. SS-Panzerkorps propaganda then gave a decisively misleading account of it. How can this be explained?
First, we have to remember that - unlike the Wehrmacht - the Waffen-SS did not have a experienced tank arm. Compared with the brilliant exploits of the «old» (Wehrmacht) panzer divisions, the Waffen-SS could not hope for similar successes. At a pinch, the II SS-Panzerkorps's action in Russia, in the southern sector, during Operation Zitadelle in July 1943, commands respect. So with Obersturmfuhrer Wittmann, Sepp Dietrich tried his utmost to manufacture a hero. On the Eastern front, the Knight's Cross was awarded for «kills», as were Oakleaves. This is all the more astonishing as, both in the Wehrmacht tank arm and among the tank destroyers, many soldiers had much higher scores
As we know, the legend of the "Second World War tank commander with the highest number of kills" has been kept up to this day. This judgement is completely wrong, in terms both of the actual score and the tactics employed! A competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes as Wittmann made.
1. The company commander knows exactly the technical status of all his panzers. He does not place a
vehicle which has engine trouble at the head of a stationary column; the risk of blocking all the other panzers is just too great.
2. A sunken lane can afford some protection, but it is not a suitable standby base when the enemy's position is unknown. The major concern is for the panzers to be disposed in such a way as not to hamper their freedom of movement.
3. In a concentration sector, all battleworthy panzers are placed in alert positions. These positions and the
roads leading to them have to be carefully reconnoitered. When placed on the alert or when the concentration sector is attacked, upon orders, the crews join them individually. But when the morning alert came,
none of the company's tank commanders knew what to do.
4. After the first intelligence of the enemy, the company should have been placed on the alert at once with orders to ready itself for battle as quickly as possible. Invaluable time would certainly have been saved
and it could have regrouped before engaging the enemy. Such action would have been more effective.
5. As the enemy's position was not clear, it was all the more necessary to work out a well-conceived counter-attack. On the basis of observation relying on an overall view of the situation, valuable intelligence could have been obtained before engaging. Such overhastiness was uncalled for, as the next company (1./SS-101) was in a favorable position further north-east, and it could have attacked the enemy forces when they advanced.
6. The hasty, single-handed attack on the large and powerful British force may seem brave, but it goes against all the rules (no centre of gravity, no concentration of forces, importance of the moment of surprise). The action that followed by the bulk of the 2nd Company and by Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive.
7. The carefree advance of a single panzer into a town occupied by the enemy is pure folly.
Thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost the "tank commander with the highest number of kills" his life on August 8th 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank.

Like I said, I do not care about one engagement. I am sure that if you look through history all great commanders of any kind have made mistakes or were rash in there decisions.

To judge someone off of one engagement is foolish.

 

[Juha]

Soren
Now even Manstein's southern pincer alone had 102 Tigers at the beginning of the Zitadelle ie the German attack phase of the Battle of Kursk, not 10. If you are happily intermingled numbers of Tigers participating the tank battle of Prokhorovka with the losses of the whole battle of Kursk, then your Tiger numbers made sense, if we left out the Tigers of the Tiger Coy of the 3rd SSPzGrD T, they were there but IIRC they were still S of river Psel on 12 July, but probably II SSPzAK could have used them if it had wanted because if they were S of Psel they were then at the rear of 1st SSPxGrD LAH which took the brunt of the attack of Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army.

Are the Soviet claim of 3000 LW a/c shot down only that claimed in air-to-air and the ~200 LW a/c lost the number lost in air combat?

Juha

 

[Amsel]

Wittmans performance on the Eastern front alone puts him in the running for best tank commander. He was a natural at finding enemy anti tank emplacements and I don't think those are noted in the kill record. Anti-tank guns were considered by many to be worth more then a tank kill. His experience in the Stug helped him immensely in the slow turning turret of the Tiger I.

 

[Amsel]

His aggression probably helped him become one of the greater tank commanders, since armor is essentially an assault weapon. His death should come as no surprise noting the imbalance of men and equipent in all theaters.

"...the decision was a very, very difficult one. Never before had I been so impressed by the strength of the enemy as I was by those tanks rolling by; but I knew it absolutely had to be and I decided to strike out into the enemy."

Michael Wittmann, 13th June 1944

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Wittmans performance on the Eastern front alone puts him in the running for best tank commander. He was a natural at finding enemy anti tank emplacements and I don't think those are noted in the kill record. Anti-tank guns were considered by many to be worth more then a tank kill. His experience in the Stug helped him immensely in the slow turning turret of the Tiger I.

Nope we can't do that! He may have made some bad mistakes or some rash decisions. That and the fact that the was German takes him out of the running...

 

[pbfoot]

On a side note there was a show Called "Battle Field Mysteries" trying to determine which unit eliminated Wittman, they went into the ranges with all the ballistics of the weapons near him , along with recce photos showing the units placements . It was pretty cool .

 

[m kenny]

Wittmans performance on the Eastern front alone puts him in the running for best tank commander.

Which specific incidents do you have in mind?

 

[Lucky13]

This is what I found....
Unit: Losses/Kills, Kill/Loss Ratio
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501: 120/450, 3.75
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502: 107/1,400, 13.08
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503: 252/1,700, 6.75
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504: 109/250, 2.29
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505: 126/900, 7.14
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506: 179/400, 2.23
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507: 104/600, 5.77
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508: 78/100, 1.28
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 509: 120/500, 4.17
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 510: 65/200, 3.08
13./Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland: 6/100, 16.67
III./Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland: 98/500, 5.10
13./SS-Panzerregiment: 1/42 400, 9.52
8./SS-Panzerregiment: 2/31 250, 8.06
9./SS-Panzerregiment: 3/56 500, 8.93
schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (501): 107/500, 4.67
schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 (502): 76/600, 12.82


Total 1,715/9,850, 5.74

Didn't Otto Carius have something similar as Wittmanns Villers-Bocage...Malinava something, or am I thinking of someone else?

 

[m kenny]

This is what I found...
Unit: Losses/Kills, Kill/Loss Ratio
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 501: 120/450, 3.75
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502: 107/1,400, 13.08
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503: 252/1,700, 6.75
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504: 109/250, 2.29
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 505: 126/900, 7.14
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506: 179/400, 2.23
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507: 104/600, 5.77
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 508: 78/100, 1.28
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 509: 120/500, 4.17
schwere Panzer-Abteilung 510: 65/200, 3.08
13./Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland: 6/100, 16.67
III./Panzer-Regiment Grossdeutschland: 98/500, 5.10
13./SS-Panzerregiment: 1/42 400, 9.52
8./SS-Panzerregiment: 2/31 250, 8.06
9./SS-Panzerregiment: 3/56 500, 8.93
schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 (501): 107/500, 4.67
schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 (502): 76/600, 12.82


Total 1,715/9,850, 5.74

From Willbeck's book and compiled using unconfirmed crew claims. More a wish list than a record of reality