Technical developments of a Luftwaffe vs. VVS only war

[wiking85]

Regardless if the shooting war between Britain and Germany comes to an end because Churchill is dead, there is not a great deal of difference in the outcome. Despite the false premise on which this scenario is based, ie that Churchill was responsible for the continuation of the war after the fall of France, certain things dont change. Britains policy for at least 400 years, regardless of the quality of its leadership, has remained remarkably constant in that time....no single nation on the continent be allowed to dominate the continent. For that reason, Britain has always backed to the second most powerful nation on the continent.

In the scenario of a Britain at peace with Germany, (and presumably the other German lackeys like Italy), Britain will simply be free of Uboats and other constraints. presumably Japan will not go to war in this scenario, so massive aid via Vladivostock, and from the south is possible, in which Germany can do nothing because she is at peace with Britain. From July the Americans can join this push. Lend Lease to USSR (presumably both British and US) will be 10-20 times what it was historically in 1941. The latest and best a/c, unlimited amounts of food, transport, raw materials.....it will be all over by the end of 1942 in that scenario. Germany cannot raise additional forces, because the implicit threat from a continuing existence of the British, now free of a Uboat menace will require additional coast garrisons throughout Europe.

A return to normal trade conditions for Germany would never be accepted, except if the prewar demands like return of Polish security and a relinquishing of the occupation of western europe was to occur. Even with a truce of sorts in place, it was never even considered by the most rabid of the Germanophile members of the Govt to relax the Control commission Activities and a return to free trade for Germany. That had not been fully available to Germany since Munich. If it were Britain would effectively have surrendered, and that was never going to happen, even under Halifax. People should take the time to actually read what Halifax was prepared to do, before making such wild assumptions in their scenario constructs.

Halifax was a member of the appeasement group, and recently declassified documents of the British govt, show that in 1939, shortly after the outbreak of war Halifax helped with the travel arrangements of John Lonsdale Bryans, who believed he could bring down Hitler by making contact with prominent anti-Nazi Germans including Ulrich von Hassell, the former German ambassador in Rome. Initially Lonsdale Bryans thought he could drum up support for an anti-Nazi coup in Germany. But he subsequently changed tactic and tried to contact Adolf Hitler in a bid to negotiate a peace. These discussion went nowhere of course,m but Halifaxs association with the appeasement lobby meant that even if Churchill had not been on the scene, Halifax was most unlikely to garner the support of parliament to form govt after Chamberlain, another member of the appeasement group, so patently lost support. Had Halifax machinations with Bryans, which were known and fully documneted in the Secret Service file being kept on him and Halifax was to be released. This would have destroyed Halifax if he had any notions of making a grab for power. He knew the administration knew about his little jaunts with the enemy,m and that they were prepared to use them against him if he tried anything. For that reason, the so called halifax option was a complete non-starter.

In the lead up to the fall of the Chamberlain administration, it was becoming apparent that within the government itself there was failing support for the appeaement group. 81 abstentions, and on the 8th May despite a valiant attempt by Churchill to save his boss it was clear, his days were numbered. In desperation Chamberlain called a meeting with Churchill, Halifax, Chamberlain and the opposition leaders Attlee and Greenwood in attendance. The opposition was asked if it would support some form of unity govt. It becomes a little murky as to details after this, but the general consensus is that they came back with the reply that they would support a unity govt for the duration, but the tories had to rid themselves of the appeasement dominance. That meant that both Halifax and Chamberlain, along with other lesser fish, had to go. Halifax had been offered the prime ministership, but turned it down, knowing that he too could not gurantee the support of his own part or the opposition. British resistance was working independant of Churchill, though Churchill became the perfect man for the job of channlling and focussing that oppisitiion in the months and years that followed. There was never the slightest possibility of Halifax getting the job and Churchill was irrelevant to that outcome. If it hadnt been Churchill, it would have been another anti-German who took on the job, never was it a possibility of Halifax, or any appeasement oriented politician getting the leadership job after Poland. Ironically, it might have been possible, only if the allies were winning from Poland on. in a way, hitlers runaway success ensured the British would never surrender, whilst Hitler was on the scene.

There will be little difference to the outcome, except that the whole of Europe will be under Soviet control by 1945, unless the western allies respond, which they would do. They would never have allowed either germany or the USSR a free dominating hand in western Europe

What's your sourcing for the Halifax parts, because the indications from what I've read is that he was the only option besides Churchill. Only members of the war cabinet could replace Chamberlain and no one had the support within the Conservative party other than Halifax; Labour lacked enough support to form a government and there were no other anti-Germans of Churchill's stripe in the conservative party that had the ability to lead. As to Halifax getting the position, he was a bigger appeaser than even Chamberlain by 1940. Besides without Churchill who was there to rally the country after the Fall of France?

 

[Juha]

These, both of these. So long as Hitler (and a number of other Nazi higherups) were in control, there'd be no consistent, potent, practical military planning, goals, or contingency arrangements. Aside from horrible logistics management, there was the total lack of planning for digging in and holding ground with potent defensive capabilities if (ie WHEN) further expansion was impractical. Even IF they somehow managed to Blitz Russia all the way back to the Urals, if the Allies still sided with Russia (if for not other reason than to prevent a unified European Empire state), supplies and support could be coming in from the Far East and Pacific. (then again, the more competent generals making up a hypothetical Military-run deposed-Nazi Germany might have favored definitively dealing with the British threat before ever seriously considering invading Russia)

That aside from possible changes in alignment in the PTO, including things like the Germans breaking their Alliance with Japan or even declaring war.


But then again, if the Nazi government was deposed (at some point -timing would affect things greatly) would the new government (particularly if one resulting from a military coup) consider concession/compromise, relinquishing occupied territory in negotiations with the allies (or perhaps even aim at re-establishing the WWI boarders)?

I would not be so sharp, e.g. Operation Blau had sensible roots, Germany needed Causasian oil, Volga was an essential waterway to the SU and Stalingrad was an important industrial and transport center. Problems were Hitler's demand to try to conquer Stalingrad and Caucasus simultaneusly not one after another and the logistics. Did germany have capacity to reach Baku in 1942?

 

[wiking85]

I would not be so sharp, e.g. Operation Blau had sensible roots, Germany needed Causasian oil, Volga was an essential waterway to the SU and Stalingrad was an important industrial and transport center. Problems were Hitler's demand to try to conquer Stalingrad and Caucasus simultaneusly not one after another and the logistics. Did germany have capacity to reach Baku in 1942?

No, but Hitler was informed of that and he dismissed it claiming a way would be found; had the Black Sea ports been taken Axis shipping could have made it viable in 1943 due to taking the pressure off of rail supply.

 

[parsifal]

What's your sourcing for the Halifax parts, because the indications from what I've read is that he was the only option besides Churchill. Only members of the war cabinet could replace Chamberlain and no one had the support within the Conservative party other than Halifax; Labour lacked enough support to form a government and there were no other anti-Germans of Churchill's stripe in the conservative party that had the ability to lead. As to Halifax getting the position, he was a bigger appeaser than even Chamberlain by 1940. Besides without Churchill who was there to rally the country after the Fall of France?

Im sourcing the outcome of the meeting 8 may 1940. prior to that, in the house of commons, Chamberlain had faced an effective vote of no confidence. Despite his party's massive majority, he had faced 31 votes that had crossed the floor and a massive 81 abstentions. The vote against Chamberlain was in reality a vote against the appeasement lobby, of which Halifax was a clear member. It is irrelevant to try and blame Churchill at this juncture, even though he represented the voracious calls of opposition to appeaserment since before the war. at the vote of 8 May, Churchill had made a valiant attempt to save Chamberlain, not bring him down. There is no smoking gun of Churchill working to bring Chamberlain down. He was a loyal member of the govt, but he had also always opposed appeasement.

At that abovementioned meeting on the 8 May, the only way of forming a unity govt, was to ditch the whole appeasement movement, and that meant Chamberlain, Halifax, and the whole appeasement camp had to yield. It was nothing directly to do with Churchill. If Churchill was there, or not there, the parliament wanted Chamberlain and Halifax gone.

There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing at the cabinet meetings 26-29 May, when it looked like most of the BEF was going to be lost, and Halifax pedalled the so-called Bastiani initiative, but these were repelled by Churchill and his supporters and the path of the British opposition settled once the BEF was rescued from Dunkirk. If the BEF had been captured, Churchill may have been induced to a temporary truce with the Germans, but there was never the slightest chance of Britain accepting a general peace. In the scenario of the BEF being lost, Britain would make peace to buy time, but the blockade would remain and peace would only last a maximum of 6 months whilst a new army was trained to defend britain.

If Churchill had not been available, but all other things were the same, neither Chamberlain or Halifax could retain leadership given the effective vote of no confidence by their own party and the terms for support by Attlee and Sincalir, the next most ardent opponent of appeasement after Churchill. If Churchill were not there, Chamberlain could call a general election, but unlikely given the crises being faced at that time. Most likely, he and his entire cabinet would have resigned to make way for some form of unity government. Its pointless to speculate, because the variables are too great, other than it would be a govt in which appeaseement was no longer an option. I happen to think that with no Churchill, the most likely candidate would be a minority Liberal govt under Archie Sinclair, head of the liberals. The liberals had last been a part of the the unity govt in 1930-31 when faced with the depression crisis, so it is not beyond the realm of possibility that without Churchill, the most likely candidate for head of government could be a non-conservative. Unlikely that the conservatives would support an Attlee led administration....but certain that the appeasement lobby, of which halifax was its most ardent proponent, was finished by the first week in May.

There is about as much chance of Halifax getting control as the whole of parliament being killed off, unless there is another Guy fawkes in the house i guess.

 

[wiking85]

Im sourcing the outcome of the meeting 8 may 1940. prior to that, in the house of commons, Chamberlain had faced an effective vote of no confidence. Despite his party's massive majority, he had faced 31 votes that had crossed the floor and a massive 81 abstentions. The vote against Chamberlain was in reality a vote against the appeasement lobby, of which Halifax was a clear member. It is irrelevant to try and blame Churchill at this juncture, even though he represented the voracious calls of opposition to appeaserment since before the war. at the vote of 8 May, Churchill had made a valiant attempt to save Chamberlain, not bring him down. There is no smoking gun of Churchill working to bring Chamberlain down. He was a loyal member of the govt, but he had also always opposed appeasement.

At that abovementioned meeting on the 8 May, the only way of forming a unity govt, was to ditch the whole appeasement movement, and that meant Chamberlain, Halifax, and the whole appeasement camp had to yield. It was nothing directly to do with Churchill. If Churchill was there, or not there, the parliament wanted Chamberlain and Halifax gone.

There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing at the cabinet meetings 26-29 May, when it looked like most of the BEF was going to be lost, and Halifax pedalled the so-called Bastiani initiative, but these were repelled by Churchill and his supporters and the path of the British opposition settled once the BEF was rescued from Dunkirk. If the BEF had been captured, Churchill may have been induced to a temporary truce with the Germans, but there was never the slightest chance of Britain accepting a general peace. In the scenario of the BEF being lost, Britain would make peace to buy time, but the blockade would remain and peace would only last a maximum of 6 months whilst a new army was trained to defend britain.

If Churchill had not been available, but all other things were the same, neither Chamberlain or Halifax could retain leadership given the effective vote of no confidence by their own party and the terms for support by Attlee and Sincalir, the next most ardent opponent of appeasement after Churchill. If Churchill were not there, Chamberlain could call a general election, but unlikely given the crises being faced at that time. Most likely, he and his entire cabinet would have resigned to make way for some form of unity government. Its pointless to speculate, because the variables are too great, other than it would be a govt in which appeaseement was no longer an option. I happen to think that with no Churchill, the most likely candidate would be a minority Liberal govt under Archie Sinclair, head of the liberals. The liberals had last been a part of the the unity govt in 1930-31 when faced with the depression crisis, so it is not beyond the realm of possibility that without Churchill, the most likely candidate for head of government could be a non-conservative. Unlikely that the conservatives would support an Attlee led administration....but certain that the appeasement lobby, of which halifax was its most ardent proponent, was finished by the first week in May.

There is about as much chance of Halifax getting control as the whole of parliament being killed off, unless there is another Guy fawkes in the house i guess.

I get that you have a strongly held opinion, but where is your information coming from? Stating that Halifax had no shot requires some sourcing other than your opinion. I've never heard that the cabinet was willing to resign like that and there is no way in hell that the Conservative party would give up their majority position to let a minority led government run the war, even if they had issues with Halifax.
E. F. L. Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Labour leaders telephoned at 5 p.m. on the 10th to report that the party would take part in a coalition government, although this had to be under the leadership of someone other than Chamberlain. Accordingly, Chamberlain went to Buckingham Palace to tender his resignation, recommending the King to ask Churchill to form a government.[11] On doing so, one of his first actions was to form a new, smaller, war cabinet by replacing six of the Conservative politicians with Greenwood and Attlee, and retaining only Halifax and Chamberlain.

Churchill's political position was weak; although he was popular with the Labour and Liberal Parties for his stance against appeasement in the 1930s, he was mistrusted by many members of the Conservative Party, nor would he have been the choice of the King. Halifax had the support of most of the Conservative party and of the King, and was acceptable to the Labour party. His position as a peer was a merely technical barrier given the scale of the crisis, and Churchill reportedly was willing to serve under Halifax. As Lord Beaverbrook said, "Chamberlain wanted Halifax. Labour wanted Halifax. Sinclair wanted Halifax. The Lords wanted Halifax. The King wanted Halifax. And Halifax wanted Halifax." The last sentence was incorrect, however; Halifax did not want to become Prime Minister. He believed that Churchill's energy and skills as leader of a desperate cause were superior to his.[13] Like Chamberlain he served in Churchill's cabinet, frequently exasperated by Churchill's style of doing business.

13] Blake, Robert (1993). "How Churchill Became Prime MInister". In Blake, Robert B.; Louis, William Roger. Churchill. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 264–270. ISBN 0-19-820626-7.
Churchill : A Major New Assessment of His Life in Peace and War: Robert Blake, William Roger Louis: 9780393034097: Amazon.com: Books



Of course the point of that what if is the technical aspects, not the plausibility of the OP. If you have something to contribute to the aero-technics of such of war, even if you think the scenario is implausible, I'd like to hear it.

 

[parsifal]

I rely principally on primary records like Hansard and contemporary history, but in terms of verifiable online records, you can have a look in various places.

Professor David Reynolds work will show you that Halifax could never assume the top job, given the Secret Service files kept on his activities. he knew that the Secret Service had the goods on him, and he knew they would use it to discredit him if he did try to take the top job.

Dr Juliet Gardiner in her paper on this period has written that in any case Halifax would have found it difficult to form a govt. She points out that for a start he was an un-elected member of the house of Lords, and no Lord had been head of Government since 1640. A unity govt was an absolute essential element to the formation of govt, and the other members of the unity ticket, Attlee and Sinclair, simply would not support any member of the appeasement group notwithstanding what you may scrape up in wiki. There is no official record of that meeting, but I believe Gardiners position on that.

As far as the position of the conservative party, they had made it abundantly clear in their no-confidence motion. The party itself had failed to support Chamberlain. the reason was because Chamberlain was a member of the appeasement faction, as was Halifax. The Conservative Party itself wanted these guys out. The options available are either the whole govt resigns and goes to an election, or, they form a unity govt in which either a member of the anti-appeasement conservatives are put into power, or a minority govt is formed. You wont find anything written down about minority govt, because nothing ever came of it. Churchill was there to take the reins, so the issue of minority govt never arose.

With regard to the wiki article you are relying on, Halifax did not enjoy the support of the Labour party as such. They would not support him if his secret dealings had emerged. They werent released until 2010, but would have been if he tried to take power.

As far as the technical aspects are concerned, you cannot separate them from the political positioning. Short answer is this. Halifax couldnt form a govt, Churchill entertained a temporary peace with Hitler only whilst the BEF looked like being lost. No possibility of unrestricted use of the oceans by Germany in any of those scenarios. If general peace lasts, it will be in the form of an uneasy stand off. if Hitler turns east, you can take British support in the form of massively expanded lend lease to the bank.

Even if you want to force the issue and assume the germans have access to the high seas, post Norway they simply lack the shipping capacity to do so. Post Weserubung, German domestic shipping is down to less than 1 million tons. The British have the neutrality Act which makes it illegal to deal with Germany except through the Control Commission, where all shipping must pass through the checking stations at Kirwall and the Downs and much of the cargoes confiscated as contraband. Its simply a pipe dream to suppose they could overcome that. Nearly all the useable neutral shipping after France falls into the hands of the british...or are we waving the magic wand to ignore all that as well????

With Britain unfettered by Uboats and intrinsically opposed to Germany (based on a 400 year pattern of opposing the top power of Europe to prevent European domination by any one power), it is certain the British will give all possible aid to the Russians, whether or not they are at war, regardless if Churchill is in power or not. There is no other option other than that. Any belief that Britain would stand back and give the germans a free hand in europe is a fairytale. So, the aeronautic input you are looking for us that the entire British aeronautic capability, including production capability, would be placed at the disposal of Stalin, to maximise his chances of withstanding the Nazis. Spitfires over Stalingrad in other words, and a re-supply rate of around twice that of the germans. in other words, the same result would eventuate as the historical model

 

[wiking85]

I rely principally on primary records like Hansard and contemporary history, but in terms of verifiable online records, you can have a look in various places.

Professor David Reynolds work will show you that Halifax could never assume the top job, given the Secret Service files kept on his activities. he knew that the Secret Service had the goods on him, and he knew they would use it to discredit him if he did try to take the top job.

Dr Juliet Gardiner in her paper on this period has written that in any case Halifax would have found it difficult to form a govt. She points out that for a start he was an un-elected member of the house of Lords, and no Lord had been head of Government since 1640. A unity govt was an absolute essential element to the formation of govt, and the other members of the unity ticket, Attlee and Sinclair, simply would not support any member of the appeasement group notwithstanding what you may scrape up in wiki. There is no official record of that meeting, but I believe Gardiners position on that.

As far as the position of the conservative party, they had made it abundantly clear in their no-confidence motion. The party itself had failed to support Chamberlain. the reason was because Chamberlain was a member of the appeasement faction, as was Halifax. The Conservative Party itself wanted these guys out. The options available are either the whole govt resigns and goes to an election, or, they form a unity govt in which either a member of the anti-appeasement conservatives are put into power, or a minority govt is formed. You wont find anything written down about minority govt, because nothing ever came of it. Churchill was there to take the reins, so the issue of minority govt never arose.

With regard to the wiki article you are relying on, Halifax did not enjoy the support of the Labour party as such. They would not support him if his secret dealings had emerged. They werent released until 2010, but would have been if he tried to take power.

As far as the technical aspects are concerned, you cannot separate them from the political positioning. Short answer is this. Halifax couldnt form a govt, Churchill entertained a temporary peace with Hitler only whilst the BEF looked like being lost. No possibility of unrestricted use of the oceans by Germany in any of those scenarios. If general peace lasts, it will be in the form of an uneasy stand off. if Hitler turns east, you can take British support in the form of massively expanded lend lease to the bank.

Even if you want to force the issue and assume the germans have access to the high seas, post Norway they simply lack the shipping capacity to do so. Post Weserubung, German domestic shipping is down to less than 1 million tons. The British have the neutrality Act which makes it illegal to deal with Germany except through the Control Commission, where all shipping must pass through the checking stations at Kirwall and the Downs and much of the cargoes confiscated as contraband. Its simply a pipe dream to suppose they could overcome that. Nearly all the useable neutral shipping after France falls into the hands of the british...or are we waving the magic wand to ignore all that as well????

With Britain unfettered by Uboats and intrinsically opposed to Germany (based on a 400 year pattern of opposing the top power of Europe to prevent European domination by any one power), it is certain the British will give all possible aid to the Russians, whether or not they are at war, regardless if Churchill is in power or not. There is no other option other than that. Any belief that Britain would stand back and give the germans a free hand in europe is a fairytale. So, the aeronautic input you are looking for us that the entire British aeronautic capability, including production capability, would be placed at the disposal of Stalin, to maximise his chances of withstanding the Nazis. Spitfires over Stalingrad in other words, and a re-supply rate of around twice that of the germans. in other words, the same result would eventuate as the historical model

You mention this secret file and its certain use as leverage, but what is your source on that contention? How about sources where the two profs you mention support what you claim? The source I provided was a book by Churchill scholars on various topics of his life, including one about how he got the job. It was a pretty serious book on the topic and if you have contradictory sources (not just names of people you claim said stuff, hard sources that can be verified) I'd love to see them. The Conservative party was still the majority in 1940, so they aren't going to reliquish power and Halifax was the only guy in the party to take the job. What Lend-Lease? It didn't exist in 1940 and wouldn't in this scenario because it only started after a lot of politicking by Roosevelt in the US. The British were nearly out of hard currency for foreign trade by the end of 1940 (hence LL), so could supply the Soviets without undermining their own rearmament. Historically they were borrowing from Belgium to finance the war into 1941 before LL kicked in.

The governments in exile are likely going to cut deals with Hitler if Britain drops out, so they bring back their merchant shipping, while the end of the war and blockade means German shipping can come home from the neutral ports they were trapped in during the early war. Plus the Axis captured a fair amount of foreign shipping in the invasion of Norway and Western Europe. Britain didn't control all the waters of Europe, so its not as if they could legally inspect German shipping for contraband; they could cut sales of contraband once Germany invades the USSR, but not stop Germany trading with other neutrals. Britain didn't have the finances to give the USSR unlimited anything for free, plus its not as if the British conservative party, which had a visceral class hatred of the USSR, would supply the USSR with anything for free, rather they were more likely to sell them whatever they could afford and bank on Germany getting stuck in an endless occupation and low/medium level conflict in the East as the rump USSR continued to resist from Central Russia even if it wasn't able to drive out the Germans.

 

[parsifal]

One of the great post war lies is that following the defeat of france, hitler offered generous terms of peace to Britain. It was just so much hitlerian double speak, as the details of directive 13 dated 27 may clealry show.

This is from the translated version of the german Admiralty war diary:

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval ,Staff Special Itern s^

1. Fuehrer Directive No e 13 received (WA/Afrt. L'Nr, 33028AO dated 27 May) %

The directive indicates the destruction of the French, British and Belgian forces enclosed in xirtois and Flanders, as the next aim of operations in the West, Preparations are to. be made in three large operational sectors for the .-.. subsequent Army operation to destroy the enemy forces in France, which is to follow as soon as possible.

Specially Important is the section of the directive which, independent of operations in France, permits the Air Force to use all its resources in warfare against the British Isles as soon as adequate forces are available.

The directive is also of decisive importance for the Navy.

" Previous regulations restricting the conduct of submarine warfare are canceled. Full offensive action is permitted in principle in the waters around Great Britain and off* the French coast. Naval Staff is to submit a proposal for the limitation of maritime areas in which the offensive measures permitted for the siege are used.

Naval Staff makes the following proposal:

Our area: equivalent to the U.S.A. combat zone in which submarines were up to now permitted full offensive action at once against darkened ships, tankers and Greek ships, is extended eastwards, to 3° E, except for a strip 10 miles wide along the coast of the Irish Free State. Submarines are permitted full offensive action at once against all ships in this area.

In the reply to the Fuehrer (seelSkl. I Op* 83? Ao Chefs. dated 28 May, War Diary, Part-C, Vol. IV) it is, however, expressly pointed out that this ruling means that U.S., Irish, Italian, Spanish, etc e ships can also be attacked in this area and that no free access to Ireland is left open.

In order to ensure that not a single concession has to be made from the proposed final ruling because of subsequent considerations and that the forces are not prevented from full exploitation of their weapons by the establishment of exceptions, Naval Staff considers it necessary to notify the neutrals, especially the fri nndly States, that in future German operations in the maritime area around Great Britain and France will involve all ships in increased danger, for which the German Reich must decline all responsibility and therefore warns against traversing the original U.S. combat zone. The. Fuehrers consent has granted to this order. .

2. In a supplement to Directive No, 9 (OKW/WAF Abt. Nr, 33038 Chefs dated 26 May), Armed Forced High Command issues new guideing principles for warfare against the enemy economy. The bases of this have been decisively improved by the occupation of Norway and Holland and the approaching conclusion of operations in Belgium and Northern France. Armed Forces High Command draws the following conclusions and issues the following directives:

a) The destruction of British food supplies is of decisive importance in the battle against the main ports of transshipment and British supply economy.

b) War against enemy tonnage is to be continued in spite of the fact that It cannot be expected alone to have a decisive effect. (Success from forcing into convoys, therefore strain on freight space.)

c) By agreement between Commander in Chief, Navy and Command'er in Chief, Air Force aerial minelaying operations, are to be extended to the French Atlantic
ports also.

d) Interruption of the supply economy (gas, water, electricity is of extreme importance wiithin the conduct of economic warfare.


The directive is in complete concord with Naval Staff's ideas. It points quite clearly to the aim of this war, the destruction of the chief enemy^ Great Britain, The way to her subjection leads via the destruction of her Continental weapon, France, to the starving out of the British Isles and the destruction of her economic fighting strength. This struggle can only be conducted as the greatest economic war of all times, in which the single elements of the economic war are used to develop the maximum effectiveness according to uniform planning. The reference to the overwhelming importance of destroying British food supplies is of special significance regarding Air Force operations. These can exercise a decisive effect on the war if 'carried 'out systematically, but must be "prepared for the present to exclude other valuable and ostensibly worthwhile objective while concentrating on this end For the Navy the fight against enemy tonnage demands that
submarine construction and submarine warfare be pursued with perseverance, while solving the following problems at the same time

....

The order was signed 28 May by Hiltler. Later he mouthed peace feelers of a sort after the fall of france, but intended only for the british to surrender, not make peace as a sovereign nation. Directive 13 was never completed, though the Germans had a very good go at it. It shows the germans were not genuine in their offers of peace at any stage. By 28th May, the british intelligence services were aware of this position.

 

[wiking85]

One of the great post war lies is that following the defeat of france, hitler offered generous terms of peace to Britain. It was just so much hitlerian double speak, as the details of directive 13 dated 27 may clealry show.

This is from the translated version of the german Admiralty war diary:

....

The order was signed 28 May by Hiltler. Later he mouthed peace feelers of a sort after the fall of france, but intended only for the british to surrender, not make peace as a sovereign nation. Directive 13 was never completed, though the Germans had a very good go at it. It shows the germans were not genuine in their offers of peace at any stage. By 28th May, the british intelligence services were aware of this position.

Alright, so I'm going to assume you don't have sources to back up your previous statements and are reframing the discussion to avoid that acknowledgement. So instead you provided a war order that Hitler issued in the middle of a major military campaign before France was defeated and any sort of peace discussions were on the table. I'm sure you can find similar orders on the British side about blockading Germany to force and end to the war. This has no bearing on the peace discussion because its a war order before France surrendered and the political situation changed and it has nothing to do with Hitler's position on peace its a military order on how to continue the war into the next phase once the current campaign is brought to a close.

 

[Juha]

No, but Hitler was informed of that and he dismissed it claiming a way would be found; had the Black Sea ports been taken Axis shipping could have made it viable in 1943 due to taking the pressure off of rail supply.

Maybe but Germans had found out that the harbours were hard to take at least from the north ie from the land side.

 

[parsifal]

ive already provided two sources, plus hansard, plus the german Admiralties war diary. You may also wish to look at halifaxes own memoirs. Churchills memoirs are of some assistance as well as to what happened. Halifax is silent on the issue of his illegal behaviour, but in his own words he states

"I had no doubt at all in my own mind that for me to succeed him would create a quite impossible situation. Apart altogether from Churchill's qualities as compared with my own at this particular juncture, what would in fact be my position? Churchill would be running Defence, and in this connexion one could not but remember the relationship between Asquith and Lloyd George had broken down in the first war... I should speedily become a more or less honorary Prime Minister, living in a kind of twilight just outside the things that really mattered"

If you have difficulty in accessing those unpublished works by the professors (they are available if you try however), You should perhaps take a look at a published work. Churchill's Secret Enemy By Jonathan Pile is a good single volume source to explore this stuff pretty well. Essentially it brings out Halifax's secret dealings as sidelining both Churchill and Hitlers and achieving a tempoirary settlement with the Germans to give Britain time to recover, not an abject surrender.


no, I am not short of information, nor am i conceding anything. But flaming your own thread is something I dont want to be part of. Just remember that because the whole scenario is based on the false premise that Hitler was prepared to make a genuine, lasting peace in Europe, or that he did not, and halifax would agree to unfettered german aggression in the East, the whole debate leaves the realm of plausible alternative history and fits better in the category of fantasy.

 

[wiking85]

Maybe but Germans had found out that the harbours were hard to take at least from the north ie from the land side.

Primarily because the Soviets had the Black Sea Fleet to support the southern side and keep it supplied. Without the war in the West, had say X. Fliegerkorps been in the Black Sea region instead of fighting the British in the Mediterranean they would have probably killed the Black Sea Fleet in 1941 and finished up the remnants during 1942. In fact with the anti-shipping unit present Odessa probably falls a lot sooner and without the evacuated troops helping Sevastopol during the late 1941 push to take that city (with support of the X. Fliegerkorps) it probably falls. That probably prevents the Soviet landings on Kerch in December, which in turn means without the Crimean operations in 1942 that the 11th army goes north sooner and Case Blue starts in May or early June. A Caucasian push with the X. Fliegerkorps mining and blockading the ports in the Black Sea while killing remaining Soviet shipping means those ports fall and supplies start flowing a lot closer to the front.

 

[Juha]

Primarily because the Soviets had the Black Sea Fleet to support the southern side and keep it supplied. Without the war in the West, had say X. Fliegerkorps been in the Black Sea region instead of fighting the British in the Mediterranean they would have probably killed the Black Sea Fleet in 1941 and finished up the remnants during 1942. In fact with the anti-shipping unit present Odessa probably falls a lot sooner and without the evacuated troops helping Sevastopol during the late 1941 push to take that city (with support of the X. Fliegerkorps) it probably falls. That probably prevents the Soviet landings on Kerch in December, which in turn means without the Crimean operations in 1942 that the 11th army goes north sooner and Case Blue starts in May or early June. A Caucasian push with the X. Fliegerkorps mining and blockading the ports in the Black Sea while killing remaining Soviet shipping means those ports fall and supplies start flowing a lot closer to the front.

But that would also mean no Operation Trappenjagd (Soviet losses 170 000 men, 400+ a/c, hundreds of tanks and guns) so crossing of Kerch Strait would have been more difficult.

 

[wiking85]

But that would also mean no Operation Trappenjagd (Soviet losses 170 000 men, 400+ a/c, hundreds of tanks and guns) so crossing of Kerch Strait would have been more difficult.

Except the Germans didn't cross the Kerch straight in 1942, they attacked it from the land side after moving south from Rostov. Those forces would probably be killed either north of Rostov fighting Case Blue or south after Case Blue rolled on into the Caucasus.

 

[parsifal]

Primarily because the Soviets had the Black Sea Fleet to support the southern side and keep it supplied. Without the war in the West, had say X. Fliegerkorps been in the Black Sea region instead of fighting the British in the Mediterranean they would have probably killed the Black Sea Fleet in 1941 and finished up the remnants during 1942. In fact with the anti-shipping unit present Odessa probably falls a lot sooner and without the evacuated troops helping Sevastopol during the late 1941 push to take that city (with support of the X. Fliegerkorps) it probably falls. That probably prevents the Soviet landings on Kerch in December, which in turn means without the Crimean operations in 1942 that the 11th army goes north sooner and Case Blue starts in May or early June. A Caucasian push with the X. Fliegerkorps mining and blockading the ports in the Black Sea while killing remaining Soviet shipping means those ports fall and supplies start flowing a lot closer to the front.

There were already elements of FKX and most of the Black Sea Flt was out of action by the end of 1942. There were other problems that bedevilled german oil imports. Their merchant marine was so devastated by the campaign in Norway, that even if their international trade could resume, their balance of payments were in ruins by that stage. This is exemplified by their inability to even pay the rumanians for the oil sources they did have access to. In 1941, Rumania was the chief supplier of oil to Germany. It reached respectable levels June - December 1941, with a minimum monthly delivery rate of 150000 tons in June, rising to 361000 in August and then for the rest of the year monthly deliveries hovered around 220000 tons per month. Then for three months there was a disastrous collapse in production, to well under 100000 tons (average was 74000) due mostly to the inability of the Reich to pay for its imports. The Rumanians refused to hand over their oil for nothing, but more seriously the trasnsport capacity of the eastern european railway network and the Danube barge traffic was inadequate to maintain the flow of oil and continue the prosecution of the war in the east.

Capturing the Russian ports in the Black sea was occurring, but it would not come anywhere near solving the oil supply issues for Germany. A report prepared in July I think, found that it would be at least 2 years before the captured wells could return to meaningful production, and then only if there was a complete cessation of hostilities at the front. Maikop wells were never returned to full production even post war until the 1960's!

And how on earth are the Germans going to get shipping into the Black Sea. Turkey, even as a neutral would never allow any shipping from any nation to pass through the Bosphorus in wartime, and you can bet your bottom dollar that Britain sure as hell wouldnt allow a transfer of shipping in this way. not that germany had any shipping to spare. They barely had enough to keep the flow of iron and coal coming in from scandinavia after Norway, let alone releasing vast amounts of shipping to ply the Black sea for non-existent oil supplies, to be transported to Constanta to overload even further an overttyaxed rail system and barge capacity....or better yet, risking that shipping as it passed through British controlled waters and past the allied control commission ships

Its just another example of wishful; thinking and the ultimate German wet dreams.

 

[Koopernic]

Did the Jumo 211J have the performance a fighter needed? Also would the DB605 have had as many issues with access to quality lubricants and materials? Plus wouldn't its supercharger be more tuned for lower altitudes? What was a decent hs129 engine option by 1941-42? Also wouldn't the Jumo 222 be alright in 1943 if it had access to proper materials? Apparently Milch put it in the production schedule for 1944 and probably could have started in 1943 if not for the strategic bombing especially of the Dessau facility.

The DB605A didn't get released for 1.42 ata boost till somewhere between june-October 1943. Thus for nearly a year the Jumo 211J produced more power, mainly down low.

The Czech Avia company produced Me 109 with Jumo 211 but they were horrible because they used a Ju 88 propeller and gearbox and thus had the wrong weight distribution.

Roughly the story is
Ju 288A was to weigh 11 tons, have 3 crew and required 2000hp of the Jumo 222A2/B2. The first two Ju 288A prototypes flew on BMW801 but the V3 and V4 flew on 2000hp Jumo 222A2/B2 before December 1941.

Requirements changed and the Ju 288B was speced to be a 4 man 14 tons aircraft, this required the 2500hp Jumo 222A2/B2, in fact it now required the Jumo 222E/F which had an two stage supercharger and intercooler.

This was asking too much of the engine as production had to begin in December 1942 and so they upped the weight of the Ju 288 again to create the Ju 288C which was now to be powered by the DB610 (same as He 177). Ju 288C prototypes with the DB606 coupled engines caused problems but the Ju 288C with DB610 earned praise from its pilots.

The sleave bearings apparently required a lot of tin and as this was in short supply it gave another reason to suspend the production of the engine while it was improved.

Jumo 222A2/B2 was definitely on the production program for September 1944 but delayed due to need to produce Jumo 213 as a result of engine production dispersal. The improved Jumo 222A3/Be and Jumo 222E/F as well. A Jumo 222E/F was taken to the USA and its performance was regarded as impressive. Supposedly one prototype Ju 288 flew with 2500hp engines in November 1944. The Jumo 222E/F actually achieved 2800hp on B4+MW50.

There was also a Jumo 222C/D which although same configuration and type number should be regarded as a completely separate engine as it had over 60L capacity and was expected to produce 3500hp. It had run a number of times. It was shifted on to the highest development program in late 1944: Amerika bomber.

Rejecting the Jumo 222A2/B2 rated at only 2000hp is perplexing and surely only a production philosophy decision. The Dornier Do 217, particularly the Do 217M would have been a monster with it.

 

[tomo pauk]

The DB605A didn't get released for 1.42 ata boost till somewhere between june-October 1943. Thus for nearly a year the Jumo 211J produced more power, mainly down low.

Vs. the DB 601E/605A, the Jumo 211J has several shortcomings, besides the lower power: it was wider (804 mm vs. 705 mm and 763 mm respectively), it is also higher 28 mm; that, coupled with intercooler installed, will mean more drag; it need to be modified to allow for prop cannon. The 30-min rating, 'Kampfleistung', is 1260 PS at 1.5 km, vs. DB 601E with 1280 PS at 2.1 km and vs. DB 605A with 1400 PS at 2.1 km. That leads us to another reason why the Avia copy was a lesser fighter than the Bf-109G.
If we want even more power from the DB 601E/605A down low, use the lower supercharger step-up gearing, same way when DB 601Aa was created from DB 601A.

The Czech Avia company produced Me 109 with Jumo 211 but they were horrible because they used a Ju 88 propeller and gearbox and thus had the wrong weight distribution.

The Avia copy was burdened with every draggy item from the late Bf-109s: HMG bulges, fixed tailwheel, bigger main wheels wing bulges to acomodate them, gondola cannons. Add the low power of the Jumo (211F?) and in 1946 you have a a fighter that is not even as good as Spitfire V.

 

[Koopernic]

The DB505A 1.3ata produced 1300ps at sea level, the jumo 211J 1420ps.
The jumo was 804mm v 763 wide, not much, 5% I also suspect more jet thrust of the jumo.

 

[Juha]

Except the Germans didn't cross the Kerch straight in 1942, they attacked it from the land side after moving south from Rostov. Those forces would probably be killed either north of Rostov fighting Case Blue or south after Case Blue rolled on into the Caucasus.

Maybe, maybe not but anyway Trappenjagd was exceptionally succesful operation, the loss ratio was almost 20:1, so probably destroying the 3 Soviet armies later would have been more costly to Germans. And as Parcifal wrote, Soviets were very thorough in their destruction work, Germans didn't get a drop of oil from Maikop wells before they had to retreat from there in Jan 43.

 

[tomo pauk]

The DB505A 1.3ata produced 1300ps at sea level, the jumo 211J 1420ps.
The jumo was 804mm v 763 wide, not much, 5% I also suspect more jet thrust of the jumo.

The 1420 PS power was for take off only, allowed for 1 min. It won't help any bit in aerial combat. Wider and higher engine that also has an intercooler means not only greater drag, but also necessitates redesign of front part of front part of the Bf 109.
Expecting from the Jumo 211J to have greater exhaust thrust than DB 605, despite lower power, seems a bit off IMO.

The Bf 109 have had it's shortcomings. Installation of a draggier powerplant that requires a redesign of airframe and has less power would not solve anything.