I didn't ignore anything, and I think we both know that. You are looking for facts to suit your conclusion instead of the other way around.
Why on earth would I look for facts that don't suit my conclusion?
I haven't seen any
facts that don't suit my conclusion. I have seen some conjecture or supposition.
What was the oil production of Java in 1942?
enough to support Japan as it was historically or enough to support various expeditions using tens of thousands of tons of fuel per week.?
WHat was the Japanese transport situation in the summer of 1942? enough to keep the home Islands supplied with imports (pretty much the pre-war goal of the Japanese merchant fleet + foreign hired shipping which tended to disappear in 1942) with how much surplus shipping to support some grand adventures?
The Japanese had ports on Sumatra, they had Rangoon (wrecked by the British during the retreat but repairable), they had Kuala Lampur, and yes they had Singapore
A port is NOT a base. A port
might be a base if it has sufficient supplies and repair facilities for what you are trying to do.
The supplies they positioned in Truk and Rabaul weren't there before the war, they had the ability to move logistics.
Well, you may be technically correct in that much of the supplies at Truk and Rabaul were brought there after the war started, depending on exactly when you are talking about
" The Japanese had in fact developed considerable base facilities here before the war, including four separate
airfields and storage for 77,200 tons of fuel
oil, including a 10,000-ton underground tank and two 33,600-ton above-ground
steel tanks (
151.883E 7.369N). This was the largest Japanese fuel depot outside the home islands. "
from
The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Truk
But your statement gives a rather false impression as how important Truk was to Japanese plans leading up to the war.
The above quote also shows some of the difference between a "port" and a "base"
The IJA also demonstrated during the conquest of Burma that they could still handle British colonial forces in 1942. If the British made a major effort to challenge them there they could always move more assets in.
Yes the Japanese did handle the colonial forces fairly well in Burma. But in Sri Lanka/India the numbers would be much more against the Japanese. Some accounts of the fighting in Burma/Singapore have it a fairly narrow race between the British surrendering and the Japanese running out of supplies. Yet you are proposing a bigger operation 1500 miles further away than Singapore?
I would note that the British torpedoes seemed to work fairly well at this point in the war. I would also note that the British submarine service achieved the 2nd highest kill to loss ratio of any submarine service in WW II. (the Americans were 1st) and that while they had only 3 Subs in the Pacific in Jan of 1942 they had 8 T class boats at Alexandria in Jan of 1942.