Most certainly, but instead of just modifying the Ki-43, a new design incorporating the type's features would seem more plausible, perhaps utilising the same basis of the Type 9-Shi fighter, as with what the A5M was to the A6M? The aircraft has to meet the stringent requirements of the 12-Shi spec. The Ki-43 alone would not have done so.
The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.
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Most certainly, but instead of just modifying the Ki-43, a new design incorporating the type's features would seem more plausible, perhaps utilising the same basis of the Type 9-Shi fighter, as with what the A5M was to the A6M? The aircraft has to meet the stringent requirements of the 12-Shi spec. The Ki-43 alone would not have done so.
Seems to me one of the biggest problems the Japanese had with regard to improving their fighters was with their engines. One comparatively easy solution to that was by borrowing German ones like the Italians did. They had what I would call a partial technology transfer of the DB 600 series engine, an early (I think 601A) version which was adapted to the Ki 61. The problem is that Japanese industry had trouble adapting to the new engine, and probably could have used more help. Communications with the Germans was very limited and difficult. By the mid-war any physical transfer of artifacts such as engines, parts, blueprints or machine tools had to be done by submarine, and those were often being caught and destroyed by US or British naval assets.
If they had been able to start robust production of a reliable DB 601E some time around 1942, which probably would have required the Germans sending maybe a couple of people and a lot of documentation and machine tools, that Ki-61 could have become much more of a problem for the Americans. That might have given the Japanese a viable replacement to the Ki-43 and possibly also the A6M in time to make a difference until their own radial engine designs caught up.
If they had been able to start robust production of a reliable DB 601E some time around 1942, which probably would have required the Germans sending maybe a couple of people and a lot of documentation and machine tools, that Ki-61 could have become much more of a problem for the Americans. That might have given the Japanese a viable replacement to the Ki-43 and possibly also the A6M in time to make a difference until their own radial engine designs caught up.
Packard was able to make good Merlins after about a year. Alfa Romeo was able to get 601 series engine production working pretty well - no doubt under close German supervision, but it took a little while too. Japan suffered from being so far from their Ally.
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This is certainly true as time progressed but initially this was not an issue. The Zero's performance in 1940/1941 was comparable to foreign carrier fighters of the same vintage. Obviously as time went on, the discrepancies became greater.
Yup, it was the DB 601A, which became the Kawasaki Ha-40 engine that powered the Ki-61 and its predecessor the Ki-60 heavy interceptor, the naval variant was the Aichi Atsuta that went into the excellent Yokosuka D4Y dive bomber. The Japanese versions suffered mechanically inthat crankshaft failure was an issue - many of the problems were never solved and apparently the engine was not popular from a mechanic's standpoint.
An aircraft that never progressed that held promise, powered by the same engine was the Nakajima Ki-62, which looked like a Ki-84 with an inline engine, the latter incorporating design features of the Ki-62. Only one was built and it was discontinued in favour of developing the Ki-43 and '-44 fighters. Perhaps a Nakajima 12-Shi might have resembled the projected radial engined variant, the Ki-63, that looked like a Ki-84?
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michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
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- Jul 15, 2016
I actually think facing p40s with A5Ms at this stage is not as hopeless as it might look at first glance. At that point in the game everyone was still turnfighting, tactics to use speed and if possible altitude to neutralize the moaenuverability advantage of Japanese types had not been developed. In low or medium speed turning fight between an A5m and a p40 I'm not sure the p40 comes out on top. I think things are going to be alot closer than we might think with our knowledge of tactics that were developed later.
The similar (maybe superior) Ki 27 didn't fare that well against P-40s though it mostly faced pilots using BnZ tactics. I know A5M faced I-16 and some other types in Manchuria not sure how that went precisely. I think the speed disparity with those fixed undercarriage types is so significant it would become obvious pretty quickly how to win against them. The Zero was a lot scarier because it's performance was actually quite good. P-40s could outrun them in dives etc. but it took careful tactics and discipline. It was never easy or safe to fight a Zero with a good pliot even in much more powerful fighters late in the war.
Reading about the Germans selling liquid cooled engine technology to the Japanese.
They did not mind sending how to build the engines.
They refused to sell the Fuel Injection Technology the Japanese had to design their own.
Seems they did an ok job but were unreliable because there were too few trained mechanics to tune them.
When they did work Ki61 was a competitive aircraft.
When they came on line were able to dive and outclass the P-40s.
This caused General Kenny to ask for more P-38 Lightnings.
(I am looking for the specific Citation)
They did not mind sending how to build the engines.
They refused to sell the Fuel Injection Technology the Japanese had to design their own.
Seems they did an ok job but were unreliable because there were too few trained mechanics to tune them.
When they did work Ki61 was a competitive aircraft.
When they came on line were able to dive and outclass the P-40s.
This caused General Kenny to ask for more P-38 Lightnings.
(I am looking for the specific Citation)
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Oh, but they had! Unfortunately, this was done by the heretic, Chennault, which rendered it unpalatable to the air combat orthodoxy of USAAF. It took costly lessons to vindicate his tactical lessons to the Establishment.
Cheers,
Wes
A virgin prewar P40 pilot, uncontaminated by Chennaultism, would be meat on the table for any reasonably competent A5M driver.
Cheers,
Wes
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MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
Both the A6M and Ki-43 seats were designed to be used with parachutes so you needed a parachute to sit in them. Shinpachi and others have blown that myth away multiple times.
Unlike any of our fighters the A6m had an excellent flotation system to give the pilot time to evacuate the aircraft after ditching. See the Zeke 32, Design Analysis article
MiTasol
1st Lieutenant
The critical factor on the Atsuta engine was the shortage of copper in Japan - to the point that they named the engine after the shrine gates that were melted to provide the copper. (Francillon Japanese aircraft of the Pacific)
When an aviation maintenance monoculture suddenly has to cope with a new and radically different technology which stands all of their practices and procedures on their heads, it tends to disrupt things a little.
I just read the metliculously researched "South Pacific Air War" which described several incidents of Japanese pilots not wearing parachutes in the New Guinea area.
fubar57
General
Probably a personal choice.
DA WEBS
DA WEBS
My fathers only drama as a stoker on a destroyer in WW2 was hitting an iceberg, I stupidly said "why didn't you learn to swim dad", "what the hell would I swim to in iced water"? came the curt reply. For some naval aviators saving the weight was a rational decision if your chances of being rescued were close to zero.
fubar57
General
Sakai Saburo's thoughts, from "Samurai"...
"In 1942, none of our fighter planes carried pilot armor, nor did the Zeros have self-sealing fuel tanks, as did the American planes. As the enemy pilots soon discovered, a burst of their 50-caliber bullets into the fuel tanks of a Zero caused it to explode violently in flames. Despite this, in those days not one of our pilots flew with parachutes. This has been misinterpreted in the West as proof that our leaders were disdainful of our lives, that all Japanese pilots were expendable and regarded as pawns rather than human beings. This was far from the truth. Every man was assigned a parachute; the decision to fly without them was our own and not the result of orders from higher headquarters. Actually, we were urged, although not ordered, to wear the parachutes in combat. At some fields the base commander insisted that chutes be worn, and those men had no choice but to place the bulky packs in their planes. Often, however, they never fastened the straps, and used the chutes only as seat cushions.
We had little use for these parachutes, for the only purpose they served for us was to hamstring our cockpit movements in a battle. It was difficult to move our arms and legs when encumbered by chute straps. There was another, and equally compelling, reason for not carrying the chutes into combat. The majority of our battles were fought with enemy fighters over their own fields. It was out of the question to bail out over enemy territory, for such a move meant a willingness to be captured, and nowhere in the Japanese military code or in the traditional Bushido (Samurai code) could one find the distasteful words "Prisoner of War." There were no prisoners. A man who did not return from combat was dead. No fighter pilot of any courage would ever permit himself to be captured by the enemy. It was completely unthinkable"
"In 1942, none of our fighter planes carried pilot armor, nor did the Zeros have self-sealing fuel tanks, as did the American planes. As the enemy pilots soon discovered, a burst of their 50-caliber bullets into the fuel tanks of a Zero caused it to explode violently in flames. Despite this, in those days not one of our pilots flew with parachutes. This has been misinterpreted in the West as proof that our leaders were disdainful of our lives, that all Japanese pilots were expendable and regarded as pawns rather than human beings. This was far from the truth. Every man was assigned a parachute; the decision to fly without them was our own and not the result of orders from higher headquarters. Actually, we were urged, although not ordered, to wear the parachutes in combat. At some fields the base commander insisted that chutes be worn, and those men had no choice but to place the bulky packs in their planes. Often, however, they never fastened the straps, and used the chutes only as seat cushions.
We had little use for these parachutes, for the only purpose they served for us was to hamstring our cockpit movements in a battle. It was difficult to move our arms and legs when encumbered by chute straps. There was another, and equally compelling, reason for not carrying the chutes into combat. The majority of our battles were fought with enemy fighters over their own fields. It was out of the question to bail out over enemy territory, for such a move meant a willingness to be captured, and nowhere in the Japanese military code or in the traditional Bushido (Samurai code) could one find the distasteful words "Prisoner of War." There were no prisoners. A man who did not return from combat was dead. No fighter pilot of any courage would ever permit himself to be captured by the enemy. It was completely unthinkable"
