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Perhaps I am missing something here.
In the battle of Coral Sea and again at Midway, the enemies engaged each other solely by aircraft alone and the opposing fleets suffered damage and destruction solely by aircraft alone.
And it was the action of these aircraft that altered the intentions of the fleets - in the case of Coral Sea, the planned invasion of Port Moresby was abandoned and in the case of Midway, the invasion of Midway island was abandoned.
There were no engagements by surface ships or actions by submarines that influenced the course of either battle. The order to abandon the Port Moresby invasion was mainly due to the fact that the Japanese suspected there were more Allied carriers in the area...in otherwords, for the fear of more air attacks.
Strategic change occurs when your overall objectives are forced to change. That didn't happen due to fighters at the BoB, and it didn't happen solely because of coral sea or midway. They were big operational successes, but they were not overwhelming strategic victories 9as is so often touted for them0 because they did not lead to any change in Japanese objectives at the time, or allied objectives either 9well maybe watchtower was made possible I guess)
Except for the fact that, except for land-based aircraft at Midway itself, all those air sorties were flown off ships. Ergo to say it was "only aircraft" is stretching things a little. It took a lot of naval resources, not just the carriers themselves, to get both sets of forces ready for action around Midway.
Again, 'fraid I disagree. The extent to which an action is or is not strategic is largely dependent on each side's primary strategic centre of gravity. It is entirely possible for a battle to have major strategic consequences even if an adversary's strategy doesn't change.
Take the Battle of Britain as an example. Until that time Hitler had the luxury of, for the most part, embarking on a sequential series of campaigns with a common objective. Everything was moving in one direction and he was never forced to fight a true 2-front effort. After the BoB, the entire strategic calculus had changed. Hitler had to face the prospect of a 2-front war which any good student of military history will tell you is a recipe for disaster. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler's megalomania refused to concede that he could possibly lose and so he pressed ahead. His strategic objective remained unchanged but the context surrounding that strategy had shifted seismically against him...it's just that he refused to respond to that change. The ultimate result was disaster for his aspirations of global dominion.
Bottom line...you don't have to force a change of adversary objective to result in a strategic impact. If the enemy is too stupid to realize that the situation has changed, they may well press ahead with original plans, to their own detriment.
Except for the fact that, except for land-based aircraft at Midway itself, all those air sorties were flown off ships. Ergo to say it was "only aircraft" is stretching things a little. It took a lot of naval resources, not just the carriers themselves, to get both sets of forces ready for action around Midway.
Again, 'fraid I disagree. The extent to which an action is or is not strategic is largely dependent on each side's primary strategic centre of gravity. It is entirely possible for a battle to have major strategic consequences even if an adversary's strategy doesn't change.
Take the Battle of Britain as an example. Until that time Hitler had the luxury of, for the most part, embarking on a sequential series of campaigns with a common objective. Everything was moving in one direction and he was never forced to fight a true 2-front effort. After the BoB, the entire strategic calculus had changed. Hitler had to face the prospect of a 2-front war which any good student of military history will tell you is a recipe for disaster. Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler's megalomania refused to concede that he could possibly lose and so he pressed ahead. His strategic objective remained unchanged but the context surrounding that strategy had shifted seismically against him...it's just that he refused to respond to that change. The ultimate result was disaster for his aspirations of global dominion.
Bottom line...you don't have to force a change of adversary objective to result in a strategic impact. If the enemy is too stupid to realize that the situation has changed, they may well press ahead with original plans, to their own detriment.
The Battle of the Atlantic was won primarily by the surface escorts before the mid Atlantic gap was closed. Read the book Black May which tells the story of the pivotal convoy battle of the war, convoy ON5. Without any air support the 4 corvettes , 1 frigate and 1 destroyer of Escort Group B5 (reinforced sporadically by destroyers) fought off two wolfpacks totaling 43 U boats . The fighting was extraordinarily intense such that historians have difficulty in counting the numbers of attacks that were made. The final tally was 13 merchantman ships lost for 6 U boats sunk and 7 damaged, a exchange ratio the Germans could not afford. This was followed by the successful defense of 3 more convoys. Donitz called off the attacks on north Atlantic convoys on May 24, 1943. Air power certainly contributed but it was not the most important element. A convoy could be successfully defended by surface vessels alone but could not be defended by airpower alone.The Liberator definitely helped a lot but I heard it was a combination of things that won the battle of the Atlantic, and the Liberator was only one component of that?
Right. And you think that USAAF 8th AF precision bombing was actually precise?
Their accuracy was probably not much different to the Lancasters at night.
Also, when Lancasters were sent against the German oil industry they needed fewer sorties to knock the facilities out than did B-17s.
The Battle of the Atlantic was won primarily by the surface escorts before the mid Atlantic gap was closed. .
The Boeing B-17, with Honorable Mention going to the Curtiss Hawk series. While the Lancaster, Halifax and Wellington were notable nocturnal bomb trucks, able to set fires in big cities causing lots of mayhem, it took daylight precision bombing, no matter how costly, to actually knock out the Nazi strategic targets. I mean, at least some of your bombs must hit in the intended target area to achieve the necessary effect. .
I thought this would be interesting because it's a bit different from the usual which aircraft is best at a particular mission or in general. Alot of this had to do with factors other than performance such as oportunity( being in the right place at the right time) , numbers produced, and maybe even just plain luck.
Lots of possible good picks here. A couple obvious ones are of course the Spitfire and Hurricane. For me though I think I would have to go with the SBD, the caviaght being that it by far mostly affected the Pacific theater. The difference it made in that theater however was huge.
Would love to hear everyones picks and I'll bet there's a few good ones I haven't even thought of.
So which aircraft would you credit most for turning the tide.
I believe the C-47/Dakota was the one aircraft that made victory possible. The true turning point of the war in Europe was D-Day and without the paras and gliders backing up the invasion, the invasion would have not been a success.
The question was "which airplane did the most to turn the tide of war", not who finished it and whether the Lancaster could or couldn't carry the atom bomb!
So, in answer to the question:
For the RAF in Europe - the Hurricane (for obvious reasons - it and its pilots saved Britain); For the US in the Pacific - the SBD (finished off the Japanese carriers and thus directly influenced the course of the war); for the US in Europe - the duality of B-17 and B-24 (the war restarted in Europe when these two showed up and changed everything from 1943 as between 1941 and 1943 not much happened in that theatre).
This is mostly true, however the bit about massive bombing campaigns using Lancasters before the USAF turned up in force with the B-17's needs a little clarification. The British only built 693 Lancasters in 1942. They used Lancasters in large number of raids in 1942 but the large numbers of aircraft per raid were made up of other bombers than the Lancaster.I could be wrong but weren't the British essentially launching some massive bombing campaigns using Lancasters before the USAF turned up in force with the B-17's? From memory the American bombing campaign took a while to get going because it took so long to get all the equipment and personnel into the UK.
The Americans don't show up to bomb Germany until Jan of 1943 (they did bomb targets in france and low countries in late 1942) so the British do beat them on that score no matter how many or how few Lancasters were used.
At the outbreak of the war the UK had about 130 Spitfires in service. At the fall of France there were approximately equal numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes 250 each. All losses inflicted by the RAF in France up to Dunkerque were by Hurricanes, and other forces used Hurricanes too, Hawkers could make them faster than the RAF could take them into service. Without the Hurricane we would have had no real numbers of pilots experienced on monoplane fighters. Of course if there wasn't a "Hurricane" much more effort would have been put into other things, but that is "what if".
In Season 3, Episode 4 of Grand Tour television show, James May echoes the argument that the hurricane won the Battle of Britain. He also asserts that the Battle of Britain was actually a draw. That would be so interesting argument.