The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

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This thread is certainly becoming very revealing. Not to be outdone, I can reveal that the super plane whose appearance yet again turned the tide in the pacific war (as the european one was over), making the Japanese belive they still had a chance, was merely a copy of an allied plane.

It is testified somewhere in another thread that the outstanding Ki 61 was merely a copy of the He-100. In 1945 this was however not anymore up to the task, and Kawasaki therefore applied their copying skills to the Curtiss P-36, making the plane that had it not taken so long to reverse engineer, would have driven the allies from the skies over Japan.

Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the Curtiss Ki-100.

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1711954696680.jpeg
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
Another important effect of the B-29 was psychological: it allowed the Japanese population to understand that all the propaganda about the war was clearly BS.
Click to expand...
I agree. For context, I was a young kid at Johnson AFB and Tokyo from age 3 to 6. Tokyo was still rebuilding and the area around the Palace still showed the scars of March 1945.

The polite ''resentment' toward Gaijin was tangible to me even at that early age.Today,I totally understand the POV.
 
EwenS said:
Liberators
The first Coastal Command Liberators were 11 (10 with 20mm gun pack) LB-30B (ex B-24A) delivered in 1941 as Liberator GR.1. These were followed by 10 LB-30 conversions during 1942 as Liberator GR.II. None of these conversions had turbosupercharged engines.

There was then a batch of 11 B-24D delivered from US stocks as an emergency delivery in March/April 1942 as Liberator IIIA (delivery dates for these and subsequent deliveries are when received at Dorval in Canada. They still had to find their way to Britain to be fitted out to CC requirements)

Deliveries from RAF orders then began in April 1942 with 57 GR.III delivered until Oct 1942. These and the following GR.V were based on the B-24D airframe. It is these that feature in the photo in post #1372 above (taken at Aldergrove in March 1943, the nearest pair belong to 120 squadron & the third, with the "Dumbo" nose to 86 squadron). The GR.V was the first version fitted with centimetric radars (other than for trials and there were several different radars and radomes involved, the earliest having the "Dumbo" undernose radome) and only 4 were delivered between Aug & Dec 1942. In all 220 GR.V were delivered through until Nov 1943. So it was spring 1943 before the GR.V began to reach front line units. But the equipment fits, especially fuel tank arrangements, radar & armament, varied across the GR.III/V fleet with the result that by the end of May 1943 CC broke them down into Class A, B (with sub classes i, ii, iii) and C. And individual aircraft often had their equipment changed, so changing classification.

The CC Order of Battle for 10 May 1943 shows the following Liberator squadrons and their strengths and available numbers:-

Aldergrove:-
86 - 15/8
59 - 14/1 (This unit had converted from the Fortress IIA in Mar/Apr 1943 and was in the process of relocating to Aldergrove)

Beaulieu:-
224 - GR.V 19/5
53 - GR.III/V 2/0 (In process of converting from Whitley VII to Liberators from 11 May)

Reykjavik
120 - GRI/III 19/8

311 squadron converted to the Liberator GR.V from July & 547 from Oct 1943 to augment the Liberator force in CC.

At this time CC also had 2 squadrons of Fortress IIA on Benbecula (30 aircraft with 10 available) and 2 squadrons of Halifax at Holmsley South / ST Eval (converted from Whitley VII Dec 1942- Feb 1943. 34 aircraft with 11 available). There were also 2 operational USAAF B-24D anti-submarine squadrons (plus another 2 still to come on line). The remaining aircraft were Sunderland & Catalina flying boats and some Hudsons.

Available numbers were affected by the sortie length that these aircraft flew and the maintenance they required in between. So the number of land based LR/VLR aircraft available to CC around this time was not huge by any means.

Support Groups
While it is true that a number of destroyers were transferred from the Home Fleet to Western Approaches Command from March 1943, their usefulness was limited by NOT being equipped with centimetric radars (Type 271/272) OR HF/DF (ships allocated long term to Western Approaches had the priority for these equipments over Home Fleet destroyers), although some ships got these during their stint in WAC. And most of them received very little specialist AS training before embarking on their new tasking. There were other limitations. Lack of escort oilers meaning that these relatively thirsty short ranged destroyers had to be sent to ports periodically to refuel. And that also meant that the composition in the groups kept changing so practice as a team was limited.

Escort carriers
The were only beginning to appear in the North Atlantic with only Biter & Archer operating regularly during the March - June period. (other RN escort carriers joined convoys as protection in this period during their delivery voyages to Britain, where they then had to go into refit to bring them up to RN standards - see loss of Avenger & Dasher for the reasons why amongst others).

USN
Somewhere I have some information on USN CVE operations in theis period and their changing tactics if anyone is interested. But no time tonight.
Click to expand...
175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.

The first appearance was the Bogue in March which failed in its first two attempts, turning back prematurely due to storm damage and defects (HX 228 and SC123). This was particularly unfortunate in the case of HX 228 because it suffered heavy losses after the departure of Bogue. Bogue was out of action for a month to repair storm damge and a defective catapult. Biter's first convoy was ONS 4 in April followed by Archer with ONS 6 in May.

Bogue HX 228 6-Mar-43 10-Mar-43 Aborted
Bogue SC 123 20-Mar-43 26-Mar-43 Aborted
Biter ONS 4 23-Apr-43 26-Apr-43
Bogue HX 235 25-Apr-43 30-Apr-43
Biter HX 237 7-May-43 13-May-43
Archer ONS 6 9-May-43 11-May-43
Archer ON 182 12-May-43 14-May-43
Biter SC 129 13-May-43 16-May-43
Bogue ON 184 19-May-43 25-May-43
Archer HX 239 21-May-43 24-May-43
On May 24 the U-Boats are withdrawn from North Atlantic.
Biter HX 242 9-June-43 12-June-43
Biter ONS 10 14-June-43 18-June-43
Chaser HX 245 23-June-43 4-July-43
Biter SC 135 1-July-43 4-July-43

Out of the 21 North Atlantic convoys in May 1943 only 6 included an escort carrier. The bulk of the air cover in the Atlantic Gap was by VLR Liberations flying from Iceland.
Chaser is an interesting story. It was on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was not intended to be a part of the escort but on its own initiative flew ASW patrols in conjunction with the MAC ship Empire MacAlpine.
After SC 135 there was a hiatus. Bogue had moved to the Mid Atlantic at the end of May, Archer was retired prematurely due to major defects and Biter, which was also a flawed ship, underwent an extensive refit.
The Escort Carriers returned to the North Atlantic with Tracker in September followed by the reappearance of Biter in October

Tracker ON 203 25-Sept-43 30-Sept-43
Tracker HX 258 30-Sept-43 2-Oct-43
Biter ON 207 20-Oct-43 27-Oct-43
Tracker ON 207 23-Oct-43 28-Oct-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Fencer SC 145 29-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Tracker HX 264 1-Nov-43 3-Nov-43
Biter SC 146 9-Nov-43 13-Nov-43
Biter HX 265 14-Nov-43 16-Nov-43
Tracker HX 270 15-Dec-43 24-Dec-43

ON 207 was a "bait" convoy routed towards a known concentration of U-boats with a heavily reinforced escort including Biter and escort group C-1 plus 3 additional sloops and the MAC ship Amastra. The two most successful escort groups of the war Gretton's B7 and Walkers 2EG were also added. 2EG also included Tracker. Walker later stated that he did not like working with Tracker as his group spent too much time screening her.
The last two convoys escorted by Biter included a pair of own goals. A ditching Swordfish released a homing torpedo that hit the M/S Gylf (it did not sink) and even more spectacularly a Swordfish attempting to land struck the Biters round down. It ended in the water followed by its homing torpedo hitting the Biter's rudder.

MAC ships accompanied a total of 30 convoys in 1943. Empire MacAlpine was the leader with 9. Empire MacAndrew followed with 6 and Rapana with 5. Late in the year 5 more ships were added.
Their first appearance was the Empire MacAlpine in May with ONS 9. Empire MacAndrew's first convoy was ONS 15 in August followed by Rapana with ONS 17 in August. Note that Donitz has called off the wolf packs before the first appearance of a MAC ship.

Empire MacAlpine ONS 9 28-May-43 9-June-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 245 23-June-43 7-July-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 14 26-Jul-43 9-Aug-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 15 6-Aug-43 21-Aug-43
Empire MacAlpine SC 140 21-Aug-43 5-Sept-43
Rapana ONS 17 31-Aug-43 16-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew SC 141 3-Sept-43 17-Sept-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 18 12-Sept-43 29-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 19 26-Sept-43 14-Oct-43
Rapana SC 143 28-Sept-43 12-Oct-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 260 5-Oct-43 20-Oct-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 262 18-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Empire MacRae ONS 21 22-Oct-43 5-Nov-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Empire MacAlpine ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Rapana ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Empire MacKay ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Amastra ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Empire MacAndrew ON 211 13-Nov-43 29-Nov-43
Empire MacRae HX 266 13-Nov-43 27-Nov-43
Acavas ONS 23 17-Nov-43 -Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 267 19-Nov-43 3-Dec-43
Rapana SC 147 19-Nov-43 4-Dec-43
Empire MacKay HX 268 26-Nov-43 11-Dec-43
Ancylus ONS 24 30-Nov-43 18-Dec-43
Amastra SC 148 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 269 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine ON 215 9-Dec-43 28-Dec-43
Acavas SC 149 15-Dec-43 30-Dec-43
Empire MacRae ON 216 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
Rapana ONS 25 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43

All of this is a very long winded way of saying that escort carriers did not close the mid Atlantic gap. That was the done by the Very Long Range Liberators. At the beginning of Black May Coastal Command had 30 VLR Liberators in service with Squadrons 120 and 59. A perusal of the convoy reports shows they did the bulk of the work in the mid Atlantic gap.
The British did not devote a significant portion of their escort carrier activity to convoy protection. As I have noted in a previous post the first batch of Bogues received by the RN were deployed as assault carriers in the Mediterranean.
In 1943 the RN only deployed a maximum of 2 escort carrier on North Atlantic duty at any time, except for the one time appearance of Fencer in October. The USN effort in using escort carriers in the ASW role was far larger than the RNs throughout 1943. It wasn't, however, in the North Atlantic.

The MACs were not as effective as escort carriers for two main reasons:
  1. The limited number of aircraft they carried, 4 in the case of the grain ships and 3 in the case of the tankers.
  2. There were not as operationally flexible. Escort carrier were often switched between conveys in mid ocean to meet immediate needs. MACs were primarily delivery vehicles that had to stay with the convoy. This limited the number of convoys they could escort to an average of one a month.
MACs ships were not available in sufficient numbers until 1944. They only started to escort a significant number of convoys in November of 1943 which was after the fall convoy battles were won. Even then they could only escort ½ of the convoys.
The Mid Atlantic gap was closed by VLR liberators with escort carriers and MAC ships planning a much smaller role.
 
Reluctant Poster said:
175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.

The first appearance was the Bogue in March which failed in its first two attempts, turning back prematurely due to storm damage and defects (HX 228 and SC123). This was particularly unfortunate in the case of HX 228 because it suffered heavy losses after the departure of Bogue. Bogue was out of action for a month to repair storm damge and a defective catapult. Biter's first convoy was ONS 4 in April followed by Archer with ONS 6 in May.

Bogue HX 228 6-Mar-43 10-Mar-43 Aborted
Bogue SC 123 20-Mar-43 26-Mar-43 Aborted
Biter ONS 4 23-Apr-43 26-Apr-43
Bogue HX 235 25-Apr-43 30-Apr-43
Biter HX 237 7-May-43 13-May-43
Archer ONS 6 9-May-43 11-May-43
Archer ON 182 12-May-43 14-May-43
Biter SC 129 13-May-43 16-May-43
Bogue ON 184 19-May-43 25-May-43
Archer HX 239 21-May-43 24-May-43
On May 24 the U-Boats are withdrawn from North Atlantic.
Biter HX 242 9-June-43 12-June-43
Biter ONS 10 14-June-43 18-June-43
Chaser HX 245 23-June-43 4-July-43
Biter SC 135 1-July-43 4-July-43

Out of the 21 North Atlantic convoys in May 1943 only 6 included an escort carrier. The bulk of the air cover in the Atlantic Gap was by VLR Liberations flying from Iceland.
Chaser is an interesting story. It was on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was not intended to be a part of the escort but on its own initiative flew ASW patrols in conjunction with the MAC ship Empire MacAlpine.
After SC 135 there was a hiatus. Bogue had moved to the Mid Atlantic at the end of May, Archer was retired prematurely due to major defects and Biter, which was also a flawed ship, underwent an extensive refit.
The Escort Carriers returned to the North Atlantic with Tracker in September followed by the reappearance of Biter in October

Tracker ON 203 25-Sept-43 30-Sept-43
Tracker HX 258 30-Sept-43 2-Oct-43
Biter ON 207 20-Oct-43 27-Oct-43
Tracker ON 207 23-Oct-43 28-Oct-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Fencer SC 145 29-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Tracker HX 264 1-Nov-43 3-Nov-43
Biter SC 146 9-Nov-43 13-Nov-43
Biter HX 265 14-Nov-43 16-Nov-43
Tracker HX 270 15-Dec-43 24-Dec-43

ON 207 was a "bait" convoy routed towards a known concentration of U-boats with a heavily reinforced escort including Biter and escort group C-1 plus 3 additional sloops and the MAC ship Amastra. The two most successful escort groups of the war Gretton's B7 and Walkers 2EG were also added. 2EG also included Tracker. Walker later stated that he did not like working with Tracker as his group spent too much time screening her.
The last two convoys escorted by Biter included a pair of own goals. A ditching Swordfish released a homing torpedo that hit the M/S Gylf (it did not sink) and even more spectacularly a Swordfish attempting to land struck the Biters round down. It ended in the water followed by its homing torpedo hitting the Biter's rudder.

MAC ships accompanied a total of 30 convoys in 1943. Empire MacAlpine was the leader with 9. Empire MacAndrew followed with 6 and Rapana with 5. Late in the year 5 more ships were added.
Their first appearance was the Empire MacAlpine in May with ONS 9. Empire MacAndrew's first convoy was ONS 15 in August followed by Rapana with ONS 17 in August. Note that Donitz has called off the wolf packs before the first appearance of a MAC ship.

Empire MacAlpine ONS 9 28-May-43 9-June-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 245 23-June-43 7-July-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 14 26-Jul-43 9-Aug-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 15 6-Aug-43 21-Aug-43
Empire MacAlpine SC 140 21-Aug-43 5-Sept-43
Rapana ONS 17 31-Aug-43 16-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew SC 141 3-Sept-43 17-Sept-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 18 12-Sept-43 29-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 19 26-Sept-43 14-Oct-43
Rapana SC 143 28-Sept-43 12-Oct-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 260 5-Oct-43 20-Oct-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 262 18-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Empire MacRae ONS 21 22-Oct-43 5-Nov-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Empire MacAlpine ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Rapana ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Empire MacKay ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Amastra ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Empire MacAndrew ON 211 13-Nov-43 29-Nov-43
Empire MacRae HX 266 13-Nov-43 27-Nov-43
Acavas ONS 23 17-Nov-43 -Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 267 19-Nov-43 3-Dec-43
Rapana SC 147 19-Nov-43 4-Dec-43
Empire MacKay HX 268 26-Nov-43 11-Dec-43
Ancylus ONS 24 30-Nov-43 18-Dec-43
Amastra SC 148 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 269 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine ON 215 9-Dec-43 28-Dec-43
Acavas SC 149 15-Dec-43 30-Dec-43
Empire MacRae ON 216 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
Rapana ONS 25 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43

All of this is a very long winded way of saying that escort carriers did not close the mid Atlantic gap. That was the done by the Very Long Range Liberators. At the beginning of Black May Coastal Command had 30 VLR Liberators in service with Squadrons 120 and 59. A perusal of the convoy reports shows they did the bulk of the work in the mid Atlantic gap.
The British did not devote a significant portion of their escort carrier activity to convoy protection. As I have noted in a previous post the first batch of Bogues received by the RN were deployed as assault carriers in the Mediterranean.
In 1943 the RN only deployed a maximum of 2 escort carrier on North Atlantic duty at any time, except for the one time appearance of Fencer in October. The USN effort in using escort carriers in the ASW role was far larger than the RNs throughout 1943. It wasn't, however, in the North Atlantic.

The MACs were not as effective as escort carriers for two main reasons:
  1. The limited number of aircraft they carried, 4 in the case of the grain ships and 3 in the case of the tankers.
  2. There were not as operationally flexible. Escort carrier were often switched between conveys in mid ocean to meet immediate needs. MACs were primarily delivery vehicles that had to stay with the convoy. This limited the number of convoys they could escort to an average of one a month.
MACs ships were not available in sufficient numbers until 1944. They only started to escort a significant number of convoys in November of 1943 which was after the fall convoy battles were won. Even then they could only escort ½ of the convoys.
The Mid Atlantic gap was closed by VLR liberators with escort carriers and MAC ships planning a much smaller role.
Click to expand...
A well argued case.
 
Reluctant Poster said:
175 convoys crossed the North Atlantic in 1943. Of those only 20 were escorted at least part of the way by Escort Carriers, 8 by HMS Biter, 4 by HMS Tracker, 1 by both Biter and Tracker, 3 by HMS Archer, 2 by USS Bogue, 1 by HMS Chaser and 1 by HMS Fencer.

The first appearance was the Bogue in March which failed in its first two attempts, turning back prematurely due to storm damage and defects (HX 228 and SC123). This was particularly unfortunate in the case of HX 228 because it suffered heavy losses after the departure of Bogue. Bogue was out of action for a month to repair storm damge and a defective catapult. Biter's first convoy was ONS 4 in April followed by Archer with ONS 6 in May.

Bogue HX 228 6-Mar-43 10-Mar-43 Aborted
Bogue SC 123 20-Mar-43 26-Mar-43 Aborted
Biter ONS 4 23-Apr-43 26-Apr-43
Bogue HX 235 25-Apr-43 30-Apr-43
Biter HX 237 7-May-43 13-May-43
Archer ONS 6 9-May-43 11-May-43
Archer ON 182 12-May-43 14-May-43
Biter SC 129 13-May-43 16-May-43
Bogue ON 184 19-May-43 25-May-43
Archer HX 239 21-May-43 24-May-43
On May 24 the U-Boats are withdrawn from North Atlantic.
Biter HX 242 9-June-43 12-June-43
Biter ONS 10 14-June-43 18-June-43
Chaser HX 245 23-June-43 4-July-43
Biter SC 135 1-July-43 4-July-43

Out of the 21 North Atlantic convoys in May 1943 only 6 included an escort carrier. The bulk of the air cover in the Atlantic Gap was by VLR Liberations flying from Iceland.
Chaser is an interesting story. It was on its maiden voyage across the Atlantic and was not intended to be a part of the escort but on its own initiative flew ASW patrols in conjunction with the MAC ship Empire MacAlpine.
After SC 135 there was a hiatus. Bogue had moved to the Mid Atlantic at the end of May, Archer was retired prematurely due to major defects and Biter, which was also a flawed ship, underwent an extensive refit.
The Escort Carriers returned to the North Atlantic with Tracker in September followed by the reappearance of Biter in October

Tracker ON 203 25-Sept-43 30-Sept-43
Tracker HX 258 30-Sept-43 2-Oct-43
Biter ON 207 20-Oct-43 27-Oct-43
Tracker ON 207 23-Oct-43 28-Oct-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Fencer SC 145 29-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Tracker HX 264 1-Nov-43 3-Nov-43
Biter SC 146 9-Nov-43 13-Nov-43
Biter HX 265 14-Nov-43 16-Nov-43
Tracker HX 270 15-Dec-43 24-Dec-43

ON 207 was a "bait" convoy routed towards a known concentration of U-boats with a heavily reinforced escort including Biter and escort group C-1 plus 3 additional sloops and the MAC ship Amastra. The two most successful escort groups of the war Gretton's B7 and Walkers 2EG were also added. 2EG also included Tracker. Walker later stated that he did not like working with Tracker as his group spent too much time screening her.
The last two convoys escorted by Biter included a pair of own goals. A ditching Swordfish released a homing torpedo that hit the M/S Gylf (it did not sink) and even more spectacularly a Swordfish attempting to land struck the Biters round down. It ended in the water followed by its homing torpedo hitting the Biter's rudder.

MAC ships accompanied a total of 30 convoys in 1943. Empire MacAlpine was the leader with 9. Empire MacAndrew followed with 6 and Rapana with 5. Late in the year 5 more ships were added.
Their first appearance was the Empire MacAlpine in May with ONS 9. Empire MacAndrew's first convoy was ONS 15 in August followed by Rapana with ONS 17 in August. Note that Donitz has called off the wolf packs before the first appearance of a MAC ship.

Empire MacAlpine ONS 9 28-May-43 9-June-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 245 23-June-43 7-July-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 14 26-Jul-43 9-Aug-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 15 6-Aug-43 21-Aug-43
Empire MacAlpine SC 140 21-Aug-43 5-Sept-43
Rapana ONS 17 31-Aug-43 16-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew SC 141 3-Sept-43 17-Sept-43
Empire MacAlpine ONS 18 12-Sept-43 29-Sept-43
Empire MacAndrew ONS 19 26-Sept-43 14-Oct-43
Rapana SC 143 28-Sept-43 12-Oct-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 260 5-Oct-43 20-Oct-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 262 18-Oct-43 2-Nov-43
Empire MacRae ONS 21 22-Oct-43 5-Nov-43
ON 207 was the last battle of the Wolfpacks Autumn offense in the North Atlantic.
Empire MacAlpine ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Rapana ON 209 31-Oct-43 17-Nov-43
Empire MacKay ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Amastra ONS 22 4-Nov-43 22-Nov-43
Empire MacAndrew ON 211 13-Nov-43 29-Nov-43
Empire MacRae HX 266 13-Nov-43 27-Nov-43
Acavas ONS 23 17-Nov-43 -Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine HX 267 19-Nov-43 3-Dec-43
Rapana SC 147 19-Nov-43 4-Dec-43
Empire MacKay HX 268 26-Nov-43 11-Dec-43
Ancylus ONS 24 30-Nov-43 18-Dec-43
Amastra SC 148 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAndrew HX 269 2-Dec-43 16-Dec-43
Empire MacAlpine ON 215 9-Dec-43 28-Dec-43
Acavas SC 149 15-Dec-43 30-Dec-43
Empire MacRae ON 216 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43
Rapana ONS 25 15-Dec-43 3-Jan-43

All of this is a very long winded way of saying that escort carriers did not close the mid Atlantic gap. That was the done by the Very Long Range Liberators. At the beginning of Black May Coastal Command had 30 VLR Liberators in service with Squadrons 120 and 59. A perusal of the convoy reports shows they did the bulk of the work in the mid Atlantic gap.
The British did not devote a significant portion of their escort carrier activity to convoy protection. As I have noted in a previous post the first batch of Bogues received by the RN were deployed as assault carriers in the Mediterranean.
In 1943 the RN only deployed a maximum of 2 escort carrier on North Atlantic duty at any time, except for the one time appearance of Fencer in October. The USN effort in using escort carriers in the ASW role was far larger than the RNs throughout 1943. It wasn't, however, in the North Atlantic.

The MACs were not as effective as escort carriers for two main reasons:
  1. The limited number of aircraft they carried, 4 in the case of the grain ships and 3 in the case of the tankers.
  2. There were not as operationally flexible. Escort carrier were often switched between conveys in mid ocean to meet immediate needs. MACs were primarily delivery vehicles that had to stay with the convoy. This limited the number of convoys they could escort to an average of one a month.
MACs ships were not available in sufficient numbers until 1944. They only started to escort a significant number of convoys in November of 1943 which was after the fall convoy battles were won. Even then they could only escort ½ of the convoys.
The Mid Atlantic gap was closed by VLR liberators with escort carriers and MAC ships planning a much smaller role.
Click to expand...
I would agree that it was the land based VLR aircraft that played a more significant role in closing the "Atlantic Gap", but would point out that not all Liberators in CC service were considered VLR due to their equipment & fuel tank fits.

On 31st May 1943 AOCin C CC issued instructions about the standard fits he was trying to achieve on Liberators in each squadron. He broke them down into various "classes". 15 Group was to have 3 squadrons (53, 59 & 120) "flown for range with a maximum depth charge load at the expense of anti-aircraft defence". 19 Group was to have 3 squadrons (86, 224 & 311) with aircraft "to carry sufficient armament to defend themselves against air attack and here range and depth charge load are of lesser importance". Due to their existing fits it was to take some time for squadrons to get an entire complement of aircraft for their designated roles (120 for example didn't begin to receive its Mk.V until Sept 1943).

So there were Class A, B (with 3 different sub-classes) & C Liberators Mk.III/V with different fuel tank fits and armaments plus a handful of surviving Liberator I in 120 squadron. While class A & B were to achieve a range of 2,300 miles, class C were to have a range of 1,600 miles. Class A were to be Mk.V while B & C were to be Mk.III or V. So 53, 59 & 120 were to become Class A equipped while 86, 224 & 311 were to get aircraft interchangeable between Class B & C. The GR.V with various types of centimetric radars didn't begin to reach the squadrons until Feb 1943.

A further reorganisation took place in Nov 1943 with another set of instructions issued about fuel & armament fits for each squadron.

53 squadron traded its Whitleys for Liberator GR.V in May 1943.
59 finally became Liberator GR.V equipped in March / April 1943
120 had had Liberators since 1941

86 had begun to receive Liberator III in Sept 1942
224 converted to Liberator III between July & Sept 1942
311 converted to Liberator GR.V betweeen June & Aug 1943.

Often forgotten are the 2 Fortress squadrons, 206 & 220, that had been the mainstay of the CC long range effort from Sept 1942 to March 1943 when Liberators became more numerous. The Fortress IIA/II had a range of around 1,825 miles. They were moved from the Western Isles to the Azores in late 1943 after an airfield was opened at Lagens.
 
wuzak said:
If it took 44s for the bomb to fall to detonation height, and the Enola Gay was 11.5 miles away, then the Enola Gay would have been travelling at around 940mph.

Something would seem to be amiss.

At 350mph, a B-29 would travel around 4.2 miles. At 280mph, a Lancaster would be ~2.3 miles away (assuming a reduced time of 30s for the drop).
Click to expand...
Yeah, 11.5 miles is pretty hard to believe, given the time. However, according to this map showing the jet streams...

1714430130983.png


...it appears that the path of the jet stream would be moving in the general direction that the Enola Gay would've been moving on its return trip. According to Google, the average Jet Stream goes about 110 mph.
SO, if the plane's speed was 350, the Jet Stream would've pushed it to about 460.
That puts it, not approx. 4.28 miles from the drop site, but approx. 7.67 miles from the drop site.
Even if that Jet Stream were a fairly fast one, moving at say 250 mph, it would still only put the plane 10 miles from the drop site at the time the bomb went off.
Good post, Wuzak! :thumbright:
 
wuzak said:
If it took 44s for the bomb to fall to detonation height, and the Enola Gay was 11.5 miles away, then the Enola Gay would have been travelling at around 940mph.

Something would seem to be amiss.

At 350mph, a B-29 would travel around 4.2 miles. At 280mph, a Lancaster would be ~2.3 miles away (assuming a reduced time of 30s for the drop).
Click to expand...
Maybe a misunderstanding, was it 11.5 milkes away when the bomb went off or when the shock wave caught up with it?
 
Elvis said:
Yeah, 11.5 miles is pretty hard to believe, given the time. However, according to this map showing the jet streams...

View attachment 776209

...it appears that the path of the jet stream would be moving in the general direction that the Enola Gay would've been moving on its return trip. According to Google, the average Jet Stream goes about 110 mph.
SO, if the plane's speed was 350, the Jet Stream would've pushed it to about 460.
That puts it, not approx. 4.28 miles from the drop site, but approx. 7.67 miles from the drop site.
Even if that Jet Stream were a fairly fast one, moving at say 250 mph, it would still only put the plane 10 miles from the drop site at the time the bomb went off.
Good post, Wuzak! :thumbright:
Click to expand...

I agree. Wuzak raised a great point.

I was wondering if the person who did the 11.5 miles calculation typed 940mph when they meant 940KMH but that is still way too fast at 540mph. Maybe they meant 490mph including a very fast tail wind. I guess we will never know.
 
MiTasol said:
The Lincoln was originally called the Lanc IV and V and did not become operational until after VE day from memory so it is doubtful it would have been available in time
Click to expand...

The Lincoln prototype first flew on 9 June 1944. Assuming the same timely development as the Lancaster, which took fourteen months from first flight to operational debut, that would put its combat availability sometime in early August 1945, best case scenario.
 
The first Lincolns arrived on the squadrons in Aug 1945.

57 squadron at East Kirby received some B.I before disbanding in Nov that year.
75 (NZ) squadron at Spilsby received 3 B.II in the last week of Aug, just before VJ Day. It disbanded in Oct 1945 before receiving any more.

NZDF Serials - Lincoln

www.adf-serials.com.au

IIRC it was then 1946 before other squadrons began to get them.
 
Hiroshima bomb dropped airspeed 328 mph from 31,000 feet, the B-29 jumped after losing 4 tons, bomb detonated at 1,900 feet, 5.5 miles vertical drop, after 43 seconds, enabling Enola Gay to move about 4 miles. Tibbets stated they were 11.5 miles slant range when the shock wave hit.

Lincoln production, mark I, 1 in December 1944, 2 in February, 18 in March 1945 and so on, mark II 2 in March, 1 in April, 6 in May 1945 and so on. 24 Lincoln built by end March, 37 by end April, 56 by end May, 75 by end June, 106 by end July, 149 by end August.

According to AIR 8/1363 on 29 November 1945, there were 3 Lincolns in both 44 and 57 squadrons and that was still the case on 14 February 1946, the rest of Bomber Command's heavy bombers were Lancasters.
 
If the Lincoln had been operational before the end of the War, I doubt Bomber Command would have released any to Coastal Command, only over Harris's dead body. Look at the majority of Coastal Command's fleet, nearly all were cast offs from Bomber Command, Wellingtons, Whitleys, Fortresses.
 
In Tibbets' book he explains how they practiced a violent diving turn in the Silverplate B-29s stateside before moving to Saipan. He commented about an officer who wanted to take command and fly the missions and was taken up and shown how the B-29 must be sharply banked and at the same time dived. During the diving turn, the passenger turned white and never mentioned taking over the 509th again.
 
special ed said:
In Tibbets' book he explains how they practiced a violent diving turn in the Silverplate B-29s stateside before moving to Saipan. He commented about an officer who wanted to take command and fly the missions and was taken up and shown how the B-29 must be sharply banked and at the same time dived. During the diving turn, the passenger turned white and never mentioned taking over the 509th again.
Click to expand...
Was there any reason they didnt turn gently before dropping or turn after the shock wave passed?
 
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