The Best Bomber of WWII: #4

[parsifal]

The Mossies ( I mean the bomber variant) only defence was it's speed and end war it got overtaken by He-219 (rubbish overall but could kill the Mossie or it claimed it could) and Me-262 (which flew 1st in april 1941!) And as such was cannonfodder, if the Germans where in a better situation. The Mossie was a great airplane which found a gap in German defence.

My point being: Speed is not a substitude for defence. It can only hope to be so for a relative short time. After that the plane get obsolete very fast. All Japanese bombers where designed around high speed and long range. They got slaughtered when fighter speed caught up. And due to the speed being important design aspect they couldn't upgrade the aircraft with self sealing tanks and more armor etc.

This does not explain why the Mosquito had the lowest attrition rate of any RAF bomber during the war, despite easily undertaking the most hazardous missions, or that the Mosquito remained a viable bomber, the last not being retired until aboput 1960 as I recall.


And only a proportion of the Mosquitoes were unarmed. The majority packed a heavy nose armament, whilst also carrying a respectable offensive warload.

 

[Shortround6]

so multiply the values for range and pay load by 3; survivability (defence, speed etc etc) by 2; and the rest by 1.

You need actual values. relative ones will not work. Try using the bombers I suggested. The Blenheim carries 1000lb of bombs vs 7000lbs for the Whitley and 4500lbs for the Wellington and 4000lbs for the Hampden. For "points" of either 1,4,3 and 2 for your original proposal or 3,12,9 and 8. Hardly reflective of their actual capabilities relative to each other and if you add in the German bombers the results go crazy with the multiplication system, with 7 bombers on the chart the the Whitley would jump to 21 points for bomb load while the Blenheim stayed at 3. Whitley was also more likely to carry 4,000lbs on actual missions.

Cause we compare airframes to eachother we can simply state that the defensive guns on a B29 where better than the turrets on a B17 which where better than the handaimed HE177. (I would put the ECM and stuf in this catagory also)

Again, going back to the 4 British bombers you have 5 guns on the later Blenheims, 5 guns on the Whitley. 4-6 on the Hampdens and 6-8 on the Wellington?. Except on the Blenheim you have one fixed forward gun, 2 in a manually operated (i think) blister under the nose firing rearward using a periscope ( a system that never worked well no matter who used it) and a 2 gun power turret on top. Whitley used a single gun power turret in the nose and a 4 gun power turret in the tail. Early Hamdens had one fixed gun and 3 flexible with the dorsal and ventral positions upgraded to twin mounts. Flexible guns were feed by drums rather than the long belts of the power turret guns. So who gets what for points?
Add in the German bombers (all with just about the same caliber guns) and it turns into a real mess.

Same with flying characteristics (alt, speed stability) bunch it together.

Are you now suggesting that these attributes get the same multiplier or that all these attributes get lumped together and only get one number for all flying characteristics?

Rather degrades the speed and ceiling attributes doesn't it? Both of which would help limit exposure to flak.

The Mossies ( I mean the bomber variant) only defence was it's speed and end war it got overtaken by He-219 (rubbish overall but could kill the Mossie or it claimed it could) and Me-262 (which flew 1st in april 1941!) And as such was cannonfodder, if the Germans where in a better situation. The Mossie was a great airplane which found a gap in German defence.

My point being: Speed is not a substitude for defence. It can only hope to be so for a relative short time. After that the plane get obsolete very fast. All Japanese bombers where designed around high speed and long range. They got slaughtered when fighter speed caught up. And due to the speed being important design aspect they couldn't upgrade the aircraft with self sealing tanks and more armor etc.

The Mossies speed was still useful at the end of the war. Intercepting aircraft had to positioned just right to affect an interception. Even the jets with their margin of speed might be in for a stern chase of 4-6 minutes from a distance of 10-12 miles. With their limited endurance this would certainly influence the number of interceptions they could undertake in one flight. Air combat in a strategic sense was never one on one. Going back to the flak thing, the Mossies exposure to flak was whole order of magnitude below that of the 4 engine heavies.

I think you are misrepresenting the Japanese aircraft. They had several problems, one was that they were designed for great range, not necessarily speed. This meant a high payload to empty weight ratio which meant a light structure. Their engine development also lagged behind the West. Without more powerful engines the addition of armor and self sealing tanks could only come at the expense of range since max weight was governed by available power. Even with more power the light structure would need an almost total redesign to accommodate the extra power combined with the heavier structure to support the heavier engines, the extra fuel they would burn and the self sealing material and armor. The Japanese had learned in China and against the Russians that speed was not protection for unescorted bombers.

 

[Kurfürst]

This does not explain why the Mosquito had the lowest attrition rate of any RAF bomber during the war,

It depends on the situation - the Mosquito had the highest loss rate of all RAF bombers (about double that of the conventional bombers) when it was first introduced, and was facing German day fighters over France. Those could fairly easily catch a Mosquito, and as was the case with every 'fast' bomber of the day, they become vulnerable overnight as newer, faster fighters appeared, as their only defense was speed.

In other words, it proved to be just as, if not more vulnerable to enemy fighter than the existing RAF bomber types which were escorted.

despite easily undertaking the most hazardous missions,

Hardly "the most hazardous"... they operated mostly at night, when the enemy fighter opposition was slow twin engined fighters, amongst far more numerous, slow and low flying heavy bomber streams which were the primary target of enemy night fighters; or as high flying nuisance bombers during the night.

I can hardly think of less hazardous missions, actually.

or that the Mosquito remained a viable bomber, the last not being retired until aboput 1960 as I recall.

I guess for the same reason most airforces kept prop jobs for bomber roles - no serious enemy air defense, range and consumption issues with jet engines for bomber roles, lack of founding for conventional weapons when everyone was going for the A-bomb.

And only a proportion of the Mosquitoes were unarmed. The majority packed a heavy nose armament, whilst also carrying a respectable offensive warload.

Fat chances against a day fighter, a heavy, loaded twin engine laden with bombs.. (BTW, what's particularly respectable in 900 kg of bombload...? Thats pretty avarage for a light bomber of the time, hell even some of the single engines could carry that much, see P-47, Fw 190 etc.)

 

[looney]

@Shortround6 You won me over, we need to find a scale of the different points. Is a short range heavy bomber better than a long range light bomber etc etc.

1st item on the agenda is to make a list of important "points" (can't think of a better english word for it)
2nd find a way to make different points more important than others, without 1 point dominating the table
3th make a selection of bombers to compare
4th apply the above

 

[BombTaxi]

But we need to get training and strategy out of the equation, cause they don't say a thing about the aircraft.

I do think we should find some way to differentiate the most important qualities for a bomber.

You can't get training and strategy out of the equation - these bombers were all useless piles of scrap without crews. And a Lanc crewed by a bad crew would be less effective than a Betty crewed by veterans, for example. Crew skill plays a huge role in ensuring that the payload actually hits the target.

Furthermore, how do you objectively define 'sturdiness'? Sure, the B-17 could take a beating - but so could the Wellington. The B-24 was notoriously vulnerable to hits in it's wing root. But how did it fare with damage in other areas?

I am starting to believe that an objective, tabular assessment of performance is nigh on impossible for any weapons system, especially as performance may vary wildly depending on circumstances. For instance, the performance of the B-17 with Bomber Command, or over Schweinfurt, was very poor, mainly due to the strategy that you wish to exclude from the equation. However, if you were to focus on operations later in the war, with more experienced crews and long-range escorts, you suddenly have a much 'better' bomber.

Finally, how are you planning to distinguish between different marks of the same aircraft? The B-17 C,E,F an G were not the same aircraft, although they were all used in the same role. And how do you distinguish between the performance of different engines used on various types of Halifax, Lancaster or Wellington?

I'm not trying to ruip up your work here - I think the project you are setting out on is commendable. But I do think you have too many variables to deal with unless you have a substantial research grant, a team of researchers, and much deeper sources than Wikipedia.

Cheers

BT

 

[Glider]

It depends on the situation - the Mosquito had the highest loss rate of all RAF bombers (about double that of the conventional bombers) when it was first introduced, and was facing German day fighters over France. Those could fairly easily catch a Mosquito, and as was the case with every 'fast' bomber of the day, they become vulnerable overnight as newer, faster fighters appeared, as their only defense was speed.

In other words, it proved to be just as, if not more vulnerable to enemy fighter than the existing RAF bomber types which were escorted.



Hardly "the most hazardous"... they operated mostly at night, when the enemy fighter opposition was slow twin engined fighters, amongst far more numerous, slow and low flying heavy bomber streams which were the primary target of enemy night fighters; or as high flying nuisance bombers during the night.

I can hardly think of less hazardous missions, actually.



I guess for the same reason most airforces kept prop jobs for bomber roles - no serious enemy air defense, range and consumption issues with jet engines for bomber roles, lack of founding for conventional weapons when everyone was going for the A-bomb.



Fat chances against a day fighter, a heavy, loaded twin engine laden with bombs.. (BTW, what's particularly respectable in 900 kg of bombload...? Thats pretty avarage for a light bomber of the time, hell even some of the single engines could carry that much, see P-47, Fw 190 etc.)

I will give a more detailed reply later but in the meantime Kurfurst can I ask for any examples of Mossie bombers being easily caught by German day fighters in any numbers.

I say this as I do have the breakdown of losses by No 2 Group for their daylight losses for 1944.

No of Sorties 1732
Losses to Flak 17
Losses to Fighters 1
Accidents 2
Unknown 9

Even if all the unknown are due to Fighters ( a big assumption) you have a loss rate of less than 0.6%. Not too shabby for missions that included daylight raids over Berlin without escort many hndreds of miles behind the German front line.

 

[looney]

@BT

1st: I want to take out training and strategy, because allthough they are very important to the results of a bombardement they do however say nothing about the aircraft.
And we are trying to find the best airframe, thus it is vital we take training and strategy out of the equation.

Perhaps we find a "rubbish" plane which cause of training and strategy still got a large credit (finnish fighters), or the other way around (Zero, Saburo Sakai (On June 24, 1944, Sakai approached a formation of 15 U.S. Navy Grumman F6F Hellcat fighters which he mistakenly assumed were friendly Japanese aircraft. In a chase that has become legendary, Sakai demonstrated his skill and experience. Despite his loss of one eye and facing superior enemy aircraft, Sakai eluded attacks by the Hellcats for more than 20 minutes, returning to his airfield untouched.) Sabur? Sakai - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)

2nd: I know sturdiness is a hard one to judge, cause it depends a lot on theatre of operations and enemy capabilities. We could use this one to note how hard it was to shoot 1 down (ie training and strategy ish).

I would compare most produced variant, for the B17 it's the G version.

 

[parsifal]

I will give a more detailed reply later but in the meantime Kurfurst can I ask for any examples of Mossie bombers being easily caught by German day fighters in any numbers.

I say this as I do have the breakdown of losses by No 2 Group for their daylight losses for 1944.

No of Sorties 1732
Losses to Flak 17
Losses to Fighters 1
Accidents 2
Unknown 9

Even if all the unknown are due to Fighters ( a big assumption) you have a loss rate of less than 0.6%. Not too shabby for missions that included daylight raids over Berlin without escort many hndreds of miles behind the German front line.

You might add that the Mosquito is believed to have shot down approximately 600 german SE day fighters, whilst suffering neglible losses themselves. The bombload stated i Kurfursts post is average, unless you factor in the other aspect of tat capacity, namely that the Mosquito could carry that weight of bombs all the way to Berlin, and at very high speeds.

 

[Kurfürst]

You might add that the Mosquito is believed to have shot down approximately 600 german SE day fighters, whilst suffering neglible losses themselves.

Sorry but is that claim even remotely serious..?

In any case, the figures Glider posted (who had yet failed to apologize for his past behavaviour and until he will do so, will be not adressed directly) are strawman arguments, as my original statement was:

"the Mosquito had the highest loss rate of all RAF bombers (about double that of the conventional bombers) when it was first introduced"

That means, in 1942 to my best knowledge, when it had about 8% loss rate per sortie compared to conventional RAF escorted bombers in comparable missions with 4% loss rate or thereabouts

I fail to see the reasoning why then Glider posts figures for 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different - the Germans were busy intercepting US heavies and escorts over Germany and so on, circumstances that must be so painfully obvious to everyone here.

The daylight loss rate for 1944 No 2 Group Mosquitos is only worth of consideration in context - under the same time period, but not neccessarily the same circumstances, was it more survivable than comparable light bomber types? The answer, I am afraid, is not.

For example, the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest of World War II provides a vast array of statistics to play with. In the European Theatre of Operations for example, during 210,544, US heavy bombers flew 210,544 sorties, and lost 3,497 aircraft in total (loss rate of 1,6%), of which 1,516 they attributed to enemy fighter defenses (0,7%). And they were, by far, the most targeted by German fighter defences.

US medium and light bombers flew 79,461 sorties, and lost 487 aircraft in total (loss rate of only 0,62%), but only 93 were attributed to enemy fighters (0.11% ), with the vast majority felling to Flak.

Now, in 1944, No 2 Group's Mosquitoes operated (as per Glider's figures) with 1.6% loss rate per sortie, US B-17s/B-24s over West/Norther Europe operated at the same loss rate at 1.6%, and US B-25s/B-26s at much lower loss rate at 0.62%.

To put it into further context, there are also some figures for the German Air Force on the Eastern front at http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/jg26/thtrlosses.htm
According to these, German combat aircraft operated, in 1944, at a loss rate of 0.703 % per sortie.

There you go, statistics. Either the B-25 and B-26 etc. were more survivable than B-17s, B-24s (which is quite unlikely, having about the same speed, and less armament, airframe etc.), and also vastly better in this respect than Mosquitoes, and about as good as any German combat type on the Eastern Front, ie. that the operational loss rates being defined by technical aspects such as speed etc., or we can conclude that operational circumstances are the definitive factor.

Simply the Germans concentrated US/Brit heavies, smartly, as they did by FAR the most damage to them, and when possible, ignored US/Brit light bombers and fighter bombers, which could operate at inpunity - at the expense of the heavy bomber streams. Its not particularly hard to evade enemy interception, when nobody is trying to intercept you in the first place.. something similiar was happening on the Eastern Front, German (and Soviet) aircraft could operate with relative inpunity, save for the AAA: the operational area was vast, fighters were thinly spread and coordination of the fighter defenses was relatively primitive compared to Western Europe and Germany, a much smaller area, with much higher fighter concentrations.

It can be stated, however, given these loss rate figures, that there appears to be no visible advantage at all in favour of the light, fast bomber (ie. Mosquito) vs a conventional light/medium bomber. In fact, it appears that the same thing was happening as in 1942, ie. that Mosquito units were operating with 2 to 3 times the loss rate than conventional lights and mediums (1.62 % vs. 0.62%), in the same period (1944).

The bombload stated i Kurfursts post is average, unless you factor in the other aspect of tat capacity, namely that the Mosquito could carry that weight of bombs all the way to Berlin, something worth noting and quite rare.

Do you have range/payload tables for the Mosquito perhaps, that we can other comparable twin engined designs? Because until some presents some hard and digestable figures, we are left with the somewhat dubious notion that this was 'quite rare'.

 

[Milosh]

from BC - Statistics

Mosquito
39,795 sorties, 254 losses > 0.64% loss per sortie

Stirling
18,440 sorties, 606 losses > 3.29% loss per sortie

Halifax
82,773 sorties, 1,833 losses > 2.21% loss per sortie

Lancaster
156,192 sorties, 3,345 losses > 2.14% loss per sortie


Table 159 of the AAFSD

has 815 losses of light and medium bombers of which 131 were due to enemy a/c > 16% lost to enemy a/c.

For the heavies it is 5,548 losses of which 2,452 were due to enemy a/c > 44.2% lost to enemy a/c.

Table 119

Sorties flown by medium and light bombers > 131,051 (96,523 effective) > 0.62% (0.84%)
Sorties flown by heavy bombers > 332,904 (274,921 effective) > 1.67% (2.02%)

 

[Glider]

In any case, the figures Glider posted (who had yet failed to apologize for his past behavaviour and until he will do so, will be not adressed directly) are strawman arguments,

If ever I have behaved in less than a 100% honest manner on any topic I will apologise 100% in as public a manner as the original statement was made.

I cannot be fairer than that. All I ask is that you give examples. I suggest that you use a different thread to stop gumming this one up.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Do not let this topic get out of hand!

Kurfurst you just cant let **** go can you!? You can't resist taking pot shots can you?!

 

[BombTaxi]

Getting back on track, loss rate will not be of any use in the comparison looney is trying to make. Loss rates are are influenced by the tactical circumstances in which aircraft were deployed, as well as the skill of the aircrews involved - both factors which looney wants to keep out of the equation.

 

[looney]

Indeed BT. I believe that, specially end war when the Axis couldn't put up a good fight (sometimes only 2 fighters from a squadron at a time) against the 1000 bomber raids, loss rate does not tell very much about the airframe.

Losses depends to much in my opinion on usage of the aircraft (night vs day, strategic vs tactical, bombing vs convoy duty etc etc).

 

[Glider]

As promised a more detailed reply.

It depends on the situation - the Mosquito had the highest loss rate of all RAF bombers (about double that of the conventional bombers) when it was first introduced, and was facing German day fighters over France. Those could fairly easily catch a Mosquito, and as was the case with every 'fast' bomber of the day, they become vulnerable overnight as newer, faster fighters appeared, as their only defense was speed.

To a degree accurate but very misleading. It is true to say that in 1942 the Mossie had a loss rate roughly double that of the other medium bomber types in No 2 group. Actual figures are
Blenhiem 577 with 25 losses (taken out of service by August)
Boston 1,238 with 33 losses
Mosquito 357 with 27 losses
Ventura 81 with 12 losses

However to then say that the German fighters could easily catch the Mosquito is totally wrong. Very few of the losses were caused by fighters and there are a number of examples of Moquitos just leaving them behind. For example on 1st July 109 and 190's intercepted some Mosquitos one of which was shot dhown, the others evaded the first pass and pulling boost the others drew away from the fighters. On the same mission later on a Mosquito was hit in the fusualage and its speed drew it away from danger. There are a number of other examples.
I do not have a break down of losses between fighters, Flak and Accidents but I do know that up until August the vast majority are caused by Flak only 2 by fighters. The most losses happened in October when 6 mosquitos were lost and it looks as if two Mosquito's were shot down by fighters. What is interesting is that on 9th October a decision was made that Mosquitos should concentrate on Industrial Targets in towns within Germany by daylight. Apart from whatever damage was done which was likely to be limited the fact that the German population would see RAF planes bombing targets would be detrimental to their morale. There are a number of examples of Mosquito's being intercepted by German fighters and getting away so the Germans were obviously trying to stop these raids. One in particular stood out, when one Mosquito was intercepted by two Fw 190 who were within 900 yards when spotted. They chased the Mosquito for 15 minutes before the Mosquito escaped.

In other words, it proved to be just as, if not more vulnerable to enemy fighter than the existing RAF bomber types which were escorted.

And the evidence behind this statement is?

Fat chances against a day fighter, a heavy, loaded twin engine laden with bombs..

I do agree with Kurfurst here but not the language. As a fighter in a dogfight the lighter 109 and 190 had all the aces. I do know of one Mosquito 109 combat where the 109's sufferred but nothing should be drawn from it. The Mosquitos had the advantage and the 109's didn't see them. The Mosquito's had the bounce made the most of it and kept going in a straight line to get away. By the time the 109 pilots had sorted themselves out the Mosquito's were long gone.

(BTW, what's particularly respectable in 900 kg of bombload...? Thats pretty avarage for a light bomber of the time, hell even some of the single engines could carry that much, see P-47, Fw 190 etc.)

Again a true but misleading statement. The question is How many could carry 900KG all the way to Berlin in daylight and suffer lower than average losses.

It should be noted that all the details in my posting are included in 2 Group RAF by Michael Bowyer a book I would recommend to anyone.

 

[Kurfürst]

As promised a more detailed reply.

To a degree accurate but very misleading. It is true to say that in 1942 the Mossie had a loss rate roughly double that of the other medium bomber types in No 2 group. Actual figures are
Blenhiem 577 with 25 losses (taken out of service by August)
Boston 1,238 with 33 losses
Mosquito 357 with 27 losses
Ventura 81 with 12 losses

However to then say that the German fighters could easily catch the Mosquito is totally wrong. Very few of the losses were caused by fighters...

May I ask the source of the figures?

Known OKL Fighter Claims for 1942, for aircraft identified as "Mosquito". I marked with bold the ones which I believe were confirmed, too. From http://www.lesbutler.ip3.co.uk/tony/tonywood.htm

1489 20.06.42 Fw. Heinrich Nöcker: 3 3./JG 1 Mosquito  westl. Helgoland 13.54 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
1643 02.07.42 Uffz. Almenröder aka. Nocker 3./JG 1 Mosquito  7587: 28 km. S.W. Helgoland: 5 m. 13.54 Film C. 2031/II Anerk: Nr. 56
1646 02.07.42 Fw. Heinrich Nöcker: 3 3./JG 1 Mosquito westl. Helgoland 13.54 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
1679 11.07.42 Uffz. Herbert Biermann: 3 2./JG 1 Mosquito  Flensburg 19.09 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
1683 12.07.42 Ofw. Erwin Leibold: 11► 3./JG 26 Mosquito  Licques (Pas-de-Calais) 14.35 Film C. 2036/II Nr.104207/43
2581 14.09.42 Fw. Anton-Rudolf Piffer: 1 11./JG 1 Mosquito  Osnabrück: 8.500m. 14.41 Reference: 1 JG 1 Lists f. 630
2662 19.09.42 Fw. Rudolf Piffer: 1► 11./JG 1 Mosquito  7349D9: 6.000 m. (Osnabrück) 14.41 Film C. 2035/II Anerk: Nr.1
1799 28.07.42 Uffz. Karl Bugaj 11./JG 1 Mosquito  6238/ 05 Ost: 5.800 m. North Sea 19.50 Film C. 2031/II Anerk: Nr.9
1809 29.07.42 Oblt. Reinhold Knacke 1./NJG 1 Mosquito  5243: 8.000 m. 01.10 Film C. 2031/II Anerk: Nr.53
1939 01.08.42 Uffz. Karl Bugaj: 2► 11./JG 1 Mosquito  nördlich Langeoog 13.18 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
2023 15.08.42 Uffz. Max Kolschek: 1 ► 6./JG 1 Mosquito  5 km. N.W. Ghent 14.20 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
2202 19.08.42 Ltn. Gerd Steiger 2./JG 1 Mosquito  10 km. N.E. Scharmbeck: 8.800 m. 15.48 Film C. 2031/II Anerk: Nr.45
2205 19.08.42 n.n. (6 abschuss) 2./JG 1 Mosquito  Bremerhaven 16.15 Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
2375 29.08.42 Ofw. Wilhelm Philipp: 22 ► 4./JG 26 Mosquito  15-20 km. S.E. Hastings: tiefflug 12.53 Film C. 2031/II Anerk: Nr. -
2379 29.08.42 Ofw. Philipp 4./JG 26 Mosquito IV  Sea: S.E. Hastings: No. 105 Sqn. 12.53 22. Reference JG 26 List
2391 29.08.42 Ofw. Philipp 4./JG 26 Mosquito IV  Sea: S.E. Hastings: No. 105 Sqn. 12.53 22. Reference JG 26 List
2448 06.09.42 Fw. Roden: 1 ► 12./JG 1 Mosquito  41/2/8 F7: 9.000 m. 18.30 -Film C 2035/II Anerk: Nr. 1
2464 Night Phase: 6-7. September 194206.09.42 Fw. Roden 12./JG 1 Mosquito  4128F7: 9.000 m. 18.30 - C2036/I Nr.
2501 08.09.42 Ltn. Strohal 12./JG 1 Mosquito  622 8D3: 9.200 m. 19.03 -Film C. 2035/II Anerk: Nr. 2*
2506 08.09.42 Ltn.Strohal: 1 12./JG 1 Mosquito  - 19.03 -Reference: JG 1 Lists f. 630
2822 09.10.42 Fw. Fritz Timm: 1► 12./JG 1 Mosquito  - 08.05 Film C. 2035/II Anerk: Nr.3
2841 11.10.42 Uffz. Günther Kirchner: 3 5./JG 1 Mosquito  2 km. westl. Utrecht 18.32 Reference: JG 1 List f. 631
2842 11.10.42 Uffz. Max Kolschek: 2 4./JG 1 Mosquito  westl. Hoek-van-Holland 19.05 Reference: JG 1 List f. 631
3012 06.11.42 Ltn. Heinz Knoke: 2 2./JG 1 Mosquito  50 km. nordl. Helgoland: 50 m. 14.55 Reference: JG 1 List f. 631
3400 22.12.42 Flak: 2. lei.Abt. 847 I-III. Zug 2./847 Mosquito £ E. Axel: 50 m. (Zeeland) 16.47 Film C. 2027/I Anerk: Nr. - - C.2027/I

The British reported 27 Mosquitoes lost to all causes in 1942, German fighters made claims for 25 Mosquitoes. Even with the possible ratio of overclaim, it seems quite certain that German fighters could, in almost all cases when the British reported losses, catch up with the Mossies and open fire effectively to them. Even if I allow for 2 times overclaim, it would still mean that roughly 50% of them were shot down by fighters, which at least is very much in line with the loss cause for other bombers (ie. flak/fighters).

As for what the British reported for cause, I guess it can be largely inaccurate. Flak seldom killed aircraft outright, and there could be witnesses to the cause from other aircraft in the formation - in other words, they knew what took them down. On the other hand, lone Mossies recorded as "did not return" or ones that suffered the same fate after fighter attack dispersed a formation.. I would risk that these were likely the victims of fighters they never saw coming and no opportunity to report it.

And the evidence behind this statement is?

Above.

The question is How many could carry 900KG all the way to Berlin in daylight and suffer lower than average losses.

Exactly - so, can you answer your own question and at the same time, Parsifal's?

 

[Glider]

As for sources then you obviously didn't read the following that was in my previous posting.

It should be noted that all the details in my posting are included in 2 Group RAF by Michael Bowyer a book I would recommend to anyone.

As to replying this question
The question is How many could carry 900KG all the way to Berlin in daylight and suffer lower than average losses.

The reply is none, no other aircraft could do this.

As for the German claims I can match up some operations to these dates.
The 2nd July claims match the mission where one Mossquito was shot down in the first pass and the others escaped.
The 11th July there was a mission to Flensburg but all the Mosquitos returned and the record bore the comment that Fighters were absent.
No record of a mission on the 12th or 14th July.
The 19th July was a Boston Mission where one was shot down by a fighter
No missions on the 28th and 29th July but there were Boston missions. Suggest that there seems to be a problem in identification.

Breaking it down by Month comparing the claims to the losses.

May 1 lost - 0 claimed
June 1 lost - 1 claimed
July 4 lost - 8 claimed
August 5 lost - 7 claimed
September 3 lost - 4 claimed
October 6 lost - 4 claimed
November 3 lost - 1 claimed
December 4 lost - 1 claimed

Remembering that these losses are for all types Accident, AA and Fighters there seems to be a problem with the Luftwaffe records. At the end of the day the RAF counted them out and counted them back.

Looking at the August figures, some seem to match up. Most of the missions were high level against Hanover, Bremen, Cologne, Wiesbaden, Hamburg, Wilhelmshaven, Stuttgart, Mannheim and Munster. The book simply states that three planes were lost on these missions but no dates. These three certainly could have been lost due to fighters as a number of iterceptions were reported from which the Mosquito's escaped. The other two losses were a low level attack on the Pont a Vendin power station by two bombers who found themselves head on to 12 Fw190 fighters who had a height advantage. Both were hit hard and one crashed into the sea and the other made it home badly damaged but was written off, which seems to match up to the claims for the 29th August.

October was the other big month. Here the book only gives details of four losses although six were lost. Of these four three were lost on attacks on industrial targets in Essen, Bremen, Trier, Frankfurt, Hanover and Ruhr. The fourth loss was due to AA fire when on a shipping strike against a blockade runner the Elsa Essberger.

 

[Milosh]

The 19th July was a Boston Mission where one was shot down by a fighter
No missions on the 28th and 29th July but there were Boston missions. Suggest that there seems to be a problem in identification.

Or, if they had been Hurricanes, 'Spitfire Envy'. Both the Spit and the Mossie had quite the reputation with the Lw and a 'kill' of one these a/c carried some status. If one was shot up, or even down, it was always claimed to be by a Spit. Even Knoch (sp?) in his book goes into detail about chasing a shooting down a what he claimed was a Mossie. The location is no where near where any Mossie was operating.

Glider, when was the Mossie mission to Berlin flying undetected till the bombs were exploding? Interrupted some Nazi functions, iirc.

 

[parsifal]

Just remember, this is a guy that believes the germans won the Battle of Britain, or at least did not lose. He has told me that he believes they achieved all they set out to do, and then moved onto to bigger and better things.

Hard to have a serious objective conversation with someone who has those beliefs.....

 

[Glider]

Parsifal. Can I ask that you keep calm, lets see what Kurfurst reply is. At the end of the day its clear that the Mosquito bombers' were roaming over large chunks of Germany in 1942 and the Germans were unable to stop them.

In August the Mosquito bombers raided nine major German cities in daylight and only lost three aircraft. Not a great advert for the defence however they were lost be it AA, Fighters, accidents or mechanical failure.