The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

heres an example of the 'Blitz Week'. 100 P-47's escorting a group of bombers

'On the last day of Blitz Week (30 July) VIII Bomber Command targeted the Fieseler Works in Kassel. III./JG 11 and III./JG 1 were not scrambled until after the bombers crossed into Germany over Eifel. By the time they were in the air the bombers were near Emmerich am Rhein before they were intercepted. The Bf 109s were unexpectedly surprised by some 100 P-47 Thunderbolts escorts, newly equipped with drop tanks. III./JG 11 shot down two bombers but in the first major fighter combat of the Defense of the Reich lost two aircraft, with one pilot wounded and one dead.'

III./JG11 III./JG1 at that time had around 50 Bf109's ready. maybe 53. remarkable.

however no matter how good the LW pilots were, they were outnumbered, and thus, had a limited shelf life.
 
Last edited:
Wow Tante Ju, you need to calm down. Its almost like you are insulted by the document. I will check out your documents.

Thanks Paul
 
I am very cool, dear Micdrow, no worry.. even if wheater is very hot.. not insulted at all! Just say, sorry sometime, I cannot say right the things..
 
I am very cool, dear Micdrow, no worry.. even if wheater is very hot.. not insulted at all! Just say, sorry sometime, I cannot say right the things..

No worries here, Ive been out of the saddle for two years on the board and trying to catch up due to personal problems. Documents of WWII I love as you can see by the technical library.

All the best
Paul
 
There are 920 fighter plane (109 type) servicable, 917 pilots to fly them.. what about it?

It says there was 676 pilots ready to fly those 712 serviceable 109s.

There was not 920 serviceable 109s. That is the number of 109s on hand. There was 208 109s not capable of operations for one reason or another. It also shows that establishment strength was 212 a/c short.
 
pardon me:

III./JG1 had 12 aircraft ready and 12 aircraft flown out of 18 a/c available.
III./JG11 had 31 aircraft ready and 31 aircraft flown out of 68 a/c available.

thats 43 aicraft scambled to intercept the heavies P-47s.
 
Sorry you are right. I missed table. Indeed it was 712 serviceable 109s (out of 920) with 917 pilots to fly them at end of September.
 

At the beginning of July, III./JG1 had 57 109Gs and at the end of July had 60 109Gs on hand.

At the beginning of July, III./JG11 had 40 Fw190As and ended the the month with the same number on hand.
 
Sorry you are right. I missed table. Indeed it was 712 serviceable 109s (out of 920) with 917 pilots to fly them at end of September.

You still misread the table Tante Ju. Even though there was 917 pilots 'on hand' (present) there was only 676 pilots 'serviceable' (ready).
 
No, I do not. Do you know what "Einsatzbereit" means? What is German definition for this? I think no... This is what translated "ready". So there were 917 pilots who could fly planes, for 920 planes, but of that servicable was 712 planes, other were under repair etc.
 
917 - 676 = 241

So what were the other 241 pilots doing?

Est. Pres. Ready (Establishment Present Ready) is what the table says.

So lets look at the first unit in the table, I./JG2

Establishment 39
Present 39
Ready 33

There was only 33 of the 39 were able to fly. The 6 that were not able to fly could have been on leave or sick.
 
Tante Ju,

you can't win my friend. you can post documented facts all day about Luftwaffe strengths in the west, ie: outnumbered, and some just won't
believe it. what some don't realize is that most of the a/c were based in the east.

Since Bill brought it up, here are the numbers from Dr. Price's "Luftwaffe Data Book".

These are TOTAL aircraft in theatre, not just fighters which includes, transports, recon, etc. Dr. Price got his numbers from the Quatermaster reports.

JULY 1942
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
Total vs Servicable
392 - 265

Luftflotte 2 - Meditteranean
927 - 463

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
558 - 416

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1803 - 980

Luftwaffenkommando Ost - Eastern Front
604 - 392

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
396 - 307

Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte - Germany
1000 - 656

MAY 1943
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
414 - 342

Luftflotte 2 -Med
1105 - 572

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
685 - 541

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1257 - 829

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
373 - 288

Luftflotte 6 - Eastern Front
708 - 498

Luftwaffenkommando Sud Ost - Eastern / Meditteranean Fronts
163 - 141

Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte - Germany
2432 - 1457 ( WOW!!)

MAY 1944
Luftflotte 1 - Eastern Front
415 - 347

Luftflotte 2 - Med
348 - 227

Luftflotte 3 - Western Front
1079 - 597

Luftflotte 4 - Eastern Front
1060 - 805

Luftflotte 5 Eastern Front / Western FRont
294 - 262

Luftflotte 6 - Eastern Front
917 - 706

Luftflotte Reich - Germany
2374 - 1306

Luftwaffenkommando Sud Ost - Eastern / Meditteranean Fronts
353 - 284

books would be "Gunther Rall's: A memoir", although a bit later, but gives a excellent overview of the Luftwaffe, "Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope", anything by said/written by "Adolf Galland", especially his arguments with the FATMAN Hitler.

Those are the numbers I have and Bill references. I don't like to google. I have the books. Now could you please post the numbers that Galland and Rall posted in their books?
 

When I feel like you have enough credibility to debate with me on this topic I will devote more time on your 'requests'. In the interim do your Homework!!
 

III./JG1 had 12 aircraft ready and 12 aircraft flown out of 18 a/c available.
III./JG11 had 31 aircraft ready and 31 aircraft flown out of 68 a/c available.

thats 43 aicraft scambled to intercept the heavies P-47s.

43 LW a/c against 100 P-47s. 2 Allied bombers lost and only 2 LW fighters lost.

and who had air superiority?
 

If you didn't know that Blitz week was 20-25 February 1944, and that one P-47 Group had two big days in that interval? The 56th FG P-47s shot down ~ 9 t/e (110, 217, 88 ) plus 3 109s on Feb 20 west of hannover, and 12 Me 109s from Zuider Zee to Munster on the 21st and 8 Fw 190s on the 24th from W/Kassel to w/Hannover to Quackenbruck to Minden.. The ones near Kassel were close to Geissen ne of Frankfurt.

So one Group of ~ 48 P-47s were to '100' Thunderbolts near Kassel?

In the same period the 357th FG and the 354th FG, the only operational Mustangs doing long range escorts were killing German pilots from Gotha to Erfurt to Magdeburg to Oschersleben to Halbertstadt to Brunswick.

Get your facts straight - avoid internet Google searches - crap in -----> crap out
 
Last edited by a moderator:
It doesnt surprise me that the LW had difficulties in concentrating, or that in detail the USAAC was able at times to achieve superior concentration of force. LW had a number of issues to contend with....its radar detection systems were being downgraded by window, and other measures, it had a wide arc of territory to defend, by the latter part of Jan-May it was running out of pilots and fuel, and spares, and a whole range of other difficulties. We could draw some similarities (and differences) to the british situation in 1940 I might add.

But these issues are part of the battle, i would submit. They are the manouverings that makes comparisons of raw numbers somewhat arbitrary. Ther will be occasions when the germans achieve superiority of numbers, others when they wont. But they certainly wont if they dont have the numbers in the first place. And here lies the question that we have to turn our minds to....in terms of raw numbers available, did the defending fighters have more available than the USAAC could put fighters over the target? from there ther are numerous supplementary questions like, were there other factors that conspired to reduce that raw total for the germans and make it hard for them to achieve the necessary concentrations?

My opinion is that the Germans did outnumber the US 8FC in terms of available numbers, but by various tactical advantages the Americans were able to achieve better concentrations most of the time at the critical points of contact. So perhaps there are elements of truth in both arguments......something none of us had considered perhaps.....
 
One thing to consider is that the American fighters may have had to engage several German fighter groups. Dragondog certainly knows better than I and several other members of this forum have detailed accounts of the some of the German units. but did some of those American fighters have to engage one group of German fighters and then another 20 minutes later and perhaps a 3rd group even later? All after dropping tanks at the first combat and not being able to re-arm guns?
 
I wonder if the escort ever received radar assistance from Britain? Were they forewarned of enemy interceptions imminent, or were they on their own???

To what extent did radar, and ECM affect the performance of both sides in the battle????
 
How where the US escort squadrons controlled was there a senior officer in a bomber or a fighter who called in the escorts or was it just down to any pilot to shout for assistance.
 

Users who are viewing this thread