The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread. (2 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters. So never did the defending fighters attacked at once. p51 faced them in turns.

Germans had used feints and course changes in the BoB, not exactly new stuff here. Hurricanes, Defiants and Spitfires had different flight performances, nothing new here either. The P-51s, fighting fresh units in turns had to keep their engines in, if not WEP, at least a much higher throttle state for long periods of time and burn more fuel. P-51s did not have unlimited amounts of ammunition. Whatever they started "fight #3" with was what they finished "fight #2" with.

4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.

I think what some people are insisting on in consistency. If Luftwaffe bombers don't count for numbers in 1940 then why should American bombers count in 1943? Chose one method of counting or the other, not the method that makes your chosen side look the best at a given moment.

 

[drgondog]

I understand that many of the olders members have much more years of research , Mr Drgondog for example , as they are much older than the younger members, and their opinion is more important but let us the youngers too have an opinion. We too spend A LOT of money in books- ask my angry fiance.
1)German controllers during the deep penetration missions had to deal with a lot of feints attacks , bombers courses changes , weather limitations over german airfields, diferent flight performances of various types of intercepting fighters.

True

So never did the defending fighters attacked at once. p51 faced them in turns.

Definitely not true - particularly for 1st half of 1944 when it was rare for two long range escort groups to even see another one (USAAF P-38/51 Group). Look to Feb 20 South of Hannover, March 6, 1944 around Berlin, March 8 Berlin to Magdeburg, March 18 around Ulm/Augsburg or Mar 29 near Brunswick/Celle, April 8 Celle/Gifhornem or May12 (Rall) near Frankfurt, June 20 near Rugen Islands, July 7 near Halle/Bernburg, - In every case there were at least 2 Gruppe's concentrated in a small airspace defended by no more than one FG of Mustangs

2) The MISSION PROFILE of german fighters was to engage the bombers or face execution so always P51s entered the fight with great altitude advantage. Even 8 P51s versus 30 Fw190, is not equal if p51 are 3000ft higher and the Fw 190s are concentrated to attack the bombers . And one bounce is enough to destroy the attack as every german fighter dived away.It took a lot of time to reorganize a gruppe even in the days of unescorted raids. And only massive attacks were effective.

And 'massive attacks, developed in 1943 were the rule in 1944... hence the opportunity to engage a bomber box combined with fighter escort of one squadron to one Group to defend locally.

The LW developed tactics to place Me 109G-6s at 33000+ plus as high cover escort to Fw 190 forces - and initiated tactics where the Fw 190s entered combat from 28-29000 feet to avoid having an inferior position to the Mustangs which were frequently escorting from 25-28000 feet (depending on whether they were covering B-24s or B-17s. Gunther Rall gives an excellent account of his battles with the 56th FG on May 12.

Fighter pilots resort to attacks from high by climbing and meeting their foe head on - at least US pilots did. Nor did US pilots commonly use a Split-S and dive when confronted by larger numbers from high altitude. The reverse was commonly true for the LW counterparts - who quickly lost the initiative and tried tactics that worked against Spitfires and P-38s but not P-51s or P-47s.


3) German controllers were bad . Never warned german leader formation of approaching alleid fighters . No equal combat took place.

The skills of the Contollers varied as much as the skills of the Fighter leaders - you cannot say that all were bad or all were good. What is your definition of 'equal'? When superior numbers of German fighter constantly dove away from US fighters - they gave awy the initiave and became the hunted, even if attacked by small numbers of American fighters.

Most german formations were attacked from higher altitude approachingbombers or during their attacks . in such conditions not even experience could help. Galland of II/JG26 deid that way 17/8/43 ,Egon Mayers February 44, Philip fall 43 ( excuse me, i write from memory) all the same way , attacked from above without warning during their attacks in bomber formations.

Egon Mayer was killed March 2nd 1944 when he was attacked head on se Charleroiand following the merge he continued toward Fumay. Walter Gresham who no kills chased him, with his two remaining flight members, and shot him down somewhere past Fumay. His wingmen shot down Mayer's wingman. The combat film shows the Fw 190 believed to be Mayer's hit near the 20mm ammo in the left wing blowing off half the wing. Mayer's wingman described the chase and the hit which agrees the Report and film.

In some cases, particularly against P-47s during 1943 and early 1944 - the 47s entered escort space at 30,000 feet where their performance was superior. In early 1944 forward, the escorting fighters were lightnings and Mustangs - and the P-38 G and early J had issues with low ETO temperatures and stayed in the 26,000 foot range - losing altitude initiative to the LW.

As noted above Egon Mayer was shot down in a 3:2 fight with 358FS/355FG

4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.

If the German fighters chose to not attack the bombers which will never manuever to attack the fighter when in formation, the initiative belongs to the German fighter leader to attack bomber or fighter escort.

You noted that bomber claims were hugely overstated - true. LW claims as represented in Tony Woods list are consistently ~2:1 when comparing actual 8th AF losses, but I do not know whether that recording experience was relevant only to the battles over Germany. The 8th BC probably averaged 10:1 claim to actual and 8th FC probably overclaimed 10-15%

Given that the Luftwaffe NEVER shot down more than 9 of the USAAF opponent in the ETO (4th FG - August 18, 1944 near Beauvais and Les Andylis for credits of 8 German fighters) it would be hard for you to draw an illustrative example where the LW could punish the P-51s "like Spitfires over France 1941/42" - If you have examples please trot them out and compare against the whippings for each of the missions I named above?

5) Escort fighters were never attacked . It was not nessecary to score kills. Just force them to jettion early the drop tanks and disrupt their randevous programme. It was proposed but was rejected.

Would have helped as a consistent tactic but there are many examples of LW attacking the bombers early near the German border and the tanks were dropped always - so the effect was the same. That would frequently mean that the squadron which dropped its tanks could not fly say to Berlin for that mission but the other two that were not engaged were unaffected.

6) Several of the mentioned units did fought in areas that could not be reached by P47s/ Spitfires but had to take off from airfields within range of medium bombers and sometimes short range fighters.

Most of LuftFlotte Reich were out of range of all fighters except the Mustang and P-38 until after the Invasion... the random odd Mark II Mustang and occasional Intruder Mossies were the exception.

7)bmw 801 was useless at altitude (irrelevant!)
In my country there is a moto. The best way to lei is using the numbers. We all do it more or less. But to claim that LW had numerical superiority ?!?!
Just my opininon , i may be wrong.

You are in every example of mission dates I mentioned above, and probably many more examples in which the overall battle fought was with smaller than Gruppe to Group engagements.

 

[jim]

Hi and welcome Jim.

What was the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941-2? Much is made about the losses they sustained, and in the latter half of 1941, it really did get quite bad. However this is to overlook the conditions that they were forced to fight under.

I will acknowledge that my position is disputed, but evidence to disprove what I support is yet to be posted. In a related thread, I have posted that the LW took heavy losses up to June 1941, when its bombers were withdrawn. Thereafter the balance of losses tipped in favour of the LW, and remained in favour of the LW throughout 1942, but was less one sided. Plus these Allied losses achieved something, ultimately the LW losses only weakened their defences.

Beginning in April 1941, anbd continuing right through to the end of 1942, the RAF began a program of gaining the upper hand in Western European skies. This followed a planned deliberate and staged program. It began by denying access to the LW to British skies. This had been achieved by the beginning of June (well apart from some minor nuisance raids). It also included denying the Germans the ability to interfere with channel maritime traffic. This was achieved also by mid 1941 (again, some nuisance raids are an exception). Then it proceeded to deny the germans control of French airspace close to the channel. This was a much longer and more difficult process. Although the German bombers were quickly pulled away from the Coast, German fighters simply refused to come up unless they could attack from a position of numerical and tactical advantage. The RAF was forced to attack at known disadvantage in order to entice the LW into the fight. Results were often against the RAF as a result, but strategically this was still a victory. Gradually German losses mounted, less and less were they able to come up and defeat the British sweeps. Last big Hurrah for the LW along the channel was Dieppe, and this was not quite the one sided affair it is often made out to be.

By the time all this had ended, RAF was left in control of channel, British airspace, French coast....everything they had set out to do in other words. it was a very hard fought for set of preconditions that made cross channel invasion a possibility as early as 1942. Germans came away from this long, unsung series of clashes with a big material victory, but had lost all the key objectives that caused those clashes.

Plus, I cannot make the connection between this fight, and a possible fight between Mustangs and the LW.

Its out of topic so a short reply. RAF in 41/42 achieved what? Deny Britsh air space? Generally True. Deny channel airspace ? I don t aggre but let s say it s true.Deny French airspace? No. How he succed these results? By confronting 18-20 staffeln with 60-70-80 squadrons and losing from 2-1 (Raf fans) to 4-1 (LW fans). Good job. Excellent performance. In Dieppe with massive numerical superiority (750 aircrafts) lost 88 fighters to 23 germans and with B17s bombing JG26 airfields.
Of course it was mainly the german tactics and not pilot quality or performance gap that created the diference. Only when Heavy bombers begun insecond half 42 to make serius damage and LW was forced to make them priority RAF saw better results. Combat fighter losses of LW in 41/42 in Channel front in no way were unsustainable JG 26 lost 47 KIA pilots in 1941. Raf lost 71 in Dieppe alone

 

[TheMustangRider]

War is a very sad story.

Agreed.

 

[jim]

Mr Drgondog

About Mayers, The book i posses sates his formation was bounced by 29 P47 from 5000ft higher. And its aircraft took hits in the engine and cocpit areas. Perhaps someone could help?
An formation leader could not choose, he was obligated to engage the bombers. But even if he could his formation ,positioned to attack bombers, was at energetic disadvantage in comparison to escort fighters .
The idea about attacking the escorts was to engange them by several small units in hit and run attacks . Destroy the time plan and then the main force attack the bombers later hopefully unescorted . Of course the solution would be simple for the alleis.Additional P51s!
German controllers were bad. Despite the special equipment carried by formations leaders aircrafts were unable to help their pilots . Countless cases. Alleid superiority in electronics was so total
P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50
The alleis because of the ULTRA knew exactly the place ,composition and strength of each gruppe So could design their flight plans to make even harder for the germans to concntrate their forces

 

[mhuxt]

Also notable is that the Germans picked up the H2X frequencies and used them as target ranging for flak - which was very accurate and effective.

I'm aware of the Germans having used Naxos in their night-fighters to pick up H2X emissions from about March '44 onwards, but I'd not heard of the flak arm having any similar device.

Got an equipmnent name / reference for me, out of interest?

 

[parsifal]

Hi Jim

There are a lot of areas of disgreement, so perhaps to simplify our discussion I will concentrate on just one isse that you reluctantly acknowlwdge, but have lingering doubts about....the control of the channel.


I have attached the shipping losses by T/O for the Allies. In 1941, for the british Isles, the British lost 740000 tons of shipping. By the following year it had dropped to 214000, and the year after that 52000 tons. There was an increase later in the war, but these were due mainly mines. In terms of shipping losses to Axis aircraft in the waters around the british Isles, shipping losses went from more than 100000 tons in June 1940, to less than 10000 tons a year later. The LW no longer had any significant impact on local shipping, despite the deployment of two full Gerswaders with abilities to do just that.

I do not know the losses to Axis controlled shipping in the channel, and along the North Sea, but I think you would agree it was very minor. I have a book about MTBs operations that mentions in passing that Axis shipping losses due to MTB action were less than those inflicted by Allied air action, and for the period 1941-2, Axis shipping losses due to MTBs in the channel were about 100000 tons. So the best figure I can offer is that Allied airpower sank about 100000 tons or more of Axis shipping in the Channel and the north sea in 1941-2.

Now in terms of warship losses, channel became an increasingly dangerous place for the German Navy. By June 1941, they had lost 11 vessels of 300 tons or greater to air attack. More importantly, the RAF was containing the two battlecruisers in Brest and preventing them from deploying. They couldnt sink them, but these high value targets were heavily defended. They eventually escaped, true enough, but not before they had to tacitly admit defeat and withdraw from the TO.

I cannot see how it can be argued that the Allies did not gain control of the Channel airspace in 1941, on the basis of these figures and historical facts

 

[drgondog]

Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary - I would have to look up mission but believe Stettin/Posnan in summer of 44

 

[parsifal]

Jim

With regard to your claim that the LW retained air superiority over western Europe, and france in particular, I refer to John Foreman "1941 - The Blitz to the Non-Stop Offensive - The Turning Point", and also to Gallands autobiography.

Relevantly it is stated

"Thus in the air war the wheel had turned full circle. The RAF was now firmly on the offensive. Their opponents were now fighting a near totally defensive war in the west, and would remain so for the rest of the war. They retained the advantages of defence (which caused many losses for the allies), but they had lost one important psychological factor. Lufwaffe fighter pilots were known as "jagdfliegers" literally "hunting flyers", and by being deployed so defensively, they had lost much of this advantage. Adolph Galland summed this up perfectly in his autobiography"

Gallands book says, in relation to the 1941 operations

" (The Jagdfliegers) element is to attack, to track, to hunt, and to destroy the enemy. Only in this way can the eager and skillful fighter pilot display his ability to the full. Tie him to a narrow and confined ddefensive task , rob him of his initiative and you take away from him the best most valuable qualities he possesses: his aggressive spirit, joy of action and the passion of the hunter."

Foreman goes on to state

" the germans did not relish thei new defensive role......." Of course there was much hard fighting, heavy, even one sided losses, and the germans retained the ability to react selectively. But this is not air superiority by any definition.

However, using the strict definition of "air superiority", the British had achieved it by 1941. Remember the three states of air control....air parity, in which both sides retain the ability to undertake operations with some degree of comparability, then there is air superiority, where one side has the ability to undertake operations with greater freedom than the other, and finally there is air supremacy, where the opponent cannot undertake any operations of any kind without incurring heavy losses.

If we apply those definitions to the airspace over Britain, France and Germany from 1941, the Germans could no longer undertake any significant operations over large parts of the airspace. They retained limited freedom of action for their fighters. The allies denied large areas of the sky to their opponents, and routinely entered the airspace of ntheir opponents, but would suffer loss if they did. Thats not air supremacy, but it is air superiority, according to the theory, because the allies had much greater freedom of action than the germans did.

 

[mhuxt]

Freeman's Mighty Eighth War Diary - I would have to look up mission but believe Stettin/Posnan in summer of 44

Cheers, will see if I can find a copy. Should note that to be perfectly accurate, I should have said Naxos picked up H2*S*.

 

[The Basket]

Going back to the Bf 109 undercarriage...

It wasnt copied. Which pins it for me. Any advantage wasnt worth having. So the Bf 109 undercarriage wasnt good.

 

[Glider]

I would like to support Parsifals comment about having control of the air. I have a copy of No 2 Group (which I would recomend to anyone) and what I didn't expect were the number of raids which resulted in few or even no losses to German fighters, even using the Ventura which wasn't liked by the Group.
Its not quite true to say that No2 Group could bomb at will but they did have a lot of flexibility and freedom.

 

[parsifal]

Duplicate Post (DELETED)

 

[parsifal]

I would like to support Parsifals comment about having control of the air. I have a copy of No 2 Group (which I would recomend to anyone) and what I didn't expect were the number of raids which resulted in few or even no losses to German fighters, even using the Ventura which wasn't liked by the Group.
Its not quite true to say that No2 Group could bomb at will but they did have a lot of flexibility and freedom.

Yes its just the application of the theory. People see the word "air superiority" and cant make the correlation because of the losses inflicted on the allies. But there is no doubt who held air superiority in the west after the end of May 1941.

For the record, the theory as applied by NATO is: "Air supremacy is the complete dominance of the air power of one side's air forces over the other side's, during a military campaign. It is the most favorable state of control of the air. It is defined by NATO and the United States Department of Defense as 'that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.'

Friendly Forces /Enemy Forces
Air supremacy /Air incapability
Air superiority /Air denial
Air parity /Air parity

There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.

For those air forces which are unable to contest for air superiority or even air parity a course of action would be Air denial, that is maintaining a level of operations that although it concedes air superiority to the other side prevents it from achieving air supremacy and having a totally free use of the air space."

Once the theory is laid out, it is easy to see why the RAF achieved a state of air superiority from May 1941, whilst the Germans were achieving air denial. Air denial enabled them to exact a price on the British in their exercise of air superiority, but it did not allow them to undertake action free of interference, or in some areas with any prospect of real success.

Hopefully this will explain why Britain can claim air supoeriority from quite early in the campaign. Over time, of course, that superiority developed into air supremacy, but that took at least another 1.5 years over the occupied territories and 3 years to achieve over Germany itself

 

[TheMustangRider]

Very informative parsifal.

 

[riacrato]

I was under the impression the V31 was, like other later V-models of the Bf 109, first and foremost a testbed for planned Me 309 features. In this case: Semi-retractable radiator and main landing gear.

 

[Glider]

Taking the Air Superiority situation in Europe the following stats iro 2 Group may be of interest.

1941 Sorties 4,990 losses 211 (95 Flak, 39 Fighters, 16 Battle accidents, 61 unknown) approx 4.2% loss ratio
1942 Sorties 2,253 losses 97 (No Breakdown) approx 4.3% loss ratio
1943 Sorties 5,531 losses 108 (18 Flak, 22 Fighters, 12 Battle Accidents, 56 Unknown) approx 1.95% loss ratio
1944 Sorties 27,022 losses 188 (46 Flak, 3 Fighters, 13 Battle Accidents, 126 unknown) approx 0.695% loss ratio
1945 Sorties 12,311 losses 86 (29 Flak, 1 Fighters, 3 Battle Accidents, 53 Unknown) approx 0.699% loss ratio

Its fair to say that the German Fighters were never the main threat with the possible exception of 1943 when they did quite well. However even then for the fighters to only destroy 22 bombers (plus say 20 of the unknowns) over 12 months is hardly a huge success. I had expected the German fighters to do better in 1941 but again, flak was a much greater danger.

Stats from 2 Group RAF A complete History

 

[davparlr]

Mr Drgondog


P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50

Jim, you are kind of being ganged up on but I must comment on your statements regarding the P-51 including the one above and this one.

4) Some people insist not to consider the bombers part of the air superiority. Firstly bombers were credited with douzens of german fighters after each missions according to western mythology. Secondly if the bombers were not there P51s would have suffered the fate of the Spitfires over France in 1941/42.

While there is a general consensus and, good reason to believe, that the P-51 is overrated as the best fighter of the war, there also tends to a belief that the only reason the P-51 was successful was because of its range and quantity. This opinion does not hold up to scrutiny. When compared at equivalent fighter weights, the P-51B with the -7 engine and pulling 67" Hg boost (late '43 to May '44) was faster than any Bf-109F or G from SL to ceiling, often significantly so. This includes the Bf-109G -14 with both the ASM and AM engines using MW50. In climb the P-51B was generally superior to the F and roughly equivalent to the G. Against the later model Bf-109G-14 with MW-50, the P-51B had slightly less climb capability up to about 20k ft where it started to perform better than its rivals. Post May, 1944, with higher octane fuel, the P-51B /D, pulling 75" boost, was significantly superior in speed averaging maybe 30-40 mph faster to any model Bf-109G from SL to ceiling. In climb, the P-51B has the advantage from SL to ceiling of all Bf G models. The P-51D is at a slight disadvantage to the G-14 up to about 15k ft. where it starts to perform better. In general, the P-51 will out dive the Bf models and roll better. Turning is competitive and acceleration favors the Bf. Endurance easily falls to the Mustang. The only Bf model that was competitive to the P-51B/D is the K, and it is only roughly equal in performance to the P-51B with 75" boost.

I think your statement that the P-51 is not superior to the Bf-109 with MW50 is quite debatable since the P-51 is faster, generally climbs better, dives better, rolls better, and only gives up a few areas including acceleration. And can do this while running the Bf out of fuel, shooting it down on landing and flying home several hours. In my opinion, the P-51 is the better performer against any contemporary Bf-109 and the post May, "44 version is overpoweringly better than any Bf model except the K.

 

[jim]

Jim, you are kind of being ganged up on but I must comment on your statements regarding the P-51 including the one above and this one.



While there is a general consensus and, good reason to believe, that the P-51 is overrated as the best fighter of the war, there also tends to a belief that the only reason the P-51 was successful was because of its range and quantity. This opinion does not hold up to scrutiny. When compared at equivalent fighter weights, the P-51B with the -7 engine and pulling 67" Hg boost (late '43 to May '44) was faster than any Bf-109F or G from SL to ceiling, often significantly so. This includes the Bf-109G -14 with both the ASM and AM engines using MW50. In climb the P-51B was generally superior to the F and roughly equivalent to the G. Against the later model Bf-109G-14 with MW-50, the P-51B had slightly less climb capability up to about 20k ft where it started to perform better than its rivals. Post May, 1944, with higher octane fuel, the P-51B /D, pulling 75" boost, was significantly superior in speed averaging maybe 30-40 mph faster to any model Bf-109G from SL to ceiling. In climb, the P-51B has the advantage from SL to ceiling of all Bf G models. The P-51D is at a slight disadvantage to the G-14 up to about 15k ft. where it starts to perform better. In general, the P-51 will out dive the Bf models and roll better. Turning is competitive and acceleration favors the Bf. Endurance easily falls to the Mustang. The only Bf model that was competitive to the P-51B/D is the K, and it is only roughly equal in performance to the P-51B with 75" boost.

I think your statement that the P-51 is not superior to the Bf-109 with MW50 is quite debatable since the P-51 is faster, generally climbs better, dives better, rolls better, and only gives up a few areas including acceleration. And can do this while running the Bf out of fuel, shooting it down on landing and flying home several hours. In my opinion, the P-51 is the better performer against any contemporary Bf-109 and the post May, "44 version is overpoweringly better than any Bf model except the K.

Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)
Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

This has already been disproven, right? According to DerAdler, the Naval version was the Bf-109T, which used the conventional Bf-109 gear, which was strengthened, not the revised swing shown on the V-31.

Correct the V-31 had nothing to do with Carrier ops. By that point in time the Bf 109Ts were in service in Norway and the GZ was becoming an afterthought (if I recall correctly that is ).

The V-31 was a test bed for the Me 309.

Falcon's Messerschmitt Bf 109 Hangar

Not pertaining to this topic, but for those that are interested in the Bf 109T which was built for carrier use check out the following book. It is on my shelf and very interesting.

Sea Eagles: The Messerschmitt Bf109T
By: Francis Marshall

ISBN: 1871187230