The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread. (1 Viewer)

[Juha]

Hello Glider
what I recall, when BC used its heavy bombers over France during 41-42, losses tended to be rather high, at least a few Stirling and Halifax missions I can recall. Same to the Lanc low level raid to Augsburg when a few 190s low in fuel intercepted the raiders for a short time before forced to disengage because of lack of fuel.

Juha

 

[Glider]

I think the key difference is that the German raids were stopped, they were stopped due to heavy losses and a large majority of those losses were caused by RAF fighters. The Luftwaffe did not gain control of the air.
The RAF raids on France and the other occupied countrys were not stopped by the Luftwaffe, the losses were not caused by the fighters and the RAF could attack anywhere they wanted, whenever they wanted. The RAF dictated the combat, not the Luftwaffe.

Re the sortie rate in 1942, part of the reason was that it was a year of significant change to No 2 Group. All the Blenheim and handful of Fortress I were withdrawn and replaced with Ventura's, Bostons and Mosquito's. This would have had some impact as tactics were developed, tried out and implemented. I do not pretend this was the whole reason but they inevitably did impact operations.

 

[Glider]

Hello Juha
True but these were normally single figures raids often as low as three and the Lancs (I think, happy to be corrected on this) didn't have any escort. Had the RAF launched say a 100 bomber raid with an escort who knows what would have happened. 109F's found penny packet Sterlings difficult but the Fw190 would be a really serious danger. That said the Luftwaffe were not around in numbers and couldn't be everywhere.

We are in the world of speculation here. I do believe they would have done better than the early RAF daylight raids which had heavy losses. Those aircraft had no escort, armour or self sealing fuel tanks and were up against cannon armed Luftwaffe aircraft who sometimes outnumbered them. There was only ever going to be one winner in those battles.

 

[drgondog]

This "small minority" include USAAF Bomber Command after Schweinfurt and and RAF bomber command who did not fly exactly because it knew Luftwaffe had command of air.. I know, annoying fact, but little difficult to avoid it.

The LW achieved a position of stength and effectiveness against US Strategic Daylight Bombing operations during the period August 1, 1943 through February 19, 1944 - during which the US actually considered transitioning to night bombing in November 1943. - so TJ you are correct.

Having said that, the introduction to the ETO of both the P-38J and the P-51B reversed that state between February and May. During that period the two escort types, beginning with small numbers in contrast to LuftFlotte Reich's ability to concentrate in the same numbers (150-200+) fighters which devastated the US over Schweinfurt, were able to totally and completely wrest control of the air from the LW. The two Berlin missions of March 6, 1944 and April 29, 1944 were the last two fights in which the LW destroyed ~ 10% of the US attacking bomber force.




Basical: RAF goal was use bombers bait, force German fighter into fight, and shoot them down with strong fighter numbers, ie. having advantage. But German did not play this game.. they played theirs. RAF failed.
German goal was simply to skirmish RAF in West, with minimal force, cause maximum casulties... LW succeed in goal, until 1944, and USAAF escort, that is.

I agree with Jim. This is usual discussion - data I saw suggest P-51 type had advantage in speed over medium altitude, 109G-6 or G-14 with 605A, 605AM. Means high alitude over. Generally in speed but not in climb, or turn. This favours 109.

If you compare dash number versions between the P-51B versus all the Me 109G's from -6 through -14 you will only find a climb advantage and you will have to consistently compare at 1.42 ata and above to remain close in any part of the performance envelope as the octane ratings for the Packard 1650-3 and -7 engines increased available Hp by >25%.. and there were no restrictions due to lack of availability of the fuel types or WI boost.

RoC is strictly dependent on (Available Power- Power Required)/Weight

You have to be very careful in the comparisons between the two aircraft as the Zero lift Drag co-efficient of the Me 109 was more than 50% higher above the Mustang (any version).

Taking the above equation for RoC, it is derived from (T*V-D*V)/W - so play with the math as both of the induced drag contributions are similar, the 109 has a slight advantage in wing loading when the 51 has full internal fuel, the 51 bleeds energy slower because of much less overall drag.

The 109 definitely did Not out roll the Mustang except at very low speeds, it usually had a climb advantage but not a great one - but enough that if it (109) was flown by a pro it could eveade for awhile in a tight corkscrew climb in the low to middle speed ranges. In fact even the Fw190 was slower in roll at high speeds in comparison with the Mustang, so was the Spit IX.

The 109 flown by a pro at low to medium speeds could turn better, although even this is a tricky discussion because the 51 again bled energy faster and in most cases while losing ground, had more energy available to climb. A knowledgable Mustang pilot knew that and attempted to either keep his speed about 250mph or disengage using the greater enerfy..

P-51B is good performance, but not mature type - problem with vision, too light guns, reliability with them. P-51D is mature type.

P-51B-1 through -7 had many problems causing early high returns - often 30% in the December 1943 through mid April 1944. The -10 and -15 were superb machines which entered the ETO in high numbers in early April 1944. Additional advantages were the replacement of the early canopy (109 style) with the Malcomb Hood for significantly improved vision - as well as reducing most of the gun jamming with heaters but only the upright mount in the D finally solved the issues.

The aft cg issue was created by adding the 85 gallon tank but re-solved by burning the fuel down to 25 gallons.

As to the 'too light guns' they were more than adequate for the Me 109 and Fw 190. The US Mustang pilots had many examples of shooting down three, four and maybe 20 examples of five German fighters in one mission. So far I have only found about 15 examples of a 109 or Fw 190 shooting down three US fighters in the ETO and that was one example when Egon mayer claimed 4 P-47s.

Case is different with high altititude AS or D type engine - this is G-6/AS, G-14/AS G-10 or K-4 type. All equal to P-51 at altitude. 109K also slightly better in speed etc. At altitude, climb better, turn better. It is question of engine.
General - speed characteristics of both types excellent.. top speed, cruise speed. Equal. Bf 109 is more suited for close fights, because it is superior in turn, roll, climb. P-51 is superior in high speed fights. There are also many other factors - gun, vision, range etc. This gives mixed picture. Both types excellent for purpose, equal in combat.

Generally true (nearly equal) except at altitude, Excess Power over Required Power is even more critical for the 'draggier' airframe (the 109) and the stall characteristics are more subtle- and the 109 simply did not outroll the Mustang.

Turning may be better in low to medium speeds - unproven at higher speed ranges - and turning is over rated when comparing the two fighters. Usually the one that sees and engages the other first, with higher energy entering the fight wins.

 

[parsifal]

Hello Parsifal
not being interested in NATO terminology all what I said was that IMHO RAF didn't enjoy air superiority over France in 41-42 in daytime, even with strong escorts its small bomber formations suffered rather heavy losses, day-time bomber sortie rates were fairly low. Or at least RAF didn't use its claimed air superiority effectively, look 2 Group sortie rate in 42. To be able to sent a couple sqns of bombers, usually light bombers, with the need of 5 or more fighter wings to escort that token force, doesn't show at least a clear air superiority. IMHO if the RAF has been able to sent a wing of heavy bombers with 3 fighter wings acting as escorts rather regularly deep into France without heavy losses, that would have been IMHO air superiority. IMHO LW didn't win air superiority over southern England during the BoB even if it was able to sent sizeable bomber formations regularly to bomb targets in southern England during it.

And LW was not forced to move bomber units more rear during 41-42. Its main bomber unit in West, KG 2, used more or less same bases during 41-43 but when part of it was transferred first to Balkans and then to East during the second half of 41.

Juha

Hi Juha


How would you describe air superiority if you are not interested in NATO terminology. What are you referring to when you aree saying the LW enjoyed air superiority. If you are basing that simply as the numbers of aircraft shot down, but are ignoring the limited freedom of action the germans had in other airpower applications, such as strike, transport, aeronaval interdiction, then what you are referring to as "air superiority - Finn style" equates to air denial in NATO speak (which is everybody else I might point out)

I'll put it to you this way, air superiority is about freedom of manouvre, freedom to undertake operations at relatively low cost. You make a number of claims that are simply untrue in this respect:

1) That large numbers of RAF bombers were shot down over france in the daylight raids....never happened, infact the daylight raids over France suffered a lower attrition rate than the Night bombers over Germany, AND the majority of those losses were to flak, not the fighters.

2) You make the claim that 5 or 6 wings of fighters would escort these bomber formations over france. Another myth. In fact the maximum was six squadrons in 1941 for any given raid. Another urbaqn myth I am afraid, that the RAF used all the resources based in England to try to overpower the LW. If they had trried that, the LW would simply not come up to fight, as they actually did on numerous occaasions

3) You say that the German bomber formations did not move. I know that isnt true, since the units KG26 and 30 had been transferred from the Paris/Calais area to Bardofoss as part of LF5s operations against Murmansk in the first instance, but on their return were deployed to the Bordeaux Merignac area as part of Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik. The elements of KG-40 that had remained in France after the 1940 battles were quickly redeployed from Brest to Bordeaux because of the threats posed by RAF retaliation. This squadron suffered losses to RAF bombers before moving in March 1941 out of range. Later it had two additional staffeln attached to the KG. Some small recon elements and seaplanes did remain in the area, but these were of no threat to British control of the area.

Now, in the way that I describe air superiority, how can the LW mount effective operations over Britain after May 1941? They cannot. But the RAF could do the reverse, moreover, despite your claims to the contrary, bomber losses were tolerable, and fighter losses acceptable. The RAF gained control of the skies over the channel, as witnessed by the much reduced losses to shipping for the allies, and the sharp increase in losses to the Axis navy. They gained control over Northern France as well , as witnessed by the modest losses, and moderate to severe damage they inflicted on French industry. LW could only react selctively to these incursions, and then only with fighters acting on the defensive. There were no offensive operations of any note in reverse by the germans. No one is saying the germans could not react defensively to the Allies, but they were limited to reacting defensively, they had no offensive potential at all. The allies had far more options, could penetrate enemy airspace with confidence and undertake a much wider range of operations. In other words, they had air superiority.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
I'm not saying that LW had air superiority over France only denying that RAF had, other than local time to time. Even FAF was able to achieve local air superiority over targets areas during the Summer 44 Soviet strategic offensive in Karelian Isthmus, at least it lost no bombers to Soviet fighters during escorted bombing raids against Soviet army targets but nobody claims that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus. LW was able to use air transport and liaison a/c over France in 41-43, it had no needs of strike or aeronaval interdiction there, I'm not speaking situation over Channel but over France, even if LW was able to made strikes against British shipping in the Channel time to time.

1) If you look BC statics, daylight losses were in some months rather high, in fact unsustainable level, don't know the exact causes, but 6% loss rate is unsustainable in long run, whatever the causes were, in fact some experts claimed that only loss rates 3% or under were sustainable.

2) One can see that myth stated for ex Price's Spitfire Mark V Aces book pp. 18-19. According to him "Typical for these ops was Circus No 62…" 6 Blenheims were covered by 18 sqns of Spits and 2 of Hurricanes, ie ½ sqn of Blenheims covered by 20 sqns of fighters.

3) I'd not count units moved to other theatres as units moved because of RAF attacks, of course almost all bombers were moved from France as a preparation for Operation Barbarossa during late spring early summer 41 but RAF had not any effect on that. As I wrote, the main bomber unit operating against GB from mid 41 to mid 43 was KG 2 and it was not moved to rear, it changes its based time to time because of operational needs, ie was it operating against East England, against Hull for ex or against SW England, against Bristol for ex.

IMHO if the RAF would have air superiority over France it could have used regularly its medium/heavy bombers against important targets in central France with reasonable losses. It didn't do that even if daytime bombing in 41-mid 43 was clearly more effective way to deliver effective strikes against industrial and military targets.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Glider
have you LW bomber loss rates during the BoB, IMHO they might not be much worse than those of RAF over France in 41-42, in fact lower than those in BC daylight loss rates when it flew 200 or more sorties/month in 42 (between 6 and 9%), 43 between 2.1-6.6%. IMHO it was only that British were more stubborn in their air campaign and were not stopped even if the price went rather high.

Yes, the Lancs during the Augsburg raid didn't have fighter escort, they relied on low-lever flying and diversion raids by 2 Group to keep LW fighters away of the Lancs but that back-fired.

Juha

 

[drgondog]

German controllers were bad. Despite the special equipment carried by formations leaders aircrafts were unable to help their pilots . Countless cases. Alleid superiority in electronics was so total
P51s would have suffered without the bombers simply because they would be the target and LW would choose how and when to engange them. In equal combat P51 is not superior to the Bf109 with MW50
The alleis because of the ULTRA knew exactly the place ,composition and strength of each gruppe So could design their flight plans to make even harder for the germans to concntrate their forces

Perhaps you can evaluate the following:

From August 1943 through January 1944 the 8th AF sustained intolerable losses to th LW. The LW sustained relatively light losses against the unescorted bombers.

From February 1944 through April 1944 the 8th AF sustained important, but sustainable losses from the LW. The LW experienced unsustainable losses during that period of time. During May, 1944 the 8th and 15th AF mounted the campaign against German and Czechoslovakia Oil/Chemical targets and continued the destruction of Ploesti by the 15th.

The difference?

Three long range Fighter Groups at the beginning of January 1944 capable of going to Schweinfurt.

Six long range Fighter Groups at the end of March, 1944 capable of going to Munich.

Eight long range Fighter Groups at the end of April, 1944 capable of going to Brux and Posnan.

No other US or RAF Fighter Groups going past Kassel.

LW lost an average of 800 pilots per month during that period - when they did not lose 800 pilots in the West and Germany in 1943.

The LW was defeated over Germany, the Oil campaign was a success, further straining LW future reserves and operations

1.) The LW had more s/e (109/190) fighters available to place anywhere they wished and planned. The 8th AF fighters had to spread their available escorts among three separate bomb divisions of approximately 200-350 bombers each to generally spread out targets. So, if the controllers were good that particular day and wished to place only 1/3 of available day fighters (~150) on one box of bombers they would have worst case of one US Fighter Group of 30-40 effective Mustangs to defeat or fly past to get to the bombers, with perhaps another 30-40 fifteen miles (8-10 minutes) away for help.

2. According to you the LW fighters, the Me 109G-6 and Fw 190A-7 and A-8s were equivalent to the Mustang and had they decided to engage the fighters instead of the bombers the LW Fighter arm would 'easily deal with the Mustang'.

In spite of your rationale that the German Controllers were useless, the controllers could as often as not guess where the target would be and direct the Gruppe's to an altitude advantage.

But -
1. The bomber losses dropped below 1943 Schweinfurt losses on every mission except March 6 and April 29, 1944 - despite twice as many s/e and t/e fighters in Luftflotte Reich in May,1944 as in May 1943.
2. The average loss rate to German Fighters went from 10+ percent for deep penetrations with long range escort to less than 5% and trending to 2% in May.
3. The loss rate of the outnumbered US long range escorts was below that of the P-47 loss rate in air to air combat.

So - despite the focus on Bombers, and despite your claim that the German Fighter Command could easily deal with the Mustang had they chose to do so - the German air force was trounced, the bomber losses plunged, the outnumbered escorts hunted the LW everywhere in Germany ripping the heart out of the LW.

Were the German fighter pilots so inferior during this period that even with as 'good or better' fighters they were unable to remotely come close to 1:1 in air to air combat when engaging the Mustang (which was in the range of 8:1 air to air over 109/190s).

Were they superior in skill but lacking in tactics?

Were their fighters neither superior or as capable?

Or???

 

[Glider]

Juha
I have no idea as to the loss rates for the Luftwaffe bombers or fighters for the BOB, its something that I have often wondered about. The rough numbers I can find but not the loss ratio.
If you can point me in any direction I would appreciate it, I admit to expecting it to be in the 8% area but that is a guess.

 

[Juha]

Hello Glider
I don't recall any source and I don't have now time to try to dig out one, that's why I asked if you have the rates. 8% might be near, at least it sounds familiar. Maybe Njaco have the relevant info.

Juha

 

[Glider]

I have been digging around and found the largest daylight Bomber Command (not just no 2 group) action that I can identify. The details and results I hope you find interesting

24th July Target Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
There were five stages to the attack

Brest
1) 3 Fortresses bombing from 30,000 ft no losses
2) 18 Hampdens escorted by 3 squadrons of Spitfires 2 Hampdens lost
3) 79 wellingtons unescorted daylight raid 10 Wellingtons lost

Cherbourg (Diversion)
36 Blenheim escorted by Spitfires no losses

La Pallice (Scharnhorst)
15 Halifax's unescorted daylight raid 5 lost

Fighter defence was described as being stronger and more prolonged than expected. The Spitfire escort certainly worked and the Wellingtons and Halifax's paid the price. What would have happened if the escort had been given to the Wellingtons and Halifax's no one will know, but without escort they were sent on a death ride and I would have expected more of the them to have been shot down. Germany threw eveything they had into the air to protect those ships and a strong defense must have been expected.
To make matters worse the Germans would have been warned as Sterlings did an unescorted daylight raid the day before losing one bomber to fighters

I don't know the split of losses between the Fighters and Flak. I do know that the RAF claimed 15 fighters from the bombers and escort. I appreciate that this was an over estimate but if anyone has the real figures it would be interesting.

 

[Juha]

Hello
La Pallice was probably too far away for fighter escort at the time, maybe even Brest was so far away, that there was only fighter bases for only 3 Spitfire sqns close enough for effective escort work.

Juha

ADDUM, at least the Halifaxes hit Scharnhorst, IIRC one stick of 5 1000lb AP bombs hit Scharnhorst but none of those exploded, anyway Scharnhorst shipped some 3500tons of water and had to return to Brest for repairs.

 

[parsifal]

Hi Juha

In reference to your last post to me, perhaps we are talking about two different time periods, with regards to fighter committments and losses sustained. I am talking about the 1941 through to the early 1942 period. In terms of fighters scrambled, it was not uncommon for FC to scramble upwards of 20 squadrons over England when a rhubarb or a Circus was planned, however never more than 6 squadrons of fighters ever crossed the ccoast, and never more than 4 squadrons (possibly 5) were attached as direct escort to the decoy forces. In the whole of 1941, only 17 squadrons of fighters ever committed forces to cross the channel in that entire year, and of these no more than 6 (possibly 7) were committed at any single time. So when you mention 18 squadrons to escort 5 or 6 blenheims, this is a gross misrepresentation of the facts, or is referring to a time period outside of 1941. 18 squadrons may have been scrambled to support the Blenheims, but no more than 6 squadrons ever crossed the channel to engage the Germans. If it refers to 1941, it it is probable that Price is referring to the numbers of fighters scrambled, not the numbers that crossed the french coastline.

Moreover, to entice the germans up, the antics of the RAF were really quite unnerving. There were never more than 8 staffeln available along the French coast, and the LW was far too canny to scramble if the odds were against them. Only if they believed that they had a numerical advantage, or at least comparability would they commit to battle. The usual makeup of the RAF incursions was to escort the blenheims with 2 or 3 squadrons, watch for the JGs to react. The RAF would have 3 or 4 squadrons of fighters come in behind the decoy force, mixed in with the scrambled fighters over England. Whilst the LW would engage the forward elements it was the forward groups responsibility to try and hold them until the cavalry arrived. too much cavalry and the germans would turn tail if they felt the numbers were too far against them.

With regard to losses, I notice you are referring to BC losses when you start mentioning losses of 6 or 7%. But again, this is misrpresenting the facts. The vast majority of BC losses were against targets in Germany itself, where indeed it was the case the British were suffering heavy losses (for not much gain either). But in the daylight operations over france it was the exact opposite. Losses never exceeded 1.75% per month. and of these the overwhelming percentage were from flak. German fighters in France were never the major sources of losses to British Bombers engaged in daylight operations. Again, that applies to 1941, in the latter part of 1942 there was an increase, but never to the catastrophic levels of the Night Bombers in the latter part of 1941.

With regard to shipping losses to the RAF in the Channel, well, if the losses in the whole British home waters is anything to go by, then in 1940, the british lost 1.5m tons to all causes, in 1941 714000 tons, and in 1942 less than 214000 tons. This was mostly to causes other than aircraft, for example, in the whole of 1941, only 74000 tons of shipping was lost to air attack in Home waters, and I know that the majority of these were in the north sea. German efforts at coastal shipping in the channel are so low as to be counted as zero. Moreover their inability to impede British military traffic in the channel is amply demonstrated by their lack of reaction to the invasion at Dieppe. The reaction of their fighters is well known and deserves respect, but where were the KGs????Why werent they reacting???. Answer is because they couldnt. Too few, out of position and with no prospect of success

 

[pbfoot]

I just returned a book to the library which detailed 200 Spits escorting 18 Blenheims and an equally large number escorting a single Stirling , amongst the comments were JE Johnson calling the raids a waste in not so many words along with other others who commented along the same sort of line. This info was from the Official History of the RCAF

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
now the Circus No 62, flew on 7 Aug 41, according to Price's book, 6 Spit sqns operated as close escort and escort cover forces, 3 Spit sqns as the top cover, so 9 Spit sqns escorted the bombers, and 6 other Spit sqns acted as the Target Support Force and the 2 Hurricane sqns plus 3 more Spit sqns as the Withdrawal Cover Force. The LW fighter activity concentrated against the latter, so IMHO it is clear that all 20 fighter sqns operated over France, or do you think that Jagdflieger concentrated against the fighters that flew over southern England and that was late summer 41. I gave my source, I wonder what is your source to the claim that max 7 sqns were committed at any single time.

In fact tactical advantage was enough for LW, one can see that even from FC combat reports, 20-30 LW fighters attacking part of the escorts or even a Schwarm or Rotte making a fast attack on bombers through the close escort.

You can find the composition of RAF escorts in the above mentioned book or 1942 system from Price's Late Marque Spitfire Aces.

On BC losses, I referred to the day operations losses and I doubt that many of them were flew against targets in Germany, 2 Group flew a few against Western Germany targets but I doubt that there were many flown by the medium/heavy bombers of the BC. And if you check the Chorley's BC Losses 1941 for the 24 Jul 41 attacks mentioned by Glider above in the message #391, you'll see that fighters played a major part in the bomber losses suffered on that day.

Juha

 

[Tante Ju]

With regard to losses, I notice you are referring to BC losses when you start mentioning losses of 6 or 7%. But again, this is misrpresenting the facts. The vast majority of BC losses were against targets in Germany itself, where indeed it was the case the British were suffering heavy losses (for not much gain either). .

No, Juha is 100% right about losses. loss of Bomber Command and Fighter command do not fit into your thesis, so you throw it away, but it happen. 1941 was for 6,5% loss rate for Bomber Command day operations. Few missions flown, losses big.

1941 was worst year for loss rate. Hooton writes:

"The British suffered badly during 1941: FC daytime loss rate was around 2%, while BC (largely 2 Group was 7,68%, excluding anti-shipping operations, with ominous increases during the last quarter. From 14 June 1941 until end of year, FC lost 411 aircraft over the Channel, 14 during the last "Circus", and although pilots claimed 731 victories, the Jagdgruppen lost only 103... by contrast, the Jagdruppen loss rate was less than 1%".

But in the daylight operations over france it was the exact opposite. Losses never exceeded 1.75% per month.

Really? Loss rate of Bomber Command, day operation only, 1941.

January 4,2 %
February 3,2 %
March 2,5 %
April 4,4 %
May 8,4 %
June 4,7 %
July 11,8 %
August 8,5 %
September 5,7 %
October 13 %
November 0 %
December 4,6 %

See: BC Operational Stats

and of these the overwhelming percentage were from flak. German fighters in France were never the major sources of losses to British Bombers engaged in daylight operations.

Story is nice, but I do not trust after above "correction" of "facts" by your part.

Again, that applies to 1941, in the latter part of 1942 there was an increase, but never to the catastrophic levels of the Night Bombers in the latter part of 1941.

Fact - you like that word much.. so here is for you. Compile from table. BC Operational Stats

Bomber Command in number, night, 1941. 26841 sortie, 709 missing, 332 crashed, loss rate 3,87%
Bomber Command in number, day, 1941. 3507 sortie, 202 missing, 26 crashed, loss rate 6,50%

Short story - BC day bombing in 1941 was decribeable two words: insignificant. Costly.

With regard to shipping losses to the RAF in the Channel, well, if the losses in the whole British home waters is anything to go by...

Why would they? Loss of British shipping else place from air do not count?

Moreover their inability to impede British military traffic in the channel is amply demonstrated by their lack of reaction to the invasion at Dieppe. The reaction of their fighters is well known and deserves respect, but where were the KGs????Why werent they reacting???. Answer is because they couldnt. Too few, out of position and with no prospect of success

You begin to enter fantasy land... you begun to write story for yourself, about air superiority.. for while, u used books.. parts you like. then, imagination only. No KG at Dieppe? Real? In truth, 28 out of 48 German aircraft lost at Dieppe were German bombers, most of them to KG of Do 217... explain now.

 

[Tante Ju]

But -
1. The bomber losses dropped below 1943 Schweinfurt losses on every mission except March 6 and April 29, 1944 - despite twice as many s/e and t/e fighters in Luftflotte Reich in May,1944 as in May 1943.
2. The average loss rate to German Fighters went from 10+ percent for deep penetrations with long range escort to less than 5% and trending to 2% in May.
3. The loss rate of the outnumbered US long range escorts was below that of the P-47 loss rate in air to air combat.

So - despite the focus on Bombers, and despite your claim that the German Fighter Command could easily deal with the Mustang had they chose to do so - the German air force was trounced, the bomber losses plunged, the outnumbered escorts hunted the LW everywhere in Germany ripping the heart out of the LW.

Were the German fighter pilots so inferior during this period that even with as 'good or better' fighters they were unable to remotely come close to 1:1 in air to air combat when engaging the Mustang (which was in the range of 8:1 air to air over 109/190s).
Were they superior in skill but lacking in tactics?
Were their fighters neither superior or as capable?

Or???

 

[Juha]

I have been digging around and found the largest daylight Bomber Command (not just no 2 group) action that I can identify. The details and results I hope you find interesting

24th July Target Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
There were five stages to the attack

Brest
1) 3 Fortresses bombing from 30,000 ft no losses
2) 18 Hampdens escorted by 3 squadrons of Spitfires 2 Hampdens lost
3) 79 wellingtons unescorted daylight raid 10 Wellingtons lost

Cherbourg (Diversion)
36 Blenheim escorted by Spitfires no losses

La Pallice (Scharnhorst)
15 Halifax's unescorted daylight raid 5 lost

Fighter defence was described as being stronger and more prolonged than expected. The Spitfire escort certainly worked and the Wellingtons and Halifax's paid the price. What would have happened if the escort had been given to the Wellingtons and Halifax's no one will know, but without escort they were sent on a death ride and I would have expected more of the them to have been shot down. Germany threw eveything they had into the air to protect those ships and a strong defense must have been expected.
To make matters worse the Germans would have been warned as Sterlings did an unescorted daylight raid the day before losing one bomber to fighters

I don't know the split of losses between the Fighters and Flak. I do know that the RAF claimed 15 fighters from the bombers and escort. I appreciate that this was an over estimate but if anyone has the real figures it would be interesting.

Hello Glider
I checked from a couple sources and the reason for only 3 Spitfire sqns escorting the main attacks was simply that there were only 3 Spitfire sqns available because of Brest was too far away to standard 1941 Spitfire and only 3 sqns (Nos 66, 118 and 152 Sqns) were equipped with Mk IIAs with a fixed 40 gal fuel tank under the port wing, which was the only version available with enough range.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Hello Parsifal
now the Circus No 62, flew on 7 Aug 41, according to Price's book, 6 Spit sqns operated as close escort and escort cover forces, 3 Spit sqns as the top cover, so 9 Spit sqns escorted the bombers, and 6 other Spit sqns acted as the Target Support Force and the 2 Hurricane sqns plus 3 more Spit sqns as the Withdrawal Cover Force. The LW fighter activity concentrated against the latter, so IMHO it is clear that all 20 fighter sqns operated over France, or do you think that Jagdflieger concentrated against the fighters that flew over southern England and that was late summer 41. I gave my source, I wonder what is your source to the claim that max 7 sqns were committed at any single time.

In fact tactical advantage was enough for LW, one can see that even from FC combat reports, 20-30 LW fighters attacking part of the escorts or even a Schwarm or Rotte making a fast attack on bombers through the close escort.

You can find the composition of RAF escorts in the above mentioned book or 1942 system from Price's Late Marque Spitfire Aces.

On BC losses, I referred to the day operations losses and I doubt that many of them were flew against targets in Germany, 2 Group flew a few against Western Germany targets but I doubt that there were many flown by the medium/heavy bombers of the BC. And if you check the Chorley's BC Losses 1941 for the 24 Jul 41 attacks mentioned by Glider above in the message #391, you'll see that fighters played a major part in the bomber losses suffered on that day.

Juha

No, the top cover was part of the 6 squadron close escort. If Price says that there were nine squadrons, he is wrong.

The target support force never left English skies that day. The withdrawal force was drawn out over the channel as it covered the withdrawal and as you say the was not a lot of resistance to the main force, because it was too strong (my interpretation)

My sources include

Foreman
Galland
Rawlings JR (RAF Fighter Squadrons)
Richards Saunders (Royal Air Force 1939-45)
Webster C and Franklin N (The Air offensives against Germany)


Also had some access 20 years agao to :

Squadron Operations Records Books AIR27 series
Group Operations Books AIR 25 series
Fighter Command and Casualties AIR16 961

An example of the details contained in these records is available at this online address:

1941

 

[davparlr]

Mr Davabir , i simply disagree. Flight Performance comparison has been made many times in the past .Everyone has his opinion Just explain me only this. How is possible a heavier aircraft wtih 1600ps ,with low drug wing ("laminar flow"), outclimb and out turn a smaller,lighter ,1700-1800ps aircraft?(Which additionaly have a bigger displacemenmt engine)

I must reexamine my comparison of the P-51B at 67" boost. I have mixed data on climb, most of which comes from Kurfurst and is in German and I am inept at that. There are some charts showing the Bf-106G-1 having very good climb that is significant (over 300 ft/min better) below 20k. However the airspeed advantage still lies significantly with the P-51B with a typical 30 mph advantage. To illustrate this speed difference, imagine driving down the highway at 100 km/hr (60 mph) and a car goes by you at a 148 km/hr (90 mph). I think you would say, Wow, that guy is going fast! As far as comparing the P-51B and the P-51D climb with 75" boost compared to the Bf-109G-14, see these charts. The first is a USAAF test report from Spitfireperformance, and the other is from Kurfurst site. A note here, at 75" Hg, the Merlin engine is generating over 1800 hp.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p51b-44-1-climb.jpg

http://www.kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109G14_PBLeistungen/files/PBG14_ROC_SNplusMW50.jpg

Anyway P51 as a whole package was superb and i understand the proud of the american people about it.
Anyway i do consider P51 superb weapon system

While I do consider the early and more prevalent Bf-109 versions to be outclassed by the P-51, the later models, like the G-10 were quite formidable. One episode of "Dogfight" interviewed an AAF pilot who was disdainful of the Bf-109 but ran into one he could not shake and had to resort to a snap stall technique to lose him. On recovery he said he did not go looking for that plane again. It was probably a G-10.

I agree with Jim. This is usual discussion - data I saw suggest P-51 type had advantage in speed over medium altitude, 109G-6 or G-14 with 605A, 605AM. Means high alitude over. Generally in speed but not in climb, or turn. This favours 109.

See above post.

P-51B is good performance, but not mature type - problem with vision, too light guns

The P-51B with its four 50s was a deadly machine, not to be toyed with. Some pilots preferred it to the D. Also, the Malcolm hood significantly increased outside visibility. The Bf-109 was no role model in pilot visibility.

Case is different with high altititude AS or D type engine - this is G-6/AS, G-14/AS G-10 or K-4 type. All equal to P-51 at altitude.

This is true for the K, but is not true for the others. See previous charts for climb and these charts for speed. The P-51 is significantly better in aerodynamic efficiency. The Bf-109G-14 with a 1800 hp A-S engine is capable of 347 mph at SL. The P-51B with a 1500 hp engine (67" Hg) is capable of 360 mph. The P-51D with an 1800 hp engine (75" Hg) is capable of over 380 mph at SL. Only the Bf-109 K at 377 mph performs similar to the P-51.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/p51b-speed-wf.jpg


http://www.kurfurst.org/Performance_tests/109K_PBLeistungen/files/5026-18_DCSonder_MW_geschw.jpg

109K also slightly better in speed etc. At altitude, climb better, turn better. It is question of engine.

This is true, it was indeed a very formidable plane although short legged. However it was way too late in coming to the game and contemporary Allied aircraft, like the P-51H was already on the back burner.

General - speed characteristics of both types excellent

Only the Bf-109K, The others were not so excellent.

Both types excellent for purpose, equal in combat.

This is probably true with accomplished pilots. With typical pilots, the P-51 had more tools in its arsenal, except for the Bf-109K.

Was not 2000 HP at 81", but that RAF only, USAAF 72"? A bit over 67".. (1700 HP)?

75" of boost was approve for the P-51 in April, 1944.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mustang/75inch-clearance-v-1650-7.jpg

Combat reports confirm this was used. You may recognize the name on the second entry.

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/combat-reports/353-hinchey-14nov44.jpg

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/mustang/combat-reports/357-yeager-6nov44.jpg