Hello Parsifal
As I have wrote FAF could attack all targets it wanted in the Karelian Isthmus during the big Soviet strategic attack during Summer 44 even if greatly outnumbered by VVS and VVS KBF without any of the escorted bombers lost to Soviet fighters even if escorts were size of 10-20 Bf 109Gs. And that was achieved with very light fighter losses and with clearly positive loss rate vs VVS fighters. So in that sense we did clearly better than RAF over France in 41-42. Still we don't claim that FAF had air superiority over the Isthmus, only brief local air superiorities over targets and around the FAF bombers.
I don't see that RAF had "th ability to place ones own forces over enemy controlled territory, do what was wanted to be done, and then return with tolerable losses" over France in daytime, only over the narrow northern and NW coastal regions of France inside the limited range of the standard Spitfire and even so with clearly negative fighter vs fighter loss rate in 41 and at least most of 42. Outside the range of Spitfire daytime losses of RAF over France tended to be forbiddingly high, so after a short while Stirlings and Halifaxes were withdrawn from daylight ops.
Juha
Hi Juha
I am glad you raised this as an example because it helps illustrate some of the complexities of determining air superiority. Tante says that its "my thesis", which kinda brings a smile to my face. I wish it were "my thesis", in actuality its standard 2nd year OTS strategic studies course material for any staff officer.....anyway, enough rambling, lets get down to analyzing the theory....incidentally if the assumptions I make about FAF air warfare theory are incorect, please feel free to correct me. I dont pretend to know FAF strategy all that well.
I am assuming that FAF were based on those of Germany by 1944. German air theory was never about gaining total air superiority(in the way the Americans and tyhe british were seeking in 1944), it was always about getting air superiority over the battlefield, and its immediate surroundings. In other words a far more tactical application of airpower. They could then use relatively cheap to produce ground attack aircraft like the Ju87 to deliver pinpoint attacks onto the battlefield. Medium bombers were used to hit enemy airfields and logistics to isolate the enemy formations, deny them of effective air support. Fighters were used to keep any surviving enemy Divebombers/Ground attack aircaft away from the battlefield, and to engage enemy fighters where needed to achieve those objectives. The strategic goal of all that was to win battles on the ground, to assist the ground forces in taking and holding ground. Destroying the enemy air force was an integral, and essential part of thqat strategy
Soviet theories on air power on the other hand did not see the destruction of enemy airpower as essential, just nioce to have. These concepts were developed during the war, and recognized certain limitations that the Soviets laboured under in their war with Germany. The Russians never really mastered the qualitative advantage of the german fighter arm, but at some point they realized the achilles heel of the german system.......limited numbers. It was not really necessary to clear the skies of German Fighters, because there were not enough of them to make any real difference to the outcome of the battle. They got better at their trade, to be sure...better pilots, better machines, better doctrine, all of which improved the exchange rate, but they could never get to the situation where their fighters could drive the germans completely from the sky. So they adapted the theory to suit thei capabilities. Soviet doctrine after 1942 was never about destruction of the enemy air force. Soviets were never interested in achieving air superiority in the sense we understand it. They were not interested in racking up huge tallies of enemy fighters or indeed strike aircraft. These were all bonuses, to be sure, but the real prize for them was in providing direct assistance to their ground forces, assisting the advance. All other finer points of airpower were subordinated to that one goal. Soviet fighters were there to firstly harass and break up enemy bombers, and lessen their impact on the battle. They were there to also make sure their own bombers were able to complete their mission. Survival of the Soviet bombers after completion of the mission was an optional extra, not essential.
Now, equipped with a somewhat rudimentary knowledge of Soviet airpower theory, ask your self the question again about whether the Soviets gained air superiority, or whether the Finns (or the germans on the east front generally) were at all successful in achieving either an air auperiority air parity or even an air denial strategy on the eastern front??? The answer has to be no in every case. The Finns shot down a lot of Soviet aircraft, but did this make any difference??? not even a minute of difference. Did they succeed in halting the Soviet Ground offensive. No, not a bit. Did Finn bombers stop any offensives. I dont doubt they carried out some impressive ground support missions, but they stopped nothing as far as I can see. Did the Soviets provide effective ground support to their attacking armies in '44? Not sure, but I think so.
So on that basis who achieved their missions and who did not. Finns achieved none of their missions, Soviets achieved all of theirs. Reason was massive numbers but also effective doctrine and strategy to concentrate effort at the right points and extract maximum benefit oit of their airpower, something sadly missing from their application of airpower in 1939-42.
