The Bf 109 aka ME-109 landing gear myth research thread.
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That is not what I asked.
But since you mentioned radar and patrols, did not the Germans not also have these?
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Glider
Some intersting observations ther, that I largely concure with. With regard to flak losses I have a book that largely concurs with what you are saying. The book is Edward B Westermann, Flak - German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1939-45 , Univerity Of Kansas 2001
The book contains the best analysis of German Flak defences that I know of, and contains an absolute motza of information. It points out that in the first half of 1941 the Germans began to introduce radar direction and fire control for some of their AA batteries, and this greatly improved its performance. My figures are for the whole of BC, not just 2 Gp. They indicate that in January to the end of April 1941, they expended 2.886 million rounds of ammunition, to bring down a total of 144 aircraft. Average expenditure per kill was 26500 rounds per kill. Further, at page 115 Westermann says" In the 1st half of 1941, flak forces achieved the majority of shootdowns over the occupied territories. The flak forces in the occupied territories including Norway, accounted 115 of the 144 aircraft destroyed in combat, or 79% of nthe total". Westermann goes on to state "The success of the air defence located in the occupoied western territories resulted from the high concentrations of search lights, flak gun batteries, and the beginnings of radar guidance."
Further on it states "Despite the preponderance of shoot downs in the west, flask guns in germany proper were also having an effect, accounting for 40% of overall losses suffered over Germany. A comparison of the success the flak units during the day and night reveals that flak forces brought down 35% of British aircraft during the day, and 65% during the night."
Several Pages on he makes further observations as to the disproportionate losses to flak. After noting the generally poor weather conditions that plagued air operations for both sides jan-March, Westermann notes "German night fighters at the time were particularly affected in effectiveness by poor instrument flying training, which affected their performance in poor visibility conditions."
In the summer of 1941, the proportion of losses to flak dropped (if losses to the VVS are excluded...if they are included, flak continued to be the major cause of enemy aircraft shoot downs). In June/ July/August, the Shoot downs of Allied Aircraft accounted for 58/121/144 of the total losses suffered. When you consider that BC lost 98/146/156 losses for these months and perhaps 50 fighters for each month, the rough percentages of aircraft lost to flak are still about 58% of total RAF losses, the effectiveness of LW "command of the air" comes into very sharp focus.
drgondog
Major
You are both very funny guys - as to meeting Galland and Rall; yes. As to candid conversation - yes. I respect both of them enormously. We had these same discussions and when the context was set properly, they agreed my points about the first six months of 1944. You two on the other hand get hysterical when the same conditions are outlined, the facts are available, but somehow it is all about American liars?
As to the reasons for the defeat in 1944 of the air battle over Germany both stated the following key reasons for the rapid deterioration of the situation over Germany?
1. They both believed the war was lost in late 1943 to early 1944.
2. They both believed the German high command was stupid in their insistance on 'bombers first' which changed only during the Invasion when the position to regain air superiority was long gone.
3. Galland insisted on converting the German Fighter arm to concentrate on the Fw 190 and the Me 262.
4. Galland believed in the Big Blow and it was even tried on a smaller scale in November 1944
5. They both believed the Mustang was the key factor to 'accelerate the downfall of the German air force defense capabilities against daylight bomber force. Dolpho was kind enough to write a letter describing the impact of the Mustang on the operations fortunes of his command. I reproduced it in both of my books.
6. They both believed that the primary reason the Luftwaffe could only repeat limitied successes of summer/fall 1943 is that the advantage of attacking unescorted bombers AND BEING ABLE TO STAY IN CONTACT with the bombers except for a very short period before escorts would engage.
7. The LW psychologically fell prey to 'flight versus fight' and completely transferred the initiative to smaller forces of fighters. This was absolutely contrary to every other theatre at the time.
Yes, the Luftwaffe was greatly outnumbered, as the AVG was in China, or USAF over the Yalu (but not US vs N.Korea and China with relative airpower) or LW against VVS. What is debated here with neither of you listening is the operational situation from Berlin to Leipzig to Schweinfurt to Munich - where the Luftwaffe was systematically defeated by 8th AF long range escorts against locally superior LW day fighter forces. It is painful to see you cling to a hope that all the heros you have were only defeated by 'hordes of US fighters that could not defeat the LW unless the odds were 10:1 or greater"
The 8th AF lost approximately 650+ Mustangs to LW in the ETO. Those are known air to air, possible air to air in which German Fighters were present, missing for unknown cause/no radio contact nor bad weather present, or lost crash landing due to damage caused in a fight - which I extracted from EVERY Missing Aircrew Report filed by the 8th AF in the ETO.
You both, on the other hand are masters of slurs, innuendo, sarcasm - but fact poor in this dialogue.
You won't deal with facts or context and the recent posting of 8th AF daily sorties versus having the knowledge that mosy 8th AF fighters in December 1943 were short range P-47s - Not the small force spread thin over 100 miles of bomber stream. You won't bother plotting the strengths of the deployments of the LuftFlotte Reich day fighters and easily conclude that more than 50% could easily be deployed, assembled, and flow to a single location -and easily outnumber any US concentration of escorts avaiable to resist a concentrated attack.
If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult.
As to the reasons for the defeat in 1944 of the air battle over Germany both stated the following key reasons for the rapid deterioration of the situation over Germany?
1. They both believed the war was lost in late 1943 to early 1944.
2. They both believed the German high command was stupid in their insistance on 'bombers first' which changed only during the Invasion when the position to regain air superiority was long gone.
3. Galland insisted on converting the German Fighter arm to concentrate on the Fw 190 and the Me 262.
4. Galland believed in the Big Blow and it was even tried on a smaller scale in November 1944
5. They both believed the Mustang was the key factor to 'accelerate the downfall of the German air force defense capabilities against daylight bomber force. Dolpho was kind enough to write a letter describing the impact of the Mustang on the operations fortunes of his command. I reproduced it in both of my books.
6. They both believed that the primary reason the Luftwaffe could only repeat limitied successes of summer/fall 1943 is that the advantage of attacking unescorted bombers AND BEING ABLE TO STAY IN CONTACT with the bombers except for a very short period before escorts would engage.
7. The LW psychologically fell prey to 'flight versus fight' and completely transferred the initiative to smaller forces of fighters. This was absolutely contrary to every other theatre at the time.
Yes, the Luftwaffe was greatly outnumbered, as the AVG was in China, or USAF over the Yalu (but not US vs N.Korea and China with relative airpower) or LW against VVS. What is debated here with neither of you listening is the operational situation from Berlin to Leipzig to Schweinfurt to Munich - where the Luftwaffe was systematically defeated by 8th AF long range escorts against locally superior LW day fighter forces. It is painful to see you cling to a hope that all the heros you have were only defeated by 'hordes of US fighters that could not defeat the LW unless the odds were 10:1 or greater"
The 8th AF lost approximately 650+ Mustangs to LW in the ETO. Those are known air to air, possible air to air in which German Fighters were present, missing for unknown cause/no radio contact nor bad weather present, or lost crash landing due to damage caused in a fight - which I extracted from EVERY Missing Aircrew Report filed by the 8th AF in the ETO.
You both, on the other hand are masters of slurs, innuendo, sarcasm - but fact poor in this dialogue.
You won't deal with facts or context and the recent posting of 8th AF daily sorties versus having the knowledge that mosy 8th AF fighters in December 1943 were short range P-47s - Not the small force spread thin over 100 miles of bomber stream. You won't bother plotting the strengths of the deployments of the LuftFlotte Reich day fighters and easily conclude that more than 50% could easily be deployed, assembled, and flow to a single location -and easily outnumber any US concentration of escorts avaiable to resist a concentrated attack.
If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult.
parsifal
Colonel
It certainly was. Fighter strengths are reasonably well known. Bomber strengths are less well known because British bombers did not play any role in the BoB. Which makes the reply you received quite redundant.
However, for the record the bommber command possed the following forces at the end of June 1940.
Bomber Command 30 June 1940
No 2 Group West Raynham(18,101), Wattisham (107,110), Bodney (21) Watton (82) Wyton (40,57), Alconbury (15), Horsham St Faith (114,139). 11 squadrons, all equiped with Blenheim IV, but only 6 squadrons declared operational.
No 3 Group Feltwell(37,75NZ)Newmarket (99) Mildenhall (149)Stradishall (214), Marham (38,115) Honington (9). Total 8 squadrons, 7 operational. Equiped with the Wellington 1A, 1C.
No 4 Group Dishforth (51), Linton on Ouse (5*8*) Topcliffe (10), Driffield (77) Cottam (102), York (7*8*). 6 squadrons, 5 operational. Equiped with Whitley IV, IVA, V.
No 5 Group Hemswell (61,144) Scampton (49,83) Waddington (44,50), Finningley (106) 7 Squadrons, 6 operational. Equiped with Hampdon aircraft.
No 1 group was the battle group - and had been detached to be part of the Advanced Air Striking Force. at the start of the war it had 10 operational squadrons of Battles, 0 operational.
Overall, Bomber command had 42 squadrons in June 1940, of which 18 were not operational. Of course total aircraft numbers will be much larger, and included types involved in advanced training and conversion, and would include other and subsequently obsolete types. But in terms of operational strengths there were about 300 bombers ready for operations.
Even with operational bombers thrown in the mix (for what reason I cannot think why), the RAF was outnumbered, and significantly so
From Bomber Command 1936-1968 - Ken Delve.
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' You both, on the other hand are masters of slurs, innuendo, sarcasm - but fact poor in this dialogue '
sarcasm yes, slurs no.
but to be CRYSTAL CLEAR. I do listen, and we are always talking about after D-day. the only problem
I have, was with those who insist the LW wasn't outnumbered during the specified time.
facts, well thats a subjective term. it seems to me that ANYTIME a Allied document differs from a German
account, that the Allied document should be taken as golden gospil. not true. whats the old saying.. " its the
victors who write the history ".
it dosn't matter how many LW docs show 1 thing vs a piece of allied paper showing otherwise. that scrap of paper
wins.. every time.. therefore, no need to argue it.
so in conclusion.. what are 'facts'. is it one side or the other? or somewhere in between? thanks.
' If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult.'
missed this one. my feelings never get hurt. I never hit the report button, unlike some
others. lol.
sarcasm yes, slurs no.
but to be CRYSTAL CLEAR. I do listen, and we are always talking about after D-day. the only problem
I have, was with those who insist the LW wasn't outnumbered during the specified time.
facts, well thats a subjective term. it seems to me that ANYTIME a Allied document differs from a German
account, that the Allied document should be taken as golden gospil. not true. whats the old saying.. " its the
victors who write the history ".
it dosn't matter how many LW docs show 1 thing vs a piece of allied paper showing otherwise. that scrap of paper
wins.. every time.. therefore, no need to argue it.
so in conclusion.. what are 'facts'. is it one side or the other? or somewhere in between? thanks.
' If your feelings are hurt, deal with it. Everybody on this board is an adult.'
missed this one. my feelings never get hurt. I never hit the report button, unlike some
others. lol.
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1. Why the hell do you have to keep putting fuel on the fire???!!!
2. NO ONE HAS CALLED YOU A PIECE OF CRAP OR A LIAR!
3. I am sick and tired of this. As I said there is no more warnings. Did I, or did I not say that the next time I log on there better not be any of this childish bullshit?
Not a single person here attacks you personally and then you go off and spout your mouth with such stupid posts that do nothing but take away from the discussion. Why do you ignore me and the other moderating staff?
I think it is time for people to take vacations. This is for everyone on both sides of the argument. Note to P-40K: I am not singling you out here, read the words "both sides of the argument". Therefore don't get your panties in a wad about being singled out.
Either way I am tired of this. I am now going to take action, since several of you enjoy ignoring what the mods have to say.
Parsifal and Bill: You need to quit putting fuel on the fire as well. Choose your words a bit more wisely. This is all getting very very tiresome. I am getting a headache from all this "He said, she said bullshit".
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Gladly...
Anyone else? Please everyone just quit the childish bullshit. We have asked you all on many occasions to please quit it. We have shown more than enough patience, and it is growing very very old.
Glider
Captain
I have been looking into this in more detail and can confirm that the figures I have posted EXCLUDE aircraft that crashed either on take off or on return for whatever reason. However there is another section in the book that DOES GIVE these details, unfortunately the breakdown isn't by year but it does point out that a number of these aircraft would have been returned to use after repair. No allowance has been made re repaired aircraft so we can work on the basis that these are the worse case scenario.
They are called Operational Crashes and defined as aircraft that have crashed in the UK while outward or inward bound on operational missions for whatever reason. During the entire war 1,368 bombers were lost in this manner adding 0.35% to the overall loss ratio and they do say that in the first half of the war the ratio was 1.05% and in the second half of the war it was down to 0.2%. Logic tells me that there was a sliding scale so I suggest that we have found the difference between 6.5% and 7.8% for 1941.
Can I thank everyone for their patience, I should have seen this earlier but to be fair its a big book 800+ pages of small print and a lot of detail.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
parsifal
Colonel
Hi Glider
Was curious, what is the book that you are referring to?
Was curious, what is the book that you are referring to?
Glider
Captain
The Bomber Command War Diaries by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt. Second Hand copies can be bought on Amazon.
Every day of the war is looked at giving the number of bombers sent out their type and the losses. Often they compare the claims with the official German records for the towns so you often get a fair idea as to the damage caused and there are about 80 pages of statistics.
Every day of the war is looked at giving the number of bombers sent out their type and the losses. Often they compare the claims with the official German records for the towns so you often get a fair idea as to the damage caused and there are about 80 pages of statistics.
pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
Out of curiosity is there any mention of the Part XV Squadrons. Part XV Squadrons were those Squadrons made up of Commonwealth crews . The RCAF in particular the RAAF and RNZAF wanted Squadrons manned solely by crews of like nationalities with any excess allowed to be used by RAF .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_XV_squadrons
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Glider
Captain
Yes it has the stats by squadron and No 6 (Canadian) Group. For example 75 (New Zealand) Squadron
Formed April 1940 and served in 3 Group for the whole war.
Based at Feltwell, Mildenhall, Newmarket and Mepal
Raids Flown
Wellingtons 291 bombing raids, 24 minelaying, 4 leaflet 1 Photo Recce
Sterlings 103 bombing, 107 minelaying
Lancasters 190 bombing, 18 minelaying, 1 leaflet
Losses
Wellingtons - 2,540 sorties, 74 lost 2.9%
Sterlings - 1,736 sorties 72 lost 4.1%
Lancaster 3,741, 47 lost 1.3%
8 Lancasters lost in Operational Crashes
plus other details. You get the picture, a lot of detail
Formed April 1940 and served in 3 Group for the whole war.
Based at Feltwell, Mildenhall, Newmarket and Mepal
Raids Flown
Wellingtons 291 bombing raids, 24 minelaying, 4 leaflet 1 Photo Recce
Sterlings 103 bombing, 107 minelaying
Lancasters 190 bombing, 18 minelaying, 1 leaflet
Losses
Wellingtons - 2,540 sorties, 74 lost 2.9%
Sterlings - 1,736 sorties 72 lost 4.1%
Lancaster 3,741, 47 lost 1.3%
8 Lancasters lost in Operational Crashes
plus other details. You get the picture, a lot of detail
very small example, this is only for Jg 11. let alone every other Staffel in any particular unit in the Western Front. can go on and on for miles about how during the whole of 1944 that the Luftwaffe was severely outnumbered ~
January 5th, 1944:
245 heavies escorted by 70 P-38 and 41 P-51 to strike at Kiel
Stab and II./JG 11 attacked. downed three B-24 and nine P-38. no loss of their own.
February 3rd, 1944:
724 heavies covered by 632 fighters were dispatched to Emden and Wilhelmshaven.
formation attacked by III./JG 11. Engaged and out numbered by P-47 and despite their
efforts, did not get through to the heavies. downed three P-47 while losing three.
February 10th, 1944:
169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1*.
February 11th, 1944:
223 heavies covered by 606 fighters bombed frankfurt. II./JG 11 intercepted.
in ferocious combat downed three fighters. lost 3 Bf109's. at 12:33pm I./JG 11 intercepted
same formation. downed one B-17. lost two aircraft.
February 20th, 1944:
1000 heavies and 835 fighters were dispatched into Germany. heavies were intercepted by JG 11
pilots. Only six 3./JG 11 machines attacked the arriving armada. downed two heavies and
lost five of their own. the remaining a/c of the unit were refuled and were airborne again at
12:45pm. 10 heavies downed, no loss of their own.
moral of the story here is that once hundreds of escorting fighters for the heavies were deployed,
the LW losses started to mount. not becouse of susposed Allied superior aircraft, but becouse
the heavies were the #1 priority, and they had to fight there way through the fighters to get to the
heavies. the allied fighter escorts were at an extreme advantage.
I would post actual #'s availble to JG 11. but some insist on looking at the aircraft alloted #'s, which is vastly different.
*includes elements of JG1 Jg53.
January 5th, 1944:
245 heavies escorted by 70 P-38 and 41 P-51 to strike at Kiel
Stab and II./JG 11 attacked. downed three B-24 and nine P-38. no loss of their own.
February 3rd, 1944:
724 heavies covered by 632 fighters were dispatched to Emden and Wilhelmshaven.
formation attacked by III./JG 11. Engaged and out numbered by P-47 and despite their
efforts, did not get through to the heavies. downed three P-47 while losing three.
February 10th, 1944:
169 heavies screened by 466 fighters. II./JG 11 took off from airfield at Wunsdorf.
downed two B-17. losing seven of their own. later III.JG 11 intercepted same formation.
killed eleven aircraft and lost six. estimates were that the Germans were ounumbered
20:1*.
February 11th, 1944:
223 heavies covered by 606 fighters bombed frankfurt. II./JG 11 intercepted.
in ferocious combat downed three fighters. lost 3 Bf109's. at 12:33pm I./JG 11 intercepted
same formation. downed one B-17. lost two aircraft.
February 20th, 1944:
1000 heavies and 835 fighters were dispatched into Germany. heavies were intercepted by JG 11
pilots. Only six 3./JG 11 machines attacked the arriving armada. downed two heavies and
lost five of their own. the remaining a/c of the unit were refuled and were airborne again at
12:45pm. 10 heavies downed, no loss of their own.
moral of the story here is that once hundreds of escorting fighters for the heavies were deployed,
the LW losses started to mount. not becouse of susposed Allied superior aircraft, but becouse
the heavies were the #1 priority, and they had to fight there way through the fighters to get to the
heavies. the allied fighter escorts were at an extreme advantage.
I would post actual #'s availble to JG 11. but some insist on looking at the aircraft alloted #'s, which is vastly different.
*includes elements of JG1 Jg53.
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Kryten
Senior Airman
Post #437 does seem to imply JG11 were fighting this battle single handedly?
It also implies that all these aircraft were in one big gaggle, feb 20th being a prime example, this force would have had to be operating over a considerable area and over an equally important matter of time frame, the notion of localised superiority by concentrating on one element is also ignored!
It also implies that all these aircraft were in one big gaggle, feb 20th being a prime example, this force would have had to be operating over a considerable area and over an equally important matter of time frame, the notion of localised superiority by concentrating on one element is also ignored!
