"The case for the P-47 Thunderbolt being the greatest fighter of the Second World War " (1 Viewer)

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You might see that I backed up his statement with my post #536 above.
Which you edited in after my post. It is also noteworthy that the reference is to the Korean conflict rather than
why China ended up with the P-47.
 
Which you edited in after my post. It is also noteworthy that the reference is to the Korean conflict rather than
why China ended up with the P-47.
The edit was to the exact post # because I had requested that a duplicate post that I could not remove was deleted by admin.

And the statement that I was referring to was Greg's comment that the P47 took over from the P51H because "it was more resistant to ground fire", and that was the focus of the two paragraphs that I included from the article about the Korean War.

Both the article and Greg's comment related to survivability of the P47 in a ground attack environment.

See?

Here it is again.

Another duplicate part of a post.

No matter what I try there seems to be some sort of "bug" that I do not know how to fix.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Here it is again.

Another duplicate part of a post.

No matter what I try there seems to be some sort of "bug" that I do not know how to fix.


Each your post should have the Edit option at the bottom of the post window. Click that and you should be able to edit your own post. When you done hit the Save button at the bottom of the editing window.

edit.jpg
 
Thanks to Wurger for your reply.

I will look at your suggestion.

P.S. Even though my mum can't read this.....Happy 99th birthday!

She has just been on Australian National ABC radio being wished a Happy Birthday by Philip Clark and the Nightlife family as the oldest winner of the Nightlife Quiz where I am a regular competitor.

EDIT: Tonight I correctly answered a question about Operation Eagle Claw/hostage rescue in Iran 1980.

If anyone is interested, tomorrow I will post the ABC Radio podcast including my mother and myself.


Please forgive my "off topic" as a salute to a magnificent Australian.

1 year to go.....
 
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Both the P51H and "late model" P47's were available to the Chinese Nationalists at very low prices(possibly at no charge at all according to Greg).

But according to Greg, the Chinese had a preference for the P47 as it was more resistant to battle damage, and the P51 was ultimately passed over partly because of this.

I did point this out before.

P.S. There is an excellent article that I posted at ArmchairGeneral possibly 10 years ago about the relative merits of the P51/P47 concentrating on the Korean War.

Unfortunately, as the ACG forum "died" a few years ago, I am no longer able to access it.

This:


is a reduced version.

Here are two of the more illuminating paragraphs from that article:
And yet, Korean War data suggests otherwise as the F4U, a supposedly "tough" bird had almost the exact same loss rate in ground attack role as the "delicate" Mustang.

Lost to Enemy Action Total (All Causes)
--------------------------------------------
F-51 341 471

F4U 325 494
==========================

Hard to equate the P/F-51 was more vulnerable based on combat data.
 
And yet, Korean War data suggests otherwise as the F4U, a supposedly "tough" bird had almost the exact same loss rate in ground attack role as the "delicate" Mustang.

Lost to Enemy Action Total (All Causes)
--------------------------------------------
F-51 341 471

F4U 325 494
==========================

Hard to equate the P/F-51 was more vulnerable based on combat data.
False equivelencies!
Until you can show loss rate per sortie, and match loss rates to equivelent threat environments, these are just numbers!

Sorry. Just trying to match the tone of the thread.
 
Evaluations by pilots bear this out and by the end of the war certain aircraft types were better all rounders
than others. The Typhoon suffered the same fate as soon as the war was over being another type that no longer
had good enough all round capability.
For the particular case of the Typhoon, the RAF had enough Tempests for the post-WWII force, so there was no reason to keep the Typhoon.

I do wish they'd had saved more of them for museums and "flying heritage" air shows etc, but purely from a capability point of view there was nothing the Typhoon did that the Tempest couldn't do better.
 
For the particular case of the Typhoon, the RAF had enough Tempests for the post-WWII force, so there was no reason to keep the Typhoon.

I do wish they'd had saved more of them for museums and "flying heritage" air shows etc, but purely from a capability point of view there was nothing the Typhoon did that the Tempest couldn't do better.
I read here years ago that the Tempest didnt get approved to carry external stores until quite late in the war, the Typhoons job was always to get the allies from Normandy to Germany and then get scrapped, some were made and put in storage just for it.
 
Both the P51H and "late model" P47's were available to the Chinese Nationalists at very low prices(possibly at no charge at all according to Greg).
Once again a flawed statement. The P-51D/K were available in limited numbers.

Post VE Day, AAF/USAF retained ALL P/F-51H and F-82 for Air Defense, and P-51H was still active in SAC as Base Defense as late as 1952. The other active duty assignments for the H post war were in CONUS and Alaska and Hawaii and National Guard squadrons post WWII.

Zero P-51H were released by USAF to foreign governments for even racing purposes for competition at Bendix and Thompson Trophy Races. Only P--51B/C/D/K through 1955/56 when the USAF started selling Mustangs en masse from USAF and National Guard - with the P-51H the last to go.

The P-47D and P-51D that went to Nationalist China followed the inventory wind downs in Pacific at the end of WWII when many P-47Ds and P-51Ds went to China, Phillipines, Korea, etc. No P-47Ns went anywhere but Stateside after brief existance with residual P-38L in Phillipines - into 1946. Primary Source Gruenhagen and NAA documents for P-51 references. The 343rd FG, based in Alaska was first operational P-51H Fighter Group in Air Defense Command, receiving them in August 1945 . I have yet to see solid reference to a single P-51H unit actually in-place for Invasion of Japan. As the P/F-51H and P/F-82 were still considered the Only LR interceptor in USAF inventory and limited in numbers - it is hardly credible that the Nationalist Chines were offered the H when so many P-51Ds were in place in th Far East post VE Day.
But according to Greg, the Chinese had a preference for the P47 as it was more resistant to battle damage, and the P51 was ultimately passed over partly because of this.
Did Greg state that the Chinese Nationalists not only 'abandoned' the Mustang but acquired P-47s to replace them? How did the P-51D inventory land in hands of PRC following route of Chinese Nationalists in1949? Has anyone seen any details of P-47s active in post war China?

I did point this out before.

P.S. There is an excellent article that I posted at ArmchairGeneral possibly 10 years ago about the relative merits of the P51/P47 concentrating on the Korean War.
There were rational reasons why the P-47s were left at home. First was availability of the active duty USAF P-51D Fighter Bomber Groups in Japan and Australia and Korea when the war started, combined with the logistics fabric to support them. Second was the concentration of P-51D National Guard units on West Coast compared to East Cost P-47D/N units. Third conideration - airfield lengths in Korea were marginal for combat loaded P-47. Last but perhaps most important for 1950 was that US lost ROC airfields rapidly during the N.Korea advance.

If you will pull Dean's AOHT and look at combat radius (Official AAF Docs) for full internal fuel while carrying 2x1000 bom load had CR of 350 miles. The P-47D WITH NO BOMBLOAD - only internal fuel 370gal - had CR of 225mi. BTW pg 599-600 Dean's AOHT.

While we are at it, Dean's AOHT reproductions include the assumptions and Boundary conditions applied to DEFINE combat radius. If you are remotely curious from an academic POV, you should seek Engineering Characteristics and Performance Charts, USAAF Aircraft, Wright Field Ohio. Those and many relevant documents may be found within NARA - Sarah Clark Collection of R&D Materiel Command docs.

Go back to the alter of Worship and see how many of those boundary conditions are a.) explained, and b.) explained correctly?

Further, take note that 8th AF performed their own CRs, as combined from above USAAF Performance Charts with those data from Cass Hough VIII ATS under 8th AF in UK.

The 8th AF desired to fold in such considerations that weather and visibility and winds aloft in northern Europe from Wright Field, Muroc and Eglin. To give you insight there are two components that Greg seriously left out when he 'departed the pattern' with respect to engineering and logic.

First, there is no use for a point to be struck in London or center of East Anglia (like Cambridge) and draw a straight line to say Berlin and pronounce gleefully 'Berlin - 550 mi.

You may note that Berlin is in fact much longer if the route shown includes taking off, flying in cute circles around the airfield as elements form into flights, into sections, into squadrons, into the composed Group and begin to climb east-NE in the general direction of Amsterdam, thence across Denmark, thence along the coast line heading eastward while making course changes to avoid flak concentrations until finally the R/V point is reached, usually at extent of P-47 escort, say Bremen- then Ess in coverage maintaining Cruise speed of ~ 260 to 300mph TAS. Somewhere east of Bremen, say Rugen Is., the Task Force breaks SE near IP for bomb run on Berlin. Escort is maintained through Rally Point and circuit around Berlin to south and thence westerly heading of say 270, still essing in coverage until maybe Kassel when the P-47 escort R/V occurs and Mustangs return in near straight line with some deviation for flak coverage until coastline is reached. The descent is made at lower power/fuel consumption because gravity is your friend. Alas UK socked in and you fool around at lower altitude with low RPM and boost for to a.) confirm your feet are dry, and be get some sense where you are, and b.) then run out of fuel and bail out after using 30 minutes of remaining reserve (approx 25 for P-51, 40+ for P-47). (This is Mustang profile where the pilot has Much more flexibility to manage range when not constrained as much as P-47, which R/V with bombers close to coast and immediately engages in Ess type coverage of bomber box to which it is assigned.

The Developed CR's do NOT take into account, the reduced course Real speed of the B-17 formation (150mph IAS ~ 205mph TAS). The Jug is burning 80+ gph at cruise settings which would enable 300mph at 25000 feet in straight line cruise - but his sore butt is only moving toward the target at 205mph.

His 20min Combat (5min WEP, 15min MP) drains approximately 90 gal (P-51B ~ 58gal) of his remaining Interal fuel. Takeoff at MP, loitering to form up and intial climb while switching to external tanks burns about 190gal internal fuel. As experience level of Group pilots increased, switchin to external tanks occurred immediately after climb started - reducing MP drain to perhaps 60 gallons of internal fuel. So, for internal fuel - which is basis for Combat, return cruise, let down and reserve - has already been reduced from 305 at start engine to 305-90-90-40=95 gal to return home after a fight - in a straight line.. A little over an hour at best cruise in mph - say 320+ miles. Does NOT matter how much external fuel you carry because you have to drop your external tanks when engaging.

When an order states 'engage, drive off, return to escort' the internal fuel drain of 90 gal lowers to say 20 gal extra consumption leaving 155 gal stretchin CR to 400+ miles.

Combat Radius charts are straight line legs from takeoff, through immediate climb through optimal cruise to point from base that reversing course at same optimal cruise, descending and landing with 30 minutes reserve. The closest analogy from Wright Field data is a fighter sweep for which no close escort is planned - sweep in front, sweep an area with drop tanks, encounter no opposition until external tanks are released. For the P-47D the extent of combat radius in which a serious 20 minute fight occurs, the maximum actual CR with 2x 150 gal tanks is about 425mi (P-47D-25 and lower w/305 internal) for a Fighter Sweep. For Penetration and Withdrawal support, the CR is about 100-150 miles less.

.
Unfortunately, as the ACG forum "died" a few years ago, I am no longer able to access it.

This:


is a reduced version.

Here is one of the more illuminating paragraphs from that article:
Did the illuminating article also point out that the R-2800 engined F4U loss rate per 1000 sorties was only 1/2% lower than P-51D? - and typical CAS missions were far shorter range from carrier to target than typical P-51 targets.
 
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Once again a flawed statement. The P-51D/K were available in limited numbers.

Post VE Day, AAF/USAF retained ALL P/F-51H and F-82 for Air Defense, and P-51H was still active in SAC as Base Defense as late as 1952. The other active duty assignments for the H post war were in CONUS and Alaska and Hawaii and National Guard squadrons post WWII.

Zero P-51H were released by USAF to foreign governments for even racing purposes for competition at Bendix and Thompson Trophy Races. Only P--51B/C/D/K through 1955/56 when the USAF started selling Mustangs en masse from USAF and National Guard - with the P-51H the last to go.

The P-47D and P-51D that went to Nationalist China followed the inventory wind downs in Pacific at the end of WWII when many P-47Ds and P-51Ds went to China, Phillipines, Korea, etc. No P-47Ns went anywhere but Stateside after brief existance with residual P-38L in Phillipines - into 1946. Primary Source Gruenhagen and NAA documents for P-51 references. The 343rd FG, based in Alaska was first operational P-51H Fighter Group in Air Defense Command, receiving them in August 1945 . I have yet to see solid reference to a single P-51H unit actually in-place for Invasion of Japan. As the P/F-51H and P/F-82 were still considered the Only LR interceptor in USAF inventory and limited in numbers - it is hardly credible that the Nationalist Chines were offered the H when so many P-51Ds were in place in th Far East post VE Day.

Did Greg state that the Chinese Nationalists not only 'abandoned' the Mustang but acquired P-47s to replace them? How did the P-51D inventory land in hands of PRC following route of Chinese Nationalists in1949? Has anyone seen any details of P-47s active in post war China?


There were rational reasons why the P-47s were left at home. First was availability of the active duty USAF P-51D Fighter Bomber Groups in Japan and Australia and Korea when the war started, combined with the logistics fabric to support them. Second was the concentration of P-51D National Guard units on West Coast compared to East Cost P-47D/N units. Third conideration - airfield lengths in Korea were marginal for combat loaded P-47. Last but perhaps most important for 1950 was that US lost ROC airfields rapidly during the N.Korea advance.

If you will pull Dean's AOHT and look at combat radius (Official AAF Docs) for full internal fuel while carrying 2x1000 bom load had CR of 350 miles. The P-47D WITH NO BOMBLOAD - only internal fuel 370gal - had CR of 225mi. BTW pg 599-600 Dean's AOHT.

While we are at it, Dean's AOHT reproductions include the assumptions and Boundary conditions applied to DEFINE combat radius. If you are remotely curious from an academic POV, you should seek Engineering Characteristics and Performance Charts, USAAF Aircraft, Wright Field Ohio. Those and many relevant documents may be found within NARA - Sarah Clark Collection of R&D Materiel Command docs.

Go back to the alter of Worship and see how many of those boundary conditions are a.) explained, and b.) explained correctly?

Further, take note that 8th AF performed their own CRs, as combined from above USAAF Performance Charts with those data from Cass Hough VIII ATS under 8th AF in UK.

The 8th AF desired to fold in such considerations that weather and visibility and winds aloft in northern Europe from Wright Field, Muroc and Eglin. To give you insight there are two components that Greg seriously left out when he 'departed the pattern' with respect to engineering and logic.

First, there is no use for a point to be struck in London or center of East Anglia (like Cambridge) and draw a straight line to say Berlin and pronounce gleefully 'Berlin - 550 mi.

You may note that Berlin is in fact much longer if the route shown includes taking off, flying in cute circles around the airfield as elements form into flights, into sections, into squadrons, into the composed Group and begin to climb east-NE in the general direction of Amsterdam, thence across Denmark, thence along the coast line heading eastward while making course changes to avoid flak concentrations until finally the R/V point is reached, usually at extent of P-47 escort, say Bremen- then Ess in coverage maintaining Cruise speed of ~ 260 to 300mph TAS. Somewhere east of Bremen, say Rugen Is., the Task Force breaks SE near IP for bomb run on Berlin. Escort is maintained through Rally Point and circuit around Berlin to south and thence westerly heading of say 270, still essing in coverage until maybe Kassel when the P-47 escort R/V occurs and Mustangs return in near straight line with some deviation for flak coverage until coastline is reached. The descent is made at lower power/fuel consumption because gravity is your friend. Alas UK socked in and you fool around at lower altitude with low RPM and boost for to a.) confirm your feet are dry, and be get some sense where you are, and b.) then run out of fuel and bail out after using 30 minutes of remaining reserve (approx 25 for P-51, 40+ for P-47). (This is Mustang profile where the pilot has Much more flexibility to manage range when not constrained as much as P-47, which R/V with bombers close to coast and immediately engages in Ess type coverage of bomber box to which it is assigned.

The Developed CR's do NOT take into account, the reduced course Real speed of the B-17 formation (150mph IAS ~ 205mph TAS). The Jug is burning 80+ gpm at cruise settings which would enable 300mph at 25000 feet in straight line cruise - but his sore butt is only moving toward the target at 205mph.

His 20min Combat (5min WEP, 15min MP) drains approximately 90 gal (P-51B ~ 58gal) of his remaining Interal fuel. Takeoff at MP, loitering to form up and intial climb while switching to external tanks burns about 190gal internal fuel. As experience level of Group pilots increased, switchin to external tanks occurred immediately after climb started - reducing MP drain to perhaps 60 gallons of internal fuel. So, for internal fuel - which is basis for Combat, return cruise, let down and reserve - has already been reduced from 305 at start engine to 305-90-90-40=95 gal to return home after a fight - in a straight line.. A little over an hour at best cruise in mph - say 320+ miles. Does NOT matter how much external fuel you carry because you have to drop your external tanks when engaging.

When an order states 'engage, drive off, return to escort' the internal fuel drain of 90 gal lowers to say 20 gal extra consumption leaving 155 gal stretchin CR to 400+ miles.

Combat Radius charts are straight line legs from takeoff, through immediate climb through optimal cruise to point from base that reversing course at same optimal cruise, descending and landing with 30 minutes reserve. The closest analogy from Wright Field data is a fighter sweep for which no close escort is planned - sweep in front, sweep an area with drop tanks, encounter no opposition until external tanks are released. For the P-47D the extent of combat radius in which a serious 20 minute fight occurs, the maximum actual CR with 2x 150 gal tanks is about 425mi (P-47D-25 and lower w/305 internal) for a Fighter Sweep. For Penetration and Withdrawal support, the CR is about 100-150 miles less.


Did he illuminating article also point out that the R-2800 engined F4U loss rate per 1000 sorties was only 1/2% lower than P-51D? - and typical CAS missions were far shorter range from carrier to target than typical P-51 targets.
Great post drgondog I think there's a typo I made bold should this be gph? One thing rarely put in these calculations although you allude to them is contingency for the amount of extra time/ fuel a squadron or fighter group needs over and above that of a single plane to do anything. With all the fighters and all the bombers taking off from different fields to different plans but heading for a RDV somewhere above the North Sea there were always some who arrived early or late which means fuel burned loitering or catching up. On the groundhog thread someone posted Park's instructions to controllers in the BoB about time to climb to 30,000ft for Hurricanes the difference between an individual plane and a squadron was measured in minutes, doing things as a group is always different to what an individual can manage and never for the better. Without a contingency things can go very wrong very quickly.
 
Once again a flawed statement. The P-51D/K were available in limited numbers.

Post VE Day, AAF/USAF retained ALL P/F-51H and F-82 for Air Defense, and P-51H was still active in SAC as Base Defense as late as 1952. The other active duty assignments for the H post war were in CONUS and Alaska and Hawaii and National Guard squadrons post WWII.

Zero P-51H were released by USAF to foreign governments for even racing purposes for competition at Bendix and Thompson Trophy Races. Only P--51B/C/D/K through 1955/56 when the USAF started selling Mustangs en masse from USAF and National Guard - with the P-51H the last to go.

The P-47D and P-51D that went to Nationalist China followed the inventory wind downs in Pacific at the end of WWII when many P-47Ds and P-51Ds went to China, Phillipines, Korea, etc. No P-47Ns went anywhere but Stateside after brief existance with residual P-38L in Phillipines - into 1946. Primary Source Gruenhagen and NAA documents for P-51 references. The 343rd FG, based in Alaska was first operational P-51H Fighter Group in Air Defense Command, receiving them in August 1945 . I have yet to see solid reference to a single P-51H unit actually in-place for Invasion of Japan. As the P/F-51H and P/F-82 were still considered the Only LR interceptor in USAF inventory and limited in numbers - it is hardly credible that the Nationalist Chines were offered the H when so many P-51Ds were in place in th Far East post VE Day.

Did Greg state that the Chinese Nationalists not only 'abandoned' the Mustang but acquired P-47s to replace them? How did the P-51D inventory land in hands of PRC following route of Chinese Nationalists in1949? Has anyone seen any details of P-47s active in post war China?


There were rational reasons why the P-47s were left at home. First was availability of the active duty USAF P-51D Fighter Bomber Groups in Japan and Australia and Korea when the war started, combined with the logistics fabric to support them. Second was the concentration of P-51D National Guard units on West Coast compared to East Cost P-47D/N units. Third conideration - airfield lengths in Korea were marginal for combat loaded P-47. Last but perhaps most important for 1950 was that US lost ROC airfields rapidly during the N.Korea advance.

If you will pull Dean's AOHT and look at combat radius (Official AAF Docs) for full internal fuel while carrying 2x1000 bom load had CR of 350 miles. The P-47D WITH NO BOMBLOAD - only internal fuel 370gal - had CR of 225mi. BTW pg 599-600 Dean's AOHT.

While we are at it, Dean's AOHT reproductions include the assumptions and Boundary conditions applied to DEFINE combat radius. If you are remotely curious from an academic POV, you should seek Engineering Characteristics and Performance Charts, USAAF Aircraft, Wright Field Ohio. Those and many relevant documents may be found within NARA - Sarah Clark Collection of R&D Materiel Command docs.

Go back to the alter of Worship and see how many of those boundary conditions are a.) explained, and b.) explained correctly?

Further, take note that 8th AF performed their own CRs, as combined from above USAAF Performance Charts with those data from Cass Hough VIII ATS under 8th AF in UK.

The 8th AF desired to fold in such considerations that weather and visibility and winds aloft in northern Europe from Wright Field, Muroc and Eglin. To give you insight there are two components that Greg seriously left out when he 'departed the pattern' with respect to engineering and logic.

First, there is no use for a point to be struck in London or center of East Anglia (like Cambridge) and draw a straight line to say Berlin and pronounce gleefully 'Berlin - 550 mi.

You may note that Berlin is in fact much longer if the route shown includes taking off, flying in cute circles around the airfield as elements form into flights, into sections, into squadrons, into the composed Group and begin to climb east-NE in the general direction of Amsterdam, thence across Denmark, thence along the coast line heading eastward while making course changes to avoid flak concentrations until finally the R/V point is reached, usually at extent of P-47 escort, say Bremen- then Ess in coverage maintaining Cruise speed of ~ 260 to 300mph TAS. Somewhere east of Bremen, say Rugen Is., the Task Force breaks SE near IP for bomb run on Berlin. Escort is maintained through Rally Point and circuit around Berlin to south and thence westerly heading of say 270, still essing in coverage until maybe Kassel when the P-47 escort R/V occurs and Mustangs return in near straight line with some deviation for flak coverage until coastline is reached. The descent is made at lower power/fuel consumption because gravity is your friend. Alas UK socked in and you fool around at lower altitude with low RPM and boost for to a.) confirm your feet are dry, and be get some sense where you are, and b.) then run out of fuel and bail out after using 30 minutes of remaining reserve (approx 25 for P-51, 40+ for P-47). (This is Mustang profile where the pilot has Much more flexibility to manage range when not constrained as much as P-47, which R/V with bombers close to coast and immediately engages in Ess type coverage of bomber box to which it is assigned.

The Developed CR's do NOT take into account, the reduced course Real speed of the B-17 formation (150mph IAS ~ 205mph TAS). The Jug is burning 80+ gpm at cruise settings which would enable 300mph at 25000 feet in straight line cruise - but his sore butt is only moving toward the target at 205mph.

His 20min Combat (5min WEP, 15min MP) drains approximately 90 gal (P-51B ~ 58gal) of his remaining Interal fuel. Takeoff at MP, loitering to form up and intial climb while switching to external tanks burns about 190gal internal fuel. As experience level of Group pilots increased, switchin to external tanks occurred immediately after climb started - reducing MP drain to perhaps 60 gallons of internal fuel. So, for internal fuel - which is basis for Combat, return cruise, let down and reserve - has already been reduced from 305 at start engine to 305-90-90-40=95 gal to return home after a fight - in a straight line.. A little over an hour at best cruise in mph - say 320+ miles. Does NOT matter how much external fuel you carry because you have to drop your external tanks when engaging.

When an order states 'engage, drive off, return to escort' the internal fuel drain of 90 gal lowers to say 20 gal extra consumption leaving 155 gal stretchin CR to 400+ miles.

Combat Radius charts are straight line legs from takeoff, through immediate climb through optimal cruise to point from base that reversing course at same optimal cruise, descending and landing with 30 minutes reserve. The closest analogy from Wright Field data is a fighter sweep for which no close escort is planned - sweep in front, sweep an area with drop tanks, encounter no opposition until external tanks are released. For the P-47D the extent of combat radius in which a serious 20 minute fight occurs, the maximum actual CR with 2x 150 gal tanks is about 425mi (P-47D-25 and lower w/305 internal) for a Fighter Sweep. For Penetration and Withdrawal support, the CR is about 100-150 miles less.


Did the illuminating article also point out that the R-2800 engined F4U loss rate per 1000 sorties was only 1/2% lower than P-51D? - and typical CAS missions were far shorter range from carrier to target than typical P-51 targets.
Have a look at the following "Greg" video:

The Top Gun Maverick Controversy and the P-47


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kB1gLzmWNlI

P47N's in Nationalist Chinese markings are clearly shown in flight and on the ground.

He also makes comments about P51H and P47N in the above video, in addition to the earlier "Conclusions" video.

I believe he would be reasonably sure of himself if he twice deliberately mentioned the P51H/P47N Nationalist Chinese situation.

Once in isolation may be an error.

Twice would be much more certain to be based on grounded knowledge.

Note: Access to his sources on all of his videos are available via subscription to his "Patreon" network.

I am not currently a subscriber.

I am not that much "into it" to feel the need to subscribe.
 
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Photos of Chinese AF P-47D appeared on this site many years ago. Firstly from an Aorcam publication.


And this

1681232429850.jpeg


One reason for there being less photos of P-47D in Chinese markings is that the 81st FG were the only unit in China in Aug 1945 that were equipped with that aircraft. So fewer P-47D than P-51 to be turned over to them.
 
Have a look at the following "Greg" video:




View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kB1gLzmWNlI

P47N's in Nationalist Chinese markings are clearly shown in flight and on the ground.

He also makes comments about P51H and P47N in the above video, in addition to the earlier "Conclusions" video.

I believe he would be reasonably sure of himself if he twice deliberately mentioned the P51H/P47N Nationalist Chinese situation.

Once in isolation may be an error.

Twice would be much more certain to be based on grounded knowledge.

Note: Access to his sources on all of his videos are available via subscription to his "Patreon" network.

I am not currently a subscriber.

I am not that much "into it" to feel the need to subscribe.

After I saw Greg claim that no German plane in ww2 was equipped with a swirl throttle I stopped watching the videos (Every single jumo 213 in ww2 had one).
 
After I saw Greg claim that no German plane in ww2 was equipped with a swirl throttle I stopped watching the videos (Every single jumo 213 in ww2 had one).
I am just wondering is it probable that he is 100% wrong 100% of the time, or is he capable, sometimes, of making mistakes, and being wrong only sometimes, and getting it right most times.

Could you please link to the video in which you found the error?

Logic, based on his extremely high level of positive comments, suggests that he gets it right most of the time.

After all, he does have 113,000 subscribers, most who would have at least some idea about aviation and the associated engineering.

That, to me, would suggest a reasonable level of competency.

And if he didn't, I think he might not be employed in the capacity that he is.
 
The prevalence of positive to negative comments can also be determined by the level of knowledge of the commenter
who has watched the video. It is no true indication of validity at all.

After I saw Greg claim that no German plane in ww2 was equipped with a swirl throttle I stopped watching the videos (Every single jumo 213 in ww2 had one).
This is a very telling point. If you are going to make what is supposed to be a well researched video then no such claim would be made.
It shows a lack of research on the subject which does in fact render the whole thing suspect.
 

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