The other factor is the learning process that happened. The USAAF B-17s and B-24s didn't start with operations to Berlin. They started with short, cross-channel raids where existing fighter resources could provide escort.
As ranges increased, it wasn't clear whether fighter escort was needed all the way to the target. Some of that had to be learned...the hard way. The Nazi Germany's air defences might have been merely a tough outer crust which, if a force could break through, would allow unescorted bombers free reign over enemy airspace.
In hindsight, that was a naiive perspective (if it ever existed). Attempts to operate B-17s and B-24s beyond the range of escorting fighters proved costly and the rest, as they say, is history. However, it requires more foresight than perhaps was present at the time to suggest those issues could have been identified without some tough, first-hand operational lessons.