A Jan. 30, 2003 report from the British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) claims al Qaeda's attempts to manufacture a 'dirty bomb' are much more advanced than was previously known. The report was based on previously undisclosed evidence released to the BBC by the U.K. authorities, including intelligence reports from British agents who had infiltrated al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda training manuals detailing how to best use dirty bombs were also uncovered — as was a quantity of radioactive materials. According to the BBC, officials at the Porton Down defense research center in Wiltshire, England, where these materials were analyzed, concluded "al Qaeda had a small dirty bomb but probably not a full blown nuclear device."
Osama bin Laden's organization is believed to have acquired radioactive isotopes from the Taliban. No device has been recovered, although an al Qaeda weapons expert from the western Afghan city of Herat, where the dirty bomb development had been taking place, is still at large. Currently, it is not entirely clear if al Qaeda have actually built a bomb, as the BBC say officials at Porton Down attest, or whether work on this was just much more advanced than had hitherto been believed. Either way, the incident represents a worrying development on the terrorism front, albeit one that has gone by relatively unnoticed amid the ongoing Iraq crisis.
The BBC report comes some six months after U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a warning about the potential risk of an al Qaeda dirty bomb attack, announcing the arrest of a U.S. citizen in connection with such a strike. Within a day of this warning, issued on June 10, 2002, some officials within the Bush administration were claiming that the threat posed by such a plot may have been overstated by Ashcroft. Similarly, European security officials were later said to be "highly skeptical" that the arrested plotter, Abdullah Al Muhajir, was preparing such an attack. Meanwhile, the plot was acknowledged by Washington as not having passed beyond the most basic of stages. Just how advanced such a plan needs to be before it warrants being called one is a moot point. However, the manner and timing of Ashcroft's announcement — given the furor over alleged pre-Sept. 11 security lapses by the CIA and FBI — led to charges of its being politically motivated. Likewise, the very nature of the threat being discussed makes it especially sensitive to being seen as alarmist. Despite such factors, as the recent BBC reports highlight, the possibility of a dirty bomb attack is one that cannot be ignored.
The prospect of such an attack is but one of many nightmare scenarios to be issued forth from the Pandora's Box sprung open by al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001. Not that this is a new threat — the possibility of such an attack has long been acknowledged by many as possible if not imminent. Indeed, as nuclear devices go, a dirty bomb has been cited as among the most easily attainable additions to the terrorist arsenal. In the dirty bomb, al Qaeda may well have found the perfect 'force multiplier.' It is also, potentially, the quintessential terrorist weapon in that its psychological effects are claimed by many experts to outweigh any physical destruction it may cause. Thus, the threat of such attacks must be carefully handled by the authorities if they are to avoid unwittingly aiding the terrorists in petrifying their targets. This was evidenced in the warning over potential dirty bomb and chemical weapon attacks issued by the British government last November but later withdrawn — a move that may have been considered necessary lest the public focus on such threats to the exclusion of others in the terrorists' arsenal.
A dirty bomb — or radiological dispersion bomb — is a relatively unsophisticated device that combines radioactive materials with conventional explosives. When exploded, such a device scatters radioactive particles into the environment. No nuclear-fission reaction takes place as would occur with a true nuclear weapon, and, while anyone within the initial blast radius will probably be killed immediately, more casualties would probably result from the long-term effects of the dispersed radioactive material. According to Michael Levi, the physicist who managed a Federation of American Scientists' (FAS) study into the effects of a dirty bomb explosion, protecting yourself after such an attack is a matter of getting indoors, showering, and not eating contaminated food or breathing open air. As he put it: "It's really a matter of closing your windows and waiting for instructions." Levi also cautioned that the much-hyped potassium iodine anti-radiation pills said to be selling so well in the wake of the attorney general's announcement, are likely to be of limited use against dirty bombs, as most studies predict the use of non-iodine radiation in any such device.
Moreover, Dr. John W. Poston Sr., professor of nuclear engineering at Texas A&M University, and chairman of a committee that produced a study on dirty bombs for the national Council on Radiation Protection, contends that the dispersal method used in such a device would so dilute the radioactive material involved as to make any radiation doses incurred non-fatal. Similarly, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1.5 pounds of radioactive cesium dispersed by detonating 4,000 pounds of TNT would only increase the amount of radiation that most of the affected people are normally exposed to by 25 percent. As Mark Gwozdecky of the International Atomic Energy Agency put it: "It's hard to imagine any kind of dirty bomb producing the kinds of mass casualties that we saw on Sept. 11." Such a device would, he added, be a weapon of mass disruption rather than a weapon of mass destruction.
Osama bin Laden's organization is believed to have acquired radioactive isotopes from the Taliban. No device has been recovered, although an al Qaeda weapons expert from the western Afghan city of Herat, where the dirty bomb development had been taking place, is still at large. Currently, it is not entirely clear if al Qaeda have actually built a bomb, as the BBC say officials at Porton Down attest, or whether work on this was just much more advanced than had hitherto been believed. Either way, the incident represents a worrying development on the terrorism front, albeit one that has gone by relatively unnoticed amid the ongoing Iraq crisis.
The BBC report comes some six months after U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a warning about the potential risk of an al Qaeda dirty bomb attack, announcing the arrest of a U.S. citizen in connection with such a strike. Within a day of this warning, issued on June 10, 2002, some officials within the Bush administration were claiming that the threat posed by such a plot may have been overstated by Ashcroft. Similarly, European security officials were later said to be "highly skeptical" that the arrested plotter, Abdullah Al Muhajir, was preparing such an attack. Meanwhile, the plot was acknowledged by Washington as not having passed beyond the most basic of stages. Just how advanced such a plan needs to be before it warrants being called one is a moot point. However, the manner and timing of Ashcroft's announcement — given the furor over alleged pre-Sept. 11 security lapses by the CIA and FBI — led to charges of its being politically motivated. Likewise, the very nature of the threat being discussed makes it especially sensitive to being seen as alarmist. Despite such factors, as the recent BBC reports highlight, the possibility of a dirty bomb attack is one that cannot be ignored.
The prospect of such an attack is but one of many nightmare scenarios to be issued forth from the Pandora's Box sprung open by al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001. Not that this is a new threat — the possibility of such an attack has long been acknowledged by many as possible if not imminent. Indeed, as nuclear devices go, a dirty bomb has been cited as among the most easily attainable additions to the terrorist arsenal. In the dirty bomb, al Qaeda may well have found the perfect 'force multiplier.' It is also, potentially, the quintessential terrorist weapon in that its psychological effects are claimed by many experts to outweigh any physical destruction it may cause. Thus, the threat of such attacks must be carefully handled by the authorities if they are to avoid unwittingly aiding the terrorists in petrifying their targets. This was evidenced in the warning over potential dirty bomb and chemical weapon attacks issued by the British government last November but later withdrawn — a move that may have been considered necessary lest the public focus on such threats to the exclusion of others in the terrorists' arsenal.
A dirty bomb — or radiological dispersion bomb — is a relatively unsophisticated device that combines radioactive materials with conventional explosives. When exploded, such a device scatters radioactive particles into the environment. No nuclear-fission reaction takes place as would occur with a true nuclear weapon, and, while anyone within the initial blast radius will probably be killed immediately, more casualties would probably result from the long-term effects of the dispersed radioactive material. According to Michael Levi, the physicist who managed a Federation of American Scientists' (FAS) study into the effects of a dirty bomb explosion, protecting yourself after such an attack is a matter of getting indoors, showering, and not eating contaminated food or breathing open air. As he put it: "It's really a matter of closing your windows and waiting for instructions." Levi also cautioned that the much-hyped potassium iodine anti-radiation pills said to be selling so well in the wake of the attorney general's announcement, are likely to be of limited use against dirty bombs, as most studies predict the use of non-iodine radiation in any such device.
Moreover, Dr. John W. Poston Sr., professor of nuclear engineering at Texas A&M University, and chairman of a committee that produced a study on dirty bombs for the national Council on Radiation Protection, contends that the dispersal method used in such a device would so dilute the radioactive material involved as to make any radiation doses incurred non-fatal. Similarly, according to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1.5 pounds of radioactive cesium dispersed by detonating 4,000 pounds of TNT would only increase the amount of radiation that most of the affected people are normally exposed to by 25 percent. As Mark Gwozdecky of the International Atomic Energy Agency put it: "It's hard to imagine any kind of dirty bomb producing the kinds of mass casualties that we saw on Sept. 11." Such a device would, he added, be a weapon of mass disruption rather than a weapon of mass destruction.
