The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now. (6 Viewers)

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The FW 190A-7/A-8 should never outclimb the Spit VIIIIX at any altitude, but the margin is smaller with 90-100 gal remaining at beginning of combat after releasing tanks. Ditto XIV.
The MkXIV dominated all marks of 190 and 109 with the 90g combat tank attached but they weren't available in this time frame.
 
Thank you, I was thinking on the similar lines. I think that the Mk. XIV will handily beat any non-jet German fighter of 1944, even with double the fuel fraction (tricky to do due to the CoG, though).

My train of thought is something like this, for our Spitfires with more fuel - I prefer a 40-50 imp gal tank behind the pilot, or something similar, and the Mk.VIII over the IX:

Allies can probably deploy as many of them, as target escort, in mid to late 1943, as the Germans can deploy of the Fw 190s. Neither aircraft has a major advantage that can reliably & definitely negate the enemy's advantage of position, altitude, speed and/or the pilot's skill (higher we go, Spitfire is better of the two, especially with the 70 series Merlins). Allies can also deploy the P-47s to do the roles of inbound and return escort, with a sprinkling of Typhoons to 'visit' the airfields, range permitting. Also the Spitfire Vs to plug the gaps, but closer to UK. 8th AF also deploys the heavies.
LW defenders have though choices to make: do they attack the initial escorts, or the target escort, or the 'retreating' escort, or the bombers? Or the Typhoons? They don't have nearly enough to attack all of them, and if they split the forces, they will fare badly in either task. The rocket-toting Bf 110s and Fw 190s are in severe problems.

IOW, Germans might have the parity in aircraft performance when we look at 1 vs. 1, however the numerical disadvantage is their big problem.
I can't get my head around the fact an abundance of Spitfires were sitting around RAF airfields not really achieving much while the Americans were so desperate for escorts they were bolting ferry tanks onto P47's which were unsuitable to the task so they at least had something.
 
I can't get my head around the fact an abundance of Spitfires were sitting around RAF airfields not really achieving much while the Americans were so desperate for escorts they were bolting ferry tanks onto P47's which were unsuitable to the task so they at least had something.
The RAF did not consider daylight attacks as a worthy national interest sufficient enough to allocate scarce resources deemed critical to the US. That specifically included expending assets to modify Spitfires (or Tempests) to achieve even intermediate escort ranges in 1943. That is one of the reasons the AAF turned to Mustangs to form the Scout Forces as very few Mosquitos left RAF control.
 
The RAF did not consider daylight attacks as a worthy national interest sufficient enough to allocate scarce resources deemed critical to the US. That specifically included expending assets to modify Spitfires (or Tempests) to achieve even intermediate escort ranges in 1943. That is one of the reasons the AAF turned to Mustangs to form the Scout Forces as very few Mosquitos left RAF control.
They used Spitfires as short range escorts for both the outbound and return leg so they were available and the RAF was involved, it wouldn't have been hard to add at least the 30g rear tank and a 50g dropper which were both readily available and sweep ahead of the raids attacking when opportunities presented, adding the 33+42g rear with a 90g dropper to the MkVIII would have been game changing early '43, there was the likes of Blackburn and Fairey doing stuff all that could have been doing the work. I watched the " operations room' on youtube last night, that was heartbreaking seeing the B17s getting slaughtered attacking the ball bearing factories, the P47 pilots would have been distraught turning around leaving them to their fate
 
If the RAF is willing it would be possible to extend the range of the Spitfires to around P-47 distances in 1943, after that the P-38, later P-47 and P-51 arrive in numbers and have better ranges. Against that is the reality the RAF was finding it hard to break even in the air combats at relatively short range, going deeper would increase losses. The Spitfire VIII as built had a theoretical combat radius of around 300 miles at 320 mph at 20,000 feet with 124 gallons internal and a 90 gallon external tank that refills the internal tanks.

The Spitfire rear fuselage tanks were a second half of 1944 arrival.

The Luftwaffe was minimising its commitment to the west until the events of July 1943 (Kursk, Sicily, Hamburg) then August, and as long as the 8th Air Force persists in strikes beyond escort range the presence of more allied fighters is unlikely to do much to losses on either side. Given production numbers and the overseas commitments Fighter Command was a mainly Spitfire V force during 1943.

To obtain the early 1944 nominal 75 aircraft strength of a US fighter group requires almost all Spitfire XIV built to end March 1944, probably to end May once you allow for reserves etc. The Griffon used more fuel than the Merlin so it had less range.

First Spitfire HF.IX in March 1944, First HF.VIII in May 1944

First Merlin 70 in January 1944 for Spitfire, first Merlin 72 in February 1943, Merlin 73 from April (4 built December 1942/January 1943) for Mosquito, B/PR.IX production from April 1943, B/PR.XVI from November.

Reading between the lines it seems around 33 gallons was about the limit for a Spitfire rear fuselage tank when entering combat, the Spitfire was more sensitive than the Mustang to CoG issues, requiring the better elevators of Westland design plus the heavier engine to handle a rear tank. It meant more issues with fuel movement in a partially full rear tank, leading to stacking a pair of 33 gallon tanks rather than one 75 gallon one.

Spitfire Vb, 84 gallons, range after deducting 15 minute allowance of 335 miles at 310 mph at 15,000 feet, the range goes to 480 miles at 180-190 mph at 15,000 feet. The 15 minutes allowance is deducting fuel used in 15 minutes at maximum power at sea level and is for warming up and climbing to operational height. On the Spitfire V that comes to 30 gallons leaving 54 for cruise, the Spitfire VIII figure for take off and climb to 20,000 feet is 23 gallons. So the allowance range is an underestimate.

Add the 25 gallons of mark VIII type wing tanks to the mark V ups the fast cruise range to 490 miles, economic cruise range to 700 miles, having 109 gallons internal enables full use of a 90 gallon external tank.

Hawker Typhoon, 144 gallons internal, drop tanks entered service in August 1943, usually a pair of 44 gallon, taking range to around 1,000 miles which would probably be at economic cruise.

Then comes sorting out the command issues, escort tactics (stick with bombers?) and things like the bombers ability to communicate with the fighters.
 
The RAF did not consider daylight attacks as a worthy national interest sufficient enough to allocate scarce resources deemed critical to the US. That specifically included expending assets to modify Spitfires (or Tempests) to achieve even intermediate escort ranges in 1943. That is one of the reasons the AAF turned to Mustangs to form the Scout Forces as very few Mosquitos left RAF control.

I think this is pretty much the crux of the Long Range Spitfire hypothetical. Daylight strategic bombing was completely at odds with RAF strategy and they were expending a lot of effort lobbying for essentially night attacks on Berlin.

Even when AAF hit Schweinfurt the first time, the RAF basically outright refused to conduct a follow-on night attack.

Similar can be said about denying use of rolled steel for drop tanks and necessitating development of the paper tank.
 
Reading between the lines it seems around 33 gallons was about the limit for a Spitfire rear fuselage tank when entering combat, the Spitfire was more sensitive than the Mustang to CoG issues, requiring the better elevators of Westland design plus the heavier engine to handle a rear tank. It meant more issues with fuel movement in a partially full rear tank, leading to stacking a pair of 33 gallon tanks rather than one 75 gallon one.
This has been discussed ad nauseum, the Spitfire had the same restrictions the Mustang had regarding rear fuel, the MkIX was cleared for all combat maneuvers with the lower 33g rear tank full, the Mustang was cleared for the same with 35g, the Mustangs tank also had internal baffles to limit fuel movement as did all fuel tanks in general, the fuel tank in my car has an internal baffle.
 
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I can't get my head around the fact an abundance of Spitfires were sitting around RAF airfields not really achieving much while the Americans were so desperate for escorts they were bolting ferry tanks onto P47's which were unsuitable to the task so they at least had something.
An over simplification. They were not just sitting around, not achieving much. An examination of the Fighter Command, Group and Squadron records would reveal the activities being performed by all those Spitfire Squadrons that were supposedly "sitting around".

First task, and the highest priority they had allocated was defence. Protect the airfields, the supply chains, factories, all the facilities within the UK that needed to be defended against aerial attack to allow the conduct of the war and operations from the UK. Protect the ports where the supplies were coming in from overseas, protect the convoys on their final stages of their travel into ports and out of them; protect where the US forces were arriving into the UK, protect the areas where the troops were concentrated and training and preparing for the invasion.

Then, within the capabilities and range of the various marks of the Spitfire between 1941 to mid-1944, conduct offensive operations or operate in support of offensive operations against targets in occupied Europe. Early on that entailed escorting the like of Blenheims, then Stirlings, then more so the light/medium bomber aircraft of 2 Group (Bostons, Venturas, Mitchells, Mosquitoes) on bombing raids against targets in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. As things progressed, those operations were often against targets such as airfields and conducted to coincide with the ingress or egress of USAAF heavy bombers against targets elsewhere. On occasions for target within their range, they did provide the escort for the USAAF heavies when operating against targets such as the French ports, U-Boat pens in France, etc - especially when the weather forecast for targets inside Germany were unsuitable. Later still, they did a lot of ingress and exit escort for USAAF heavies on return from targets in Germany. And large scale fighter sweeps in support of the operations of the 'heavies' - tying Luftwaffe units to protecting particular areas in the Netherlands, Belgium and France or disrupting their efforts to intercept the 'heavies' when called in as reinforcements.

Escort for Coastal Command operations against enemy coastal shipping along the coastline from up near Texel in the Netherlands out into the Bay of Biscay off the French coast.

On top of that they still continued their programs of Rangers, Rhubarbs and other offensive operations against targets within their range, attacking flak posts, railway engines and rolling stock, Luftwaffe airfields, Army camps, supply and fuel depots, early morning and evening sorties trying to catch E-Boats and German minelayers and mine sweepers operating in the Channel and North Sea.

Then if you look at the records, when the USAAF medium bombers, primarily the B-26 Marauders started operating from the UK, a high percentage of their escort was provided by RAF Fighter Command units, leaving the USAAF fighter units to concentrate on the long range escort role.

Into late 1943 and early 1944, the Spitfire units, particularly those on the Spitfire V, get their bomb racks and start performing fighter bomber operations against initially transportation targets, bridges, then become very heavily involved along with the Hawker Typhoon fighter bomber units, in the attacks against the V weapon sites being constructed in northern France. Another aspect of that was the campaign operating as fighter bombers against the railway marshalling yards and holding yards where the V weapons were coming in to supply the launch sites after they were built.

Add to that the training required to improve unit efficiency, armament practice camps, train with Army units in the CAS role, periods of rest and maintenance after long periods on operations including integrating and training up replacement aircrew (often with a secondary operational role protecting rear areas even whilst notionally 'on rest').

And I'll also throw in there, the number of the RAF's Spitfire Squadrons from mid-1942 onwards who were hosting USAAF pilots for periods of operational experience - usually somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks with a Squadron. Often this was in the timeframe between when the units the pilots belonged to initially arrived into the UK and before the aircraft they were to operate arrived by sea from the USA and were reassembled and made ready for operational use. A number of the USAAF fighter pilots who were to fly with the 8th and 9th Air Forces got their first operational experience in the ETO in a Spitfire belonging to a RAF Squadron as a part of that program. Was helpful in getting them used to European weather and the way the airspace in and around the UK was controlled and some exposure to the theatre of operations with experienced RAF pilots.
 
This has been discussed ad nauseum, the Spitfire had the same restrictions the Mustang had regarding rear fuel, the MkIX was cleared for all combat maneuvers with the lower 33g rear tank full, the Mustang was cleared for the same with 35g, the Mustangs tank also had internal baffles to limit fuel movement as did all fuel tanks in general, the fuel tank in my car has an internal baffle.
The aft CG was restored at 45gal, but you miss the key point - namely that the Mustang was not challenged with immediate combat if 65 or 85 gallons were loaded pre-takeoff. Takeoff and climb to cruise altitude consumed average of 58-gal with 2x 108-gal drop tanks. The length of the mission dictated how much internal fuel should be burned - but 40-45-gal burn left 40-gal for combat and post combat return. I know SOP for 355th FG was to load 65-gal and use 20+ for climb before switching to externals.

The differences were important. First, only the left main (92-gal) was used for warm up and takeoff and was refilled partially with carb overflow, then switched to fuselage tank - after that the mustang operated on the 2x108-gal eternal tanks all the way to Berlin.

Secondly and most important, If a fight started there, the Mustang had approximately the same fuel in one wing as the Spitfire on takeoff.
 
The 'bomber mafia' prioritized the P-38 for 8th AF as escort fighter in June 1942, Three were operational/near operational when Eisenhower pulled them for 12th AF and Torch. Marshall, Arnold and King objected, FDR ruled for Eisenhower.
Yes. Yes. We know the history. But think what you could do with eternal tanks on a P-39. It's the Expert's fever dream.
 
I think this is pretty much the crux of the Long Range Spitfire hypothetical. Daylight strategic bombing was completely at odds with RAF strategy and they were expending a lot of effort lobbying for essentially night attacks on Berlin.
But the RAF did escort daylight raids but due to a lack of range were pretty much useless,
 
The aft CG was restored at 45gal, but you miss the key point - namely that the Mustang was not challenged with immediate combat if 65 or 85 gallons were loaded pre-takeoff. Takeoff and climb to cruise altitude consumed average of 58-gal with 2x 108-gal drop tanks. The length of the mission dictated how much internal fuel should be burned - but 40-45-gal burn left 40-gal for combat and post combat return. I know SOP for 355th FG was to load 65-gal and use 20+ for climb before switching to externals.

The differences were important. First, only the left main (92-gal) was used for warm up and takeoff and was refilled partially with carb overflow, then switched to fuselage tank - after that the mustang operated on the 2x108-gal eternal tanks all the way to Berlin.

Secondly and most important, If a fight started there, the Mustang had approximately the same fuel in one wing as the Spitfire on takeoff.
Like I stated earlier, use the P47 and MkV's to sweep ahead of the longer ranged MkXVIII/IX's as escorts, use what you have, make it work, the P47's that were used on these raids were fitted with unpressurised ferry tanks just to get a bit further, I'm looking at the USAF that were desperate enough to use whatever they could, who cares if Spitfires were hit earlier in the fight, use the top 42g rear tank to get out over France at 30,000ft, at that height they won't be bounced and won't be hit by FW190's, if they do get intercepted by 109's great, ditch the dropper and get stuck in, that's one less fighter attacking the bombers.
 
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An over simplification. They were not just sitting around, not achieving much. An examination of the Fighter Command, Group and Squadron records would reveal the activities being performed by all those Spitfire Squadrons that were supposedly "sitting around".

First task, and the highest priority they had allocated was defence. Protect the airfields, the supply chains, factories, all the facilities within the UK that needed to be defended against aerial attack to allow the conduct of the war and operations from the UK. Protect the ports where the supplies were coming in from overseas, protect the convoys on their final stages of their travel into ports and out of them; protect where the US forces were arriving into the UK, protect the areas where the troops were concentrated and training and preparing for the invasion.

Then, within the capabilities and range of the various marks of the Spitfire between 1941 to mid-1944, conduct offensive operations or operate in support of offensive operations against targets in occupied Europe. Early on that entailed escorting the like of Blenheims, then Stirlings, then more so the light/medium bomber aircraft of 2 Group (Bostons, Venturas, Mitchells, Mosquitoes) on bombing raids against targets in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. As things progressed, those operations were often against targets such as airfields and conducted to coincide with the ingress or egress of USAAF heavy bombers against targets elsewhere. On occasions for target within their range, they did provide the escort for the USAAF heavies when operating against targets such as the French ports, U-Boat pens in France, etc - especially when the weather forecast for targets inside Germany were unsuitable. Later still, they did a lot of ingress and exit escort for USAAF heavies on return from targets in Germany. And large scale fighter sweeps in support of the operations of the 'heavies' - tying Luftwaffe units to protecting particular areas in the Netherlands, Belgium and France or disrupting their efforts to intercept the 'heavies' when called in as reinforcements.

Escort for Coastal Command operations against enemy coastal shipping along the coastline from up near Texel in the Netherlands out into the Bay of Biscay off the French coast.

On top of that they still continued their programs of Rangers, Rhubarbs and other offensive operations against targets within their range, attacking flak posts, railway engines and rolling stock, Luftwaffe airfields, Army camps, supply and fuel depots, early morning and evening sorties trying to catch E-Boats and German minelayers and mine sweepers operating in the Channel and North Sea.

Then if you look at the records, when the USAAF medium bombers, primarily the B-26 Marauders started operating from the UK, a high percentage of their escort was provided by RAF Fighter Command units, leaving the USAAF fighter units to concentrate on the long range escort role.

Into late 1943 and early 1944, the Spitfire units, particularly those on the Spitfire V, get their bomb racks and start performing fighter bomber operations against initially transportation targets, bridges, then become very heavily involved along with the Hawker Typhoon fighter bomber units, in the attacks against the V weapon sites being constructed in northern France. Another aspect of that was the campaign operating as fighter bombers against the railway marshalling yards and holding yards where the V weapons were coming in to supply the launch sites after they were built.

Add to that the training required to improve unit efficiency, armament practice camps, train with Army units in the CAS role, periods of rest and maintenance after long periods on operations including integrating and training up replacement aircrew (often with a secondary operational role protecting rear areas even whilst notionally 'on rest').

And I'll also throw in there, the number of the RAF's Spitfire Squadrons from mid-1942 onwards who were hosting USAAF pilots for periods of operational experience - usually somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks with a Squadron. Often this was in the timeframe between when the units the pilots belonged to initially arrived into the UK and before the aircraft they were to operate arrived by sea from the USA and were reassembled and made ready for operational use. A number of the USAAF fighter pilots who were to fly with the 8th and 9th Air Forces got their first operational experience in the ETO in a Spitfire belonging to a RAF Squadron as a part of that program. Was helpful in getting them used to European weather and the way the airspace in and around the UK was controlled and some exposure to the theatre of operations with experienced RAF pilots.
That's all well and good but 60 bombers went down in one raid over Schweinfurt, I'm just looking at what we had and what we could use to combat this.
 

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