The Great P-47 Range Debate on you tube now. (5 Viewers)

[J.D.]

I've been meaning to post this for a while vis-a-vis RAF contribution and this seems like a good opportunity. RAF escort missions for 17 August, 1943, Martin Middlebrook lists the following:

180 Spitfire sorties (all squadrons flew two operations). 2 Spitfires missing, 6 German fighters destroyed.

129 Squadron, Hornchurch
23 Spitfire sorties. Destroyed 1 FW 190, no losses.

222 Squadron, Hornchurch
25 Spitfire sorties. Destroyed 3 Me 109s, no losses.

303 (Polish) Squadron, Northolt
19 Spitfire sorties. Destroyed 1 FW 190, no losses.

316 (Polish) Squadron, Northolt
17 Spitfire sorties. No successes, no losses.

331 (Norwegian) Squadron, North Weald
21 Spitfire sorties. Shared 1 Me 110 destroyed with other squadrons, no losses.

332 (Norwegian) Squadron, North Weald
24 Spitfire sorties. Shared 1 Me 110 destroyed with other squadrons, no losses.

403 (Canadian) Squadron, Lashenden
27 Spitfire sorties, 2 missing. Shared 1 Me 110 destroyed with other squadrons.
Spitfire LZ997 (F/Lt W. C. Conrad, evader). Crashed near Armentières after collision with Spitfire MA615
Spitfire MA615 (F/Lt C. M. Shouldice, Chesley, Ontario, killed).
Crashed in English Channel after collision.

421 (Canadian) Squadron, Kenley
24 Spitfire sorties. No successes, no losses.

In addition to escort duties, the RAF provided diversionary and supporting operations.

3 Squadron, Manston
8 Typhoons bombed Woensdrecht

19 Squadron, Newchurch
24 Spitfire sorties to Calais and Poix; Poix flight recalled.

41 Squadron Westhampnett
25 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix.

56 Squadron, Manston
6 Typhoons to Woensdrecht.

65 Squadron, Kingsnorth
26 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix

91 Squadron, Westhampnett
25 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix

122 Squadron, Kingsnorth
22 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix.

132 Squadron, Newchurch
24 Spitfire sorties to Calais and Poix: Poix flight recalled.

174 Squadron, Lydd
7 Typhoons to Woensdrecht but only reaching Flushing.

175 Squadron, Lydd
8 Typhoons to bomb Woensdrecht but bombed ship off Flushing instead.

181 Squadron, New Romney
8 Typhoons bombed Lille/Vendeville.

182 Squadron, New Romney
6 Typhoons to Lille/Vendeville, 1 missing.
Typhoon DN553 (F/Lt W. H. Bewg, West Norwood, London, killed).
Presumed crashed in English Channel after earlier damage by German fighter.

183 Squadron, Tangmere
8 Typhoons bombed Poix, 3 damaged by Flak.

226 Squadron, Swanton Morley
7 Mitchells to bomb Dunkirk but operation not completed.

245 Squadron, Lydd
9 Typhoons to Woendstrecht.

247 Squadron, New Romney
6 Typhoons to Lille/Vendeville

320 (Dutch) Squadron, Attlebridge
6 Mitchells bombed Calais.

341 French Squadron, Biggin Hill
25 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix; Poix flight was recalled. 1 Spitfire missing and 1 FW 190 destroyed on the Bryas flight.
Spitfire MH419 (Sgt L. Poirier, taken prisoner but killed flying after the war). Shot down by German fighter and crashed approximately 10 km N. of Hesdin.

401, 411 and 412 (Canadian) Squadrons, Staplehurst
Approximately 35 Spitfires to Dunkirk but recalled.

402 (Canadian) Squadron, Merston
18 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix.

416 Squadron, Merston
22 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix.

485 (New Zealand) Squadron, Biggin Hill
24 Spitfire sorties to Bryas and Poix: the Poix flight was recalled. 1 Me 109 destroyed on the Bryas flight.

486 (New Zealand) Squadron, Tangmere
11 Typhoons to Poix.

602 (City of Glasgow) Squadron, Tangmere
24 Spitfire sorties to Calais and Poix; Poix flight was recalled.

- "The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission", Martin Middlebrook, 1983, pp. 329-31

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

I did a quick search and didn't see this video linked on this forum, and only one brief mention of it by name, so I'm putting this here. I'm curious to hear thoughts on the video particularly from those who disagree with Greg. But please, watch the entire thing before commenting.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8DEUO9mqKk

 

[drgondog]

I did a quick search and didn't see this video linked on this forum, and only one brief mention of it by name, so I'm putting this here. I'm curious to hear thoughts on the video particularly from those who disagree with Greg. But please, watch the entire thing before commenting.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8DEUO9mqKk

A couple of points as I don't have much time now:
1. Only Republic had a proprietary drop tank attach scheme through the P-47D-4, two sets 29" apart on each skid plate. ALL US bombs, chem stores, frag cluster, drop tanks produced in US were AN-B-7 and AN-B-10 racks for 1,100 and 2,200 pound limit, with lug spacing 14" apart.
2. Republic refused orders from Materiel Command (Maj Kelsey 2-42), (BG Carroll 10-42) to provide 'adaptors/mounts' for existing 75-gal. and then 150-gal. tanks on the belly and wing respectively to increase ferry range. Source AAF Materiel Command "Case History of Droppable Fuel Tanks" Reel A2069, USAFHRC Maxwell AFB, AL.
3. Republic finally complied with a direct order from MG Branshaw, Chief, Mat.Div. Wright Field, (6-1-43) to install adaptors to wing and belly of the future P-47s in order to use the existing 75 and 150-gal. drop tanks in inventory in UK (remaining following departure of P-38s to Torch). Republic first flight tests were conducted with racks, tanks and submersible G-9 fuel pumps in July 1943. Note - test report cited fuel draw limitations of ~18,000 feet for the C/L 75-gal tank and 24,000 for the wing tanks. Source AAF Materiel Command "Case History of Droppable Fuel Tanks" Reel A2069, USAFHRC Maxwell AFB, AL.
4. The average bombing altitudes of B-24 and B-17s in SWPA were 12,000 to 18,000 feet. (source USAF Historical Study 43, 113 and 116 The Fifth Air Force in the Bismark and Huon Gulf Campaigns January 1943 through February 1944)
5. According to the above cited histories of the 5th AF, only P-38s were used for long range target escort, P-47Ds through February 1944 were limited to the 'brisbane tank' as external store and permitted a total combat radius of 325 mi (Fighter Mission in which no escort was performed).
6. The longest mission documented, in which prolonged air combat was documented, was the Oct 11 MoH mission of Col Neal Kearby CO 348FG. The 348 was stationed at Hollandia. The mission was flown from Hollandia, refuel at Tsili, fly straight to Wewak, climb to 25,000 feet to loiter over Wewak B-25 and A-20 attack, dive on Japanese interceptors, fight, return to Lae to refuel, return to Hollandia. The Combat radius from Tsili was 320mi, to Lae 310mi.
7. Eaker ordered 43,000 Lockheed (BAD4) designed 125-gal steel tank with Republic skid plate design, from Bowater-Floyd in March 1943 after receiving the unsatisfactory Republic 200-gal Ferry tank (composite, incapable of pressurization). Sir Wilfred Freeman RAF Air Marshal and Ministry of Production denied priority for rolled steel, forcing a change to the paper composite 108-gal. drop tank, forcing delivery from May to September 1943. Withold later recinded his denial of priority in 1944.
8. The brisbane tank became high altitude capable when Republic delivered the same vacuum pump exhaust slave scheme modification as the P-35 and later, the P-38. It was not necessary, however as climbing to 18,000 feet and cruising over water or the Owen Stanley range was a.) undefended, and b.) draconian (i.e. Lindberg) cruise settings of low MP and Rpm were permissible due to lack of AA and Interceptor molestations.
9. SWPA conducted the same wing mods as ETO beginning in December 1943, were the first to receive the production P-47D-15 with wing drop tank capability and began 'longer' escort and fighter mission type missions in February - but still only to 400+mi combat radius (Short of Schweinfurt from Halesworth) which was not enough to escort to Rabaul. The P-38 was still the only target escort type capable of Rabaul in SWPA.
10. The so called 'bomber mafia' NEVER discouraged or held drop tanks back from Republic, nor did they have any motive to dismiss long-range-escort when they ('bomber mafia) tasked ALL of the near operational (1, 14, 82 and 78th) P-38 FGs to Bolero/8th AF - at the expense of all other theatres. Contrary to Greg's claims that Arnold was responsible for sending them to Torch, it was Eisenhower with furious objections from Marshall, Arnold, Armstrong (ETOUSA) and even King - but were overruled by FDR at Churchill's request.

Greg repeated dives into calculations and (historically) unsupported target escort claims based on His calculations, that he cites as proof that a 'brisbane' tank in the ETO would have enabled escort throughout Germany in 1943!!! thereby eliminating the need for the P-51B. Despite a barrage of facts from the 8th AF Victory Credits Board - June 1945 that I sent him citing all the VC claims in the 8th AF including the location of the claim, there was NEVER a claim made past Halberstadt (410mi) before D-Day, and that was 56th FG with 2x150gal. tanks May 19th 19444. When the 108-gal tank was introduced, the farthest VC was Bremen ~310mi on a Fighter Mission flying in front, the longest with 150-gal tank provided farthest engagement at Celle on February 20th (~380 mi), with 2x108-gal Hagenow (~400mi) with x108-gal on 3/18/44.
Never close to Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Regensburg or Munich. Never at or near Schweinfurt.

In other words, historical facts trump 'Greg calculations'.

Until I showed him the receipts, he never knew that the P-47C thru D-4 mount scheme was incompatible with all US airborne ordnance, which ALL other fighter manufacturers complied with, never acknowledged the different bomber attack altitudes between SWPA and ETO, didn't know that the Wewak mission with Kearby was only 300 mi *from Tsili), not 450 from Dobudura or Finschafen. He didn't know about the large inventory of 75 and 150-gal drop tanks stored at VIII Air Services Command after Torch pulled the P-38s. He didn't know that the 800 mi Balipapan mission (from Morotai) with 35th FG was a.) a fighter mission, b.) was conducted with new P-37D-28s with 370-gal. internal fuel, 2x150-gal. wing tanks and one 75-gal belly tank. He also didn't know that the only recorded loss (MIA) was a 35th FG pilot that ran out of fuel on the way back to Moratai. He mistakenly believed that it was a P-47D with only 305-gal. internal fuel.

More later.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

A couple of points as I don't have much time now:
1. Only Republic had a proprietary drop tank attach scheme through the P-47D-4, two sets 29" apart on each skid plate. ALL US bombs, chem stores, frag cluster, drop tanks produced in US were AN-B-7 and AN-B-10 racks for 1,100 and 2,200 pound limit, with lug spacing 14" apart.
2. Republic refused orders from Materiel Command (Maj Kelsey 2-42), (BG Carroll 10-42) to provide 'adaptors/mounts' for existing 75-gal. and then 150-gal. tanks on the belly and wing respectively to increase ferry range. Source AAF Materiel Command "Case History of Droppable Fuel Tanks" Reel A2069, USAFHRC Maxwell AFB, AL.
3. Republic finally complied with a direct order from MG Branshaw, Chief, Mat.Div. Wright Field, (6-1-43) to install adaptors to wing and belly of the future P-47s in order to use the existing 75 and 150-gal. drop tanks in inventory in UK (remaining following departure of P-38s to Torch). Republic first flight tests were conducted with racks, tanks and submersible G-9 fuel pumps in July 1943. Note - test report cited fuel draw limitations of ~18,000 feet for the C/L 75-gal tank and 24,000 for the wing tanks. Source AAF Materiel Command "Case History of Droppable Fuel Tanks" Reel A2069, USAFHRC Maxwell AFB, AL.
4. The average bombing altitudes of B-24 and B-17s in SWPA were 12,000 to 18,000 feet. (source USAF Historical Study 43, 113 and 116 The Fifth Air Force in the Bismark and Huon Gulf Campaigns January 1943 through February 1944)
5. According to the above cited histories of the 5th AF, only P-38s were used for long range target escort, P-47Ds through February 1944 were limited to the 'brisbane tank' as external store and permitted a total combat radius of 325 mi (Fighter Mission in which no escort was performed).
6. The longest mission documented, in which prolonged air combat was documented, was the Oct 11 MoH mission of Col Neal Kearby CO 348FG. The 348 was stationed at Hollandia. The mission was flown from Hollandia, refuel at Tsili, fly straight to Wewak, climb to 25,000 feet to loiter over Wewak B-25 and A-20 attack, dive on Japanese interceptors, fight, return to Lae to refuel, return to Hollandia. The Combat radius from Tsili was 320mi, to Lae 310mi.
7. Eaker ordered 43,000 Lockheed (BAD4) designed 125-gal steel tank with Republic skid plate design, from Bowater-Floyd in March 1943 after receiving the unsatisfactory Republic 200-gal Ferry tank (composite, incapable of pressurization). Sir Withold Freeman RAF Air Marshal and Ministry of Production denied priority for rolled steel, forcing a change to the paper composite 108-gal. drop tank, forcing delivery from May to September 1943. Withold later recinded his denial of priority in 1944.
8. The brisbane tank became high altitude capable when Republic delivered the same vacuum pump exhaust slave scheme modification as the P-35 and later, the P-38. It was not necessary, however as climbing to 18,000 feet and cruising over water or the Owen Stanley range was a.) undefended, and b.) draconian (i.e. Lindberg) cruise settings of low MP and Rpm were permissible due to lack of AA and Interceptor molestations.
9. SWPA conducted the same wing mods as ETO beginning in December 1943, were the first to receive the production P-47D-15 with wing drop tank capability and began 'longer' escort and fighter mission type missions in February - but still only to 400+mi combat radius (Short of Schweinfurt from Halesworth) which was not enough to escort to Rabaul. The P-38 was still the only target escort type capable of Rabaul in SWPA.
10. The so called 'bomber mafia' NEVER discouraged or held drop tanks back from Republic, nor did they have any motive to dismiss long-range-escort when they ('bomber mafia) tasked ALL of the near operational (1, 14, 82 and 78th) P-38 FGs to Bolero/8th AF - at the expense of all other theatres. Contrary to Greg's claims that Arnold was responsible for sending them to Torch, it was Eisenhower with furious objections from Marshall, Arnold, Armstrong (ETOUSA) and even King - but were overruled by FDR at Churchill's request.

Greg repeated dives into calculations and (historically) unsupported target escort claims based on His calculations, that he cites as proof that a 'brisbane' tank in the ETO would have enabled escort throughout Germany in 1943!!! thereby eliminating the need for the P-51B. Despite a barrage of facts from the 8th AF Victory Credits Board - June 1945 that I sent him citing all the VC claims in the 8th AF including the location of the claim, there was NEVER a claim made past Halberstadt (410mi) before D-Day, and that was 56th FG with 2x150gal. tanks May 19th 19444. When the 108-gal tank was introduced, the farthest VC was Bremen ~310mi on a Fighter Mission flying in front, the longest with 150-gal tank provided farthest engagement at Celle on February 20th (~380 mi), with 2x108-gal Hagenow (~400mi) with x108-gal on 3/18/44.
Never close to Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Regensburg or Munich. Never at or near Schweinfurt.

In other words, historical facts trump 'Greg calculations'.

Until I showed him the receipts, he never knew that the P-47C thru D-4 mount scheme was incompatible with all US airborne ordnance, which ALL other fighter manufacturers complied with, never acknowledged the different bomber attack altitudes between SWPA and ETO, didn't know that the Wewak mission with Kearby was only 300 mi *from Tsili), not 450 from Dobudura or Finschafen. He didn't know about the large inventory of 75 and 150-gal drop tanks stored at VIII Air Services Command after Torch pulled the P-38s. He didn't know that the 800 mi Balipapan mission (from Morotai) with 35th FG was a.) a fighter mission, b.) was conducted with new P-37D-28s with 370-gal. internal fuel, 2x150-gal. wing tanks and one 75-gal belly tank. He also didn't know that the only recorded loss (MIA) was a 35th FG pilot that ran out of fuel on the way back to Moratai. He mistakenly believed that it was a P-47D with only 305-gal. internal fuel.

More later.

Did you not watch the video? The 5th AF with limited resources was able to produce a drop tank (the Brisbane tank) in 1943 with which it flew P-47D sorties up to targets 470 miles away over New Guinea without landing to refuel, at altitudes in the 20-30k feet range (e.g. on 22 October 1943 from Port Moresby to Wewak and back, without landing at Tsili-Tsili, see also here: Pacific Wrecks - P-47D-2-RE Thunderbolt Serial Number 42-8117). The tank itself could be used up to 35k feet.

Why wasn't the 8th AF with much better logistics and resources able to do the same?

 

[wuzak]

7. Eaker ordered 43,000 Lockheed (BAD4) designed 125-gal steel tank with Republic skid plate design, from Bowater-Floyd in March 1943 after receiving the unsatisfactory Republic 200-gal Ferry tank (composite, incapable of pressurization). Sir Withold Freeman RAF Air Marshal and Ministry of Production denied priority for rolled steel, forcing a change to the paper composite 108-gal. drop tank, forcing delivery from May to September 1943. Withold later recinded his denial of priority in 1944.

Withold?

Freudian slip?

What priority did Sir Wilfred Freeman give for the steel that was denied for the tanks?

 

[wuzak]

Until I showed him the receipts, he never knew that the P-47C thru D-4 mount scheme was incompatible with all US airborne ordnance

So, not capable of carrying bombs either?

b.) was conducted with new P-37D-28s with 370-gal. internal fuel, 2x150-gal. wing tanks and one 75-gal belly tank.

Typo? - P47D-28?

 

[wuzak]

Why wasn't the 8th AF with much better logistics and resources able to do the same?

The airspace on the routes over Europe weren't unopposed - flak and fighters were present over occupied Europe, radar enabled the Luftwaffe to track raids from their bases in England and plot intercepts.

Luftwaffe fighter strength in the western front was increasing through 1943.

Pretty sure the Japanese didn't have much air defences in and over the mountains of New Guinea that the attacking forces flew over.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

The airspace on the routes over Europe weren't unopposed - flak and fighters were present over occupied Europe, radar enabled the Luftwaffe to track raids from their bases in England and plot intercepts.

Luftwaffe fighter strength in the western front was increasing through 1943.

What does this have to do with the question? And are you saying it didn't matter if the 8th AF's bombers were escorted or not; the Luftwaffe, flak and radar would've gotten them anyway?

 

[wuzak]

What does this have to do with the question? And are you saying it didn't matter if the 8th AF's bombers were escorted or not; the Luftwaffe, flak and radar would've gotten them anyway?

The condtions that allowed the P-47 to use that fat drop tank and fly slow to achieve long range didn't exist in Europe.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

The condtions that allowed the P-47 to use that fat drop tank and fly slow to achieve long range didn't exist in Europe.

Let's look at that sortie from 22 October 1943 I mentioned as an example. They took off from 17 Mile Drome near Port Moresby at 8:40 am and arrived over Wewak at 10:15 am (see my earlier link). 470 miles in 95 minutes. That'd be 297 mph on average, but a part of that is going to be getting into formation and climbing; they'd probably be going at a somewhat higher speed over the journey over the mountains to Wewak, right? What kind of cruise speeds were they going at at 20-30k feet in the ETO with P-47D-2s or similar variants of the P-47?

 

[drgondog]

Did you not watch the video? The 5th AF with limited resources was able to produce a drop tank (the Brisbane tank) in 1943 with which it flew P-47D sorties up to targets 470 miles away over New Guinea without landing to refuel, at altitudes in the 20-30k feet range (e.g. on 22 October 1943 from Port Moresby to Wewak and back, without landing at Tsili-Tsili, see also here: Pacific Wrecks - P-47D-2-RE Thunderbolt Serial Number 42-8117). The tank itself could be used up to 35k feet.

Why wasn't the 8th AF with much better logistics and resources able to do the same?

did you not read my comments?
Greg Mis-stated the October 11 1943 mission to Wewak for the Medal of Honor mission flown by Neal Kearby. He flew from Port Moresby to Tsili, refueled, went to Wewak (~310mi) climbed to 28,000 feet (according to the citation), attacked the Japanese interceptors below him, claimed six VCs and returned to Lae to refuel (~300mi), then returned to Port Moresby. Google the Medal of Honor Citation.

P-47s did not (and were not capable of) attaining more than 400 miles radius, with combat, until May 1944 for all the P-47s with only 305-gal of internal fuel. Certainly NOT the 348th or 58th or 35th FG based in New Guinea.

No, that tank was NOT used to 35,000 feet. While it would withstand necessary internal pressure slaved from the vacuum pump exhaust, that modification was not made to the SWPA P-47Ds until December 1943. Further, to date I have not seen a 'brisbane tank from that era with the accompanying pressure line in the tank. Post 1943 views of the tank with the correct lugs spaced 14" apart on the top center of the tank Do have a pressure line along with fuel line.

As to why the 8th AF was not able to do the same? They WERE able to do the same at BAD4, prototype and test a 125-gal steel tank and placed an order with Bowater-Floyd, Ltd to manufacture 43,000. Unfortunately the Brits were not forthcoming with priority for rolled steel to make that tank and were forced to accept the paper/composite substitute after several months of appealing to Sir Withold Freeman.

Worse, your failure to read what I wrote for you, also caused you miss what Greg missed in his cursory examinations of AAF history - namely that there were 1,000s of 75-gal and 150-gal steel drop tanks remaining in UK that worked on P-38s, and worked on P-47s AFTER Republic finally paid attention to AAF Materiel Command demands that THEY conform to the same bomb rack standards as the P-38, P-39, P-40, P-51 and P-63 (and B-18, B-23, B-25, B-26, B-17, B-24 and A-20, A-24, A-25, A-36). The standard was AN-B-7 and AN-B-10 with 14" on-center hooks to mate with 14" on-center lugs for bombs and fuel tanks. Republic provided 29" on center hooks, 2 per skid plate - requiring FOUR lugs per tank or bomb. No such ordnance other than the proprietary Republic Ferry tank had such arrangement.

 

[drgondog]

Withold?

Freudian slip?

What priority did Sir Wilfred Freeman give for the steel that was denied for the tanks?

yes Sir Wilfred Freeman. 81 yr old brain fart

 

[drgondog]

Withold?

Freudian slip?

What priority did Sir Wilfred Freeman give for the steel that was denied for the tanks?

Every RAF request. He later stated (source USAF Study 136) that he was unaware of the importance relative to providing escort for 8th AF.

 

[drgondog]

Let's look at that sortie from 22 October 1943 I mentioned as an example. They took off from 17 Mile Drome near Port Moresby at 8:40 am and arrived over Wewak at 10:15 am (see my earlier link). 470 miles in 95 minutes. That'd be 297 mph on average, but a part of that is going to be getting into formation and climbing; they'd probably be going at a somewhat higher speed over the journey over the mountains to Wewak, right? What kind of cruise speeds were they going at at 20-30k feet in the ETO with P-47D-2s or similar variants of the P-47?

You're calculations are based on Port Moresby to Wewak, when the mission was from Port Moresby to Tsili then to Wewak for the October 11 and 22 and 23 missions to Wewak..

For Oct 11, they took off from Port Moresby at 0800, refueled at Tsili at 0845 and left for Wewak at 0900. They reached Wewak at ~ 1045, burned the Brisbane tank, then climbed to 28,000 feet and dropped them and loitered until 1115 when they attacked, departed and returned to Lae (~300mi) at 1235 with 35-50gal remaining. The longer duration outbound leg of ~ 1.75 hours to cover 300mi implies slow cruise. The same approximate leg to Lae of 1 hr+ implies fast cruise.

Total time from Tsili to Wewak, loiter/fight, return to Lae about 3 1/2 hrs - source John Stanaway, Kearby's Thunderbolts, 5th AF MOH citation/details for Kearby.

Repeat - NOBODY but Greg states that the mission was flown directly from Port Moresby to Wewak, and back to Port Moresby. - Not the official 5th AF AWPA histories, the Report submitted for the Medal of Honor award, the research done by Stanaway and Bruning - only Greg

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

did you not read my comments?
Greg Mis-stated the October 11 1943 mission to Wewak for the Medal of Honor mission flown by Neal Kearby. He flew from Port Moresby to Tsili, refueled, went to Wewak (~310mi) climbed to 28,000 feet (according to the citation), attacked the Japanese interceptors below him, claimed six VCs and returned to Lae to refuel (~300mi), then returned to Port Moresby. Google the Medal of Honor Citation.

I read them. I don't think Greg misstated anything, rather you misunderstood him back in the range debate. He covers this in the video in the first few minutes. Either way, it's not really relevant because we have sorties going out from Port Moresby straight to Wewak on 22 October 1943. No refueling at Tsili-Tsili.

P-47s did not (and were not capable of) attaining more than 400 miles radius, with combat, until May 1944 for all the P-47s with only 305-gal of internal fuel. Certainly NOT the 348th or 58th or 35th FG based in New Guinea.

The example on 22 October 1943 that I mentioned saw no combat, but it doesn't seem likely they'd send P-47Ds to 470 mile radius sorties without expecting the possibility of combat while still expecting them to reach the target, in this case Wewak. Furthermore there appear to have been several of these sorties. Sometimes they refueled along the way, sometimes they didn't.

I think what would be useful to do would be to write a list of 5th AF P-47D combat sorties in 1943 exceeding the combat radius required to escort bombing raids into Germany in 1943. That's really the meat of the matter here, after all.

From 13:20 in the video:

No, that tank was NOT used to 35,000 feet. While it would withstand necessary internal pressure slaved from the vacuum pump exhaust, that modification was not made to the SWPA P-47Ds until December 1943. Further, to date I have not seen a 'brisbane tank from that era with the accompanying pressure line in the tank. Post 1943 views of the tank with the correct lugs spaced 14" apart on the top center of the tank Do have a pressure line along with fuel line.

This is dated 7 August 1943, from 5:00 in the video:

As to why the 8th AF was not able to do the same? They WERE able to do the same at BAD4, prototype and test a 125-gal steel tank and placed an order with Bowater-Floyd, Ltd to manufacture 43,000. Unfortunately the Brits were not forthcoming with priority for rolled steel to make that tank and were forced to accept the paper/composite substitute after several months of appealing to Sir Withold Freeman.

I don't find this a believable excuse. The 5th AF was able to produce the Brisbane tank with scant resources in 6 weeks, and field it. The 8th AF with the US industry and great logistics at its back wasn't able to come up with an equivalent in months? Really?

You're calculations are based on Port Moresby to Wewak, when the mission was from Port Moresby to Tsili then to Wewak.

They took off from Port Moresby at 0800, refueled at Tsili at 0845 and left for Wewak at 0900. They reached Wewak at ~ 1045, burned the Brisbane tank, then climbed to 28,000 feet and dropped them and loitered until 1115 when they attacked, departed and returned to Lae (~300mi) at 1235 with 35-50gal remaining. The longer duration outbound leg of ~ 1.75 hours to cover 300mi implies slow cruise. The same approximate leg to Lae of 1 hr+ implies fast cruise.

Total time from Tsili to Wewak, loiter/fight, return to Lae about 3 1/2 hrs - source John Stanaway, Kearby's Thunderbolts, 5th AF MOH citation/details for Kearby.

You keep going on about this Kearby flight on 11 October 1943. I haven't mentioned it.

EDIT: Added "timestamps" for the images.

 

[drgondog]

Let's look at that sortie from 22 October 1943 I mentioned as an example. They took off from 17 Mile Drome near Port Moresby at 8:40 am and arrived over Wewak at 10:15 am (see my earlier link). 470 miles in 95 minutes. That'd be 297 mph on average, but a part of that is going to be getting into formation and climbing; they'd probably be going at a somewhat higher speed over the journey over the mountains to Wewak, right? What kind of cruise speeds were they going at at 20-30k feet in the ETO with P-47D-2s or similar variants of the P-47?

If by 'they' you are referring to the 348th FG, the October 22 mission to Wewak was FLOWN FROM TSILI. The 200-gal tank was not magic. Check Stanaway pg 62. Check the AAF Study 116 5th AF Huon Gulf Campaign. Do your own research.

I read them. I don't think Greg misstated anything, rather you misunderstood him back in the range debate. He covers this in the video in the first few minutes. Either way, it's not really relevant because we have sorties going out from Port Moresby straight to Wewak on 22 October 1943. No refueling at Tsili-Tsili.


The example on 22 October 1943 that I mentioned saw no combat, but it doesn't seem likely they'd send P-47Ds to 470 mile radius sorties without expecting the possibility of combat while still expecting them to reach the target, in this case Wewak. Furthermore there appear to have been several of these sorties. Sometimes they refueled along the way, sometimes they didn't.

On October 22, 1943 staging at Tsili and flying target escort for B-25 strike, the 348Fg was bloodied by Ki-61 when they were bounced flying at 2,000 feet over Dagua, just west of Wewak and lost 3 P-47s. ZERO P-47s flew escort more than 400miles until the P-47D-25 and Subsequent arrived in ETO late May/june 1944 and August 1944 in SWPA. The 348th NEVER got the P-47D-25, they were flying D-4/D-11/D-15s (with wing tanks) until August 1944 when they got -21 and -23s.

I think what would be useful to do would be to write a list of 5th AF P-47D combat sorties in 1943 exceeding the combat radius required to escort bombing raids into Germany in 1943. That's really the meat of the matter here, after all.

From 13:20 in the video:

View attachment 894556

The Bremen mission was first flown by the 56th FGs on 11/29/43 - which was only possible for Halesworth. Debden and Steeple Morden, for example were 50 miles farther away. That mission was flown with the single 108-gal Bowater tank. On December 13, the 354FG (P-51B) escorted to Kiel (475mi) and on Dec 31st, escorted to Bordeaux (500mi) from Boxted, near Halesworth. The first time the 56th FG escorted to Frankfort (347mi) was Big Week with the new 150-gal 'flat' tank on Feb 20 1944. The first time the 56th FG made 400 miles was Hagenow (403mi) with 2x150-gal drop tanks on Mar 18, 1944. The first time the 56th (or any P-47D-2 thru D-23) escorted to Schwenfurt (410mi), Regensburg (500mi), Berlin (500mi) was Never.

Only after the 78th and 56th FG received D-25 and subsequent with 370 gal INTERNAL fuel could the P-47D perform Escort (600mi) or Fighter Mission/Target Escort (800 miles)

This is dated 7 August 1943, from 5:00 in the video:

View attachment 894551

The tank could pressurize to 30,000 feet but a SUBMERSED G-9 pump could not 'push' the fuel (past 18-20K from Belly, 22-24K from wing pylons), and the engine driven G-9 could not Pull the fuel. The P-47 in ETO was modified in July with a kit that slaved exhaust at 5-7psi to pressurize and push the fuel out of the drop tanks. The 'funny bottom cowl kit' that Kenney mentioned was sent from Republic to all theaters. It contained the 'new' (and necessary) lower keel with AN-B-7 bomb rack which FINALLY enabled every P-47 to carry standard US drop tanks and bombs (but not the P-38 150-gal tank, it was too 'fat'). The 110-gal tank was perfect for the B-7 rack, ditto the 150-gal flat tank, and later the 200 gal flat tank.

In other words Kenney was Ok with not having the latest introduction by Republic to use every other drop made and used for other AAF fighters.

He pleaded with AAF and Republic to modify the first shipment of the D-6 scheduled in Dec 1943, and they complied but insisted he accept all future p-47s as designed and produced. When the D-6 and D-11 arrived, he ordered the addition of standard two lug plate to be added to centerline of the Brisbane tank so that it would attach to the centerline B-7 rack. They used the last of them as the new D-15s arrived in March 1944. (also in ETO but ETO got -16-RE's)

I don't find this a believable excuse. The 5th AF was able to produce the Brisbane tank with scant resources in 6 weeks, and field it. The 8th AF with the US industry and great logistics at its back wasn't able to come up with an equivalent in months? Really?

The Australian government had zero problem with Ford complying with AAF drawing calling for rolled steel to manufacture the 200-gal Brisbane tank. The British government DID have a problem which is the 108-gal paper tank was made by Bowater-Lloyd in the ETO. The steel 125-gal tank prototyped by Lockheed at BAD4 was made by using existing 75-gal tanks, inserting a plug and welding a plate with 4 lugs to attach to Republic scheme in days. the cysle between order, reject, redsign in paper, get approval, set up and produce - took months. Ford Brisbane had no such problem as the design was delivered to them from the 27thAir Depot Squadron at Eagle Farm.

You keep going on about this Kearby flight on 11 October 1943. I haven't mentioned it.

EDIT: Added "timestamps" for the images.

See above and previous post. The October 11 mission was far more notable and the first occurrence of staging at Tsili and Lae to enable the P-47 to escort near Wewak. The 348th moved from Port Moresby to Finschafen (east of Lae) in December 1943.


My perspective is that you should ignore both Greg and me - Do your own research on the dates and events.

 

[Squish]

I read them. I don't think Greg misstated anything, rather you misunderstood him back in the range debate. He covers this in the video in the first few minutes. Either way, it's not really relevant because we have sorties going out from Port Moresby straight to Wewak on 22 October 1943. No refueling at Tsili-Tsili.


The example on 22 October 1943 that I mentioned saw no combat, but it doesn't seem likely they'd send P-47Ds to 470 mile radius sorties without expecting the possibility of combat while still expecting them to reach the target, in this case Wewak. Furthermore there appear to have been several of these sorties. Sometimes they refueled along the way, sometimes they didn't.

I think what would be useful to do would be to write a list of 5th AF P-47D combat sorties in 1943 exceeding the combat radius required to escort bombing raids into Germany in 1943. That's really the meat of the matter here, after all.

From 13:20 in the video:

View attachment 894556


This is dated 7 August 1943, from 5:00 in the video:

View attachment 894551


I don't find this a believable excuse. The 5th AF was able to produce the Brisbane tank with scant resources in 6 weeks, and field it. The 8th AF with the US industry and great logistics at its back wasn't able to come up with an equivalent in months? Really?


You keep going on about this Kearby flight on 11 October 1943. I haven't mentioned it.

EDIT: Added "timestamps" for the images.

View: https://youtu.be/slZebBww70g

I am just going to plug my own video regarding the matter. In this one I mainly address efforts in Europe and don't engage with Greg's narrative about the Pacific Theater.

The long story short is that Greg did not do much research in formatting his original conclusion and then plays a game of sleight of hand when it comes to the New Guinea missions; i.e in one of his first videos he cites the Kearby MOH mission as proof that the P-47 had the range required. He somehow had an idea that they didn't have any refueling stops during the mission when in fact they had one on the way there, and one on the way back. He also over-states the time Kearby spent in combat.

There are also just a lot of problems with the Kearby mission in general; namely that AAC claimed to have downed 9 aircraft that day, and Japanese records only show a loss of 2 aircraft. The ugly question nobody wants to ask is regarding the possibility that the narrative of that day is basically made-up.

 

[drgondog]

View: https://youtu.be/slZebBww70g

I am just going to plug my own video regarding the matter. In this one I mainly address efforts in Europe and don't engage with Greg's narrative about the Pacific Theater.

The long story short is that Greg did not do much research in formatting his original conclusion and then plays a game of sleight of hand when it comes to the New Guinea missions; i.e in one of his first videos he cites the Kearby MOH mission as proof that the P-47 had the range required. He somehow had an idea that they didn't have any refueling stops during the mission when in fact they had one on the way there, and one on the way back. He also over-states the time Kearby spent in combat.

There are also just a lot of problems with the Kearby mission in general; namely that AAC claimed to have downed 9 aircraft that day, and Japanese records only show a loss of 2 aircraft. The ugly question nobody wants to ask is regarding the possibility that the narrative of that day is basically made-up.

Hi Daniel - good presentation and general comments. I also agree your closing remarks about Greg. He IS a good guy, but I agree that he ingested some theories from Telenko and Stephenson/Sprey that were astonishly dis-engaged from the historical record. I sent him Study 136 and the A2069 Reel before the debate to bring him up to speed but he only cherry picked the July 1943 memo from Kenney and the now infamous May 1939 memo regarding Arnold's instruction to not deliver/pay for the P-36A with drop tanks, but permitting investment by Curtiss at their own expense.

I'm still searching but believe that the P-36's in the Philippines were delivered and equipped with racks.

 

[Squish]

Hi Daniel - good presentation and general comments. I also agree your closing remarks about Greg. He IS a good guy, but I agree that he ingested some theories from Telenko and Stephenson/Sprey that were astonishly dis-engaged from the historical record. I sent him Study 136 and the A2069 Reel before the debate to bring him up to speed but he only cherry picked the July 1943 memo from Kenney and the now infamous May 1939 memo regarding Arnold's instruction to not deliver/pay for the P-36A with drop tanks, but permitting investment by Curtiss at their own expense.

I'm still searching but believe that the P-36's in the Philippines were delivered and equipped with racks.

Thanks for the kind words.

There are a few things that I would probably change about the video with my present level of knowledge and understanding of the case history; specifically the events in 1943 and the Ohio Rubber Company tank, and the quantities ordered.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

AFHRA reel B0302 page 1472

348th Fighter Group, Operation of P-47 type airplane with 305 gallon internal tanks, 200 gallon external belly tank.

Patrol missions, 4 to 4.5 hours, 16 or more airplanes.
1. Climb 18,000 feet, 33 inches HG, 2300 RPM, 170 mph, 500 feet/minute
2. Climb 18,000 to 25,000 feet, 36 inches HG, 2450 RPM, 170 mph, 500 feet/minute
3. Climb above 25,000 feet, 38 inches HG, 2500 RPM, 170 mph, 500 feet/minute
4. Level cruise to 25,000 feet, 30 inches HG, 2000 RPM, 200 mph (IAS?)
5. Level cruise above 25,000 feet, 31 inches HG, 2000 RPM, 190 mph (IAS?)
6. Climb to 20,000 feet on straight line at settings will take formation approximately 150 miles from base in 45 minutes.
7. Average gasoline consumption (auto lean above 8,000 feet)
a) Climb to 25,000 feet 125 to 150 gallons per hour
b) Level cruise 80 to 100 gallons per hour
c) Average for mission 100 to 110 gallons per hour
8. Radius of action 300 miles maximum, allowing for 20 minutes combat and reserve of 50 gallons.

Escort missions, 3 to 3.5 hours, 16 or more airplanes.
1. Same settings as above only formation has to weave constantly after levelling off to stay with bomber formation.
2. Over target air speed is increased to 250 mph, 35 inches HG and 2450 RPM, continually weaving and changing altitude within 1,000 to 1,500 feet to off set enemy anti aircraft fire.
3. Gasoline consumption is increased slightly, averaging 100 to 120 gallons per hour
4. Radius of 300 miles maximum, allowing for 20 minutes combat and reserve of 50 gallons.

Patrol missions, 4 to 4.5 hours, 4 ship flight.
1. Same settings as larger patrol missions
2. Average gasoline consumption 95 to 105 gallons per hour
3. Radius of action of 300 miles gives 45 to 60 minutes over target.

end information from page 1472, from another source 20 minutes combat allowance was 89 gallons, add 50 for reserves leaves a maximum of 166 gallons for return flight. It is the internal fuel remaining after combat that determines combat radius.

Case History of Fighter Plane Range Extension Program, Parts I and II," USAF Historical Research Document 202.2-11, 22 February 1945, Enclosure 1." Gives the distance covered by a P-47D climbing to 25,000 feet as 57 miles clean, 81 miles with 300 gallons of external fuel, which would indicate 150 miles (about the distance from Cambridge to the European Coast) is a slow climb.

Back to reel B0302
348th Fighter Group, activity 25 July 1943 to 31 January 1944 inclusive, missions are by squadrons, not by group
341 missions 3,339 sorties escorting transports
129 missions 1,849 sorties escorting bombers
113 missions 858 sorties intercept
281 missions 2,562 sorties patrol
18 missions 68 sorties strafing
19 missions 136 sorties escorting PBY
14 missions 59 sorties escorting Photo
664 missions 1,816 sorties miscellaneous (including courier, dropping missions, covering small boats, ferrying and cross country flights within combat zone etc.)

Total 10,687 sorties, the USAAF operating out of Britain had 25,897 airborne sorties August 1943 to January 1944, to support the USAAF effort apart from imports from the US, in December 1943 the British produced 5,943 Paper composition and 3,095x90 Imperial/108 US Gallon, Metal composition, this appears to be perhaps twice the total production of Brisbane tanks. Then again the US started supplying P-47 external tanks to the Pacific as well as Europe and the wing rack P-47 were on the way on late 1943.

348th Fighter Group Claims
11 October 1943, sweep, Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 39 fighters and 12 bombers, 5 to 15,000 feet, claimed 9 fighters
12 October 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 1 Dinah, 5,000 feet, claimed it destroyed
16 October 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 2 fighters, 18,000 feet, claimed 1.
19 October 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 6 Petes, taking off, claimed 6.
22 October 1943, bomber escort Wewak, 8 P-47, sighted 7 fighters, 5,000 feet, claimed 3, lost 1 P-47.
5 November 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 12 fighters and 15 other aircraft, 12,600 to 16,000 feet, claimed 6 fighters.
7 November 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 5 fighters, 22,000 feet, claimed 4 fighters.
15 November 1943, bomber escort Wewak, 15 P-47, sighted 15/20 fighters, 8,000 feet, claimed 5 fighters.
25 November 1943, sweep Wewak, 4 P-47, sighted 1 Dinah, 18,000 feet, claimed it destroyed

Unfortunately the reel only contains the summary history, not mission lists.

Google maps gives Tsili Tsili to Wewak as 292 miles.

Roger Freeman, B-17F at 55,000 pounds, 1,760 gallons of fuel, 8th Air Force, take off and climb to 25,000 feet 380 gallons, 320 miles to target 695 gallons, return and landing leaving 115 gallons in tanks. The penalties for fast climbs and large, tight formations, given the official range was 2,000 miles.

In terns of cruise, Spitfire I at 15,000 feet with 84 gallons of fuel, range cruising at 304 mph, 484 miles, at 180 to 190 mph, 575 miles.