Dieppe
At 04.30 the first two wings of the air umbrella, those of Kenley and Northolt, took off. Fifteen minutes later, eight other squadrons were airborne. At 04.50 Sqn.-Ldr. du Vivier led his twelve 43 Squadron Hurricanes in a line abreast low-level cannon strike on the beach defences -- opening the main Dieppe assault. The gunners of the 13th Flak Division, however, caused severe damage to, or loss ot, seven of 43's aircraft. At 05.12 the four bombarding destroyers opened fire on the buildings lining the promenade. While 226 Squadron's Bostons laid smoke-screens, four squadrons of Hurricane 11Cs and 11Bs hedgehopped over the beach, spraying cannon fire and dropping 250-lb. bombs on the German defensive positions with a precision that aroused the admiration of the enemy commander. However, though the cannon fire did keep the defenders' heads down, the few bombs dropped had hardly any effect at all -- and when they were gone the Germans merely re-commenced fire. Heavy and accurate AA fire was encountered, but despite a flak explosion which shattered his jaw, Flt.-Lt. J. F. Scott led his Blenheims on to lay smoke on the East Headland. By 05.15 the air attack was in full swing with Spitfires and 88 Squadron Bostons attacking Batteries 7/302 (behind the West Headland), B/302, and those inland. Then the beach supporting fire and bombing ceased just before the first landing craft touched land at 05.23. The German defences, virtually intact, immediately chopped the main assault force to pieces. On the beaches all control of the situation was lost and with but a few exceptions, the assault was pinned down. However, with the beaches covered in smoke screens and due to a monumental communications break-down, the Force Commanders were to be quite unaware of the real situation for the next three hours, and were to act accordingly till then.
Mist over Jagdgeschwader 26's airfields had precluded immediate action, but JG 2 was clear and the first Luftwaffe sortie, a reconnaisanee to the North West of Dieppe, was off at 05.30. At first only a few German fighters were up, though 71 Squadron shot one of them down as one of the first kills of the day. Between 05.45 and 05.55, the Hornchurch and Biggin Hill Wings became airborne, while elements of their chief adversary, JG 26, joined the fray shortly after 06.00. Before the Hornchurch Wing could intervene, Fw 190s shot down three 174 Squadron Hurricanes (including the CO) which were covering Bostons. The Biggin Wing had a brush with Focke-Wulfs and Lt. Junkin of the 307th Fighter Squadron, 31st Fighter Group, scored the first USAAF kill in the European theatre of operations. At 06.10 the North Weald (Norwegian) Wing began to taxi out. Over Dieppe, Capt. Bjorn Raeder became separated and fought a single-handed action against eight Fw 190s until he disengaged over the Channel and crash-landed in England. Meamvhile, Bostons were bombing the inland Batteries, A/302 and 256. Just behind the latter attack, at Arques-la-Bataille, six Hurricanes went in to attack the 110th Divisional HQ supposedly there. It was not, and four Hurricanes were lost, crashing into the town, killing their pilots and eight civilians. Further main beach landings at 07.05 were only covered by a Hurricane cannon strike on the East Headland, while the smoke-laying aircraft were back at base -- the landing was non-scheduled and the air plan too rigid to allow for adequate immediate cover.
By 07.00 there were only about thirty German fighters in the air and Leigh-Mallory was disappointed. Oblt. Sepp Wurmheller of JG 2, despite a broken leg in plaster, was in action, though he was soon forced to crash on a beach. Later that day, he shot down seven Spitfires and a Blenheim. While Hurricanes searched with MGBs for F-boats in the Channel, 10 (Jabo) JG 26's Fw 190A-4/U8s attacked isolated British ships, though with less success than they claimed. Elements of (F)122 and/or (F)123 also scouted the Channel, looking for another possible British attack force, while the Tactical Reconnaissance Mustangs flew deep into France looking for German reinforcements. Approximately every twenty minutes sections of Hurricanes arrived for ground support patrols over Dieppe, with Bostons at longer intervals. Around 08.30 the first German bomber made its appearance - there now being some fifty Luftwaffe aircraft up.
About 09.00 the Force Commanders became aware of the true situation on the beaches and the withdrawal order, Vanquish, was given for 10.30. However, Air Commodore Cole was forced to point out that the RAF's time table only allowed for a maximum effort to cover Vanquish at 11.00. His point made and accepted, Cole informed Uxbridge at 10.04 that smoke screens would be required over the main beaches for the evacuation from 11.00 for half an hour at least. At 10.10 the final softening up of the indestructible headlands began, and was kept up for 30 minutes by twenty-four Bostons and twenty-two Hurri-bombers: an assault that was too soon and too short.
By 10.00 the German bombers had arrived in force and the Luftwaffe had committed over a hundred aircraft to battle over Dieppe at any one time -- meeting Fighter Command's challenge. With the job of air cover foremost, the RAF was soon paying a high price for maintaining its superlative and near-impregnable air umbrella over the main assault force. It was losing aircraft because its Spitfire VBs (not to mention tactics) were outclassed by the Fw l9OAs and Bf l09Fs, but they were stopping the German bombers from getting at the ships and the beaches. Thus for all its victories, the Luftwaffe was losing the air battle of Dieppe.
At 10.30 twenty-two out of a force of twenty-four B-17E Boeings of the 97th Bomb Group, 8th USAAF, carried out accurate though indecisive bombing of Abbeville-Drucat airfield as a diversion. Ever since 10.00, Luftwaffe fighter reserves between Flushing and Beaumont le Roger had been put on the alert, while bomber forces from Holland to Beauvais were steadily being committed to battle. The Typhoon Wing flew a diversionary feint to Ostend, then over Le Treport they bounced some Fw l90s, damaging three. But two Typhoons failed to pull out of their dives when their tails snapped off. In the end, some nine Spitfire squadrons were sent into the area to stop the bombers reaching Dieppe. The North Weald Wing on their second sortie shot down eight of nine unescorted Do 217Es. Returning over the Channel, a frantic "Look out 190 approaching 3 o'clock!" caused Lt. Kristensen, Yellow One, to whip round and fire a short, effective burst. The 190 burst into flames and dived inverted into the Channel -- it was only then that they realised that it was a Typhoon ... R7815 of 266 Squadron, the pilot being killed.
Back at Dieppe, "Vanquish" was going badly. As 226 Squadron's Bostons laid dense smoke screens on the headlands and along the waterfront at 11.00 to cover the withdrawal, Luftwaffe bomber reinforcements arrived in strength and pressed home their bombardment of the beaches and together with the German gunners turned the evacuation into a worse massacre than Dunkirk. At 11.15 43 Squadron's Hurricanes attacked the East Headland, but five minutes later a call came from the beach for more smoke and air support. Again at 11.35 and 11.38, calls came in to the effect that the beaches were under tremendous fire and evacuation was impossible under such conditions. Uxbridge was inundated with calls for more bombing. Hurri-bombers were on the way, but would only arrive at noon.
At Pourville the remnants of the attack on the West Headland were being evacuated under increasing attack from both shore and air. Fw 1 90s strafed while Ju 88s were subsequently reported as "flame thrower aircraft" (early napalm?). The RAF, however, were fully engaged over Dieppe, and could not give cover here.
At last the Hurricane 11Bs arrived over Dieppe at 12.00, and their attacks kept some German gunners' heads down while Spitfires kept at bay the dogged attempts of Ju 88s, Do 217s and a few He 111s to intervene. At 12.43 three Bostons laid a last smoke screen in the face of heavy AA fire from the Royal Navy. Just after 13.00, however, the survivors on the beaches were forced to surrender -- though, as late as 13.45, RAF attacks were belatedly still going in on the Headlands and beaches, killing several Canadians who were now POWs.
Heading for England now were some 200 vessels in close convoy with the inevitable stragglers behind. With a renewed effort, the Luftwaffe tried to inflict more casualties. For the RAF fighter pilots flying their third, fourth or even fifth sorties of the day, this was the last challenge. Tn addition to the general air cover provided, eighty-six additional patrols were put up to intercept specific attacks. Only one incident was to mar what was otherwise a near-perfect essay into fighter cover. At the tail end of the convoy a free-for-all was developing over the last ships getting into station. At 13.08 a section of three Do 217s, though harried unmercifully by Spitfires, pressed home their attack. Just after 13.14, one bomb exploded under the destroyer HMS Berkeley, breaking her back. Her crew were evacuated and she was sunk by a fellow destroyer. By 15.45, the Luftwaffe, realising the futility of further mass attacks, sent single bombers to harass the convoy, using the gathering overcast for protection. But by 20.00 the convoy was nearly home and the RAF had the sky to itself. During the day the Luftwaffe had made scattered raids on South East England. They came again that night: a Do 217 falling to Wing-Cdr. Pleasance's Beaufighter of 25 Squadron. For several nights afterwards, Ju 88s intensified their shipping reconnaisance over the Channel, some falling foul of 29 Squadron.