The Greatest Air Battle

[Venganza]

Juha, in an earlier post in this thread, I had mentioned Kursk, and you're right about the Soviets interfering more with the Nazis as time went on. One of the things I didn't mention about the air battle was that leading up to the battle and as it went on, the Soviets were changing their tactics from using smaller units to using larger units, with more fighter protection. In addition, they used some IL-2's specifically to suppress the flak, which lessened the aerial losses. The battle of Kursk also helped the Soviets hone the cooperation between the air attack units and the troops they were supporting, which made the air attacks on the German ground forces more and more effective as the war progressed. On the subject of the Barbarossa air assault, that obviously seriously crippled the Red Air Force at the onset of the war. It also had the effect of weeding out a lot of obsolete and obsolescent Soviet warplanes, such as the I-15, I-16, R-5, etc., which were destroyed on the ground in huge numbers. The Soviets were forced to put into large-scale production more advanced aircraft, such as the MiG's, the Lavochkins, IL-2's and so on, to replace their losses. It seems that the law of unintended consequences bit the Nazis on this one.

 

[Erich]

not too sure on that one by the LW JG scores during the battle, but must agree on the ground and in the air there was one set of unbelieveable huge activity.

Bergstroms books are interesting Juha I will leave it at that, still may pick up his volume as no-one has put the effort into covering the air consequences at all except for some small brief note about HS 129 knocking out a Soviet Pz brigade or some such other and the Rudel strike force. well I will say Fw's of JG 51 were performing minute by minute ground attacks both on Soviet infantry as well as Mt and armor and more than just them.

true the Il-2 was coming into it's own as the most respected of all Soviet A/c both by the LW pilots-crews and the men on the ground.

interesting to note the obsolete Soviet A/C garbage that is referred to was used at night and was shot to pieces by the LW NF's both single engine and twin and the bi-plane principle as well

 

[Njaco]

interesting to note the obsolete Soviet A/C garbage that is referred to was used at night.....

Erich, I seem to remember the LW doing the same with Hs 123s!

 

[Erich]

believe it or not Njaco but there were some Hs 123 ground attack aces on the Ost front, if I remember flown at night by some of the NSGr

 

[Njaco]

Thats what I thought. Amazing for the type of A/C used!

 

[Erich]

they were so stinking slow almost stall speed they could maneuver with ease and drop small bombs with pretty great accuracy. The Soviets only countered with Flak. though I am limited on Soviet NF activity their slowness to react with anything in the air really put them into great difficulties over their own space at night, anything they put up on ops could be intercepted, reason enough why NJG 100 alone scored over 500 kills

for the greatest air battle, well Bodenplatte not sure if I will term this as a great air battle but might be cased as a great LW disaster. have interviewed several LW pilots that flew on 1-1-45, what a joke the originator of this debacle should of been shot. the LW losses were extreme, if you guys ever say the dogfights Asch-Bodenplatte episode when JG 11 attacked that airfield and the 352nd Mustangs chewed up the Lw unit severely.
Jg 4 one got completely lost. German ju 88G-1 and G-6 NF's with radar personell tried to get the s/e to the Allied occupied A/F's. didn't help when 'nearly 12/ of these German twin engiens were intercepted and shot down by Allied fighters and or AA.
that attack was so mismanaged that even the German flak positions shot their own LW A/C down before they could attack Allied airfields ........

 

[Njaco]

I remember somewhere that out of a squadron of LW aircraft, half were shot down by their own flak.

 

[drgondog]

they were so stinking slow almost stall speed they could maneuver with ease and drop small bombs with pretty great accuracy. The Soviets only countered with Flak. though I am limited on Soviet NF activity their slowness to react with anything in the air really put them into great difficulties over their own space at night, anything they put up on ops could be intercepted, reason enough why NJG 100 alone scored over 500 kills

for the greatest air battle, well Bodenplatte not sure if I will term this as a great air battle but might be cased as a great LW disaster. have interviewed several LW pilots that flew on 1-1-45, what a joke the originator of this debacle should of been shot. the LW losses were extreme, if you guys ever say the dogfights Asch-Bodenplatte episode when JG 11 attacked that airfield and the 352nd Mustangs chewed up the Lw unit severely.
Jg 4 one got completely lost. German ju 88G-1 and G-6 NF's with radar personell tried to get the s/e to the Allied occupied A/F's. didn't help when 'nearly 12/ of these German twin engiens were intercepted and shot down by Allied fighters and or AA.
that attack was so mismanaged that even the German flak positions shot their own LW A/C down before they could attack Allied airfields ........

I think the difficulty for me in this poll is differentiating 'most important' versus 'Greatest'.

In terms of sheer numbers of a/c in small volume of space Bodenplatte has to be number one with any one of several 8th AF raids to be considered next (only because RAF did not have equivalent number of fighters and the raid track was so strung out and relatively few nightfighters to oppose.

Iin terms of importance - to me Midway and BoB was number one - with daily numbers in Bob higher than Midway.

In terms of sheer fury, Dieppe and maybe Kursk and maybe November 2, 1944 where so many USAAF Fighters engaged such a large number of LW - which makes the Marianas Shoot in same ball park for PTO.

 

[Freebird]

I think the difficulty for me in this poll is differentiating 'most important' versus 'Greatest'.

Yes indeed, that is the big knock on Jubilee {Dieppe} that it was such a pointless operation, the success or failure of the air battle was not going to have a drastic effect on the ground operation, which was a disaster from the start....

 

[renrich]

The air battle that took place, to the extent that it enabled the evacuation to succeed at Dunkirk, was of vital importance. If around 338,000 troops had not been taken off the beach, the BOB may not have been as important. I don't believe that Hitler was ever really serious about invading England but he may have been so if most of the BEF had not been saved.

 

[drgondog]

The air battle that took place, to the extent that it enabled the evacuation to succeed at Dunkirk, was of vital importance. If around 338,000 troops had not been taken off the beach, the BOB may not have been as important. I don't believe that Hitler was ever really serious about invading England but he may have been so if most of the BEF had not been saved.

Rich - that is a pretty darn good point.

 

[Soren]

Yeah he had them, and to let them go was one of his biggest mistakes. He was still trying to convince the British to join them at that point though, treating British prisoners like royalties.

 

[Erich]

in any case on the morrow is the anniversary of the Kassel-Göttingen disaster. Much is still unknown as to why the 445th bg made the fatal turning error and the 3 Sturmgruppen let it fly on them.........

 

[parsifal]

There is some truth to Hitler wanting to court the british, but this is not the reason for holding back at dunkirk. Quite the contrary, hitler wanted as many prisoners as possible to act as bargaining chips at the peace table

Other issues dominated the German thinking about the Dunkirk battle.

hitler believed that the ground was unsuitable for tanks, and was worried that his ace - his panzerwaffe would be so weakened in the close quarters fighting around Dunkirk, that there would not be sufficient strength to deal with the french. hitler greatly feared that the french would stage a "miracle on the marne", or that the French were prepring for a massive counterstroke along the front. he simply could not believe that victory had come so easily or cleanly.

Hitler also believed the assurances of Goring that the British evacuation accross the channel could be severely mauled by the Luftwaffe. In this regard the efforts of the RAF, coupled with the over confidence in the anti-shipping capabilities of the LW (nearly all of the units that were deployed were not trained for this work) as well as the superb onshore and offshore logistics and planning don by the RN, largely circumvented the German capability.

Hitler appears also to have been heavily influeced by the counterattack at Arras, and the bitter defence put up by the british at Boulogne and Calais. Certainly after these events, the british were not "treated like royalty" Soon after the fighting at Boulogne had finished, the german army and SS started to massacre British units enmasse...this is hardly treating them like royalty

 

[Soren]

I sure haven't heard of British prisoners being massacred anytime before Dunkirk, at all! A lot of prisoners were taken, but they were treated well by the Germans, an order straight from the top.

 

[drgondog]

QUOTE]in any case on the morrow is the anniversary of the Kassel-Göttingen disaster. Much is still unknown as to why the 445th bg made the fatal turning error and the 3 Sturmgruppen let it fly on them........./QUOTE]

IIRC the 445th was not the lead BG/Wing so they should have been following the lead crews - navigation wise. The normal cause was late to formation Rally point inbound and losing sight of lead wings.

Or Summertime Cumulous would take care of the rest as far as separation...

Not exactly the same thing but similar was the second CW (of five) separating from the first on the April 24 Munich deal when the 2nd CW inadvertantly 'cut the corner' on the south to west turn SE of Munich on the way to the IP and were hung out to dry until the 355th could catch up to them.

 

[Erich]

Bill there is some talk of a real strange mission that the 445th may have taken re: behind the turning off on their own even when they were yelling to the lead B-24 you've gone the wrong way

don;t ask me yet for particulars as I am still studying. Sadly it was the most perfect bounce the Sturmfw gruppen ever made. the opening 7-7-44 was a massacre as well including a terrible battle that shot down 35 B-26's in December of 44 quite by accident, and the last one of which I have done considerable study over the eyars is one of hiding beneficial information depending how one looks at it from the public in regards to full B-26 losses from the groups involved - Sturmgruppen IV./JG 3 was in thick cloud as was told from the ground to procede to B-17 bomber formations right in front of them..........none were present so Moritz took his Fw's and dived out of the clouds right onto the rear of the B-26's ............ what a mess for the US, no fighter protection and they got ripped, and really quite by accident. B-26 losses that have been produced knock the amount of Marauders shot down to almost half claimed which was not true

but that story is for another time maybe this December I can go into more specifics

 

[drgondog]

Bill there is some talk of a real strange mission that the 445th may have taken re: behind the turning off on their own even when they were yelling to the lead B-24 you've gone the wrong way

That would have been interesting. Bomb Group CO's that intentionally took their birds out of trail were usually fired (if not KIA during the 'mistake'). It would always put the escorting fighters in a dilemma and split the available fighter force.

don;t ask me yet for particulars as I am still studying. Sadly it was the most perfect bounce the Sturmfw gruppen ever made. the opening 7-7-44 was a massacre as well

Here is what I have been able to patch together....for July 7
July 7

F.O.436. Lieutenant Colonel Kinnard led a Ramrod to support B-24s attacking oil and aircraft assembly targets at Halle, near Leipzig.

Rendezvous was made with 2nd and 95th CW's at 0808 near Lingen at 0808 and escorted to the IP southwest Leipzig at 0922. .As the formations turned north and then northwest toward Halle they encountered the first gaggle of 100 plus single and twin engine fighters about 20 miles west of Leipzig near Querfurt.. The first wave was described as "6-8 in line abreast, 8 plus flights in trail" coming in north to south at 27,000 feet. A high cover of approximately 35-40 Me 109s were flying at 32,000 feet.

This force was only part of the estimated 300 German fighters that the Luftwaffe control group put in this area and were primarily focused on the 14th CBW with the 44th, 392 and 492nd BG's who were tasked to bomb Bernburg. The 2nd AD had split the different B-24 Combat Wings near Brunswick with one force turning south then east then north to hit Halle while the 14th and 96th continued onward to Bernburg.

Kinnard bent his throttle to intercept and his lead flight of the 354FS surged way ahead of the rest of the group. The 358FS maintained close escort for the 389th and 453rd BG's, while the rest of the 354th and the 357FS broke into the Me 410s and Me 109s. One B-24 from 95th CW, 489th BG, was hit and seen to separate from the formation. It later ditched into North Sea.

Kinnard quickly shot down two ZG26 Me 410s and then shot down a Me 109 to become the 355th's seventh air ace. His wingman, Lieutenant Huish, collided with trailing debris from one of Kinnard's exploding Me 410s to become the group's first loss of the day. Huish crashed at Bendeleben, west of Halle and north of Merseburg.

Betounes and Taylor shared a 109 before the rest escaped below. Cross shot down a pair of 410's and Emil Perry got another before the 357FS caught up

As the 354th and 357FS were engaging, the 20th and 55th FG Lightnings were also engaged in a big fight 20 miles to the northwest near Bernburg.

The Luftwaffe controllers had found the 14th CW attacking Bernburg almost completely undefended. The Luftwaffe had deployed their first Fw 190 "Sturmbock" attack with Fw 190A-8's heavily armored and equipped with 30mm cannon. In just over a minute 12 B-24s from the 492nd BG went down in flames between Halberstadt and Bernburg. Eight more 14th CW B-24s in the 44th and 392nd BGs would fall to the Fw 190s before the P-38s arrived.

To further complicate the situation, the 2nd and 95th CW's after bombing Halle targets found themselves in a collision couse with the southeast bound 14th and 96th CW striking for Bernburg! At the end of the day this was not the best day for 8th AF mission planners. The Bernburg task force was escorted only by the 4th FG and were overwhelmed at the point of attack.

Even though the 55th FG Lightnings were covering the 14th CBW including the 392nd, 492nd and 44th BG, they could not defend against the total of 175 single engine and twin engine fighters the Luftwaffe concentrated on the middle of the 14th CBW. The primary assault was carried out by I. II./ZG26, IV./JG3, II./JG5 and I.&II. /JG300

The downside of the modifications to the Fw 190A-8's, to be more effective against bombers, was that they were at a disadvantage against the Mustangs and Lightnings in the area. They were just too heavy and sluggish at that altitude to escape. They had to have the same escort from Me 109s at high altitude as the Me 410's.

Captain Minchew led one section of the 357th FS into the scrap about 20+ miles west of Halle. About 25 Me 410s were leaving the battle area in a shallow dive at about 10,000 feet. Minchew quickly shot down two 410s and shared a third with a 55th FG P-38 which cut in front of him. McNeff got a Me 109 which was closing on Minchew's tail. Minchew then chased after several more Me 410's of ZG26 and damaged two more heavily SE Nordhausen before running out of ammo.

Haviland, led the second section of 357FS toward the gaggle of Me 410s heading to the southwest. He shot down two 410s immediately and his flight chased 30-40 more Me 410's south toward Naumburg, where Fuller and Cotter each shot down another Me 410. The Me 410's were described as flying an efficient formation but only dived to evade. Lieutenant Fuller was closing on a Me 410 near Naumburg A/D but was hit by flak at 7,000 feet. He bailed out 10 mi SSE Weimar and his chute was seen to open but he did not turn up after the war.

The 55th FG scored 19 destroyed for no losses in and around Bernburg. The 4th and 20th and 361st FG engaged remnants of JG300 plus JG3 and JG51 further north and NW of Halle to score 23 more for the loss of two shot down.

Col Glenn Duncan, outstanding leader of 353rd FG was shot down by flak over Holland and fought three months with Dutch Underground before getting back to Allied lines.

Claiborne Kinnard received the 355th FG's third Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership and courage in this day's action.

Final score 14.5-0-4 for two losses

 

[Erich]

thanks for that report Bill, I have an extensive one for the LW of course, interesting to note the 15th AF came into lay and was also assaulted by Jg 3 SturmFw's. An important thing to note now here, subtle but still important. although most of JG 3 Sturms had the heavy armor only about 1/2 had the outboard 3cm cannon in place. JG 300 did not have canopy glass armor at all and never really did maybe 1/10th of the Sturms had it installed due to heavy ice problems. the case is almost the same the outboard 3cm was not fully accepted into the Sturm ranks till the end of July 44. what is apparent is the technique of using the wedge formation by both SturmFw gruppen and then as drawing closer lining up abreast as the Bomber crews witnessed before the final assault at extremely close ranges.
and yes even from the outset of the "new" Sturm wedge technique the heavier A/c needed high altitude protection from the 109's in this case from I./JG 300 from Gerhard Stamp CO.

back to 27 Set. 44 and the 445th bg. this is one of the pre-questions I have asked many times, if and a big if the 445th was sent out on it's own why did it not have some sort of US Mustang cover, even if it was just one fighter group ?

 

[drgondog]

thanks for that report Bill, I have an extensive one for the LW of course, interesting to note the 15th AF came into lay and was also assaulted by Jg 3 SturmFw's.

It's an extract from the new ABD - just like the Nove 26 mission and the April 24 deal

An important thing to note now here, subtle but still important. although most of JG 3 Sturms had the heavy armor only about 1/2 had the outboard 3cm cannon in place. JG 300 did not have canopy glass armor at all and never really did maybe 1/10th of the Sturms had it installed due to heavy ice problems. the case is almost the same the outboard 3cm was not fully accepted into the Sturm ranks till the end of July 44. what is apparent is the technique of using the wedge formation by both SturmFw gruppen and then as drawing closer lining up abreast as the Bomber crews witnessed before the final assault at extremely close ranges.
and yes even from the outset of the "new" Sturm wedge technique the heavier A/c needed high altitude protection from the 109's in this case from I./JG 300 from Gerhard Stamp CO.

back to 27 Set. 44 and the 445th bg. this is one of the pre-questions I have asked many times, if and a big if the 445th was sent out on it's own why did it not have some sort of US Mustang cover, even if it was just one fighter group ?

Every account I have read simply talks about the 445th straying off course. The primary mission for the 2BD was Kassel. A second strike of 35 bombers went to Gottingen and had no losses. The 361st was up forward of the 445th and the 4th, then 355th behind the 445th with the mainstream slightly further north. The 361st came back and had a big day, the 4th moved up and the 355th covered for the 4th FG.

Erich - I have never seen evidence of a 'secret mission' nor does such make a lot of sense - not in daylight.

One FG would have been heavy cover indeed. Usually one Fighter Group at that stage of the war would have covered at least one and possibly part of two Combat wings. The controllers could always find a hole - the question was whether they could vector the LW into that hole with running afoul of the escorts.

At this time there were still only 11 long range escort Groups in the ETO to cover 30-35 Heavy Bomb Groups over 100 mile stream. One missed R/V of bomber created a big hole - or one CW off course and out of sight when a Fighter group made R/V meant real trouble.

Didn't happen often but when successful the results were usually devastating to one CW of bombers. April 29, May 12, July 7, Sept 27, Nov 2 and 26 come to mind