The Greatest Fighter Pilot in WW II???
- Thread starter lesofprimus
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
- Status
- Thread starter
- #182
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
This is absolutly correct....
GermansRGeniuses
Tech Sergeant
I doubt it too, D...
Just a fact to be stated, saw him on the History Channel today, earlier...
Just a fact to be stated, saw him on the History Channel today, earlier...
GermansRGeniuses
Tech Sergeant
plan_D said:I bet that was a good conversation starter, or chat up line. "HEy, hi, I'm Rommels son"
Or he could be really cheesy and say something on the lines of "Hey, my dad was a general in the army, but what I want to command is YOU!"
Gemhorse
Senior Airman
I have Rommel's book and after Hitler's goons offered him suicide or a trial for treason, as he was wrongfully accused of being in on the 'Valkyrie' plot attempt to kill Adolf, he chose to shoot himself, and Hitler gave him a Hero's funeral, which Rommel's wife Magda and son Manfred HAD to attend... [and pretend] that it was all kosher....Shame on Hitler, because Rommel may have made the Allies D-Day invasion real hard work, but they arrested him right before the Invasion.......
Lightning Guy
Master Sergeant
- 2,511
- Apr 29, 2004
I believe Rommel's suicide was via cynide and not a gunshot.
No they didn't. Rommel was present, and in charge during the invasion. Not on the 6th June because he was visiting his wife, as it was her 50th Birthday.
Rommel was completely wrong during the invasion anyway. He placed the armoured divisions right behind the Atlantic Wall. He should have used them as Motorised Reserve, then they would have reached any trouble spots much quicker. Guderian advised him to do this, but Rommel refused.
Rommel was a risk taker, and luckily for him his opponents in the desert were cautious. If they had been a bit more aggressive he would have been defeated many a time.
Rommel was completely wrong during the invasion anyway. He placed the armoured divisions right behind the Atlantic Wall. He should have used them as Motorised Reserve, then they would have reached any trouble spots much quicker. Guderian advised him to do this, but Rommel refused.
Rommel was a risk taker, and luckily for him his opponents in the desert were cautious. If they had been a bit more aggressive he would have been defeated many a time.
Lightning Guy
Master Sergeant
- 2,511
- Apr 29, 2004
They weren't able to deploy the Panzers behind the Atlantic wall and they could only be moved on Hitler's expressed orders. Rommel knew full well the capabilities of Allied airpower and knew that the required movements of a reserve Panzer force would expose them to countless attack sorties and considerable losses before they even engaged the Allies. His reasoning was that it was better to have some tanks in the right place then all the tanks in the wrong place. I believe he was right.
Wrong, the Panzers were ordered by the Atlantic Wall at Calais on Rommels orders. There was always the option before the invasion to move them back as a mobile reserve. He did not. Guderian tried his hardest to change Rommels mind but he wasn't having it. The flaw was Rommels and Rommels alone.
You believe he was right yet they failed. Rommel was too afraid of Allied Airpower and was never willing after 1943 to commit acts of brilliance that some would say he did in the desert. I'd advise you to read Panzer Battles by Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin. He was Chief of Staff to Rommel in the desert and reports of his actions during the Normany campaign.
Now the greatest generals of the Germany army were Guderian, Manstein and Balck.
You believe he was right yet they failed. Rommel was too afraid of Allied Airpower and was never willing after 1943 to commit acts of brilliance that some would say he did in the desert. I'd advise you to read Panzer Battles by Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin. He was Chief of Staff to Rommel in the desert and reports of his actions during the Normany campaign.
Now the greatest generals of the Germany army were Guderian, Manstein and Balck.
Gemhorse
Senior Airman
Aye, but he was still one of the most honourable soldiers to serve Germany, and he hated the Nazis.....
That is very true "The Last Knight" as a title serves him well. He was an excellent General and adapted to armoured conflict well, the fear let him down after 1943.
His victories in the desert were quite lucky, and many a time a crisis occured but he was always cool and calm. Excellent perks of a General.
His victories in the desert were quite lucky, and many a time a crisis occured but he was always cool and calm. Excellent perks of a General.
- Thread starter
- #194
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
You are wrong about the panzers dude....
The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW. Two hours before the seaborne landings began, he ordered the two reserve panzer divisions available for counterattack in Normandy, the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr, to move immediately toward Caen. He did so on the basis of an intuitive judgment that the airborne landings were on such a large scale that they could not be a mere deception maneuver (as some of his staff argued) and would have to be reinforced from the sea. The only place such landings could come in lower Normandy were on the Calvados and Cotentin coasts. He wanted armor there to meet the attack.
Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his action decisive, his orders clear. But the panzer divisions were not under his command. They were in OKW reserve. To save precious time, Rundstedt had first ordered them to move out, then requested OKW approval. OKW did not approve. At 0730 Jodi informed Rundstedt that the two divisions could not be committed until Hitler gave the order, and Hitler was still sleeping. Rundstedt had to countermand the move-out order. Hitler slept until noon.
The two panzer divisions spent the morning waiting. There was a heavy overcast; they could have moved out free from serious interference from Allied aircraft. It was 1600 when Hitler at last gave his approval. By then the clouds had broken up and Allied fighters and bombers ranged the skies over Normandy, smashing anything that moved. The panzers had to crawl into roadside woods and wait under cover for darkness before continuing their march to the sound of the guns.
Put that in ur pipe and smoke it....
The only high-command officer who responded correctly to the crisis at hand was Field Marshal Rundstedt, the old man who was there for window dressing and who was so scorned by Hitler and OKW. Two hours before the seaborne landings began, he ordered the two reserve panzer divisions available for counterattack in Normandy, the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr, to move immediately toward Caen. He did so on the basis of an intuitive judgment that the airborne landings were on such a large scale that they could not be a mere deception maneuver (as some of his staff argued) and would have to be reinforced from the sea. The only place such landings could come in lower Normandy were on the Calvados and Cotentin coasts. He wanted armor there to meet the attack.
Rundstedt's reasoning was sound, his action decisive, his orders clear. But the panzer divisions were not under his command. They were in OKW reserve. To save precious time, Rundstedt had first ordered them to move out, then requested OKW approval. OKW did not approve. At 0730 Jodi informed Rundstedt that the two divisions could not be committed until Hitler gave the order, and Hitler was still sleeping. Rundstedt had to countermand the move-out order. Hitler slept until noon.
The two panzer divisions spent the morning waiting. There was a heavy overcast; they could have moved out free from serious interference from Allied aircraft. It was 1600 when Hitler at last gave his approval. By then the clouds had broken up and Allied fighters and bombers ranged the skies over Normandy, smashing anything that moved. The panzers had to crawl into roadside woods and wait under cover for darkness before continuing their march to the sound of the guns.
Put that in ur pipe and smoke it....
You are wrong. Field Marshal von Runstedt was the overall commander in the West. Field Marshal Rommel was the commander of the Atlantic wall, assigned to Runstedt. Rommel requested to Runstedt his ideas of keeping the Panzer divisions behind the wall, which Rundstedt approved. Both can be blamed for the fatal flaw.
What happened on the 6th June is not what is in question. The time before the 6th June is. The Panzer divisions were already in the wrong place by 6th June and any counter-attack would have been slow in materilising.
Col. Gen. Guderian chief of the OKH requested to both Commander of the West (von Runstedt) and Rommel to rethink their plan. They refused under the basis that Allied airpower would prevent any movement. Their fear prevented any kind of movement.
Had all the Panzer divisions been in mobile reserve some 20-50 miles behind the lines scattered along France and counter-attack would have been instant.
Rommel also left Panzer divisions in the South and South West of France expecting an attack on the Med coast. These would have been more useful up north.
Again, I advise you and LG to read Panzer Battles and Panzer Leader.
What happened on the 6th June is not what is in question. The time before the 6th June is. The Panzer divisions were already in the wrong place by 6th June and any counter-attack would have been slow in materilising.
Col. Gen. Guderian chief of the OKH requested to both Commander of the West (von Runstedt) and Rommel to rethink their plan. They refused under the basis that Allied airpower would prevent any movement. Their fear prevented any kind of movement.
Had all the Panzer divisions been in mobile reserve some 20-50 miles behind the lines scattered along France and counter-attack would have been instant.
Rommel also left Panzer divisions in the South and South West of France expecting an attack on the Med coast. These would have been more useful up north.
Again, I advise you and LG to read Panzer Battles and Panzer Leader.
You think you're so smart, obviously. Two Panzer divisions left waiting, do you know how many were in the West when D-Day occured?
There were 10 Panzer and Panzergrenider Divisions:
1st SS-Panzer
2nd-Panzer
116th-Panzer
12th SS-Panzer
21st-Panzer
Panzer-Lehr
17th SS-Panzergrenider
11th Panzer
2nd SS-Panzer
9th-Panzer
11th and 21st Panzer both elite-veteran units from the East.
And that's not including the 48 infantry divisions plus IX and X SS-Panzer divisions that were being brought in from the East.
Where were the 8 other Panzer divisions, I'll tell you. In the South of France and stuck behind the wall at Calais. Both removing the Panzers greatest strenght, mobility, by a fear of enemy airpower. If Guderian had been allowed to have his way, the Allies would have never made it off the beaches.
There were 10 Panzer and Panzergrenider Divisions:
1st SS-Panzer
2nd-Panzer
116th-Panzer
12th SS-Panzer
21st-Panzer
Panzer-Lehr
17th SS-Panzergrenider
11th Panzer
2nd SS-Panzer
9th-Panzer
11th and 21st Panzer both elite-veteran units from the East.
And that's not including the 48 infantry divisions plus IX and X SS-Panzer divisions that were being brought in from the East.
Where were the 8 other Panzer divisions, I'll tell you. In the South of France and stuck behind the wall at Calais. Both removing the Panzers greatest strenght, mobility, by a fear of enemy airpower. If Guderian had been allowed to have his way, the Allies would have never made it off the beaches.
- Thread starter
- #197
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
I'd rather read books on Aircraft and Aces of WW II than about armour... If i want info on tanks, i read on the internet...
The section I quoted above is from book... So I'm not wrong.... I think we may be talking about 2 different things.. LG and I are referring to the actions during the landings at Normandy, not before...
I agree with u tho, if the Panzers were set out along the obvious threat axis of a beach assault, and ordered to attack, it might have made somewhat of a difference...
The section I quoted above is from book... So I'm not wrong.... I think we may be talking about 2 different things.. LG and I are referring to the actions during the landings at Normandy, not before...
I agree with u tho, if the Panzers were set out along the obvious threat axis of a beach assault, and ordered to attack, it might have made somewhat of a difference...
I was talking about the actions before 6th June. It was Rommels idea to 'hide' the Panzers behind the wall. Those two divisions left waiting, is true (obviously) but it does not count for the complete lack of counter-offensive which could have been done by 10 Panzer divisions.
Rommel was wrong but not everyone can be right all the time. Even Guderian made mistakes when commanding 2nd Panzer Army in Russia. He had a chance to admit his mistakes, unfortunately Rommel did not.
Rommel was wrong but not everyone can be right all the time. Even Guderian made mistakes when commanding 2nd Panzer Army in Russia. He had a chance to admit his mistakes, unfortunately Rommel did not.
- Thread starter
- #199
lesofprimus
Brigadier General
OK glad we cleard that up before we got too far.....
10 divisions would have been alot, and I mean ALOT of trouble for the Allies in Normandy... Could the Allies have broken through with Shermans and Airpower???
We'll never know....
10 divisions would have been alot, and I mean ALOT of trouble for the Allies in Normandy... Could the Allies have broken through with Shermans and Airpower???
We'll never know....
Not only were there 10 Panzer Divisions, but 48 Infantry Divisions too. On top of that the 11th and 21st Panzer Divisions were the elite of the Wehrmacht. On top of that the IX and X SS-Panzer Divisions were on their way.
Unfortunately (for Germany) the Commander in Chief of the West (von Rundstedt) and Rommel were both too afraid of the Allied aircraft. I don't think the Allies could not have broken through if the counter-offensive was straight away with the 10 Panzer Divisions. All the new equipment was going to these divisions too.
Unfortunately (for Germany) the Commander in Chief of the West (von Rundstedt) and Rommel were both too afraid of the Allied aircraft. I don't think the Allies could not have broken through if the counter-offensive was straight away with the 10 Panzer Divisions. All the new equipment was going to these divisions too.
- Status
