The Long-Range Strike Bomber winner is - NORTHROP!

[GrauGeist]

.....and if I had the money, I wouldn't buy any of these!

The only one on the list I would be interested in, is the Bugatti.

If I had the money to buy that Veyron, then you know I would already have a warehouse full of classics!

 

[Lucky13]

I'd be happy with a Ferrari 246 GT Dino....since a 250 GTO probably cost more than all of these together!

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't think electronics will be 30 - 40% at all. I think 65%, or perhaps just a bit lower or higher. It's over half. Airframes aren't all that expansive. Software testing IS.

You're probably right. Composite manufacturing isn't cheap either. I see manufacturers promoting composite structures for cost and ease of manufacture but it seems replacement parts are twice as expensive of metal parts.

 

[Token]

It will, but no way I'm moving back!!!!

Oh come now, how can you pass up the light breezes, balmy summer temperatures, and light traffic on Sierra Highway?

T!

 

[Token]

The true Military Industrial Complex. I've seen it for 30 years!

Newb....

T!

 

[davparlr]

B-2 development

I was on the proposal team on the B-2 bomber, responsible for the all avionic systems excluding radar and navigation, whose criticality warranted dedicated specialist. After go-ahead I was a first level manager responsible for Avionics Controls and Displays subsystem (the red outlined areas in pix was the area of my responsibility). I was responsible for design, development, procurement, installation and test of all components, including software requirement, operational logic and symbology. I was in this role through entire development program and the beginning of production, including Program Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR). This was a pilot/engineer dream, and nightmare.

When I heard that Northrop got the contract I had mixed emotions. First, I though yea, by retirement is secure!, second was, boy, I would like a redo with lessons I've learned and the technology that is now available verses what I knew and had then (think CRTs and Comodore 64s), and lastly I thought, no way, I went through heaven and hell and that's enough for one lifetime. I do have some thoughts which I could write a book with but will try to keep it simple.

1) Government contracts are set up to overrun cost and schedule. In order for a supplier the cost usually must be cheapest. To do this legally, the subcontractor must assume the perfect program, i.e. no development problems, that type of programs never exist.

2) Government and supplier like changes. Every three years new user (military) support changes and with each change new preferences are imposed. Every change means profit for the subcontractor. Government program office generally does not have the power to challenge the government user, thus contract discipline is very poor. This is one of the major reasons for contract expansion.

3) When Northrop got the contract, they rejected the infrastructure established by the Aircraft Division building the F-5 but were behind the power curve in establishing their own procedures. As a manager who needed to start development on hardware for an extremely tight aircraft program, I signed off on my own specs for release for competition to subcontractors of my own selection (authorized by the black nature of the programs). In addition, after selection I, along with my lead engineer, negotiated the contract with the selected winner. No procurement officer was present. This was for multiple computer types, display types, and software development worth multiple millions of dollars. This is an area where Northrop Grumman should now have well under control. While most of the B-2 talent has gone, there is some important people still available such as the Northrop B-2 chief engineer.

4) When Northrop got the contract, the first thought about themselves was that they only knew building small aircraft like the F-5 and hastily went out and scarfed up leaders from other companies that had large aircraft type programs, like Boeing. My opinion was that all these big shot brought in the worst of their own companies procedures. A confusing mess.

5) I think they still have basic expertise to handle such a program although they have lost great talent.

As for the B-3 (?), I did hear a rumor that it might be capable of piloted or non-piloted missions. This makes sense as most of the B-2 mission could be done without pilot input. I did, at one time offer to the AF the capability of executing the mission if the crew became incapacitated for some reason. They rejected that for good reason. I don't think that, using that technology, it would have been wise for a B-2 to fly around with 16 big bombs looking for some place to drop them. Thoughts of Terminator come to mind.

As far as Boeing winning the tanker contract, I think there must have been some sort of threat to Airbus, since changing a contract after contract selection breaks all kind of laws!

Enough for now.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

4) When Northrop got the contract, the first thought about themselves was that they only knew building small aircraft like the F-5 and hastily went out and scarfed up leaders from other companies that had large aircraft type programs, like Boeing. My opinion was that all these big shot brought in the worst of their own companies procedures. A confusing mess.

That's the time I came on the program with Boeing as a floor inspector after getting laid off from Lockheed where I was a QA Engineer. It only wasn't the big shots but some of the assembly folks brought in by Boeing. It seemed that Boeing was bringing folks down from Seattle to "train" on the B-2 while they were being paid big money in per diem. If they "got good" they went back to Seattle to work on the 767 line. My lead was a former stock room clerk who gained his position because of seniority and knew almost nothing about aircraft, let alone building them. During the last week I worked at Palmdale, I almost got him fired because he was closing out redundant production paperwork (blue lines/ green lines, remember them?) by transferring inspection stamp numbers (mine was one of them) and forwarding them on to production control rather than having the paperwork properly deleted by Boeing planning. This idiot was double and sometimes triple billing the contract because of this. One of many "war stories" during my days on the B-2. My last day was on a Friday, layoffs begin that following Monday.

 

[davparlr]

That's the time I came on the program with Boeing as a floor inspector after getting laid off from Lockheed where I was a QA Engineer. It only wasn't the big shots but some of the assembly folks brought in by Boeing. It seemed that Boeing was bringing folks down from Seattle to "train" on the B-2 while they were being paid big money in per diem. If they "got good" they went back to Seattle to work on the 767 line. My lead was a former stock room clerk who gained his position because of seniority and knew almost nothing about aircraft, let alone building them. During the last week I worked at Palmdale, I almost got him fired because he was closing out redundant production paperwork (blue lines/ green lines, remember them?) by transferring inspection stamp numbers (mine was one of them) and forwarding them on to production control rather than having the paperwork properly deleted by Boeing planning. This idiot was double and sometimes triple billing the contract because of this. One of many "war stories" during my days on the B-2. My last day was on a Friday, layoffs begin that following Monday.

Very interesting, but not surprising. Northrop also had its problems including empire building. When we were installing avionics on AV-1, we, the design engineers, were called in to "red line" wiring on the build drawings. Since the B-2 was supposed to be a "paperless" design, I immediately to went to review the wiring database. What I found was that there were five databases, each controlled by a different organization. When I reviewed these, none of these interfaced with any other. My equipment pin-outs did not match the destination pin-outs. Therefore, manual red-lines were required.

Also, later in the program when I was working the B-2 upgrade programs, responsible for designing and costing avionics upgrades, I quickly found out that Boeing was very expensive compared to Northrop. If we installed an avionic box in the aft equipment bay, owned by Boeing, it was significantly more expensive to the government than if we installed it in the front equipment bay, own by Northrop. Therefore we tried to install upgrades in the Northrop area. The minimum cost for a change to the Boeing area was one million dollars.

 

[johnbr]

So this today.
https://news.yahoo.com/northrops-long-range-u-bomber-paused-protest-163612571--finance.html

 

[FLYBOYJ]

So this today.
https://news.yahoo.com/northrops-long-range-u-bomber-paused-protest-163612571--finance.html

That will just delay the start of the program, it's very commonplace for the loser of a US government contract bid to protest. What is hoped is during the review some error on the government side will be revealed and the award will be thrown out, the contract will then go out for re-bid.