B-2 development
I was on the proposal team on the B-2 bomber, responsible for the all avionic systems excluding radar and navigation, whose criticality warranted dedicated specialist. After go-ahead I was a first level manager responsible for Avionics Controls and Displays subsystem (the red outlined areas in pix was the area of my responsibility). I was responsible for design, development, procurement, installation and test of all components, including software requirement, operational logic and symbology. I was in this role through entire development program and the beginning of production, including Program Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR). This was a pilot/engineer dream, and nightmare.
When I heard that Northrop got the contract I had mixed emotions. First, I though yea, by retirement is secure!, second was, boy, I would like a redo with lessons I've learned and the technology that is now available verses what I knew and had then (think CRTs and Comodore 64s), and lastly I thought, no way, I went through heaven and hell and that's enough for one lifetime. I do have some thoughts which I could write a book with but will try to keep it simple.
1) Government contracts are set up to overrun cost and schedule. In order for a supplier the cost usually must be cheapest. To do this legally, the subcontractor must assume the perfect program, i.e. no development problems, that type of programs never exist.
2) Government and supplier like changes. Every three years new user (military) support changes and with each change new preferences are imposed. Every change means profit for the subcontractor. Government program office generally does not have the power to challenge the government user, thus contract discipline is very poor. This is one of the major reasons for contract expansion.
3) When Northrop got the contract, they rejected the infrastructure established by the Aircraft Division building the F-5 but were behind the power curve in establishing their own procedures. As a manager who needed to start development on hardware for an extremely tight aircraft program, I signed off on my own specs for release for competition to subcontractors of my own selection (authorized by the black nature of the programs). In addition, after selection I, along with my lead engineer, negotiated the contract with the selected winner. No procurement officer was present. This was for multiple computer types, display types, and software development worth multiple millions of dollars. This is an area where Northrop Grumman should now have well under control. While most of the B-2 talent has gone, there is some important people still available such as the Northrop B-2 chief engineer.
4) When Northrop got the contract, the first thought about themselves was that they only knew building small aircraft like the F-5 and hastily went out and scarfed up leaders from other companies that had large aircraft type programs, like Boeing. My opinion was that all these big shot brought in the worst of their own companies procedures. A confusing mess.
5) I think they still have basic expertise to handle such a program although they have lost great talent.
As for the B-3 (?), I did hear a rumor that it might be capable of piloted or non-piloted missions. This makes sense as most of the B-2 mission could be done without pilot input. I did, at one time offer to the AF the capability of executing the mission if the crew became incapacitated for some reason. They rejected that for good reason. I don't think that, using that technology, it would have been wise for a B-2 to fly around with 16 big bombs looking for some place to drop them. Thoughts of Terminator come to mind.
As far as Boeing winning the tanker contract, I think there must have been some sort of threat to Airbus, since changing a contract after contract selection breaks all kind of laws!
Enough for now.