Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline.
By Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young. New York: Simon and Schuster, Twayne Publishers, 1998. Pp. xiii+213;
illustrations, figures, appendices, notes/references, index. $33.
Formed in 1929, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was a leading American manufacturer of aircraft, engines, and propellers on the eve of World War II. The corporation's contribution to the war effort was unparalleled in terms of quantity production. Despite that success, Curtiss-Wright was effectively out of the aerospace business by the 1960 and remains today a small-scale subcontractor to various industrial concerns. Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young document this transition through an analysis of its corporate management in Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline. The authors assert that Curtiss-Wright's failure to maintain a balance between manufacturing, marketing, and management (a paradigm introduced by business historian Alfred D. Chandler) was at the root of the corporation's [End Page 147] troubles. As part of Twayne's Evolution of Modern Business Series, Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline focuses on the interrelationship between technology and business within the tumultuous American aviation industry and tells the story of the path that one corporation took.
The Curtiss-Wright Corporation resulted from the merger of companies originally founded by the greatest names in early American aviation: Glenn Curtiss and Wilbur and Orville Wright. The Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, the largest American airplane manufacturer during World War I, produced highly innovative military and racing aircraft during the 1920s. The Wright Aeronautical Corporation led in the development of one of the new aeronautical technologies of the 1920s: the radial, air-cooled engine. According to Eltscher and Young, the merger of the two corporations in August 1929 resulted from the "larger vision" of Clement M. Keys, the new president of Curtiss-Wright (p. 51). Keys wanted to build the infrastructure of American aviation—aircraft, engines, transportation networks, airports, and flight schools—and control it through the large aviation holding company. He emphasized research and technological innovation, military contracts, and exports to sustain a competitive advantage within an industry plagued by economic downturns, sparse government support, and fluctuating markets. Unfortunately, the harsh effects of the Great Depression countered most of Keys and Curtiss-Wright's efforts during the 1930s.
The authors contend that World War II was the turning point in the history of Curtiss-Wright. The only American manufacturer capable of immediately meeting the demands of the Allied aviation programs of 1938–43, the corporation concentrated on the quantity production of aircraft that were soon obsolete in light of the rapid pace of technological change. Instead of cross-licensing designs and subcontracting other producers for component parts, the corporation overextended its managerial and engineering resources to expand its own production facilities. Consequently, when Curtiss-Wright attempted to introduce new designs, such as the C-46 transport or the R-3350 radial engine, there were significant developmental problems. Curtiss-Wright's promise of untested technologies in large quantities and the failure to deliver them resulted in a considerable loss of prestige and the scrutiny of congressional investigators.
Curtiss-Wright emerged from World War II in a sound economic state, but its leaders were unsure of the direction the corporation should take. The new jet-engine technology was quickly supplanting the internal combustion reciprocating engines Curtiss-Wright had been producing during the war. An internal battle erupted between weak and indecisive managers who favored the use of profits to expand engine research and development versus aggressive stockholders who wanted a dividend. The victory of the stockholders effectively put Curtiss-Wright on the path to decline. Eltscher and Young posit that a cultural transition took place within the corporate [End Page 148] management of Curtiss-Wright. Those who had a distinct "obsession with profits" and no background or apparent interest in aviation replaced those who had matured with the corporation and the aviation industry (p. 146). Failing to find a suitable product for the aerospace market after 1960, Curtiss-Wright became a subcontractor of aircraft subassemblies and component parts for its former competitors.
Despite its brevity, historians of technology will find Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline...
