The P-38J and L in the European theater.

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The Defiant got radar and was also used for electronic countermeasures.
 
The British didn't GET P-39s. They got P-400s. It was not what they expected, but WAS what they ordered. Bell made a prototype P-400 that had 30 coats of primer with extensive sanding between them, more rigid gear door linkages, putty-filled junctions with the canopy, and a host of other changes other than the British-specified armament. When it was done, the P-400 prototype made 391 mp at 14,400 feet. The British ordered it. None of these changes were made to production P-400s, and they had a top speed of some 359 mph when tested. Bell should have been severely slapped for not supplying production airplanes that matched the performance of the P-400 prototype. I'd say they engaged in a bit of profiteering.

The British didn't GET P-38s. They got the Model 322B, which was basically a P-38E without turbochargers and with both engines being right-handed for commonality with the P-40 engines. That stepchild was not very good, and wound up as US fighter-trainers after being converted back to left and right-handed engines (still without turbochargers). If they wanted US fighter planes, it baffles me why they didn't just order them instead of ordering them with unproven changes.

Bell was at fault for the P-400s, but the British were at fault for the model 322B P-38s. Methinks things could have been a bit more above-board between allies than was the case in real life. When Lockheed tested the Model 322B, they should have raised the flag to the British. Maybe they did.
 
On 24 August, nine Defiants of 264 scrambled from Manston to engage an incoming German force; in the ensuing engagement, three Ju 88s and a single Bf 109E were shot down for the loss of two Defiants. Later that same day, another cluster of bombers appeared and were engaged by seven Defiants that had been in the process of refuelling; three Ju 88s and two Bf 109Es were downed.

On 26 August 264 Squadron engaged a formation of 12 Dornier Do 17 bombers over north-eastern Kent but was attacked by a large formation of Bf 109s.[29] Three aircraft were lost (two to ace Hpt. Gunther Lutzow of JG 3) but six Do 17s and a Bf 109 were shot down.

Not bad for such a dud a/c.

I could be wrong but:

1) I think those are claims, not actual victories (usually about 1/3 of claims are real, on average though it varied widely)
2) Defiants got some victories early on when LW pilots confused them for Hurricanes, but once they recognized the type and figured out how to safely attack from the front or below, loss rates took off and quickly reached 50%, as noted in the excerpt I posted from the same wiki you are posting from. The best strategy Defiant pilots came up with after that was a descending defensive circle that moved down to Sea Level. Not really conducive to intercepting & shooting down enemy bombers, or protecting friendly ones.

My criteria for "dismal failure" for a fighter incidentally would be it couldn't survive in the combat environment without help, let alone catch and destroy enemy aircraft.

S
 
As for the F2A, the US Navy cancelled their contract in 1941, shifting over to the F4F, but the British liked it and ordered another 170 of them, which they were still producing through the fall of 1941 - if they had done well in Singapore, Malaya and Burma, the British Purchasing Commisision would probably have ordered more. Seems like the main issue was really some kind of failure with the engine to perform properly at high altitude (overheating and oxygen starvation) which was never addressed, Brewster in fact "repurposing" some old DC 3 engines because they couldn't get enough ought of Wright.

Engine production was often the Achilles heel of new aircraft designs and it was extremely common for an engine which was anticipated in the design stage of the cycle to either not be available or to be flawed / underperforming when it came time to build a prototype or early production run, requiring a last minute switch to another engine (if that was even possible). This was quite often the reason for an aircraft to fail in what I called Stage 2 or 3.

S


You have a rather warped timeline on the Buffalo. The British ordered 120 Buffaloes in Jan 1940(initial talks had started in AUg 1939) , later increased to 170, not 2nd order for 170 planes.
Britain winds up with few more because of the Belgian order for 40 aircraft which had been placed in Dec. 1939 Only one had reached Belgium by the time Belgium fell so France took over the rest of the order. With the fall of France England took over the remainder. (some got sidetracked to French possessions)

Please note that the British did not order the P-39/P-400 until April of 1940. Because the Buffalo was actually in production (even if small quantities) Britain was actually take delivery (in England) of some of their Buffaloes in July of 1940. The First Aircobra Is don't show up in England for another year ( July 1941).

Brewster's production capability is small and the British order was interrupted in order for Brewster to build 43 F2A-2s for the US Navy, this takes from Sept 1940 through Dec 1940 (one finished in Jan) whereupon Brewster goes back to building the rest of the British order. (and Dutch East Indies)
Jan 1941 sees the US order 108 F2A-3s as Grumman is not building F4Fs fast enough. It will take until July for the first one to be delivered.
The last British 339Es is completed in May of 1941.
The Dutch got 72 Buffaloes on the initial order and an additional 40 in the 2nd order

The British would have needed divine intervention to order more Buffaloes in late winter/early spring of 1942 as the lines were being closed down. Nov 1 1941 had seen Brewster designated as an associated contractor for the F4U Corsair. Granted they made a hash of it but the idea that the British could have ordered (and received) Buffaloes in preference to the US getting (or thinking they were getting) Corsairs requires more than rose tinted glasses.

The British (and Dutch?) got ex DC-3 engines in part due to lack of capacity at Wright to build new engines and in part because The US had not cleared the latest R-1820 for export. The British and Dutch aircraft got the R-1820-100 series engines and the F2A-2 and -3 got R-1820-200 series engines. The -200 had roughly 100 more HP at most altitudes (or more) due to a number of modifications (including a new Crankcase and larger bearings) which allowed it to turn an extra 200rpm.

Things were changing pretty quick in 1940/41 and plane seen as useful in the Spring of 1940 would be regarded as a deathtrap in the Fall/Winter of 1940 let alone 1941. Unfortunately the British tended to shuffle off many these aircraft to the Middle or Far East assuming (mistakenly) that the potential enemies didn't have anything better.

For the British (and French) P-38s, they were originally specified with the same engines as the long nosed P-40/Tomahawks so they could all use the same spare engines/parts, despite Lockheed's warnings/predictions of reduced performance. Later British orders were to use turbos and handed engines.

The P-36 may be an example of your stage 2-3. The P & W R-1830 being the 4th engine to be tried in the airframe followed by the Turbo Allison in the P-37 series (XP-37 was actually the original Hawk 75 airframe) . The non-turbo Allison in the XP-40 (10th P-36 off the production line). The XP-42 was a P-36 with an extension shaft and long cowling on the modified R-1830 and P & W used a P-40 as a test hack for a two stage R-1830 so the basic P-36/40 airframe went through at least eight engines (or more depending on how you count R-1820s ) before the P-40Q.
 
The F2A was an early 30's design that went into production in the mid 30's with a mission profile that was outdated.

And the F2A-3 was heavier because of self-sealing tanks and armor installed (about 500 pounds all told), causing a performance penalty opposed to the F2A-2.

AND, the F2A in Allied hands in the PTO were piloted by inexperienced pilots against veteran IJA/IJN pilots.

The F2A in the hands of the determined Finns, fighting against the Soviets at low to medium altitudes (which was the prime operating conditions for the F2A) shows exactly what the F2A was capable of.
 
Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.



I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.
The Defiant was the RAF's most successful night fighter during the Blitz of 1940/41, the Hurricane was the most numerous night fighter and the Beaufighter, available only in small numbers, clearly the best. The Defiant II of 1941 was armed with radar and the Defiant I retro fitted with it. As a night fighter, the Defiant, with guns that could be fired upwards, was a success and led to proposals (tests?) with turret armed Beaufighters, so I think it would be fair to say that the Defiant pioneered the concept of the turret armed night fighter.
 
The F2A was an early 30's design that went into production in the mid 30's with a mission profile that was outdated.

And the F2A-3 was heavier because of self-sealing tanks and armor installed (about 500 pounds all told), causing a performance penalty opposed to the F2A-2.

AND, the F2A in Allied hands in the PTO were piloted by inexperienced pilots against veteran IJA/IJN pilots.

The F2A in the hands of the determined Finns, fighting against the Soviets at low to medium altitudes (which was the prime operating conditions for the F2A) shows exactly what the F2A was capable of.

Lets remember that the US Navy was not stupid. The F2A-2 and F2A-3 had engines that were 20% more powerful for take-off than the F2A-1 and B239 and up to 33% more powerful at altitude (British and Dutch Buffaloes were somewhere in between). They were also geared engines with larger props which, in theory, should have meant better propulsive efficiency.

The F2A-3 was about 300-350lbs heavier than the F2A-2 if both were carrying equivalent loads. (same amount of fuel and ammo).

However in the summer of 1941 when the F2A-3 went into production Curtiss was winding down the long Nosed P-40 and starting production of the P-40D/E. P-39 production went over 100 planes per month in Aug 1941 and Lockheed was doing double digits (barely) of the P-38. It didn't take a crystal ball to see that the F2A series was a dead end as a land based fighter and not a good carrier fighter for future use.
 
My criteria for "dismal failure" for a fighter incidentally would be it couldn't survive in the combat environment without help, let alone catch and destroy enemy aircraft.

S
But the Defiant wasn't a fighter, it was an interceptor, designed to intercept unescorted bombers. My idea of dismal failure would be an aircraft that took four years to develop, cost more than the planes it struggled to shoot down and which was requested by Spaatz to be replaced by a piece of wood made in another country.
 
A true example of a "dismal failure", would be the Curtiss SO3C "Seamew".
It was intended to replace the Curtiss SOC "Seagull" but it was so bad, that it was withdrawn from service after a short time and the SOC was brought back into service to replace it's replacement.

The definition of dismal failure couldn't be any clearer than this.
 
The Defiant was the RAF's most successful night fighter during the Blitz of 1940/41, the Hurricane was the most numerous night fighter and the Beaufighter, available only in small numbers, clearly the best. The Defiant II of 1941 was armed with radar and the Defiant I retro fitted with it. As a night fighter, the Defiant, with guns that could be fired upwards, was a success and led to proposals (tests?) with turret armed Beaufighters, so I think it would be fair to say that the Defiant pioneered the concept of the turret armed night fighter.

We have to be very, very, very careful with numbers/statistics from the night Blitz of 1940/41. Up until Feb of 1941 the numbers of German planes shot down was so small (sometimes over a month went by without a claim by the "night fighters" that changing the numbers by one or two can significantly swing things and changing the end date can really skew things. The Defiant never got radar before the bulk of the German bombers flew off to attack Russia so they were doing visual intercepts only as were the Hurricanes. Only the Blenheim and Beaufighters had radar up until that time (April/May of 1941).
I am not saying the bombing stopped, just that the number of German bombers was much reduced and that the British night fighters were claiming many more victories in the spring of 1941 than they did in the fall and winter of 1940/41.
Defiants may have only claimed 3-4 victories from Sept to the beginning of Feb for example. Which was more than the other types but obviously more an example of luck than combat prowess or capability.

Actual shoot downs could be different. British night fighter claims went up dramatically in April/May of 1941 which is still before radar went into Defiants.
Shorter nights or radar in the twin engine planes was finally beginning to work? 96 claims made in the first two weeks of May, mostly by Beaufighters.

It would be very interesting to see the actual number of claims for the Defiants (and other night fighters) on a month by month basis rather than statements like it was the most successful.
One book claims that the British night fighters (all types) shot down 8 German bombers in the first 2 months of the night Blitz out of 12,000 German sorties. The next 3 months were even worse.
 
The British didn't GET P-39s. They got P-400s. It was not what they expected, but WAS what they ordered. Bell made a prototype P-400 that had 30 coats of primer with extensive sanding between them, more rigid gear door linkages, putty-filled junctions with the canopy, and a host of other changes other than the British-specified armament. When it was done, the P-400 prototype made 391 mp at 14,400 feet. The British ordered it. None of these changes were made to production P-400s, and they had a top speed of some 359 mph when tested. Bell should have been severely slapped for not supplying production airplanes that matched the performance of the P-400 prototype. I'd say they engaged in a bit of profiteering.

The British didn't GET P-38s. They got the Model 322B, which was basically a P-38E without turbochargers and with both engines being right-handed for commonality with the P-40 engines. That stepchild was not very good, and wound up as US fighter-trainers after being converted back to left and right-handed engines (still without turbochargers). If they wanted US fighter planes, it baffles me why they didn't just order them instead of ordering them with unproven changes.

Bell was at fault for the P-400s, but the British were at fault for the model 322B P-38s. Methinks things could have been a bit more above-board between allies than was the case in real life. When Lockheed tested the Model 322B, they should have raised the flag to the British. Maybe they did.
I really don't believe that Bell tried to decieve the British with the P-400.

The contract was signed in April '40 at a weight of 6000#. There were five subsequent weight increases (to 7850#) under a couple of contract revisions, the last of which was in June '41 which increased the number of planes to 675.

This final revision in June was after the P-400 tests in April that showed 371mph at 14,090' for a normally equipped production plane.
Bell did produce the one 391mph modified P-400 #AH571 that had the minor modifications and highly polished surface but that one plane was clearly identified as not a production model. Tested in April the modifications were not put into the final contract revision in June.

In my opinion Bell built exactly what the British specified in the contract. A 7850# plane when contemporary SpitfireV weighed 6600#.
 
The quality of the P-400s was VERY poor, with MANY things not functioning or poorly installed. That from multiple British sources and from some U.S. pilots who were not flying them but were there when they were delivered and being put to use.

I think Bell tried their best to screw the British, and I seriously doubt it was Larry Bell. It was likely upper management other than Larry Bell, who was not a bad sort when it came to quality in his products.
 
The quality of the P-400s was VERY poor, with MANY things not functioning or poorly installed. That from multiple British sources and from some U.S. pilots who were not flying them but were there when they were delivered and being put to use.

I think Bell tried their best to screw the British, and I seriously doubt it was Larry Bell. It was likely upper management other than Larry Bell, who was not a bad sort when it came to quality in his products.
This is interesting and if you have any additional information, please post. I believe the basic structural airframes came down the same production lines as US models (our P-39 Expert could probably confirm that). Of course there was different equipment installed so was it the equipment that didn't work or the "different equipment" was poorly installed? If the factory installed equipment that didn't function as "designed" this is not a quality function.

Lastly I think some of the foreign customer equipment was installed at mod centers, but again I could be wrong.
 
Joe, we have many visitors at the museum. Not a small percent are British. Of the ones I get into conversations with that are either pilots or aviation enthusiasts, almost 70% mention the early experience with the Bell P-400s and the early P-38s when they talk about US planes at all (not their favorite subject). Almost to a person, they mention the poor quality of the P-400s and the lack of performance in the P-38s.

Most of my books that mention the P-400 at all also mention poor performance and some mention poor quality.

I am firmly in the corner which thinks the P-38 (P-322B) experience was entirely the fault of the British, who requested same-turning, non-turbo engines without a test of the configuration. I have seen first hand the quality of the typical US fighter aircraft, as have you, I know. While it isn't exactly pristine perfect, U.S. planes are not badly built in general, certainly not badly-built enough to generate such venom from the British. That goes for every manufacturer I have seen, from Seversky to Republic, Curtiss, Bell, North American, etc. Pretty decent airplanes. I am left thinking there MUST be something behind the talk, but have never seen a real, live, unrestored P-400 so I can look it over and make a first-hand evaluation. We DO have a P-39 that has a corrosion problem, but the workmanship is typical U.S. as far as I can tell. But it is a P-39, not a P-400.

Lacking a real P-400, the books and people who have spoken with me about it have convinced me that there is some basis for their almost universal insistence on poor quality. It cannot be performance alone. I also recall that this was early in the war, when everyone was ignoring the factory suggestions for proper running of the Allison engine, and engine problems could contribute to the perception of poor quality, even if it were not really true. I cannot say for sure, myself.

So, I'll just say that the P-400 failed miserably to live up to British expectations according to most reference books I have seen and backpedal from there. I believe there is a basis for the quality assertion, but cannot prove same.
 
Joe, we have many visitors at the museum. Not a small percent are British. Of the ones I get into conversations with that are either pilots or aviation enthusiasts, almost 70% mention the early experience with the Bell P-400s and the early P-38s when they talk about US planes at all (not their favorite subject). Almost to a person, they mention the poor quality of the P-400s and the lack of performance in the P-38s.

Most of my books that mention the P-400 at all also mention poor performance and some mention poor quality.

I am firmly in the corner which thinks the P-38 (P-322B) experience was entirely the fault of the British, who requested same-turning, non-turbo engines without a test of the configuration. I have seen first hand the quality of the typical US fighter aircraft, as have you, I know. While it isn't exactly pristine perfect, U.S. planes are not badly built in general, certainly not badly-built enough to generate such venom from the British. That goes for every manufacturer I have seen, from Seversky to Republic, Curtiss, Bell, North American, etc. Pretty decent airplanes. I am left thinking there MUST be something behind the talk, but have never seen a real, live, unrestored P-400 so I can look it over and make a first-hand evaluation. We DO have a P-39 that has a corrosion problem, but the workmanship is typical U.S. as far as I can tell. But it is a P-39, not a P-400.

Lacking a real P-400, the books and people who have spoken with me about it have convinced me that there is some basis for their almost universal insistence on poor quality. It cannot be performance alone. I also recall that this was early in the war, when everyone was ignoring the factory suggestions for proper running of the Allison engine, and engine problems could contribute to the perception of poor quality, even if it were not really true. I cannot say for sure, myself.

So, I'll just say that the P-400 failed miserably to live up to British expectations according to most reference books I have seen and backpedal from there. I believe there is a basis for the quality assertion, but cannot prove same.

Good info Greg, but still perplexed - "poor quality." Was the plane built poorly? Did it perform poorly (as you mentioned the engine issue)? Were components not installed properly or were not installed per engineering drawings? I know you (and many of us) will never have the full answers on that.
 
Apparently the British screwed up the clever Bell design by insisting that it carry some items that hurt performances. Like guns, ammo, radios, instruments and the like.
The basic story is that Bell never told the British that the performance numbers that sold the plane to the British (and that Bell signed the contract for and guaranteed the numbers for) were estimates based off an unarmed prototype. It takes two sides to amend a contract. Bell should have known that some of the changes the British wanted (like self-sealing tanks and armor) would affect performance and should have amended the numbers accordingly. They didn't. They came up with the specially prepared plane to try to hit the guaranteed numbers which rather shows they knew a standard production example wouldn't come close.
 
From what I read there were issues like the cabin filling with smoke when the guns were fired, compass stopping working when guns fired, things like IFF equipment bolted behind the pilot obscuring rear view, issues with undercarriage damage but this may have been pilot training issue.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back