The P-38J and L in the European theater.

[Schweik]

The Defiant was planned to fire forward, the pilotsu control column had a firing button. The guns had to be fired above, I believe, 15 degrees above the center of the aircraft to avoid destroying the propeller as they weren't synchronized. Why it wasn't incorporated I can't remember

Seems like it would be tricky to synchronize guns that could move around. Even locked forward before shooting, you would have to link sychronization equipment to a turret that moved 360 degrees. Significant engineering challenge there I would think.

Some of the battles I read about were interesting, in which Defiants in a defensive circle were able to concentrate fire from multiple planes on attacking Bf 109s- something conventional fighters certainly could not do. And they seem to have been good at attacking bombers by flying alongside and outgunning relatively weak side facing defensive guns.

The turret fighter was an interesting and "tempting" idea I would say, but in practice one with perhaps too many insurmountable technical challenges.

 

[GregP]

One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).

 

[GrauGeist]

One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).

They tested a turretless Defiant and it was no better in performance than the Hurricane, so it wasn't developed past the testing stage.

 

[Schweik]

One solution would have been easy ... fixed forward armament. Put two wing MG and reduce to two rear cannons of larger bore. However, a better solution would have been to stop making it or change it into a single seat fighter. It would have resembled a metal Hurricane, but likely would have been faster (what wasn't?).

According to the wiki they did try that - and it was faster - I think it said 360 mph. But not so maneuverable (in what way they didn't specify)

Presumably not better than a Spit though so they didn't bother.

I do kind of like the idea of the turret fighter for the extra capabilities it lends. You see something a bit like it with the remote control turrets on late war planes like me 410 and various bombers.

More efficient setup and much less draggy, though still extra weight with gunner on board.

 

[GregP]

Since the better solution wasn't better, the best solution was to stop making it. I knew they did the non-turret version, but I never saw the report of the conclusions as to why it was not proceeded with. I assumed the Hurricane was already in production and that was the main reason.

 

[Milosh]

As for the F2A, the US Navy cancelled their contract in 1941, shifting over to the F4F, but the British liked it and ordered another 170 of them

The Brits were hard up for any a/c and went for any a/c they could get their hands on.

At the time of the Defiant's design, fighters didn't escort bomber as they didn't have the range. With the fall of France that changed and the Defiant had to be used in a way it wasn't designed for.

 

[Schweik]

The Brits were hard up for any a/c and went for any a/c they could get their hands on.

Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...

At the time of the Defiant's design, fighters didn't escort bomber as they didn't have the range. With the fall of France that changed and the Defiant had to be used in a way it wasn't designed for.

Even for it's intended job, I don't think the Defiant would have cut the mustard, as a lot of Axis bombers were too fast and / or high flying.

As for the 'bombers always get through' etc.... the divergence between what planners and designers thought the war environment would be like and what it actually was is what 'phase 3' was about. The best designs often proved to be the most adaptable. A fighter with a turret that can't shoot forward is very specialized.

 

[Milosh]

Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...

Because they weren't up to doing the job in Europe!

As for the bombers, stop reading specs for bombless bombers. Besides to keep formation bombers travel at a lower than max speed and range decreased with speed.

 

[Milosh]

The Germans did quite well with upward and forward weapons.

 

[Schweik]

Because they weren't up to doing the job in Europe!

Neither was the F2A, at least not on the Allied side.

As for the bombers, stop reading specs for bombless bombers. Besides to keep formation bombers travel at a lower than max speed and range decreased with speed.

I read mostly pilot reports and squadron records, and in the Med Hurricane pilots for example reported having trouble catching Ju 88s on numerous occasions due to their speed. Italian pilots flying MC 200 and G.50 sometimes had similar problems with A-20s.

S

 

[Schweik]

The Germans did quite well with upward and forward weapons.

Schräge Musik was typically fixed not turret

 

[Milosh]

And the Defiant's turret could be locked forward.

The German NFs had to be under the e/a to hit their target while the Defiant could stand off to the side.

 

[Milosh]

The Brewster Mark I produced four Commonwealth aces: Geoff Fisken, Maurice Holder, A. W. B. (Alf) Clare and R. D. (Doug) Vanderfield

 

[Dan Fahey]

Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline.
By Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young. New York: Simon and Schuster, Twayne Publishers, 1998. Pp. xiii+213;
illustrations, figures, appendices, notes/references, index. $33.

Formed in 1929, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation was a leading American manufacturer of aircraft, engines, and propellers on the eve of World War II. The corporation's contribution to the war effort was unparalleled in terms of quantity production. Despite that success, Curtiss-Wright was effectively out of the aerospace business by the 1960 and remains today a small-scale subcontractor to various industrial concerns. Louis R. Eltscher and Edward M. Young document this transition through an analysis of its corporate management in Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline. The authors assert that Curtiss-Wright's failure to maintain a balance between manufacturing, marketing, and management (a paradigm introduced by business historian Alfred D. Chandler) was at the root of the corporation's [End Page 147] troubles. As part of Twayne's Evolution of Modern Business Series, Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline focuses on the interrelationship between technology and business within the tumultuous American aviation industry and tells the story of the path that one corporation took.

The Curtiss-Wright Corporation resulted from the merger of companies originally founded by the greatest names in early American aviation: Glenn Curtiss and Wilbur and Orville Wright. The Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation, the largest American airplane manufacturer during World War I, produced highly innovative military and racing aircraft during the 1920s. The Wright Aeronautical Corporation led in the development of one of the new aeronautical technologies of the 1920s: the radial, air-cooled engine. According to Eltscher and Young, the merger of the two corporations in August 1929 resulted from the "larger vision" of Clement M. Keys, the new president of Curtiss-Wright (p. 51). Keys wanted to build the infrastructure of American aviation—aircraft, engines, transportation networks, airports, and flight schools—and control it through the large aviation holding company. He emphasized research and technological innovation, military contracts, and exports to sustain a competitive advantage within an industry plagued by economic downturns, sparse government support, and fluctuating markets. Unfortunately, the harsh effects of the Great Depression countered most of Keys and Curtiss-Wright's efforts during the 1930s.

The authors contend that World War II was the turning point in the history of Curtiss-Wright. The only American manufacturer capable of immediately meeting the demands of the Allied aviation programs of 1938–43, the corporation concentrated on the quantity production of aircraft that were soon obsolete in light of the rapid pace of technological change. Instead of cross-licensing designs and subcontracting other producers for component parts, the corporation overextended its managerial and engineering resources to expand its own production facilities. Consequently, when Curtiss-Wright attempted to introduce new designs, such as the C-46 transport or the R-3350 radial engine, there were significant developmental problems. Curtiss-Wright's promise of untested technologies in large quantities and the failure to deliver them resulted in a considerable loss of prestige and the scrutiny of congressional investigators.

Curtiss-Wright emerged from World War II in a sound economic state, but its leaders were unsure of the direction the corporation should take. The new jet-engine technology was quickly supplanting the internal combustion reciprocating engines Curtiss-Wright had been producing during the war. An internal battle erupted between weak and indecisive managers who favored the use of profits to expand engine research and development versus aggressive stockholders who wanted a dividend. The victory of the stockholders effectively put Curtiss-Wright on the path to decline. Eltscher and Young posit that a cultural transition took place within the corporate [End Page 148] management of Curtiss-Wright. Those who had a distinct "obsession with profits" and no background or apparent interest in aviation replaced those who had matured with the corporation and the aviation industry (p. 146). Failing to find a suitable product for the aerospace market after 1960, Curtiss-Wright became a subcontractor of aircraft subassemblies and component parts for its former competitors.

Despite its brevity, historians of technology will find Curtiss-Wright: Greatness and Decline...

 

[GrauGeist]

And the Defiant's turret could be locked forward.

The German NFs had to be under the e/a to hit their target while the Defiant could stand off to the side.

Both the IJA and IJN had successful interceptors set up with Schrage Musik, too.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Those who had a distinct "obsession with profits" and no background or apparent interest in aviation replaced those who had matured with the corporation and the aviation industry.

I saw that at Lockheed during my last years there, sad but true!

 

[pbehn]

Well, they didn't want P-39s. Or P-38s as I recall...



Even for it's intended job, I don't think the Defiant would have cut the mustard, as a lot of Axis bombers were too fast and / or high flying.

As for the 'bombers always get through' etc.... the divergence between what planners and designers thought the war environment would be like and what it actually was is what 'phase 3' was about. The best designs often proved to be the most adaptable. A fighter with a turret that can't shoot forward is very specialized.

Neither P-38 or 39 performed as advertised, they were not ready for service. The F4F although initially not with folding wings did have reasonable performance. With the fall of France the design use of the Defiant disappeared and in any case a nightfighter was needed, the Defiant wasn't a particularly good night fighter, just better than anything else at the time. The concept of overweight slow turret fighter wasn't abandoned, the P-61 took it to another level.

 

[Schweik]

Neither P-38 or 39 performed as advertised, they were not ready for service. The F4F although initially not with folding wings did have reasonable performance.

Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.

With the fall of France the design use of the Defiant disappeared and in any case a nightfighter was needed, the Defiant wasn't a particularly good night fighter, just better than anything else at the time. The concept of overweight slow turret fighter wasn't abandoned, the P-61 took it to another level.

I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.

 

[pbehn]

Yeah but... we were talking about the (essentially failed) F2A not the (successful) F4F. And the F2A actually had most of the same problems that the P-38 and P-39 did.



I don't think it's realistic or even plausible to put the P-61 in the same category as the Defiant. P-61 was faster than almost all enemy bombers (other than jets), had far greater range, had on-board radar, and had it's own forward firing guns. It was more of a 'limited success' as distinct from the 'dismal failure' of the Defiant.

We were talking about what planes the British would take and what they wouldn't. Limited success and dismal failure are questions of semantics.

 

[Milosh]

On 24 August, nine Defiants of 264 scrambled from Manston to engage an incoming German force; in the ensuing engagement, three Ju 88s and a single Bf 109E were shot down for the loss of two Defiants. Later that same day, another cluster of bombers appeared and were engaged by seven Defiants that had been in the process of refuelling; three Ju 88s and two Bf 109Es were downed.

On 26 August 264 Squadron engaged a formation of 12 Dornier Do 17 bombers over north-eastern Kent but was attacked by a large formation of Bf 109s.[29] Three aircraft were lost (two to ace Hpt. Gunther Lutzow of JG 3) but six Do 17s and a Bf 109 were shot down.

Not bad for such a dud a/c.