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Not good enough against the JaBo attacks.I'll let the pilots combat reports speak for themselves in regards to how effective the Spitfire was against FW190 incursions.Spitfire Mk XII Performance Testing
Spitfire Performance Testing, wartime flight trials and reports of Spitfire aircraft. Spitfire Mk XII data.www.spitfireperformance.com
Reminds me of the following from: Jeffrey Quill, Spitfire A Pilot's Story, (Crecy Publishing Ltd., 1996), p.234.:Not good enough against the JaBo attacks.
Or the Typhoon/Sabre program would've been cancelled - which the 'Spitfire Mafia' were dead set - on doing...
Edit:
Ok the vaunted Griffon Spit, eh? What's the saying now - oh yeah: 'a day late & a $ short'.
I should dig out a book with the account of the oh-so-proud-of-his-new-Spit Mk XII Squadron Leader who
foolishly wagered an open bar on winning a base-to-base low-level race with a Typhoon S/Ldr - to his cost.
Whats also important is the pilots had faith in the Merlin and Griffon.
Scathing here means not as good as before.The Spitfire Mk 21 wasn't a success, the AFDU wrote a scathing report on it, esp' in relation to its flight control characteristics,
& by comparison to earlier marks,
Lots of production was cancelled due to the war ending or obviously ending. Castle Bromwich was being cancelled as an aircraft production location, the F.21 and F.22 shared the same Supermarine type number, the former was high back and small tail, the latter had the bubble canopy and "Spiteful" tail F.21 produced from April 1944 to January 1946, F.22 from March 1945 to February 1946, 55 of the 122 F.21 were built by end March 1945, then the two types were being built in parallel. If things were that bad in the F.21 the fix was easy and obvious.In fact, production was cancelled, & the following 20-series types received the larger Spiteful tail empennage to ameliorate the issue,
& 40 brand new Mk 21s were unceremoniously sent to Shoeburyness for use as research targets (grounded) -
The Typhoon dive speed reported was TAS, Spitfire given as IAS and at low level?the Spitfire V was thereby approved for a 450mph IAS at low level,
Typhoon, 56 squadron "reformed" with Typhoon on 11 September 1941, first Typhoon operation 20 June 1942 by 2 squadrons, up to 3 operational squadrons on 19 July 1942. First P-39 imported in June 1941, 601 Squadron received its first in August 1941, first operation 6 October. The Russian delegation arrived on 8 December 1941, but 18 P-39 had already been exported in November followed by another 29 in December. 601 squadron went to Spitfires in March 1942. Assigning the P-39 to the USSR helped fill the British quota of fighters, removed a fighter type from the RAF that clearly needed some debugging and was in line with the RAF requirement in 1941 for altitude performance, then came the news the Red Air Force liked the type.(& why the RAF rushed the Typhoon in to service - while rejecting the Bell P-39 which had been bought on the promise of its low-level speed, but didn't deliver on test)
Not what the RAF raid reports say.The Hurricane only carried 4 rockets,
Sabre IV failed to pass the 50 hour test, the other engines largely succeeded. Earlier came the idea the RAF did not want altitude performance so the Sabre IV failure did not matter. Here apparently the IV sets up the success of the V, of which 5 were built in 1943, 22 in 1944 and 68 in 1945 (36 of these August onwards). The RAF converted II to V post war creating a sizeable amount of the total Sabre V stock but any Sabre/Typhoon failure really is a success it seems.The Sabre VA was a development of the Sabre IV, (ironically, receiving the benefits of work done to sort out the high-altitude issues the
earlier unit had suffered from, (same issues other engines had) viz: oil foaming & high-tension ignition scatter problems.
While a capability the Sabre did not have is expensive and unused, apparently even with the Spitfire XIV flying top cover for the Tempests. The RAF heavies flew around 20,000 feet in day raids, escorts needed to be higher.Funny but true, the expensively developed high-altitude 2-stage supercharged Spitfires (Merlin & Griffon, both) could find 'no trade'
'upstairs' & Spifire IX & XVI were pressed into duty as (fairly unsatisfactory - compared to the Typhoon) fighter bombers, while the
vaunted Mk XIV was out-performed & out-scored (both V1 & EA) by the "more warlike" Tempest in the 'air superiority' role.
Anyone else feel the desire to rewrite the above P-38/P-47 to Typhoon, P-51 to Spitfire?Likewise, the expensive turbo-optimised P-38 & P-47 were relegated by the P-51B/C/D from the 'glamour' 8th AAF 'strategic missions'
to TAF 'mud-moving' -
The 9th AF noted a loss rate (Missing+Category E) of 1.2% for the P-38 and 0.74% for the P-47, the P-38 claimed a 1 kill per 124 credit sorties the P-47 1 kill per 175 sorties, indicating the P-38 probably saw more Luftwaffe fighters on average. Bombs were P-39 690.5 pounds per effective sortie P-47 591.5 pounds, the P-47 probably did more escorting plus used rockets. Total Droop Snoot bombing was 31 sorties airborne, 19 effective dropping 10 short tons of bombs. it would be interesting to see what the overall Typhoon loss rate was, given the usual anecdotal reports of heavy losses. John Foreman lists Typhoon losses as 87 in June and 67 in July 1944, the 9th AF says 52 and 47 P-38 along with 210 and 154 P-47.a role that was brutal enough on the the sturdy T-blot, (even after they put big 'stars & bars' markings under
both wings in an attempt to lessen 'friendly fire' from the ground) while the P-38 suffered even more, & was eventually put in sort of
a defacto Mosquito light-medium bomber role via a 100 odd 'droop snoot' conversions as formation leader/bomb aimer planes.
End 1942 Sabre Time Between Overhauls was 25 hours. Helps explain why there were so many Sabre in the repair system. I am impressed that someone who has been talking about so many low quality British aviation products decided to claim the above. It would be great to drop the attitude of the Sabre/Typhoon is the answer or it does not matter, now what was the question?Again you repeat the mistake of conflating Sabre design/performance with poor British manufacturing/organisational effort.
The Aug 1944 figures do of course include to the Battle of the Falaise Pocket.Gentlemen
Note that the chart shows a dearth of Tanks damaged/destroyed versus the Typhoon.
You can further parse this data by hours airborne (VLR escort) means longer over enemy territory. Or ground attack invites more opportunity for AAA strikes. My point being there is a bit more to those numbers (some missions being more dangerous than others).Gentlemen
While not Stats for the entire war, I have attached stats for 83 Group Sorties by type for the period June to August 1944 in Normandy show that 3 Mustang III squadrons averaged 1.03 losses per 100 sorties, 12 Spitfire Mk IX Squadrons averaged .57 losses per 100 sorties, and 10 Typhoon IB squadrons averaged 1.01 losses per 100 sorties. Note that the chart shows a dearth of Tanks damaged/destroyed versus the Typhoon.
Data for the 9th Air Force for May 22 through Sept 4 1944 shows P-51, 1.08 losses per 100 sorties, P-47 .93 losses per 100 sorties, and P-38 1.51 losses per 100 sorties. USAF losses include Cat E.
Data (derived)for 9th AF Stats from "IX Air Force Service Commandin Operation Overlord" pages 36, 37, and 38.
83rd Group Data in attached table.
FWIW
Eagledad
Those were most likely FAA F6Fs and F4Us operating aboard British carriers. The US Navy mainly provided logistical support for the British Navy in this theater of operation. By this time of the war USN carriers were serving primarily in the Pacific Ocean.By this time there seems to have been some US Navy assets in the Indian Ocean, as the 64th Sentai did encounter US Navy aircraft.
As I noted earlier in this thread, the USS Saratoga and 3 escorting destroyers joined the British Eastern Fleet on 27th March 1944. In conjunction with HMS Illustrious she raided Sabang (just off north end of Sumatra) on 19th April and then Soerabaja, Java on 17th May. After that she took her leave off NW Australia to return to the USA to refit.Those were most likely FAA F6Fs and F4Us operating aboard British carriers. The US Navy mainly provided logistical support for the British Navy in this theater of operation. By this time of the war USN carriers were serving primarily in the Pacific Ocean.
Yes Ewen I read your post and believed I was supporting it. We were talking about late summer/early fall 1944 so just about the beginning phases of the push on the Philippine Islands.As I noted earlier in this thread, the USS Saratoga and 3 escorting destroyers joined the British Eastern Fleet on 27th March 1944. In conjunction with HMS Illustrious she raided Sabang (just off north end of Sumatra) on 19th April and then Soerabaja, Java on 17th May. After that she took her leave off NW Australia to return to the USA to refit.
Saratoga V (CV-3)
On 17 October 1777, American troops commanded by General Horatio Gates compelled a British Army led by General John Burgoyne to surrender at Saratoga, N.Y. This victory ended a prolonged British effort to cut the colonies in two and induced France to enter the war as America's ally.www.history.navy.mil
The first British Hellcats in the Indian Ocean arrived in southern India in April 1944. They only went aboard their parent carrier Indomitable, on 25th July, first seeing combat on 23rd Aug.
The fighter squadrons on Illustrios & Victorious in this period flew Corsairs.
Sorry if i misinterpreted your post. It didn't read to me that you were referring to a later period.Yes Ewen I read your post and believed I was supporting it. We were talking about late summer/early fall 1944 so just about the beginning phases of the push on the Philippine Islands.
Are you saying the US Navy had carrier groups in the Indian Ocean during this time? I'm interested to know because I have nothing in my library which gives me an indication that they were operating in this region this late in 1944.