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Shores states:
"The Avengers and Fireflies were escorted by 16 Hellcats and 16 Corsairs, which engaged Ki 43s of the 71st Chutai, claiming seven of these shot down. The Firefly pilots added two more. Two of the Chutai's pilots were killed, 1/Lt Terabumi Murakani (reportedly whilst undertaking a ramming attack) and Wt Off Kamao Hirate. Details of losses where pilots may have baled out or crash-landed are not known, but during these engagements no FAA fighters were missing. One Avenger was damaged by a Japanese fighter and one force-landed in the sea due to engine failure, the crew being rescued successfully."
So we know that the IJ units lost aircraft because of pilot fatalities but the actual losses are likely understated. This is true for Meridian 1 and II also. The TBM loss may not have been due to battle damage.
Your zeal is amusing, as is your palpable outrage. Lighten up Francis.
I was referring mainly to the claim that the Ki-43 was armed with 7.7mm light machine guns, which they definitely were not, and in the highly exaggerated portrayal of the Ki-44 as much more modern than the Ki-43 - in the 'Armouredcarriers' summary. Not necessarily in the wartime briefing. "Can be expected to give a good account of themselves"
Underestimating the Ki-43 became a common trope post-war. During the war I think in Theaters where they actually encountered Ki-43s, the local Allied units were quickly disabused of these fantasies.
Your other claims are also I think, unfounded. I was not able to find numbers for the JAAF units, except for some partial numbers, from Shores, but it appears that none of the JAAF fighter units were at full strength. One of the Oscar units in Meridian I was noted to launch 6 aircraft. Then there is an additional issue of how many aircraft on both sides actually got into contact and were engaged. I was careful not to make any claims on either side of this fence.
However, being outnumbered, which was a routine occurrence on both sides during the fighting in the CBI and South Pacific, did not necessarily lead to bad outcomes. Many other factors, including pilot training and the traits of the aircraft used, played a role in the outcomes. It was routine in fact for Allied units to engage Japanese units in the CBI when outnumbered and still come out ahead. This includes RAF units flying Spit VIIIs. Of course, we know that these pilots were flying pretty strictly according to the 'best practices' doctrines, i.e. "Boom and Zoom". It's unclear if the FAA was using this or how strictly they were implementing it if they were. Certainly there seems to have been some discipline issues at play.
The constant claims of RAF and now FAA being outnumbered against the Japanese is something I'd like to specifically address, based on data from Shores and the other sources.
Yes I read it which was why I queried your statement. Paraphrasing in the way you did portrays a misleading picture which you would have realised, if you had stopped to think about it. The alternative explanation is that you are seeking to portray a biased view of BPF operations, something that quite a number of your fellow countrymen that I have encountered on the net are prone to doing. So let us get the record straight.I was just paraphrasing Shores and a handful of other sources that I read. Shores gives this summary on page 322 (which I assume you have read already?)
"The cost to Force 63 had been quite substantial however. During the two late January raids 16 aircraft had been lost in combat, 11 had ditched near the fleet and 14 had been written off in deck landings - 41 aircraft in 378 sorties. Thirty aircrew were lost including 19 Avenger personnel, one Hellcat pilot, eight Corsair pilots and the crew of a Firefly. Three pilots had been seen to bale out apparently safely, whilst four of those who had returned to the carriers had been wounded. Victorious and Illustrious had suffered most and sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew until replacements could arrive. However, the three January raids were probably the British Pacific Fleet's greatest contribution to victory despite the scale of their subsequent activities in the Pacific."
See aboveAs usual, I appreciate the data but I am 'curious' as to your accusing tone here, just like last time when you got so animated about the idea that there was resistance by RAF officers to replace the Hurricane in Burma and India, which their clearly was, and were implying that I had made this up, which I obviously didn't.
Yes. But don't forget that was the same Vian that had commanded Force V at Salerno. So he brought a certain bias with him before he started. The Seafire squadrons recognised their limitations and come July had come up with solutions which meant that they could become more useful. And Seafire attrition rates in the BPF came no where near those at Salerno, for all the reasons discussed on various previous threads.I'll also quote a couple of passages from the long writeups you linked on armouredcarriers.com:
(@RCAFson should also find this interesting
"The performance of the US-built FAA aircraft was generally reported to be excellent."
"The serviceability problems experienced by the FAA's Avengers was attributed to the hot, damp tropical conditions. But the strain placed on the armoured carriers' small maintenance teams in the sweltering hangars was also a factor. Captain Denny reported HMS Victorious was carrying one Avenger and four Corsairs more than her listed capacity. This meant more aircraft on deck exposed for longer to the elements, and fewer mechanics per aircraft for maintenance."
"Admiral Vian expressed disappointment about the conduct of his Seafires. He went so far as to declare them unsuitable for Pacific operations. Low endurance prevented their use in RAMRODS or as close escort. Even in their role as CAP fighters, their hourly turn-over rate forced the fleet to constantly manoeuvre. While excellent in combat, their weak landing gear had produced an unacceptably high deck-landing attrition rate."
That sounds pretty familiar.
As I noted above and should have been clear to you from what you read elsewhere.As an assessment of losses:
"But Meridian was a costly exercise for the British.
Captain Lambe noted that the Meridian operation had cost HMS Illustrious 10 per cent of his fighter pilots, 8 per cent of his Avenger crews, 24 per cent of his Avenger aircraft and 24 per cent of his fighters."
"Neither the loss in FAA aircraft or air crew could be made up until the fleet arrived in Sydney. HMAS Unicorn, sailing separately was carrying all available spares and replacements."
Yes . And I have set out the reasons why. Why do you seem to have a problem with that?Finally, from your own review up above here, it seems like the this fleet did not get into action until March.
But the intention never was for the BPF to face the IJN on its own. It was always intended that it should operate alongside the USN.Based on all this, I have to again question whether the Royal Navy and FAA was ready to face the IJN on their own, even this late in the game, as we have discussed previously in this thread.
I won't speak for others but I never said that the RAF or FAA were constantly outnumbered. I did observe that the mission on 29 Jan 1945 was likely a situation where the FAA force was significantly outnumbered. I made no such statements about the missions on 4 or 24 Jan...so I'm hardly making a "constant claim."
The bigger issue here is that you want to make generalized comparisons while I'm trying to point out that things aren't that simple. You previously stated that the P-40s and Hurricanes were engaged in the same mission profiles and therefore we could directly compare their performance. I'd like to take the bomber escort mission as an example.
Let's say the Hurricanes are escorting Blenheims while the P-40s are escorting B-25s (both are realistic force compositions for this theatre in 1944). The B-25 cruise speed is over 30mph faster than the Blenheim, while it's maximum speed was obtained at a higher altitude. Those factors will change how the escorting fighters function in order to perform their mission. The ability to fly higher and faster is, clearly, an advantage for the escorting fighters.
This is just one example. Just because aircraft were performing similar missions in the same theatre does not mean they can be directly compared because there are just too many other variables, including adversary numbers, the starting point of the engagement etc etc.
I have no "palpable outrage." I'm simply calling out your oversimplification of basic tenets of air combat and your overzealous application of the retrospectroscope. It's called a discussion where we offer different insights. You clearly want to ridicule. my contributions since you persist in knowing my state of mind. I can't help wondering if you just don't like it when people disagree with your broad statements.
Yes, the later Ki-43s had better armament than the 7.7mm MGs stated. However, if the FAA didn't KNOW that, then it can't be an underestimate, can it? You also completely ignore my other point that the FAA crews were expecting to face a mix of Ki-43s and Ki-44s and, in the heat of combat, the pilots were unlikely to take the time to worry about which was which...thus any "understimate" of the Ki-43's armament is irrelevant.
An IJAAF Sentai could comprise up to 50 aircraft. The units involved in these engagements were almost certainly understrength but even if we discount the minimal contribution of the 64th Sentai, you're still looking at 4 sentai's worth plus a couple of independent squadrons...so 150 may not be a bad estimate. Even if it's 100, that's still a 2-to-1 advantage. I would also point out that I never made a "claim" that 150 IJAAF aircraft were involved: it was an estimate, nothing more nothing less.
The success or otherwise of any particular engagement is down to the details specifics of that engagement. The FAA did come out ahead on 4 and 24 Jan and, even though they suffered on 29 Jan, they still achieved mission success. You're ignoring these details to support your position.
I won't speak for others but I never said that the RAF or FAA were constantly outnumbered. I did observe that the mission on 29 Jan 1945 was likely a situation where the FAA force was significantly outnumbered. I made no such statements about the missions on 4 or 24 Jan...so I'm hardly making a "constant claim."
The bigger issue here is that you want to make generalized comparisons while I'm trying to point out that things aren't that simple. You previously stated that the P-40s and Hurricanes were engaged in the same mission profiles and therefore we could directly compare their performance. I'd like to take the bomber escort mission as an example.
Let's say the Hurricanes are escorting Blenheims while the P-40s are escorting B-25s (both are realistic force compositions for this theatre in 1944).
The B-25 cruise speed is over 30mph faster than the Blenheim, while it's maximum speed was obtained at a higher altitude. Those factors will change how the escorting fighters function in order to perform their mission. The ability to fly higher and faster is, clearly, an advantage for the escorting fighters.
This is just one example. Just because aircraft were performing similar missions in the same theatre does not mean they can be directly compared because there are just too many other variables, including adversary numbers, the starting point of the engagement etc etc.
Some people seem to add a little vinegar to the disagreement every single time anything of a certain national association is portrayed as anything less than ideal or perfect. Exploring the realities of the war is not a contest in which each nation scores points against the other. I am routinely just as critical of one force as any other.
No mate, you completely missed my point that the underestimate was largely a post-war phenomenon. The summary of the briefing given "expect a good fight" was correct. The summary of the Ki-43 on the modern armoured carriers site is where it goes awry.
My theory as to war-time units in general, both in the US and Commonwealth forces, is that the higher-ups had an incorrect under-estimate of the capabilities of the Ki-43, just as they had with the A6M prior to the outbreak of war, but (to repeat myself again) the units in the field did not suffer from this illusion. However, it is by far the narrative which survived postwar, and one which this thread seeks to correct.
I'm not ignoring a damn thing, as you know very well. You just don't like what I have to say. All of my conclusions are provisional pending further data.
Yes I read it which was why I queried your statement. Paraphrasing in the way you did portrays a misleading picture which you would have realised, if you had stopped to think about it.
The alternative explanation is that you are seeking to portray a biased view of BPF operations, something that quite a number of your fellow countrymen that I have encountered on the net are prone to doing. So let us get the record straight.
Yes the carriers had suffered losses during Meridian. But given that they sailed direct from carrying out those operations to Australia without returning to Ceylon and without being able to pick up replacement aircraft, of course they "sailed into the Pacific deficient in both aircraft and aircrew" (my emphasis). Replacements were not obtainable until they arrived at Sydney. And last time I looked Sydney was on Australia's Pacific coast! By the time they sailed from Sydney a couple of weeks later those losses had been made good.
See above
Yes. But don't forget that was the same Vian that had commanded Force V at Salerno. So he brought a certain bias with him before he started. The Seafire squadrons recognised their limitations and come July had come up with solutions which meant that they could become more useful. And Seafire attrition rates in the BPF came no where near those at Salerno, for all the reasons discussed on various previous threads.
If the USN had been willing to provide more Hellcats (and other aircraft) during 1943/44, instead of seemingly tearing up agreements on aircraft allocations between the two nations, then perhaps Indefatigable and Implacable (which arrived at Sydney on 8 May 1945) could have taken them to the Pacific instead of Seafires.
As I noted above and should have been clear to you from what you read elsewhere.
Yes . And I have set out the reasons why. Why do you seem to have a problem with that?
But the intention never was for the BPF to face the IJN on its own. It was always intended that it should operate alongside the USN.
But I have no doubt that whatever I say you will persist in your negative views of the BPF.
That's not a reasonable excuse for simply marking my posts as funny, I'm afraid. You've consistently said I'm displaying a national bias when all I'm trying to do is provide some different contextual understanding to the direct comparisons you're trying to make.
Then I truly don't know what you're trying to achieve. I, for one, never underestimated the Ki-43. It was an outstanding fighter. By 1944 it was definitely past its best but it was still a dangerous adversary. I've never held a different position than that.
Well, the briefings to the FAA pilots were provided by "higher ups" or, at least, with their sanction. So which side of the argument is it? Early in the war in the Far East, it was often the squadron-level personnel who ignored accurate intelligence on the capabilities of the A6M. Unit commanders arriving in the Far East did, on occasion, ignore the advice of the "old hands" who'd been in-theatre a while...to their cost. Once the capabilities were understood, I find it incredibly hard to believe that anyone, at any echelon, would believe that either the Ki-43 or the A6M were anything other than dangerous adversaries.
Am I correct in my understanding that your theory, at least from the Commonwealth perspective, is based on Richey's account and, hence, you blame Peirse for not getting better aircraft into theatre?
Well, here I have to disagree. My likes are irrelevant. I'm just frustrated that you ARE ignoring posts and information provided.
I pointed out several times that Japan was bottom of the priority pile from the UK's perspective, and that it was London that assigned forces to specific theatres. You have completely ignored that point and just went back to blaming Peirse for failing to adequately equip his command, and hence he was an idiot. When I pushed back on that, you then asserted that "From your point of view, it's almost impossible for the senior RAF leadership in Burma to have made terrible decisions vis a vis the Hurricane, because they were wise and intelligent men doing their best."
The bottom line is that London set the priorities. Peirse could be screaming for better fighters but if London didn't send them, then he had to make do with what he had. Whether Peirse was capable or incapable of bad decisions is irrelevant. It wasn't within Peirse's gift to conjure up additional resources for his theatre. That was London's job...and they priorities any theatre where Germany was operating above the Far East.
FWIW, the same general approach to force allocation is followed today. For example, the US Geographic Combatant Commands do not generate their own forces. They request forces from the Secretary of Defense and it's through the Global Force Management and Allocation Process (GFMAP) that forces are assigned to theaters based on priority of need.
Then again, you'll probably just add another "funny" emoji to this post, too.
Gentlemen
What the US Army Air Torce thought of the Ki-43 can be found here
Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Vol 28 Iss 6 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
Air Force Magazine 1945-06: Volume 28, Issue 6.Digitized from IA1533407-07.Previous issue: sim_air-force-magazine_1945-05_28_5.Next issue:...archive.org
Eagledad
It seems to give a honest assessment of the Oscar II until you read the last sentence.
Perhaps outweighing these technical advantages is the fact that American pilots can think better and quicker than the Japanese.
I edited the last word.
My dad and two of my uncles fought the Japanese soldier in the Pacific, some hated them to their dying day, but they all respected them.
,
The Bf 109 had the capacity to be upgraded to a point that it remained competitive with the very best of Allied types, within an increasingly narrow envelope. A G-10 or K-4 was still a formidable adversary in 1945, even when flown against a P-51D or Spitfire Mk.XIV.Well, that may be true, but the Germans needed something else than the Bf 109 by 1944 too, I'd say. And yet the two stories are told very differently.