The Ta-152.... The Best High Altitude Fighter?????

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Bill yes agreed. even with the rear attacks it was a real rairity for the 3 Sturmgruppen in whatever attack mode they were in and even if they flew back to back or alone with their high defense cover, could only get in one attack from the rear through the front of the bombers and then bank right or left and then belly up an down due to the ever present escorts and again when not avialable they could then do an about face, form up together enmasse fly the opposite direction of the bombers and pursue from the rear again

lucky - yes indeed, and hopeful the pilot had full radio contact with the ground and paying attention to his 4 by 4 inch ground map of other possible landing - field locations. We wonder why there was so much abandoned Luftw junk lying all over the fields with no-one present ..... ?
 
Erich, I hear you. The head on attacks were alos most succesful with experienced pilots - the sheer conversion speed making sure it took good experience with deflection shooting in order to be certain of scoring a lethal barrage of hits.

As to the dedicated LW fighters having to climb to engage the Mustangs, well I must admit I can hardly recall an account where this wasn't the case.
 

Soren - in this arena you simply do not know what you are talking about.

The LW controllers were picking up 8t AF attacks when they were warming up, were tracking them (and fighter escorts) with airborn shadows and radar - and the LW fighter pilots picked their noses, conducted briefings for the daily plan, if necessary started moving fighters around and, when set, the fighter pilots were picking their noses until it was time to go!

Now, the occasional 51 squadron or flights that happened to be raoming around could simply ruin the nose picker's day if he was unlucky in the Jan1944 thru May 1944- the latter time, less 'luck'.

You must think that LW commanders, controllers and planners were dumber than dirt if if you think they had to 'climb to intercept the allied escort'. Read the operational diaries of JG26, 54, 4, 301, etc if you don't believe me. They knew they had to be above the 51's to have a chance of survival.

The standard 8AF FC doctrines were for one squadron to be high (i.e 2,000 feet higher than the High box of the wing they were covering , then a mixture of front and rear or side to front, or put one high fron and one each high side - but not the same every mission - and the ships didn't stay together - they mostly criss crossed in 8 ship sections

Do the math, read more and look at the millions of pictures of fighter escort contrails with the bombers.

The math is 20-22,000 feet for the 2ND Division B-24's and 24-26,000 feet for the 1st and 3rd B-17s (yes it varied but not much because the 24 was a major Hog at B-17 altitudes. Add 2,000 (go for broke add 3,000 feet) to each of those numbers..

Then tell me LW could not climb to 30,000 or that Me109G-6 and beyond could not fly at 34-36K to provide escort to the Fw190A8s and Me410's at 28,000 if necessary? Then tell me, "well they of course could do that - but they didn't want an altitude advantage!"

OK Soren.

Bill
 
When attacking the bombers the LW bomber-interceptors (G-6, A-8, A-9 etc etc) were extremely vulnerable to escorts, which the escorting fighters took full advantage of.
 
34,000 ft is not a good altitude for either the A-8, A-9 or G-6, at this alt these a/c were at a distinct disadvantage in performance, and on top of this when the LW fighters reached the escorting P-51's they found themselves out-numbered 8 to 1 ! It would take a fleet made out of Ta-152's or Me-262's purely in order to overcome such odds.
 
oh - Is the altitude advantage talk (briefly?) suspended, and now we're talking about performance advantage at altitude?

and those nasty brutish american knuckledraggers had the audacity to take advantage of and 'advantage'??? The Brits would be mortified.

How dreadful.

Regards,

Bill
 
well there was a numerical advantage from come after Normandie, the Luftw stalled and blew several chances to score big. Bill is right and I have also mentioned that the lw knew how many escorts and bombers were taking off from England as disheartening as it was, the typical non com pilot did his duty knowing well enough it might be his last mission. what gets me after reading after action-luftw reports is the stupidity of some Staffelkapitäns in having his formation of fighters not loosen up when attacked from the rear-behind but to stick close at had thinking there was safety in numbers. I remember this case when P-51's of Blue noser 352nd decimated a small band of A-9's and Dora 9's of II./JG 301, the small flight had an altitude advantage as they were seeking 4-engines and the blue nosers climbed banked and got in behind and shot all of them down. the Luftw flight leader in red 1 Fw 190Dora 9 made a fateful decision: date 2 March 45.

Incidently the Bf 109G-6/AS used by JG 1, and 11 in April of 44 and I./JG 3 were designed exclusively for taking on the P-51's over the 30,000 ft altitude with the help of MW 50 injection

ok we are digressing from the Ta 152H in some respects ...........
 

OK let's do the math.

With an 8:1 numerical advantage in January 11 to mid February 1944 the entire force of Mustangs was about 40 for the 354FG on loan to 8th. Let's say they were 100% at the target (lucky in reality to get 20 in the early days)

So, for that period the Luftwaffe engaged 5 (total) against any attack in Germany, closely enough to engage that massive P-51 force? Right?

and after the 357FG went operational in mid Feb, the 4th on Feb 28, the 355th on March 6-8 and the 352 in 1st and second week in April through the end of April - That was It! So by 28 Feb (150 up, 110 effective but go with 150 through the 7th of April)

That means the Luftwaffe never attacked the Bomber formations with ALL of the MUstang formations in that same space, escorting them, with more than 18 total aircraft? Right? 8:1?

352nd comes on line and we are up to 200 for MAXIMUM Mustang coverage for ALL US Bombers (12th, 9th, 15th, 8th AF) through the end of April... and your premise is that when all 200 are effective (Never Close to 80%), that only 25 total LW fighters were available to attack the entire USAAF Heavy Bomber Command at the target where no P-47 can engage and ALL 25 are engaged with only the Mustangs? Ang in the case of going after different task forces in different locations, the LW cleverely 'split the 25' to attack - in order to maintain the 'inferiority'??

Really? I've Always been confused how the Luftwaffe managed to achieve 1:8 numerical inferiority but now I know. Thank you.

Regards,

Bill
 
I even remember Erich talking about incidents where the LW fighter were out-numbered 12 to 1.
 
I wish some people would realize that 85% of all German armed forces were pre-occupied in the east.
 
the 12 to 1 came in 1945. think Bill is talking of the first escort missions in late 43 through spring of 44 Soren ........

this does go back in my opinion to the pre-Normandie conflict where it is evident that with 8th AF bombers and escorts whether P-47 , P-38 or P-51 the Luftwaffe could not be everywhere where it wanted to be. yes it could still challenge but not so great a numbers as in the 1943 and early 1944 realm.

After mid January 45 it was all over for the Luftwaffe defending Germany with units like JG 300 and 301 doing double duty - taking on the US as well as the Soviets. most of the Reich defense units had gone to the Ost front for the final battles and in the ending months March - May of 45 the odds became greater even up to 12 to 1
 
I'm ready to bury the hatchet - and not in your head.

I do harp on the 51 - not because it's 'under-rated', it IS over -rated in the context of the very best for all things.

But I studied 8th, 12th and 15th Operations all my lfe (of at least 5-62 years of adult study. As strange as it may seem I am well versed with respecto why I think it is the most important, and pretty darn good.

The Mustangs success was multi fold. It was an exceptional performer at the altitudes it operated in to make Strategic Bombardment Doctrine work. It had the range to take on the best of the Luftwaffe everywhere. It had the latitude from Command to do just that.

It's role and importance was assisted by German High Command stupidity in that they would not let their Fighter Commanders take on the 51s early and fight them when they were 'slugs' with the 85 Gal tank and wing tanks still nearly full. Had they done so, the 51's would have to jettison external and maybe not make the entire target penetration/early withdrawal cycle.

They (the LW) got smarter and put 109s at high altitude to try to be Mustang Repellant w/limited success as more skilled pilots were killed and the 109 series thru the G10 still was not 'good enough' to consistently defeat the 51's (or the longer range 47's) at bomber altitudes.

And the better the LW interceptors got, the fewer pilots they had to fly them and the more (entire Allied Fighter Command) they had to fight

BUT

The Mustangs were nearly always numerically outnumbered at the point of attack (in the timeframes I described) - but not all the fighters they met were capable of engaging as the war dragged on - until 1945 then the ratios ? well pick a numer.

this is why I jump in when I hear the perpetual harp on 'we were always outnumered, they swarmed us' chatter if we steer the conversation like I did in these last posts? I had this conversation w/Galland and Krupinski and Rall at Tuscon in 85/85 timeframe and it was lively - but my point was conceded very gentlemanly by all three (and maybe to be polite-lol)
 
Bill, the dedicated LW fighters were almost always out-numbered 8 to 1 by the Mustangs - hence why the G-6/AS, G-10, -14 and Dora-9's only achieved limited success - they were swarmed. The bomber-interceptors weren't in any position to fight off escorting fighters as they were heavily armed and carried multiple loads limiting their performance.

Std. practice for the bomber-interceptors was attack, look is there any escorts, if so dive for cover if not a second attack could be made. They certainly had no desire to fight against the much more lightly loaded escorts at their current state, that job was given to the dedicated fighters.

The period I'm talking about is 1944 - 1945 - in 1943 the odds were more even, and the Allied sorties certainly took some very heavy tolls in this period.

As to the Mustang and its performance;

At the altitudes where the bombers operated the P-51 featured great performance and held a clear advantage at this height over all the Anton versions and the G-6 - Only the G-6/AS, G-10 -14, K-4, Dora-9, and Me-262A-1 proved a match to more than a match at those altitudes, but they were hopelessly out-numbered. This fact is ofcourse also a big contributor to why the P-51 enjoyed the success it did. - The Ta-152H was ofcourse far superior at any alt but it was only fielded at low to medium alts, fortunately for the Mustang pilots.

The Mustang pilots can be happy that the fights weren't fought at the same altitudes as on the eastern front, as that would've left P-51 at a disadvantage in performance to most LW fighters.

OT: There was never any bad feelings involved from my side Bill.
 
The Ta-152H was ofcourse far superior at any alt but it was only fielded at low to medium alts, fortunately for the Mustang pilots.


this just does not sound right..


The Germans are not stupid.. not hardly, why was it not deployed? What were the problems preventing it's use in its designated high altitude role?

It was obviously needed.


The Germans had radar, ithe TA-152 was not even used to get P38 (F5) recon flights at 44-48 thousand feet? I submit, Walter Boyne is correct in his assesment.

Flying with Walter J. Boyne

I have an email to him asking for the necessary location of the Luftwaffe documents at the Library of Congress Archives that was the basis for his comments about the air worthyness of the TA-152.



I believe the founder / director of the NASM, and noted historian is not far off base.

I recommend all of his books.
 
Sir,

I am researching the TA-152 and at the Smithsonian's web site I noticed that it is said this plane was grounded before the end of the war. Do you have any idea where in the Archives or Library of Congress I can find the necessary captured Luftwaffe documents that support this notion? I am also curious to find out if any documents are available as to why this plane was not used in the role of high altitude interceptor.



Thank you


J E S CPA

703-

Fairfax Va

Focke-Wulf Ta152H
 
I have to repsond to something Soren said above. He claims that 85% of all German forces were preoccupied on the Russian front.

Not true. See below.

Percent of German Forces on Russian Front by Year

Unit 1941 1942 1943 1944
Divisions 67% 75% 60% 57%
Troops 84% 74% 72% 40%
Aircraft 64% 65% 42% 45%

The Germans never committed 85% at ANY time, and only approached that in troops. during 1940 and 1941. By 1943 and 1944, the Germans, not being stupid, had most of their aircraft in the West to combat the bombers that were decimating the Reich.

The Russian Front was very important to the war effort, and it took a lot of ground troops, but the air forces were mostly about half and half on the fronts after 1942.

In point of fact, the Germans MAY have seen disadvantages of 10 or 12 to 1 but, if so, it was due to lack of propellers, fuel, pilots, or a com,bination of the three. It was NOT due to lack of airframes being available and late in the war. MOST German aircraft were being used to defend against the Allied bombers.
 
Good post AV8 - what's your source?
 
Hello J e s cpa

The Ta-152 was not grounded before the end of the war (except perhaps for some reason common to all airplanes) but of course it did not see extensive service. It would have been used as a high altitude interceptor if time and circumstances had permitted. I don't know that either the Library of Congress or the archives would have the documents you want, but I'd start with the National Archives, as they are generally the most helpful. You might also write the Deutches Museum in Munich for assistance.


Best

Walt





I guess I should read "Ta152 Herrmann Dietmar", I gather this is the best chronicle on the subject.

I still believe, given the P-38's problems with British gasoline and the German use of coal syn fuel, there was a problem fielding this aircraft at altitude.

I doubt the Luftwaffe had the 151 octane gas that was really needed to perform at the stated max altitudes.
 
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