This Day in the Battle of Britain

[Njaco]

( 11 August 1940 continued...)

The RAF fared no better than the Luftwaffe with six Spitfires and twenty-one Hurricanes shot down, one Spitfire and five Hurricanes making forced landings and one Spitfire and nine Hurricanes damaged. Four Hurricanes from RAF No. 111 Squadron were shot down off of North Foreland and all four British pilots were killed. F/Lt R.Voase-Jeff of RAF No 87 Squadron was lost in combat in his Hurricane I (V7231) over Portland Bill at 10:45hrs. He was awarded the D.F.C. and later the Bar to the D.F.C. P/O John R.**** flew with RAF No 87 Squadron and was the first Australian to shoot down an enemy aircraft in WW II. He baled out of his Hurricane I (V7233) safely after being shot down off Portland Bill at 10:50hrs by Oblt. Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 (Wick claimed 3 kills for the day). He swam ashore slightly injured. His Hurricane I (V7233) LV-K was recovered in 1983 and was on display at Tangmere Aviation Museum. F/O A.Ostowicz from Poland joined RAF No 145 Squadron on the 16th of July 1940. He was in combat with enemy fighters when he was shot down off Swanage and killed in his Hurricane I (V7294). He was awarded the K.W. and Bar on the 1st of February 1941. The RAF ace F/Lt Roland Derek G.Wight of RAF No 213 Squadron was shot down and killed off Portland in his Hurricane I (P3789) at 11:00hrs whilst leading 3 Hurricane's against 60 Bf 110's. He held the D.F.C. and is buried at Cayeux sur Mer France. His Score stood at 10½ confirmed kills.

For the RAF squadrons, it had been a hard day. No sooner had they landed to refuel and rearm, they were up again repeating the performance all over again. To illustrate how busy the day was, the Squadron log of RAF No. 74 squadron (Manston and Hornchurch: Spitfire I and II) commanded by South Africa's "Sailor" Malan - read:-

"take off at 0749 hrs., second patrol: take off 0950, third patrol: take off 1145, fourth patrol: take off 1356."

Operations Rooms had been stretched to the limit, as the casualties mounted and fresh squadrons were brought to readiness. They didn't know it then, but with 'Adler Tag' yet two days away, this was only the beginning.

During the early afternoon the Dorniers of 9./KG 2 were sent to attack a merchant convoy off Harwich on the Essex coast and again escorted by twenty-four Bf 110s from Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer's Epr.Gr 210. Another battle ensued as fighters from RAF No.17 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No.74 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.85 Sqd (Hurricanes) fought in heavy combat. The convoy - code named "Booty" - suffered two freighters set on fire but the RAF lost three aircraft just off of the East Coast while two Bf 110s were damaged but all returned to base.

Meanwhile, another build up of enemy aircraft was forming in the Thames Estuary, this was picked up by radar, and again the Luftwaffe was heading towards another convoy. This time a medium convoy that had just left the docks in London. The formation consisted of forty-five Dorniers of II and III./KG 2, ten Ju 87 Stukas, and about fifteen Bf 109s. RAF No.74 Sqd (Spitfires) were redirected south to make an interception along with RAF No.54 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No.111 Sqd (Hurricanes). But by all accounts, the weather started to deteriorate rapidly and the mission was aborted.

But the British tried to put pressure on the German landing operations on the French coast. At 1130 hours, fighters from JG 51 intercepted a formation of Spitfires from RAF No. 610 Sqd covering a formation of Blenheims from RAF No. 604 Sqd over Calais. Another 2 Blenheims of 604 Squadron escorted by 3 Spitfires of 152 Squadron attempted to set fire to waterborne He 59s off France. Two Spitfires were shot down in the ensuing combat including the first victory of the war for Uffz. Alfred Rauch of 5./JG 51. Hptm. Ernst Wiggers of 2./JG 51 destroyed a Blenheim from the bomber formation.

Night time missions also began to increase as Göring prepared for 'Alder Tag'. Several He 111s of III./KG 55 took-off from Villacoublay airfield at 2015 hours to bomb the aircraft factory at Filton and the oil tanks at Avonmouth. One bomber crashed returning to France after the mission. At 2335 hours, seven He 111s of II./KG 27 attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Factory and the Avonmouth docks and lost one Heinkel when it crashed in Dorset.

At night a Bristol searchlight team held a He-111H in their beam long enough for a Hurricane of 10 Group to bring about the Groups first night success.

The heaviest day in losses so far found 38 Luftwaffe and 32 RAF planes downed in air battles

 

[Airframes]

Good account Chris. Be aware that the photo, often captioned as pilots scrambling during the BoB, is pre-war, taken at Duxford, and is of 19 Squadron's Spitfires. Note the early 'flat' canopy, lack of armoured wind shield, 'straight' radio mast, and two-bladed prop. Also the half black underside colour.

 

[Njaco]

Yes, I was aware it was early but didn't know it was 19 sqdrn. Thanks! August heats up now!

 

[Njaco]

12 August 1940 Monday

UNITED KINGDOM: Göring ordered Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 to be ready for 'Alderangriff'' to commence the next morning at 0700 hours with the code words 'Alder Tag'.

Hans-Joachim Jabs of 2./JG 27 remembered;

"For some reason, all of us had a gut feeling that something was now about to break. During the previous month we had all been engaged in heavy combat, but by the end of the month all operational missions became few and far between, many squadrons were only going out on spasmodic attacks. We enjoyed the comfort and relaxation of that first week of August, we almost behaved as if there was no war on, although many were asking the question . . . why? Word had got around that the Fuhrer had endorsed a plan of invasion of England and we all believed that this to be somewhere on or about the 10th or 12th of August and I think that this period of quiet that we were experiencing was to get all our aircraft in 100% operational condition. Many trucks were seen arriving at the base and we could only assume that they were bringing in fresh supplies of fuel and ammunition, everyone seemed to know that the planned invasion of England was near. When we were given orders to stand down for 24 hours, we then knew that it must be the next day that the invasion was to start."

The day before the official Adler Tag was due to commence, British radar detected German aircraft at 07:20 hours approaching from the direction of Calais. It was not unusual for German bomber formations to fly directly overhead en route to their target area. But this time it was different, this was a highly skilled Bf 110 operation. As a prelude to Adler Tag, the Luftwaffe decided to target the British coastal radar chain in a series of attacks that moved up and down the coast in stages. Each of the Bf 110s carried a single 500kg bomb, and this elite squadron, Epr.Gr 210, was commanded by Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer who split his Gruppe into four groups of four Bf 110s each shortly after 09:25 hours. At first, he led the section on a westerly course, flying low in an effort to avoid detection, then just south-east of Beachy Head, they swung northwards and headed towards Eastbourne and the white cliffs of Dover. At a pre-determined point, the raiders started to gain height so as to effectively dive bomb their targets. The British radar suddenly picked up the German formation but became bewildered as to how they had suddenly appeared. The twenty-one Bf 109s and Bf 110s were flying directly for Dover, then, as soon as they flew over the coast they suddenly turned and immediately attacked the tall towers of the radar installations. Oblt. Wilhelm Rössiger and his Messerschmitts headed for the radar station at Rye, Oblt. Martin Lutz and his Bf 110s headed for Pevensey, Oblt. Otto Hinze and his flight flew to the radar masts at Dover while Hptm. Rubensdörffer's Zerstörers attacked the station at Dunkirk, near Canterbury.

Hptm. Rubensdörffer reported that the mission was seventy-five percent successful, and Kesselring, to make sure that the RAF radar network was in chaos, sent out Ju 87 Stukas to attack several small convoys in the Thames Estuary. Although Fighter Command's communications were stretched to the limit, Foreland CHL for some reason escaped the early morning attack by Hptm. Rubensdörffer and reported back to HQ that fifty German aircraft had been picked up, with another force of twelve that although separate from the main force were possibly intending to link up and attack the convoys of "Agent" and "Arena" that were cruising in the Estuary. These were the Stukas of IV./LG 1 commanded by Hptm. Erwin Röder who had taken over from Bernd von Brauchitsch on 6 August. Hornchurch dispatched their RAF No.65 Spitfire Sqd and Biggin Hill sent out the Hurricanes of RAF No.501 Sqd to intercept. It was not a good day for Fighter Command. Convoy "Agent" was attacked by the Ju 87s, and the Hurricanes that were trying to stave them off paid a high price. Four of them were shot down and two RAF pilots were killed. Convoy " Arena" lost several vessels sunk or damaged. All the Stukas returned to base.

The convoys "Snail" and "Cable" were subjected to similar raids all day. Fifteen Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 and RAF No. 151 Sqds attacked the Stukas who were in turn bounced by the escorting Bf 109s of III./JG 26. Five RAF fighters were destroyed by the pilots of JG 26 without loss to the Gruppe. Luftwaffe fighter losses to other fighter units amounted to nine Bf 109s destroyed and five returning damaged to France with one from I./JG 2 being written off. After shooting down two British fighters, the Gruppenkommandeur of Werner Mölder's old unit, III./JG 53, Hptm. Harro Harder, was lost over the convoys - shot down by a Spitfire from RAF No. 609 Squadron. He had eleven victories including five Spitfires shot down in a forty-eight hour period. Hptm. Wolf-Dietrich Wilke was named Gruppenkommandeur of III Gruppe.

At 1151 hours, Poling radar detected a large force of raiders over the Channel south of Brighton. This turned out to be a bomber force of fifteen Ju 88s of KG 51 and KG 54, escorted by Bf 110s of ZG 2 and ZG 76. Cover for the formation was provided by twenty-four Bf 109s of JG 53. In all, a total of 200+ aircraft. They kept to their westerly course following the coastline of Sussex until they were south of the triangular shape of the Isle of Wight, then the Kommodore of KG 51 Oberst Dr Fisser led his formation on a heading for Portland giving the RAF the impression that he was going to repeat the bombing of the Dorset town as he had done the previous day. But as the balloon defenses of Portsmouth came into view on his starboard side, he turned his formation northwards.

There were still other radar stations operating, notably the important one at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight, and this was to become the next target for the Luftwaffe, and at the same time, because of the major towns of Portsmouth and Southampton were nearby, attacks could be made on these. The action continued as Oberst Dr Fisser led his Geschwader west, some fifteen miles off the flat west Sussex coast with the triangular configuration of the Isle of Wight dead ahead. Then he ordered his armada sharply to starboard in order to enter Portsmouth harbour through a gap in the balloons. Portsmouth readied for the attack but Fisser and fourteen of his crack crews had other plans, though, and as he circled he watched his bombers going in like a huge serpent in line-astern.

The anti-aircraft fire, from every ship in the harbour, firing for once from a steady gun platform, and from the Army's guns ashore, was in its intensity like nothing Fisser, or any of his crews, had seen before - 4.5 inch, 3 inch, 2 pound pom-poms, Bofors and even 20mm filled the sky with black puffs and criss-crossing tracer. Now Fisser himself turned south-west, losing height and gaining speed rapidly as he raced at 300 mph and at 5,000 feet over Foreland, the eastern tip of the Isle of Wight, heading for the little seaside resort of Ventnor. There, on a strip of high-level ground close to the town, were sited the tall towers of the CH station which covered the whole mid-Channel area, and whose screens were now scarred with the blips from Fisser's main force and, more ominously, the detachment coming directly for the Station. Fisser wasted no time. Like Rubensdörffer, he wanted to get in and out as fast as possible, and he aimed the nose of his Ju 88 at the towers and the buildings, all connected by a criss-cross pattern of white concrete paths. Like most Ju 88 commanders, he favored the shallow dive approach which gave his bomb-aimer the best visibility and more time to make last split-second adjustments than in the 45 degree or steeper approach. Fisser saw no anti-aircraft fire, and it was almost impossible to miss with the four 250 kg, delayed-action, high-explosives they all carried.

Dropping his bombs and lighter by a ton, he pulled up steeply above the scattered boarding- houses and small hotels of the seaside resort, over the chalk cliffs and the breakers on the shore, and watched the bombs explode. Fisser was a veteran of the Polish and French campaigns, had dropped bombs across half of Europe, but he could never have seen such concentrated devastation. The whole target was engulfed by white-and-black clouds, with more exuding from the inferno as he turned away and ordered his planes to close in, climbing at full throttle, to escape the avenging wrath of the British. But already the first reports were coming in from behind that still distant Hurricanes were diving towards them. And, belatedly, the Bofors anti-aircraft fire had burst into action. It was accurate firing, too, and as Fisser continued his turn overland north of Ventnor, he suddenly realized that his whole detached force was in a dangerous position, with a height disadvantage and only a scattering of Bf 110s to give them any support before they could clear the area. RAF No. 145 Sqd Hurricanes were first on the Ventnor scene, but RAF No. 152 Squadron's Spitfires came in seconds later, and a whirling fight ensued before Fisser could get his Ju 88s away.

 

[Njaco]

(12 August 1940 continued....)

One Hurricane of P/O McGregor got on the tail of a Bf 110, ignoring the rear-gunner's fire, and dispatched it with a single burst. Then two more of his squadron began harassing Fisser's Junkers and were joined by two more of RAF No.152's Spitfires. The Kommodore was killed at the controls. The Junkers, trailing flames, dived towards the ground, was pulled up violently, presumably by one of the crew, and headed towards Godshill Park, yawing and only partly under control. It struck the ground heavily, sending up a cloud of pale earth, and slid to a halt, its back broken but the fire self-extinguished. Leutnant Schad and Oberleutnant Luederitz, both wounded, staggered from the wreckage, and their captors succeeded in extricating the fourth crewman, badly burned, a few minutes later. Most of Fisser's Geschwader were still attacking Portsmouth at 12.25 hours as he lay dead in this pleasant park on the Isle of Wight a few miles away. The anti-aircraft fire remained intense and accurate throughout the Portsmouth attack. Ten more Ju 88s fell to RAF fighters' guns from RAF No. 152 Sqd and RAF No. 213 Sqd., or the ground gunners. By a curious freak of the tides in these uncertain waters, the body of Fritz Budig- McGregor's Bf 110 victim - was washed ashore near Gosport, while his pilot's body was found on the beach near Boulogne five weeks later. Five escorting Bf 110s and a Bf 109 were also destroyed.

P/O W.S.Williams a New Zealander, shot down a Ju 88 but was himself forced to belly-land his damaged aircraft at Bembridge. He barely got clear of the blazing Spitfire I (N3175) when it exploded.

Portsmouth was hit hard in this battle, shops, buildings and factories were destroyed, fires broke out in many parts of the city and falling walls and masonry became a hazard. This was the first major attack on an English populated area, and to the British, it was a sign of things to come. 100 civilians died, but as far as the air war was concerned, the British were still losing less than the Luftwaffe. The sudden German attacks caught the British off-guard and put the radar stations at Dover, Pevensey and Rye temporarily out of action. At Pevensey, eight of the 500 lb bombs hit the station with one bomb cutting the main electrical cable. Over Rye, most of the bombs hit empty barracks but still caused enough destruction to halt operations for a few hours. The Dover station was hit hard but the crucial masts were still standing after the attack. The hardest hit was the station at Ventnor, which was out of action for three weeks, leaving a gap in the radar defenses. But other stations were able to mask the outage by transmitting on the same wavelength as Ventnor and the Luftwaffe did not exploit this. Although considerable damage was done, and the attack played havoc with the communications, again, the Luftwaffe onslaught did not attain the success that it had anticipated. Dunkirk continued to transmit as did Pevensey and Dover, after only a brief interruption to communications. By noon all the radar stations were back operational except Ventnor. But Kesselring and Sperrle were convinced that now the radar station attacks had achieved their purpose and that the RAF was now 'without it's eyes'. The Luftwaffe would now impose the next phase of the battle, and that was the destruction of the RAF airfields in southern England. The first three on the list were, Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston.

After returning to base, the warplanes of Epr.Gr 210 were re-armed and refueled and took-off for another mission over England. This time the target was the RAF airfield at Manston. Manston, or 'Charlie 3' as this airfield was known, was the real prime target, it was the most easterly of all the airfields in the south, and another of the all grass airfields which allowed entire squadrons to take off together thus they were in the air and reaching the enemy quicker than if they had to take off in single file on any of the concrete runways. Shortly after 1300 hours, the Bf 110s and bomb-laden Bf 109s dove on the airfield. RAF No 56 Squadron, already airborne and approaching the airfield, tried to intercept the raiders but with so many German planes swirling over the base, a concentrated effort was lost as pilots dove to singly attack different bomber formations.

RAF No 54 Sqd (Spitfires) witnessed the whole of the attack from the air. The Squadron had managed to get off safely before the Epr.Gr 210 Bf110s and Bf 109's arrived and began an interception of the German formation, but RAF No 65 Sqd had a hair raising experience taking off as bombs exploded around them. Only P/O K.G.Hart was injured and his aircraft damaged in the attack. No sooner had RAF No 54 and RAF No 65 Squadrons pushed the Bf 110s and Bf 109's back over the Channel, a formation of thirty Dornier Do 215s of KG 2 led by Oberst Fink escorted by forty Bf 109s came in over the Straits of Dover and headed for Manston again.

This was the first major attack on a British airfield. For two solid hours Manston had been under constant bombardment. The airfield was now a shambles. It is estimated that 150 high explosive bombs fell, destroying hangars, workshops and damaging two Blenheims and the airfield finished up with more holes in the ground than an eighteen hole golf course. After the bombing of Manston, the Luftwaffe diverted their attacks on to the airfields of Lympne and Hawkinge where they were bombed by Ju 88s of II./KG 76. Hawkinge suffered a similar fate as Manston with hangars and huts destroyed and twenty five large, and numerous small craters appearing all over the airfield, enough to put Hawkinge out of action for three days. Lympne also suffered in the attack. Hptm. Kurt Fischer's I./JG 26 provided close escort for the Lympne bombers from KG 3 and beat off an interception by RAF No. 601 Sqd. Spitfires. Two Spitfires were shot down but the Gruppe lost Oblt. Friedrich Butterweck when his Bf 109 exploded over Ashford.

A fighter sweep over Dover by III./JG 26 failed to enticed any British fighters to battle but part of the Gruppe managed to become entangled in the combat over Manston. Three Spitfires were shot down, one by Lt. Heinz Ebeling of 8./JG 26 for his third of the day, and one each for Fw. Gerhard Gryzmalla of 8./JG 26 and Lt. Johannes Naumann of 9./JG 26. P/O A.Geoffrey Page of No 56 Squadron was shot down in flames while attacking some Do 17's, baling out of his Hurricane I (P2970) "Little Willie" over the Channel and was rescued, badly burned.

The Bf 109s of II./JG 52 flew their first mission over the Channel coast from Pas de Calais and lost three aircraft and pilots. Uffz Leo Zaunbrecher of 2./JG 52, flying Bf 109E 'Red 14', was damaged in combat with P/O J. McLintock of RAF No. 615 Squadron and crash landed in a cornfield near Selmeston, Sussex.

Lt. Max-Hellmut Ostermann of 7./JG 54 described his Geschwader's actions;

"In comparison with my combats in France, I was very calm. I didn't fire, but tried again and again to get into a good position. But every time I got there the Tommy would break away . . . Finally my chance came. Below, I saw a Bf 109, and 200 metres behind him, a Spitfire. I peeled off and dived, turning in behind him. Now it was I who sat 200 metres behind the Tommy. Be calm; don't fire yet! I applied full power and slowly closed the gap, as the Tommy did with his own target. Now, at 100 metres, the wing-span filled the Revi gunsight. Suddenly the Tommy opened fire, and the Messerschmitt in front broke away. I had pressed the gun button at the same instant, aiming dispassionately as we went into a slight left-hand turn. My first shots hit. The Spit streamed a long grey smoke trail and dived steeply into the sea, just off the coast. A great column of water marked the impact. At once I called my victory over the radio, and had enough witnesses to confirm my crash. My first Tommy was down."

It now seemed that the stage had been set. The Luftwaffe knew of the importance of the British radar, but they knew little about the basic fundamentals of how it was working for Fighter Command. They knew that the radar was the 'eyes' of the RAF, and that before making any attempt at engineering raids on RAF installations and facilities this radar had to be knocked out. They had tried, but only to find out that within hours, the radar stations were back in operational status once more. Even Ventnor, which they thought had been totally destroyed, was much to their surprise back in operation within four weeks.

Thirty-one German aircraft on this day were shot down, but it was not a day that favored the RAF as twenty-two fighter planes were destroyed and eleven pilots were killed.

During a return flight from a night mission to attack Bristol, a He 111 from 9./KG 55 crashed at Rambervillers, France, killing two crew members. The night bombers begin to switch targets from docks and shipping to RAF airfields. Soon after midnight He 111s of II./KG 27 attacked the RAF airfield at Sealand, Cheshire.

The pilots and personnel of JG 3 met a newcomer. When Obstlt. Hassel von Wedel, an old World War I friend of Göring and newly appointed as the official historian of the Luftwaffe, demanded to be placed at a front-line fighter group, Göring posted him to JG 3 to record the upcoming battle. He arrived this day to the airfield at Samer.

The first Bristol Beaufighters were delivered to the Fighter Interception Unit at Tangmere, equipped with A.I. MkIV (airborne interception) radar. An experimental British radar, using the cavity magnetron which was developed only six months earlier, tracks an aircraft for the first time.

 

[timmo]

Naco - how can I best print out your whole story without other comment?

That photo - it makes me squirm to see idiots doing the 'egg spoon race' carrying their 'chutes risking a trip by various leads/connections.

I would have been airborne before they reached their aircraft!!

= Tim

 

[Glider]

Personally I am cutting and pasting each days onto a word document.

 

[Njaco]

Sorry, each post is limited to 1000 words so some days get 2 posts. Sorry guys.

 

[Njaco]

I will be away for the next few days so I am putting the reports for the next 3 days on now.

 

[Njaco]

13 August 1940 Tuesday

"ADLERTAG"
UNITED KINGDOM: The second phase of the "Battle of Britain" began in earnest as the Luftwaffe switched from destroying convoys to targeting RAF airfields and radar stations in an effort to finally destroy the RAF before the invasion.

With the beautiful weather of the past two days and the promise of more of the same, Reichsmarschall Göring had ordered that the planned attack against the RAF would begin at 0700 hours on the 13th. But with the morning came fog, cloud and moisture, forcing Göring to again postpone the day's mission. But as the recall order was issued, several formations of bombers and fighters were already airbourne and failing to get the recall order, continued on to their objectives. Instead of the mass attack that was planned, the day's activities turned into a smattering of confused raids and attacks.

As early as 05:30 radar stations identified two forces, about 60 aircraft, assembling over France, so 11 Group ordered two squadrons, Nos. 64 and 111, to protect damaged Hawkinge and Manston, assuming the enemy would, logically, hit them again. Hurricanes from North Weald took station over a Thames convoy, while others watched over Tangmere. A Do17P was shot down at 06:20 off Kent by Sq. Ldr. A.G. Malan partnered by Flg. Off. J.C. Mungo Park (74 Sqn.)

Fifty-five Dornier Do 17s of KG 2 mounted the day's first raids against the naval base at Sheerness and the airfield at Eastchurch. The thick cloud served to hide them until they split, one group to Eastchurch Coastal Command airfield, a smaller group to Sheerness dockyard. Already in the air at 0730 hours when the recall order came through, Kanalkampfführer Oberst Johannes Fink, the Kommodore of KG 2, led his Kampfgeschwader to the rendezvous point of the fighter escort only to find a few Bf 110s, trying to turn the bombers back by flying up and down and around the bombers. Ignoring the twin-engined fighters, Oberst Fink along with Oblt. Weitkus' II./KG 2 and Major Fuchs' III./KG 2, set course for the Thames. Dropping down to 1500 feet, the bombers encountered no defending British fighters on their way to the target. There were none, since the British radar operators had designated the formation as "only a few aircraft', no fighter squadrons were dispatched. The bombers arrived at Eastchurch with none of the escorting of Bf 110s in sight, and, with surprise, totally destroyed the airfield including five Blenheim bombers. Only on the return flight was the formation intercepted by RAF Nos.74 and 151 Squadron and lost five bombers to the fighters. Hurricane L1750, the first cannon-armed Hurricane, flown by Flt. Lt. R. Smith scored a certain success and RAF No. 111 Sqn then joined in. After continuing to search the skies for his escorting fighters to get the Spitfires off his back, Oberst Fink finally guided the bomber formations to cloud cover in an attempt to evade the British fighters and soon the Spitfire attacks broke off. Returning to base, Oberst Fink discovered that "Alder Tag" and the day's operations had been cancelled and his Kampfgeschwader lost several crews for nothing. 100 bombs were dropped on Eastchurch killing 16 men, injuring 48 and destroying one Spitfire of 266 Sqn. The station was fully operational by evening. Five Do 17s were shot down.

Despite the weather turning even worse in the afternoon, Göring decided to begin "Alder Tag" precisely at 1400 hours and more raids were scheduled. The first mission was complex, using a flight of Bf 110s to draw away British fighters while a second flight of German bombers attacked airfield targets. Chosen as the lead diversion were twenty-three Bf 110s of Hptm. Liensberger's V(Z)./LG 1 who were ordered only to make the English coast and then freiejagd over the countryside. Believing that the British radar stations were down from the previous day's missions, they crossed the coast around the appointed time of 1400 hours and several RAF squadrons bit at the bait and took off to intercept. This happened even though Air Marshall Dowding had forbidden his fighters from having direct contact with Luftwaffe fighters. The misunderstanding was because as the radar reports indicated a formation approaching, it didn't give the type of aircraft, so instead of German bombers, the British fighters came upon Hptm. Liensberger's Bf 110s. As the Messerschmitts crossed the coast, fifty British Spitfires engaged the twin-engined Zerstörers from the rear. Before Hptm. Liensberger could get his flight into a defensive circle, two Bf 110s were shot down by the British. The Spitfires then flew directly into the circle, firing upon every German fighter that they could. But this presented an easy target for some of the Zerstörer rear gunners who sent some of the British fighters back to bases, spouting black smoke. Finally the German flight broke from the combat and headed for home. Upon reaching the Caen airfield, Hptm. Liensberger found that five of his Bf 110s were shot down and several others badly damaged.

But the effort was a waste of time. On the German side, the plan was to engage and tie up the British fighters so the bombers could get through unharmed. But as with many things, timing was everything. Instead of the bombers arriving twenty to thirty minutes after the fighter battle to find the British fighters refueling, weather caused the bombers to arrive three hours later, when the Spitfires and Hurricanes, landed and refueled and re-armed, were waiting.

At 1700 hours, the German bomber formations crossed the coast again, this time fifty-two Ju 87s of Major Graf Schönborn's StG 77 escorted by Bf 109s of Oblt. Max Ibel's JG 27, to their west were 30 Ju 87s of II./StG 2, on course for Southampton and Middle Wallop. Forward support was provided by Bf 109s of JG 53 which swept between the Isle of Wight and Lyme Bay until they ran low on fuel. Increasing heavy cloud cover and weather over the entire area caused the Stukas to miss their targets. Near the airfields, the Ju 87s were intercepted by seventy British fighters who became entangled with the Messerschmitt escorts. But while the battle was joined among the English and Germans, one squadron of fifteen Spitfires from RAF No. 609 was able to dive past the Bf 109s and attacked the Stukas II./StG 2. Five German dive-bombers were shot down, the day being noted as the 'glorious 13th' in the Squadron's records.

A second wave of Ju 88 bombers from Oberst Bülowius' LG 1 also failed to find their targets in the bad weather and set off for targets of opportunity. Hptm. Kern and his I./LG 1 attacked the installations at Southampton while six other Ju 88s bombed the fighter base at Middle Wallop. Another attack on Middle Wallop strayed and attacked Andover instead. Twelve German bombers badly damaged the airfield at Andover but the base was not part of the vital RAF fighter command chain of bases.

 

[Njaco]

13 August 1940 continued.......

As Andover was attacked, a third flight of dive-bombers from StG 2 attacked two targets on the Thames Estuary. Escorted by fighters from JG 26 who cleared intercepting British fighters out of the way, eighty-six Ju 87s Ju87s of LG 1 reached the airfield at Detling unscathed. At 1815 hours, the Stukas destroyed the airfield, killing 67 and destroying 22 aircraft on the ground but the landing strip was, again, not a vital fighter sector station. It was a Coastal Command airfield performing sea patrol and reconnaissance. The station was functional the next day. The second target - Rochford on the north bank of the Estuary - was left alone when the Stukas couldn't find the airfield because of the thick cloud cover. They returned to base still carrying their bombs. KG 54 attacked the aerodromes at Odiham and RAE Farnborough, but the formations were broken up by RAF fighters.

Despite claiming victory and success, "Alder Tag" was a miserable failure when instead of destroying important RAF fighter airfields the Luftwaffe for the most part succeeded only in attacking insignificant air bases. The Luftwaffe mounted some 1,485 sorties while Fighter Command opposed with 727 defensive sorties. In combat the Germans lost twenty bombers with fourteen badly damaged; fifteen Bf 110s with six damaged; and nine Bf 109s destroyed. Fighter Command lost fourteen fighters and six damaged and no significant damage to airfields or command and control.

Oblt. Werner Machold of 1./JG 2 destroyed a RAF Hurricane over Brighton in the morning. But his Geschwader lost two Messerschmitts from combat damage including the plane of Oblt. Paul Temme of the Stab I./JG 2 who was shot down and made a prisoner of war by the British. Oblt. Temme had six victories. (see pic below of Temme's Bf 109 crash)

The Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 51, Hptm. Hans-Heinrich Brustellin destroyed a British aircraft to increase his victory total.

In the evening two Heinkel He 111s dropped bombs over the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton around midnight. Other bombers dropped equipment such as parachutes, radios and maps over the Midlands of England and the lowlands of Scotland in an effort to make the British believe that a parachute landing had been made. He-111s of Kgr 100 equipped with the X-Gerat navigational system attacked the Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich, Birmingham.

 

[Njaco]

14 August 1940 Wednesday

UNITED KINGDOM: The weather continued to worsen and prevented the Luftwaffe from following up the raids of the 13th with a large attack, even one at Gruppe strength. Instead several missions were planned but without an all-out effort, not much was achieved.

At 1200 hours, sixteen Bf 110s of Epr.Gr 210 were able to again elude discovery and attack RAF Manston airfield, losing several Zerstörers to the defending anti-aircraft fire. The Messerschmitt of Lt. Brinkmann was hit by the airfield defenses and collided with the Bf 110 of Uffz. Steding, causing both planes to crash to the ground. Everyone on board was killed except for Gefr. Schank, who was captured by the British with severe wounds. Only four bombs hit the airfield destroying a Puss Moth, damaging three Blenheims of No 600 Squadron and four hangars were left blazing at the airfield. Three and a half squadrons of 11 Group (forty-two fighters of RAF Nos. 32, 65, 610 and 615 Sqdrns) were in the area but mainly above cloud dealing with Bf 110s and Bf 109s from JG 26. Fighter Command lost 9 fighters while JG 26 lost one Bf 109.

At 12:00 hours, five raids totaling some 300 aircraft approached the Kentish Coast between North Foreland and Dover. At 12:20 the main Stuka force attacked Hawkinge and Dover, with a detachment sinking the Gate Light Vessel killing two crew. This was the attack that the Bf 109s of JG 26 were escorting when they became entangled with the fighters from 11 Group. The successful intervention of JG 26 allowed only one Ju 87 to be lost from the raid. A mid-afternoon raid by Do 17s on Pevensey was thwarted and the attackers forced to jettison their load, but a later raid on Pevensey put four bombs in the radar station.

Middle Wallop Aerodrome was attacked four times between 17:07 and 19:35 hours. About 20 HE were dropped and two hangars were reported to have been seriously damaged. Three airmen and one civilian were killed. During the same period, Andover Aerodrome was also attacked, 15 HE bombs being dropped which destroyed a transmitting set in the centre of a group of W/T masts, and killed a civilian operator. About 20 HE were dropped in the St Denys area of Southampton at 17:05 hours causing damage to the main railway tracks and to rolling stock. The main line was blocked with debris.

Fighters of II./JG 52 lost three more aircraft and pilots over the Channel. In the afternoon the Ju 88s of I./LG 1 bombed the railway station at Westons Mare and the Whitchurch airport. For alittle over two hours beginning at 15:51 hours, He 111s of III./KG 27 raided the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton again and a factory north of Bristol. The bombers were intercepted over the Severn Estuary by Spitfires from RAF No. 92 Squadron. Three He 111s were shot down, two of the bombers crashing in Somerset and the third lost in the Bristol Channel.

Although no operational training units were involved in the battle, No. 7 OTU at Hawarden, Flintshire, formed a battle flight to deal with emergencies. On the 14th, after hearing explosions and gun-fire in the area, Wing Commander Hallings-Pott accompanied by S/L J. S. McLean and P/O P. V. Ayerst, took off in Spitfires and intercepted a He 111, shooting it down near Chester.

In a battle over Dover, Bf 109s of JG 51 engaged British warplanes. Experten of JG 51 adding to their scores were Ofw. Arthur Dau of 7./JG 51 shot down his sixth Allied aircraft – a Hurricane, Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 brought his score to fourteen with a destroyed Hurricane and Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 added to his victory total by defeating a British Spitfire.

There was very slight Luftwaffe activity at night, but a He 111, which appeared in North Wales, was subsequently shot down near Sealand by anti-aircraft fire. Oberst Alois Stöckl, Gruppenkommandeur of KG 55, was killed in the He 111 near Wallop and was replaced with Oblt. Hans Körte the next day. There were a few raids in Aberdeenshire and over convoys off Kinnaird's Head.

Losses: Luftwaffe 21 : Fighter Command 6

GERMANY: The personnel of 6./KG 55 lost a He 111 due to engine failure near Giessen, Germany.

Tonight an air raid alert was sounded in Berlin at 01:35 and ended at 02:22. This was the third alert in the German capital since the outbreak of war. No explosions could be heard from the vantage point on the United Press offices, nor were any searchlights seen operating. The German Ministry of Propaganda released no details.

 

[Njaco]

15 August 1940 Thursday

GERMANY: In Germany, Reichsmarschall Göring conducted a morning meeting at Karinhall with his Luftflotten commanders, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring of Luftflotte 2 and Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle of Luftflotte 3. After discussing the outcome of "Alder Tag" on the 13 August and the reports of the bomber and fighter crews, the Reichsmarschall issued the following orders:

1. The fighter escort defenses of our Stuka formations must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuka operations. It appears necessary to allocate three fighter Gruppen to each Stuka Gruppe, one of these fighter Gruppen remains with the Stukas, and dives with them to the attack; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude and engages the fighter defenses; the third protects the whole attack from above. It will also be necessary to escort Stukas returning from the attack over the Channel.

2. Night attacks on shipping targets are only fruitful when the night is so clear that careful aim can be taken.

3. More importance must be attached to co-operation between members of individual aircrews. Seasoned crews are not to be broken up except in cases of utmost urgency.

4. The incident of V(Z)LGI on August 13 shows that certain unit commanders have not yet learnt the importance of clear orders.

5. I have repeatedly given orders that twin-engined fighters are only to be employed where the range of other fighters is inadequate, or where it is for the purpose of assisting our single-engined aircraft to break off combat. Our stocks of twin-engined fighters are not great, and we must use them as economically as possible.

6. Until further orders, operations are to be directed exclusively against the enemy Air Force, including the targets of the enemy aircraft industry allocated to the different Luftflotten. Shipping targets, and particularly large naval vessels, are only to be attacked where circumstances are especially propitious. For the moment, other targets should be ignored. We must concentrate our efforts on the destruction of the enemy Air Forces. Our night attacks are essentially dislocation raids, made so that the enemy defenses and population shall be allowed no respite. Even these, however, should where possible be directed against Air Force targets.

7. My orders regarding the carrying out of attacks by single aircraft under cover of cloud conditions have apparently not been correctly understood. Where on one afternoon 50 aircraft are dispatched without adequate preparation on individual missions, it is probable that the operation will be unsuccessful and very costly. I therefore repeat that such sorties are to undertaken only by specially selected volunteer crews, who have made a prolonged and intensive study of the target, the most suitable method of attack, and the particular navigational problems involved. By no means all our crews are qualified to undertake such risks.

8. KG2 100 (bombers) is also in future, to operate against the enemy Air Force and aircraft industry.

9. It is doubtful if there is any point in continuing the attacks on radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of operation.

10. The systematic designation of alternative targets would appear frequently to lead to certain targets being attacked which have absolutely no connection with our strategic aims. It must therefore be achieved that even alternative targets are of importance in the battle against the enemy Air Force.

11. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Luftflotten are to report to me on the question of the warnings to be given during enemy penetrations over the Reich. At present, the warnings are causing a loss of output whose consequences are far graver than those caused by the actual bomb damage. In addition, the frequent air raid warnings are leading to nervousness and strain among the population of Western Germany. On the other hand, we must take into account the risk of heavy loss of life should an attack be launched before a waning has been given.

Regarding the targeting of radar installations or Funkmess as the Germans called it, Reichsmarschall Göring ordered,

"From now on we shall waste no more time on the British radar installations."

This decision will have grave consequences in the days to come and for the battle.

UNITED KINGDOM: "BLACK THURSDAY"
The day begins with Luftwaffe reconnaissance sorties during which a Do 17 of 3(F)/31 is shot down south of Ventnor by Spitfires.

Over the French airfields the day dawned with cold, grey clouds and any morning operations were cancelled. But the clouds suddenly disappeared in the early afternoon and the air fleets of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3 began preparations to continue with the battle. And for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, bombers from Luftflotte 5 were to participate. But from Germany came the order that due to the weather, no attacks were to be mounted. Again, this recall comes too late as several flights were already on their way to England.

The first to take-off for England were forty-five Ju 87 Stukas of Hptm. Keil's II./StG 1 and Hptm. von Brauchitsch's IV (St)./LG 1 who crossed the Channel with their two Gruppen of Bf 109 escorts from JG 26. At 11:25 hours, the Stukas with escort reached the coast on their way to bomb Lympne and Hawkinge. 24 of the Stukas turned towards Folkestone and they were intercepted by British fighters who shot down the lead aircraft. The two airfields in the Kent countryside were hit hard with Lympne so damaged that the base was out of action for the next two days. As the Stukas dove on Hawkinge, they were met with Hurricanes from RAF No. 501 Squadron who immediately shot down two of the dive-bombers. The Hurricanes were then pounced on by the escorts from JG 26 and lost two of their fighters to the Bf 109s. Over Lympne, RAF No. 54 Squadron tried to reach the German bombers, but the Messerschmitts of III./JG 26 succeeded in keeping the Spitfires off the bombers and shot down two of the fighters from RAF No. 54 Squadron, with one victory going to Major Adolf Galland. When the Stukas were safely on their way to France, Major Galland gathered together his flight from JG 26 and over the Channel took on the remaining Spitfires from RAF No. 54 Squadron. He shot down one British fighter and just missed getting a second. Lympne was put out of action for two days.

The next attack was left to Luftflotte 5 out of Norway. Shortly after 1330 hours, sixty-five He 111s from I. and III./ KG 26 took off from Stavanger airfield and headed out over the North Sea to attack the airfields at Dishforth, Usworth and Linton-upon-Ouse. Believing that most of Fighter Command's Hurricanes and Spitfires would be tied up down in the south, the only escort for the bombers were twenty-one Bf 110s belonging to I./ZG 76, equipped with extra fuel tanks - called 'Dachshunds' by the Germans - for the 1,100 mile flight. No Bf 109 Fighter Gruppen were assigned the escort duty - with Fighter Command busy with its few remaing fighters, there would be no need for escorts. In an effort to counter-act the British radar defenses, the Germans outfitted the Gruppenkommandeur's Bf 110 - Hptm. Werner Restemeyer's aircraft named "Dora" - with several radio listening devices. Handling the radio duties was Hptm. Hartwich from X Fliegerkorps' radio intercept company. It was hoped that by listening in on Fighter Command's radio transmissions, Hptm. Restemeyer could then direct the bomber formation away from British fighters.

As a diversion for the attack, a flight of twenty seaplanes was sent to the Firth of Forth, seventy-five miles north of the airfield targets of KG 26, hoping to attract any remaining British fighters away. But navigational errors brought KG 26's bombers over the exact same course as the seaplanes, seventy-five miles off course. The seaplanes did their job, bringing several squadrons of British fighters up to intercept them. Instead of seaplanes, what the Spitfires and Hurricanes found were the Heinkels of KG 26.

 

[Njaco]

(15 August 1940 continued....)

The German formation was slaughtered. For nearly fifteen minutes, the bombers were attacked by Spitfires from RAF No. 72 and 79 Squadrons, breaking from formation and dropping their bomb loads into the sea and countryside. One of the first Spitfires to attack hit Hptm. Restemeyer's Bf 110 "Dora" and exploded the extra fuel tank. The Gruppenkommandeur was last seen plunging into the sea in flames. The rearguard of the Bf 110 formation, Uffz. Karl Richter, was hit in the head and lost consciousness. His radio-operator, Uffz. Hans Geishecker, thinking his pilot was dead, baled from the Messerschmitt and into the sea. But Uffz. Richter woke up in time to bring his Zerstörer out of the fall and took his crippled machine back for a crash landing at Esbjerg. Uffz. Geishecker was never heard from again. Richter was taken to the St. Josef hospital in Esbjerg where he was treated for the shot in the head.

Meanwhile the rest of the Bf 110s did their best to protect the bombers. Oblt. Uellenbeck ordered the remaining five aircraft of 2./ZG 76 to attack the British fighters and led the squadron into the battle, hitting one of the Spitfires and causing it to trail smoke. Outnumbered, the Bf 110s formed a defensive circle and tried their best to get back to base. Oblt. Gordon Gollob's 3./ZG 76 managed to stay with KG 26's bombers but after a few minutes combat with the British, the squadron was down to only four aircraft. One of those missing was Fw. Linke who managed to re-cross the North Sea on one engine and land at Jever. He was finally credited with the destruction of two Spitfires.

What was left of the bomber formation, tried to fly south in search of their targets but after more attacks by additional Hurricanes and Spitfires arriving on the scene, most of the Heinkels crews dropped their loads and headed for home. The final score for this first attack in the Battle of Britain of Luftflotte 5 was six Bf 110s and eight bombers shot down into the North Sea. During the attack 8./KG 26 lost five aircraft. The raiders claimed eleven British fighters shot down. The effort from Luftflotte 5 wasn't over.

While KG 26 was getting mauled, fifty Ju 88s from I., II. and III./KG 30, again unescorted, were sent to attack the RAF bomber airfield at Driffield. Met at the coastline by Hurricanes, the bombers broke through the British fighters from 12 Group and successfully bombed the airfield, losing six Ju 88s for the effort. Leaving the airfield and hangars a flame - including an ammunition dump which suffered a direct hit and twelve Whitley bombers totally destroyed - the remaining bombers of KG 30 turned and made for their airbases in Denmark. The contribution from Luftflotte 5 was done for the day.

While the German bombers from Norway and Denmark were turning for home, the next major Luftwaffe raid commenced. Beginning at 14:50 hours, all three Gruppen of Do 17s from KG 3 totaling eighty-eight bombers, took off from bases in Belgium and head for RAF targets south of the Thames. Along for the raid was the Kommodore of KG 3, Generalmajor von Chamier-Glisczinski flying at the head of Hptm. Pilger's II./KG 3 formation which contained thirty Dorniers. The Gruppe's target was Rochester. The bombers under Hptm. Rathmann's III./KG 3 were to again bomb the Coastal Command airfield at Eastchurch. Escorting the Dorniers were one hundred and thirty Bf 109s from Major Handrick's JG 26, Major Mölder's JG 51, Major Trübenbach's JG 52 and Major Mettig's JG 54. The heavy escort prevented the British fighters from successfully attacking the bombers and as such only two Dorniers were lost along with four Bf 109s. The airfields were badly damaged including the Short aircraft works which was developing the Stirling four-engined bomber. I. and II./KG 3 attacked the Short and Pubjoy factories at Rochester and managed to drop eight bombs near the target.

Major Adolf Galland was up for the second time of the day when his III./JG 26 were ordered to fly a fighter sweep over the south-east of England in support of the bombers. Because of the large number of escorting fighters engaged with the RAF, several Luftwaffe pilots added to their scores. The most successful were Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 and Hptm. Horst Tietzen of 5./JG 51. Hptm. Tietzen destroyed three British Hurricanes to bring his total to eighteen kills. Hptm. Oesau downed two Spitfires over Folkestone for sixteen kills then destroyed a barrage balloon over Dover. Other pilots successful in English skies were Ofw. Fritz Beeck of 6./JG 51 for his third kill, Oblt. Josef Fözö and Lt. Heinz Tornow of 4./JG 51, Otto Tange of 5./JG 51, Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 and Oblt. Hermann Staiger of 7./JG 51 who also destroyed a barrage balloon over Dover. The RCAF gets its first kill when Ernest McNab shoots down a Dornier bomber.

Just before the Dorniers of KG 3 reached their targets, twelve Bf 110s and Bf 109s of Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer's Epr.Gr 210 snuck through the radar defenses and bombed the airfield at Martlesham Heath. Late in the afternoon, 12 Ju 88s from I./LG 1 bombed Middle Wallop, and 15 aircraft from II./LG 1 attacked Worthy Down. I./LG 1 destroyed several Spitfires on the ground; but II./LG 1 was less successful, only three aircraft reached their target; and no less than 5 aircraft from 4./LG 1 were shot down. Only the Staffelkapitan and one other crew survived.

 

[Njaco]

(15 Augut 1940 continued....)

10 Group scrambled its largest number of fighters when 80 bombers headed towards Swanage and Southampton shortly after 17:00. Three squadrons made for Swanage to engage about 40 Ju 87s protected by Bf 109s and Bf 110s, all heading for Portland. RAF Nos. 87 and 213 Squadrons tackled the bombers and the '110s, leaving 14 Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Squadron to engage first the Bf 110s and then the Bf 109s, which in overwhelming their interceptors shot down four. Nevertheless, the Stukas had been forced to jettison their loads.

Because of the severe losses, Luftflotte 5 was withdrawn from any more operations over England. Hptm. Graf von Stillfried was made Gruppenkommandeur of I./ZG 76 in Hptm. Restemeyer's place. Hptm. Rolf Kaldrack was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of III./ZG 76 in place of Hptm. Friedrich-Karl Dickore.

Returning from a mission raid on Plymouth, Devon, an He 111 from 2./KG 55 force landed near Granville, France with several members wounded and one killed.

In the early evening KG 27 conducted several missions to Bristol. III./KG 27 sent its He 111s to raid the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton at 08:00 hours but the mission was aborted. Later II./KG 27 sent He 111s over the airplane factory at Filton and the Avonmouth docks a little before 0100 hours.

The Luftwaffe made 1,266 fighter sorties and 520 bomber runs, losing seventy-five aircraft over England including twenty-six Bf 110 Zerstörers. Major Adolf Galland of III./JG 26 commented on the problems facing the Jagdwaffe pilots,

"Two or three sorties daily was the rule, and the briefing read: 'Freie Jagd over south-east England.' The physical as well as the mental strain on the pilots was considerable. The ground personnel and the planes themselves were taxed to the limit . . . Failure to achieve any noticeable success, constantly changing orders betraying lack of purpose and obvious misjudgment of the situation by the Command, and unjustified accusations had a most demoralizing effect on us fighter pilots . . . We complained of the leadership, the bombers, the Stukas and were dissatisfied with ourselves. We saw one comrade after the other, old and tested brothers in combat, vanish from our ranks. Not a day passed without a place remaining empty at the mess table. The reproaches from higher quarters became unbearable. We had the impression that whatever we did we were bound to be in the wrong . . . In those days all the loudspeakers of the 'Greater German Reich' from Aachen to Tilsit, from Flensburg to Innsbruck, and from the army stations of most of the occupied countries, blared out the song 'Bomben auf En-ge-land'. We pilots could not stand this song from the very start."

Luftwaffe losses, 75 aircraft, RAF losses, 35.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Excellent, THANKS!!!!

 

[T Bolt]

Wonderful!! Your doing a brilliant job Chris

 

[Njaco]

16 August 1940 Friday

UNITED KINGDOM: Though the weather was good for operations, the German attacks started in the late morning. The day was marked by three great assaults. At midday the Germans operated over Kent and the Thames Estuary; a little later they attacked objectives in Sussex and Hampshire; and in the early evening they crossed the coast almost simultaneously at four points between Harwich and the Isle of Wight. Main stream attacks were at Biggin Hill, Kenley, Croydon and the Northolt airfields. Other forces attacked Manston, West Malling, Tangmere, Gosport, Lee-on-Solent, Farnborough and Harwell. The London suburbs of Esher, Malden and Wimbledon were bombed, and other raids on Harrow and Wealdstone, Gravesend and Tilbury. Ventnor radar, although still out of action was bombed again. It was typical, however, of the weaknesses of the German plan, or German intelligence, that only three of the eight airfields attacked were used by Fighter Command.

At 1200 hours a formation of 100 Do 17s and Bf 109s headed to the Thames Estuary. This force was one of three sent to targets in the British Isles. One squadron of Spitfires and two squadrons of Hurricanes were sent to engage the bombers. At 1215 hours a larger formation of bombers crossed the coast at Kent and was intercepted by three squadrons of RAF fighters. All three fighter squadrons decided to attack together at the middle of the bomber formation in an attempt to separate the flight. Soon numerous planes were weaving about the sky as bombers and fighters mixed together. The Hurricane of RAF F/L Henry Ferris, caught up in the confusion, collided with a Dornier bomber and both aircraft crashed to the ground. The Spitfire of S/L Rodney Wilkinson of RAF No. 266 Squadron collided with the Bf 109 of Uffz. E. Buder, who baled out and was captured. S/L Wilkinson was then bounced by two Bf 109s and shot down in flames and killed. Ten Luftwaffe aircraft were lost in the combat against six fighters lost by the RAF. Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 shot down two Spitfires off Cap Gris Nez for his seventeenth and eighteenth victories.

KG 2 's attack coming in over Dover and the North Foreland resulted in 80 bombs falling on West Malling airfield, 66 of them exploding in surrounding farmland. Two Ju 88s attacked the aerodrome at Brize Norton and destroyed 46 training aircraft.

At 1300 hours a third large build-up of enemy aircraft was picked up by the Chain Home RDF stations setting course towards the English coast from Cherbourg. This formation of about 150 aircraft comprised a large formation of fifty-four Ju 87 (Stuka) of StG 2, Ju 88s of KG 54 and escorting Bf109E fighters of II./JG 2 and Bf 110s of III./ZG 76. When the Stukas reached the Nab Tower, east of the Isle of Wight, the leading aircraft fired off signal flares and the force split into three groups; a small group peeled off to attack the Ventnor Chain Home station, a second group set course towards Portsmouth, where later they attacked Gosport, and the largest group headed for RAF Tangmere. Challenged by Hurricanes of RAF Nos. 1, 43 and 601 Squadrons along with 602 Sqn. Spitfires tackling the escort, 17 Stukas were claimed by the RAF, the Luftwaffe admitting to losing 9. Despite being intercepted by the Hurricanes, several Stukas dropped their loads over the airfield, destroying seven Hurricane fighters, six radar-equipped Blenheim fighters of the Fighter Interception Unit and a Magister trainer on the ground. Two hangers were destroyed and three others were badly damaged as well as the workshop, fire hydrants and pumphouse, all of which received direct hits; stores, sick quarters, the officers mess and the command post were partially hit causing severe structural damage A squadron of Hurricanes got past the escort and managed to destroy eight Stukas and damaged six more before the dive-bombers headed for home with several more smoking on the return flight. 43 Squadron lost four Hurricanes on the ground, and another flown by P/O C. A. Woods-Scawen crashed on the Isle of Wight although the aircraft was destroyed, the pilot was unhurt. The Ju 87s claimed two Hurricanes shot down including one from RAF No. 601 Squadron - P/O W. Fiske. William M. Fiske, III - the first American to join the RAF was killed when he force-landed Hurricane P3358, which was then strafed and burnt. He will become the only American buried at St. Paul's Cathedral in London. The inscription reads: "An American citizen who died that England might live."

Ten minutes later, Tangmere airfield was again attacked, this time by Ju 88s from Luftflotte 3. This attack was far more accurate than the earlier one with every building or hanger being hit. Aircraft in the open and in hangers were damaged, totaling fourteen RAF planes destroyed on the ground. P/O Frank Carey, later Group Captain, CBE, DFC and two bars, AFC, DFM, U. S. Silver Star, summed up his part in the action:

"This was the first time that Tangmere itself was attacked – with considerable success too. We met the raid head-on over Selsey Bill. Due to our positioning, we were only able to fire on about the second wave, leaving the leaders more or less undisturbed in their bombing. However, we were very lucky that our head-on attack so demoralized the Ju 87s that they, and the successive waves behind them, broke up. Some dropped their bombs into the sea in an effort to get away."

The German attack was not only fought in the air. Second Lieutenant E. P. Griffin of the Royal Engineers Construction Company based at RAF Tangmere, on hearing the air raid warning, went to his battle position and with his Lewis machine gun shot down a Messerschmitt Bf110. The aircraft crashed three-quarters of a mile from the aerodrome, killing the three members of its crew. A few days later his colleagues presented him with a cartoon entitled, "The Glorious 16th of August 1940".

The Ventnor radar station, out of operation since the attack of 12 August, was attacked by five Ju 87s. After five minutes of bombing the station it was again put out of action though with considerably more damage than before. It would take until 23 September, before the station was back on-line.

More Luftwaffe action was seen over the Naval establishments of Gosport and Lee on Solent. Both these bases, although not belonging to Fighter Command, were targets for the Luftwaffe and they came under constant bombing attacks. This raid caused serious bomb damage to HMS Daedalus, three hangers and forty two aircraft were destroyed, 14 people were killed and 5 wounded. Just some of the aircraft damaged in the air raid included the DH 86 AX841 (ex G-ACZO) W9374 Percival Q.6 W9374 (ex G-AFFE) and DH 94 G-AFNY The Grange RAF Station base of Gosport suffered heavily as several buildings were damaged and a number of people killed. RAF No. 213 Squadron Exeter (Hurricanes) and 249 Squadron Boscombe Down (Hurricanes) were involved in combat over Southampton and Portland with both squadrons losing aircraft.

The determination of the British pilots was shown when at 1345 hours a flight of three Ju 88s was bounced by Spitfires over the Solent. Trying to join in the attack with his Hurricane was F/L James Nicholson of RAF No. 249 Squadron. As he turned to join the combat, his plane was hit by cannon fire from a Bf 110. A second cannon burst from the Messerschmitt hit the Hurricane's fuel tank and engulfed the plane in flames. A third shot of gunfire cut through the length of the aircraft. Wounded in the head and leg, blinded from blood seeping into his eyes and his Hurricane burning fiercely, F/L Nicholson tried to turn away from the twin-engined fighter. As he did so, the Bf 110 overshot the Hurricane and into the gunsights of F/L Nicholson. Using his severely injured hand to fire his guns, he sent a burst into the Bf 110 which burst into flames and spiraled down into the sea. Once the Messerschmitt crashed, F/L Nicholson baled out of his burning aircraft and ended up at hospital. James Nicholson was awarded the Victoria Cross, England's highest award and the only fighter pilot so honored by the British. After recovering from his severe burns and other injuries (other injuries included being shot in the buttock's by a trigger happy Local Defense Volunteer as he descended in his parachute), Nicholson returned to flying in April 1941 as a Squadron Leader.

On a raid on Heathrow airfield, Middlesex, bombers of KG 55 lost six He 111s, three shot down over Sussex and three more returning to France with battle damage.

At 1730 hours a formation of He 111 bombers escorted by Bf 110 twin-engined fighters attacked the Sussex area. Met by Spitfires of RAF No. 610 Squadron and Hurricanes of RAF No. 1 and 615 Squadron, the flight lost four Heinkels and two Messerschmitts with another Bf 110 crashing upon returning to France. Two Spitfires from RAF No 610 Squadron were shot down with credit going to Hptm. Horst Tietzen for his nineteenth kill and Lt. Hans-Otto Lessing for his fourth Allied aircraft. Both pilots were from 5./JG 51. Five minutes after the battle a lone He 111 was rammed by an unarmed Anson trainer causing both to crash to the ground.

 

[Njaco]

(16 August 1940 continued...)

The last of the day's raids by the Luftwaffe was made at 1750 hours when seventy He 111s with fifty Bf 110s attacked targets in Essex. Flying back to Duxford from Coltishall, RAF No. 19 Squadron Duxford (Spitfires) were given mid-air instructions to proceed to a vectored position just off the east coast at Clacton-on-Sea Essex. At first there was no sign of the raiders, but it was not long before a flight made contact with the He111 and Bf110s just south of Harwich. Joined by another flight, a strong and intense battle emerged with weaving planes and long glowing lines of tracer above the coastline. One He111 was brought down over the sea, but a number of Bf110s crashed into the Essex countryside.

The Fighter Gruppen lost a few pilots during the day's actions including a promising leader. Oblt. Karl Ebbighausen, Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 26 with nine victories during the war, was killed in action. Hptm. Erich Bode was promoted to Gruppenkommandeur of the Gruppe in his place. Also lost to the Luftwaffe was the Staffelkapitän of 4./JG 2, Oblt. Walter Möckel who failed to return from a sortie over Portsmouth and was listed as missing until it was confirmed he was a prisoner of war. The 'Richthofen' Geschwader also lost two Bf 109s from combat with one pilot killed. Fw. Christian Hansen of 2./JG 53 'Pik As' crash landed at Goshill on the Isle of Wight after battle.

Night-time brought bombers over the Filton airfield and the Avonmouth docks. For about four hours - starting at 2330 hours - Heinkels of II./KG 27 raided the two targets along with an attack on the searchlights of Bristol.

On 16 August 1940, Winston Churchill was again watching the outcome of the enemy air raids, this time with Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park at No. 11 Group Headquarters at RAF Uxbridge. On leaving that evening, he was heard to say, "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few" – the words he used in the famous speech he made on the Battle of Britain in the House of Commons four days later.

Losses: Luftwaffe 44 : Fighter Command 28 (Including 6 on the ground).

Changes continued at ZG 2 when Hptm. Eberhard Heinlein was removed and made acting Gruppenkommandeur of II./ZG 2 in place of Hptm. Harry Carl. At Epr.Gr 210, Hptm. Hans von Boltenstern was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of the fighter-bomber unit in place of Hptm. Walter Rubensdörffer. The Gruppe was stationed at Denain flying Bf 110s and Bf 109Es.

GERMANY: The German News Bureau reported:

"An authoritative source has informed us that in the course of this afternoon's aerial hostilities, one German aerial formation took off on a special mission. This combat group was deployed against all military and war-related targets immediately surrounding the British capital. The German Luftwaffe will offer proof that no power in the world can prevent it from dropping its bombs anywhere in England that it chooses - even, if it should be necessary over the City of London."

 

[Gnomey]

Great stuff Chris! Keep it coming.