This Day in the Battle of Britain

[Njaco]

17 August 1940 Saturday

UNITED KINGDOM: A strange day in the middle of a vital battle for existence. The weather dawned bright and clear – perfect for air operations. RAF aircrews were tired from the last few days desperate battles and it was a perfect opportunity for the Luftwaffe to keep up the pressure on the RAF. But again, the Luftwaffe failed to take advantage of the situation. Needing rest and repair for their aircraft, the pilots and crews of the German air force were not given any missions for the day except for occasional reconnaissance flights which the RAF ignored.

The last few days had been hectic and tiring for all those that had taken part. Commented Ofw. Manfred Langer of 4./KG 3;

"Day after day we were flying operational duties. The constant run of failures to achieve our goals of destroying our targets due to being constantly intercepted by British fighters was beginning to take its toll. Time and time again we tell our commanding officers that we must destroy the radar systems because we are always being met over the Channel by Spitfires and Hurricanes. The British pilots are very clever, they seem to be able to turn us around and we are forced to return to our bases, not only with bullet holes all over our aircraft, but with dead or injured crewmen that have to be attended to on the return flight. We became tired and exhausted, each new day brought new missions and then came the night operations. Man can only take so much, he is not a machine, although I think that our commanders thought differently. When the weather is too bad for flying, it is like a dream come true."

Even though the 17th dawned an exceptional summers day, little wind and cloudless skies, there was not a German aircraft in sight, the skies around the south coast were empty. Radar operators at many of the stations began to suspect that their masts or receivers were faulty, not a blip could be seen on any of them. Or as Commanding Officer 32 Squadron Biggin Hill Mike Crossley commented;

"Not a single sausage, scare, flap or diversion of any description today. Amazing, heavenly day too."

While Fighter Command were asking the question "Why? Why don't they come?" Station Commanders took the opportunity to clean up their airfields. Biggin Hill, Manston, Brize Norton, Tangmere, Kenley and Hornchurch all had work to do in clearing up the mess caused by the bombing of the previous day. Although ground crews managed to repair buildings, fill in holes and craters and repair damaged aircraft, it was with pilots that replacements could not keep up with losses. Over the last five days Fighter Command had lost sixty-eight valuable pilots killed or posted as missing. As well as this some seventy had been injured or wounded and would not return to action for many weeks, some not at all.

On the brighter side, 310 Squadron made up of Czechoslovakian pilots became operational. They were posted to Duxford. RAF No 1 (Canadian) Squadron was now operational. RAF No 145 Squadron moved to Drem and RAF No 602 Squadron moved to Westhampnett near Tangmere.

While Fighter Command kept regular patrols without enemy contact, a Royal Navy vessel successfully shot down one raider in the Channel. One raid was plotted well out to sea in Cardigan Bay, and a ship was reported to have been sunk near Strumble Head. A raid was plotted in mid-Wales moving east and returning. It was reported that leaflets were dropped in the Welshpool area. A Junkers Ju 88 from NJG 1, briefed to intrude over the Wash, strayed and was shot down into the sea off Spurn Head at 03.00 hours by a Blenheim night fighter, crewed by P/O Rhodes and Sgt. Gregory from RAF No 29 Squadron. The Ju 88 was listed as lost together with its crew.

Despite the lack of any major operation, a few Experten still managed to claim British warplanes to add to their victory totals especially from JG 51. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 claimed a Hurricane for his fourth kill while Hptm. Walter Oesau of 7./JG 51 destroyed his nineteenth Allied warplane – a Hurricane off Cap Gris Nez. Another pilot from the 7th Staffel, Ofw. Arthur Dau claimed his seventh victim – a Hurricane – down over Canterbury. Not to be outdone, the rising Experte of the 5th Staffel, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, shot down a British airplane to reach the magic score of twenty kills. At 1740 hours, Hptm. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51 downed a Hurricane from RAF No. 601 Squadron.

German bombing was negligible during the daylight hours, but about midnight 17th/18th August, the attack was renewed when Luftwaffe aircraft dropped bombs in East Suffolk, Warwickshire, Staffordshire and Derbyshire, notably in the Coventry and Birmingham districts. Not much damage was done in these areas but one raid reached Liverpool where damage was done in the docks area.

The Bristol Aeroplane Company and the docks at Avonmouth were again the targets for night missions by fourteen He 111s of II./KG 27 with the bombers leaving the area at 0205 hours. Damaged in the attacks were a warehouse, dry-dock and a rail yard in Liverpool. Other bombers from KG 27 dropped bombs over the city of Coventry with slight damage. Many bombs fell on open ground. At about the same time, fourteen He 111s from KGr 100 dropped bombs on Castle Bromwich near Birmingham. Despite using X-Gerat to guide them to the target, most of the bombs fell on open ground. One of the bombers suffered a mechanical failure and crashed at Dinard returning from the mission. All the crew survived.

 

[Lucky13]

Outstanding work Chris!

 

[Njaco]

18 August 1940 Sunday
"THE HARDEST DAY"
UNITED KINGDOM: Despite the devastation of 15 August, the Luftwaffe would face its toughest test this day over England when careful plans and tactics were dismantled and English ingenuity and desperation were successful. It would be remembered as one of the harshest days the Luftwaffe had ever had to face over the British Isles, as three major attacks were planned against airfields and radar units along the coast. But despite ingenuous plans and execution from the German Air Forces by the end of the day, only one British sector station would be out of action and the RAF airfields damaged for only a few hours while the Luftwaffe realized the folly of using Stukas against British fighters and the difficulties of coordinating large formations.

First Luftwaffe intruders of the day were six reconnaissance aircraft including a Bf 110 of LG 2 which was shot down at 31,000 feet over Manston. The first loss of an aircrew for the Luftwaffe occurred during the early morning hours when a Ju 88 from NJG 1 on an intruder mission, was attacked by a RAF Blenheim. Hit numerous times, the Junkers crashed and killed the entire three man crew.

The plans called for Dornier Do 17s, Junkers Ju 88s, and Heinkel He 111s to attack the airfields at Kenley and Biggin Hill for the first major assault. While the majority of the bombers were to attack in a conventional bombing run; at about 12,000 feet, one Staffel of Dorniers was to fly tree-top level to each target and attack a few minutes after the main forces. The second attack was to be made by Stukas on the airfields at Ford, Gosport and Thorney Island along with the radar site at Poling. The last major assault of the day was for more bombers to attack the airfields at Hornchurch and North Weald. All of the attacks were to be escorted with almost all the Fighter Geschwader of Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3.

The RAF airfield at Kenley was the first targeted for attack by the bombers of KG 76, one of the most experienced Kampfgeschwader in the Luftwaffe. The attack was to be in three phases. First, twelve Ju 88s of II./KG 76 escorted by twenty Bf 109s from JG 51 were to dive-bomb the airfield, attacking the hangers and installations. Five minutes later, twenty-seven Do 17s from I./KG 76 and III./KG 76 escorted by twenty-five Bf 110s from ZG 26 would bomb from 12,000 feet in an attempt to destroy the runway and airfield defenses. Five minutes after this action, nine Do 17s from 9./KG 76 were to run in, unescorted, at low altitude and finish off the attack. The first two attacks were to come in from the south-east while the last tree-hopping attack was to come from the south. At Biggin Hill, the assault was to be made by sixty He 111s of KG 1 at the same time as the Kenley raid with escort provided by forty Bf 109s from JG 54. The whole attack would be preceded by a freie jagd of sixty Bf 109s from JG 3 and III./JG 26. The fighters from JG 26 were led by Oblt Gerhard Schopfel while Major Adolf Galland was at Karinhall on a visit to Göring.

Shortly before noon, the first two attacking formations began to take off and reach altitude. With cloud building up, the bomber formations were given the all clear to take off, some three hours behind the planned commencement of operations. Bombers of KG 1 got away as scheduled and over the French coast met up with their escorts. But heavy cloud cover forced a delay in the rendezvous as several bombers circled the airfields waiting for formations to emerge from the clouds. The Do 17s and Ju 88s of KG 76 had problems with the cloud and found it difficult meeting up with their escorts. Several minutes later the bombers of 9./KG 76, led by Staffelkapitaen Hptm. Joachim Roth took off and flew almost a direct route to the target, first at an altitude of 500 feet but dropping to 60 feet as they approached the Sussex coast, avoiding the British radar. Relatively free of any defensive fire from the British, the Dornier formation approached the airfield at about 1320 hours only to find, not pillars of smoke from the preceding attacks, but clear skies. The problem was that the delay that had occurred with the Ju 88s and Do 17s in negotiating the cloud base on take off, coupled with the fact that flying time was slower than expected, they were running up to ten minutes behind schedule while the nine low flying Do 17s crossing near Beachy Head were on time. Instead of being the third to arrive the nine bombers of 9./KG 76 were the first to arrive at the airfield and were alone.

As the German bombers spread out and selected targets, the British defenses woke up and attacked. RAF No. 111 Squadron Croydon (Hurricanes) were "scrambled" and instructed to vector Kenley, and to 111 commander Squadron Leader John Thompson's surprise, he was told to maintain only 100 feet over the airfield. Quipped Thompson;

"Your bloody mad" "......I could prune trees at that height."

Came the voice over the R/T;

"I repeat, yes repeat.......vector Kenley.....patrol at 100 feet........30 plus low level bandits approaching"

The twelve Hurricanes curved in to attack the formation from above as British anti-aircraft guns opened fire. The first plane to go down was not German but British when one of the attacking Hurricanes spun and dove into the ground. The remaining British fighters pulled up and away from the flak bursts and made for the opposite side of the airfield where the German bombers would exit after attacking the airfield. Despite the murderous fire from below, the Dorniers pressed home their attacks. Soon three hangars were ablaze as bombs scored direct hits. But many of the bombers were severely damaged from the ground fire. Reaching the end of the airfield the German bombers faced another British defense, parachute-and-cable launchers. These were cables shot into the sky and held aloft by small parachutes and weighted with a drag parachute. Launched in rows of nine or more directly in the flight path of a low flying enemy airplane, the cable would create drag on the plane and play havoc with its control, finally forcing it to crash. Upon reaching the edge of the airfield, the Do 17s were greeted with the first salvo of these innovative British defenses. Most of the bombers made it through the cables but one bomber, damaged and on fire from the anti-aircraft guns, was unable to clear the wires. The cables snagged the bomber, the plane stalled and finally crashed to the ground just outside the airfield, killing all on board.

The rest of the bomber formation cleared the cables and airfield only to be bounced by the waiting Hurricanes of RAF No. 111 Sqd. Immediately, two Hurricanes set one bomber on fire and it soon crashed. The rest of the formation scattered and tried to individually make it back to France. Continuing with their attacks as the Dorniers hedge hopped across the English countryside, the Hurricanes were able to seriously damage more of the Dorniers but lost three more fighters to the bomber's defensive fire. Crossing the coast the remaining seven bombers headed to French soil, many smoking, on fire and running on only one engine. Two Dorniers crashed into the Channel on the return flight and two more crashed onto the French coast. One of the bombers that crashed on the coastline was counted to have more than two hundred holes from .303in rounds in its fuselage. Two more landed, wheels down and seriously damaged, at other airfields in France - one piloted by the navigator after the pilot had been killed in his seat. Only one bomber made it back to its airfield at Cormeilles-en-Vexin without serious damage and no injured crewmen.

While the attack by 9./KG 76 was happening, the twenty-seven Dorniers of I./KG 76 and III./KG 76 were having troubles of their own. The first RAF fighters to engage the high flying Dorniers were Hurricanes from RAF No. 615 Sqd. who became entangled with the escorting Messerschmitts of JG 3. The Bf 109s, coming out of the sun, seriously damaged three Hurricanes, killing one of the British pilots. Despite this success, the action allowed the twelve Hurricanes of RAF No. 32 Sqd. to dive and attack the bomber formations of I./KG 76, III./KG 76 and the Zerstörers of ZG 26 unmolested from the Bf 109s. The sudden attacks by the Hurricanes knocked down one Dornier and seriously damaged several others while forcing some of the bombers to miss Kenley and instead drop their loads on rail lines near the airfield and on Croydon airfield. Several Bf 110s were damaged when eight Spitfires of RAF No. 64 Sqd. joined the battle. One of the Zerstörers attacked was that of Rüdiger Proske, who, with his rear gunner wounded and his engines damaged, pretended to 'play dead' in the face of an attack by a Spitfire. Allowing the twin-engined plane to plunge 6,000 feet out of control, Proske regained control and found nobody had followed him down during his death spin. He headed for France.

Instead of being the first to arrive, the twelve Ju 88s of II./KG 76 arrived last to find the target covered in smoke and instead switched to their secondary target, the airfield at West Malling. As the formation passed Biggin Hill, the anti aircraft defense of the airfield damaged a Ju 88 and it was immediately pounced on by RAF fighters. The bomber crashed eight miles south-east of Biggin Hill.

 

[Njaco]

(18 August 1940 continued....)

Four Ju 88s and six Do 17s were lost during the attacks on Kenley, with one Ju 88 forcing Flt. Lt. Stanford Tuck, by return fire to bale out of his RAF No. 92 Squadron Spitfire. Despite the heavy attack by KG 76, Kenley was operational again within twenty-four hours. A total of 100 bombs had fallen on the airfield with the result that ten hangers were damaged and fourteen aircraft on the ground destroyed. For the first time the operations room at Kenley was put out of action with the communications cut and nine people killed. Within three days after moving to a new location, operations were back in action.

Before the bombers arrived at Kenley, Oblt Schöpfel's fighter formation was flying twenty-five miles ahead of the Dorniers, clearing the way. As Major Schöpfel recounted;

"We were on a freie jagd. The Gruppe flew over Dover, gaining quite a bit of altitude. Suddenly I saw a squadron of English fighters climbing far beneath us. We had probably been reported and the British were looking for us. The British flew over the water in a broad arc, and then over land, in the direction of Canterbury. I led the Gruppe after them immediately. We were in a favorable position as we approached. Eight aircraft, Hurricanes, flew in front in flights of vees. Behind them was a cover flight. Its fourth aircraft was weaving - flying first left, then right. The English still had not seen us. They now had the more favorable position, since they were higher, but we attacked. I flew toward the weaving aircraft. At 100 meters I had it in front of me, and pressed the button. The fire of my cannon and machine guns literally blew the Hurricane apart. Pieces fell away, smoking and burning. The second aircraft in the cover flight was now in my sights. I repeated the same manoeuvre. I opened fire, and the Hurricane burst into flames. Undisturbed, the others continued spiraling upward. They had no inkling that there were Messerschmitts on their tails. Now I was behind the third aircraft. A short burst, and this one likewise fell apart. Number Three! The Englishmen flew onward; still they had noticed nothing. So I took on the fourth aircraft. This time, however, I approached too closely. When I pressed the button, the Englishman exploded, so near me that pieces hit my crate. It sprayed oil so thickly on the front and right side of my canopy that I could see nothing, and had to break off the battle, which had lasted two minutes."

The Hurricanes that Major Schöpfel had come across were fighters from RAF No. 501 Sqd. who, while returning from a patrol, had been ordered to station over Canterbury. Seeing that he had an advantage, Major Schöpfel ordered his Gruppe to hold course and dived on the British fighters alone. In the space of six minutes, Major Schöpfel had added four aircraft to his score. His Gruppe continued with their mission and intercepted RAF No. 17 Sqd. as they prepared to attack the returning bombers. One Hurricane was destroyed and two others crash landed with damage.

The airfield at Biggin Hill was approached by the sixty bombers of KG 1 at about 13:27 hours. Because four of the five RAF fighter squadrons available were attacking the formations over Kenley, only one British fighter squadron, RAF No. 615 Sqd with fifteen Spitfires, attempted to thwart the German bombers. The forty Bf 109s of JG 54 intercepted the Spitfires and allowed the bombers to proceed unmolested to the airfield. At the target, the anti aircraft defenses were told to hold their fire because British fighters were in the area. The Heinkels dropped their loads without any interference from the British. As the bombs dropped on Biggin Hill, the Ju 88s of II./KG 76 began dive-bombing the airfield at West Malling.

After their bombing runs, the aircraft of KG 76 and KG 1 along with their escorting fighters broke away for the return flights to France. More British fighter squadrons were called onto the retreating bombers and by 13:45 hours numerous battles were being fought over the English countryside. Hundreds of aircraft were caught up in separate battles with at one point a Bf 110 being chased by a Hurricane who was also being chased by another Bf 110 with another Hurricane on its tail. Both Messerschmitts were claimed as destroyed by the attacking Hurricane pilots.

In the largest attack by Stukas, one hundred and nine Ju 87s from StG 3 and StG 77 accompanied by 24 Ju 88s of KG 54 and escorted by 150 Bf 109s, mounted an attack on the RAF airfields at Gosport, Ford and Thorney Island along with the radar station at Poling shortly after 14:00 hours. Crossing the coast the escort fighters split into two groups . . . one to stay above with the dive-bombers on their bombing run and the second diving below to assist when they pulled out of their dives. Poling CH radar station lost two pylons, disabling the station for a week, Ford naval air station was raided losing two hangars destroyed, a third of the quarters and killing 14, Gosport and finally Thorney Island where a hangar was bombed and started a fire. It was at this moment when the RAF struck at the German formations. Eighteen Hurricanes of RAF Nos 43 and 601 Squadrons burst into the formations of dive-bombers from I./StG 77 just as the Stukas were about to dive onto Thorney Island. Several bombers were shot down as the British fighters tagged onto the Ju 87s and followed them through their dives, showering the Junkers with gunfire. More British fighters from RAF Nos. 152 and 602 Squadrons with 234 Squadron taking on the top cover, joined the battle until approximately 300 aircraft were fighting above the English coastline. When the fighting finally subsided, numerous Stukas and crew were destroyed or damaged, a total of thirty dive bombers, nearly 21% of the total force committed in the day's actions. Ten Stukas were destroyed and five seriously damaged out of twenty-eight aircraft from I./StG 77 alone, including the dive-bomber of the GruppenKommanduer Hptm. Herbert Meisel, who was killed. Six bombers were shot down and two seriously damaged from the other three Gruppen involved. The RAF lost four Spitfires and two Hurricanes.

As the German bombers and fighters head out over the Channel, sixteen Bf 109s from I./JG 52 were sent near the Straits of Dover as cover for the returning formations. Led by Oblt. Wolfgang Ewald, the Messerschmitts failed to engage any British fighters. Having plenty of fuel left, Oblt Ewald guided his fighters to the airfield at Manston and strafed the RAF airbase at 15:30. After two passes, two Spitfires were left burning and six others damaged. A Hurricane that was refueling was also destroyed. Two hours later 8 raids crossed over the Essex coast via the Blackwater and Thames estuaries. RAF Nos. 54 and 151 Squadrons came into action to hinder the bombing of North Weald and Hornchurch.

Fourteen victory Experte Lt. Walter Blume of 7./JG 26, was shot down and captured, becoming a prisoner of war as was Oblt. Helmut Teidmann of 2./JG 3, ending the war as a prisoner after having achieved seven victories against the Allies. The 7./JG 26 also lost Lt. Gerhard Müller-Dühe when he was killed in action The most grievous loss for the Luftwaffe this day was the loss of the Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 51, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, when he was reported missing over the Thames Estuary. It is believed that Hptm. Tietzen was shot down by S/L Peter Townsend of RAF No. 82 Squadron. Hptm. Tietzen became the first recipient of the Ritterkreuz to be awarded posthumously.

In air battles over Portsmouth, JG 2 lost three fighters including the Messerschmitt of Oblt. Rudolf Möllerfriedrich of 6./JG 2 who was listed as missing after failing to return from the mission. Two more Bf 109s crashed at Cherbourg returning from combat with both pilots wounded. A Heinkel He 111 from KGr 100, a pathfinder unit working during daylight for the first time, was also destroyed.

In the heaviest day of fighting so far, the Luftwaffe lost 69 planes to the RAF's 33; another 29 RAF machines were wrecked on airfields.

Due to heavy losses, the fighters of II./JG 52 led by Hptm. Hans-Günther von Kornatzki was pulled out of action from Peupelinge and transferred to Jever on the German Bight and start flying defensive missions.

During the night He 111s from KG 27 fly missions to airfields and harbours in the Bristol area.

 

[T Bolt]

This thread is a grand achievement Chris! I have been copying and pasting it to a word document so I can file it for future reference and as of todays post it's 94 pages and 45,421 words. Incredible!

 

[Njaco]

cool!

 

[Crimea_River]

Well done Chris.

Anyone wanting to read a good book on this day in the BoB, check out "The Hardest Day" by Alfred Price.

 

[Glider]

And anyone wanting a good history of the BOB, read this

 

[Grunherz]

I am absolutely in awe of this thread! Great read, great research and a great effort. Well done!

 

[rochie]

great work Chris, thought todays post might be a big one !

 

[Njaco]

19 August 1940 Monday
WESTERN FRONT: Across the Channel, Reichsmarschall Göring, realizing that at the moment his Luftwaffe was not gaining the upper hand against the RAF, was holding an important conference with his commanders at Karinhall. It was from this meeting, that a number of important changes to strategy would be made. Berating his fighter pilots for failing to achieve the air superiority needed for Operation 'SEELOEWE' , he decided to re-issue orders outlining specifically what was needed to achieve the Operation's objectives.

First, he confirmed that the Ju 87 and the StG Staffeln would cease front line operations against British targets and that only two Staffeln would be maintained. This would be for reasons that some operations may require the services of the Ju 87 for pin-point bombing accuracy that only the Stuka could deliver. For though the Stukas had bombed some of the coastal airfields with great accuracy, they had suffered the heaviest losses of all; so heavy that they were condemned to wait on airfields behind Calais until the great day of invasion, when in absence of the defeated Royal Air Force they could demonstrate their powers against the Royal Navy. VIII Fliegerkorps, with some 220 Ju 87s, were withdrawn to the Pas de Calais area thus taking them out of the battle.

Another order to come out of this meeting angered many Bf 109 commanders. Göring had instructed that on Bf 110 missions, they must be escorted by Bf 109 fighters. This was almost a laughable situation having fighter aircraft escort fighter aircraft. In addition he ordered that the Bf 109s would fly in close escort, closer than previously. He refused to accept that the High Command was responsible for the failure of the fighter pilots and still believed in the Bf 110 Zerstörer theory. Several fighter pilots became frustrated with this change and resorted to placing on their aircraft the badge of the German Railway service with the legend 'In the aerial service of the State Railways', a bitter jest on the close bomber escort work – or 'driving trains' – instead of using their full combat potential in free-chase fighter combat.

Another decision made by Göring, was that fighter crews be given the chance to 'get to know' the bomber crews that they were to escort. They should meet, build up friendships, and work together like brothers. This was further highlighted when Göring stated that all bomber crews should always have the same escorts, a view that was not received with the same enthusiasm by fighter and bomber crews alike. If anyone wanted to do something that would bind the two crews together, they said, then we should be given radio communication with each other, our radios should also be on the same frequencies making for easier and less confusing understanding of radio messages.

Göring also decided to reshuffle the command structure of the Jägdflieger by removing several Kommodore and replacing them with younger more aggressive men. According to him, the older commanders were not as aggressive as the younger fighter pilots and with new blood in command of his pilots, the fortunes of the Luftwaffe would change for the better.

Major Hanns Trübenbach was appointed Kommodore of JG 52 in place of Major Merhart von Bernegg.

Luftflotte 3's Bf 109 fighters were moved to various airfields in the region of Pas-de-Calais, bringing them under the command of Kesselring, but this would then provide them with greater limits and allow them to stay over England for a longer period of time.

UNITED KINGDOM: After a very quiet morning, a formation of approximately 100 Bf 109s, in two waves, sixty plus being detected just off the coast of Dungeness while forty plus were sighted to the north of Dover and flew along the south coast of England on a 'free chase' mission but the RAF were not to fall for such a tactic and ignored them allowing them to return to their bases. Spasmodic attacks by Bf 109 fighters from Calais airfields during the course of the afternoon made strafing attacks on many of the British coastal airfields. These included Manston, Lympne, Hawkinge and a number of airfields in the south-west. Manston received the most damage once again, but was not recorded as being serious. At 1430 hours RAF No. 602 Sqd (Spitfires) were dispatched to intercept a formation of Ju 88s detected off the Sussex coast. One Ju 88 was shot down off the coast near Bognor with all four crewmen killed. One of the Spitfires was also shot down about 15 minutes later by return gunfire from a Ju 88. The pilot managed to bale out although sustaining burns to both hands and landed near Arundel. All the Ju 88s aborted the mission and returned to their bases in Northern France.

At 1515 hours, two Ju 88 bombers of KG 51 managed to cross the south-west counties of England without interception by British fighters and traversed the River Severn and headed for the oil storage tanks at Llanreath close to the Pembroke Docks in South Wales. Two tanks received direct hits and eight tanks exploded and burst into a flaming inferno, a fire which burned for a week and destroyed ten out of the fifteen oil tanks. Another Ju 88 of III./KG 51 struck at Bibury grass airfield, a satellite aerodrome of Pembury, killing an airman and damaging two Spitfires of 92 Squadron. F/L T.S. Wade and P/O J.A. Paterson gave chase and disposed of the raider in the Solent. Wade had to crash-land his Spitfire though.

Worthy Down Aerodrome suffered a dive bombing attack at 1424 hours by a single He 111. Three 500lb bombs dropped, one damaging a hangar, one on the apron and one near another hangar causing considerable damage to buildings, cables and telephone wires and minor damage to four or five aircraft outside hangars. There were six minor casualties to personnel. Bombs were dropped at Shrivenham (Watchfield) Aerodrome. They fell outside the boundary and no damage resulted. At 1420 hours, a Ju 88 attacked Harwell Aerodrome in a steep dive releasing three heavy bombs and setting fire to three Wellingtons, which were totally destroyed. Coltishall Aerodrome was bombed at 1456 hours and an unfinished hangar was hit and slightly damaged. Honington Aerodrome was subject to two attacks, the first at 1615 hours by a single aircraft using HE and incendiaries. Slight material damage was done with four dead and many injured were reported. The second attack was delivered by one Do 17 at 1825 hours and resulted in heavy damage to one barrack, two Wellingtons and one Magister. Small raids also bombed many districts in Norfolk, Suffolk, Kent, Sussex, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, but little material damage was done.

Three cannon armed Spitfires of RAF No. 19 Squadron destroyed a 7./KG 2 Do 17z off Essex. At 1809 hours, one Bf 110 was intercepted and destroyed off Great Yarmouth.

P/O C.N.Birch of RAF No 1 Squadron crashed when he strayed into a balloon area near Finsbury Park in his Hurricane I (P3684). He baled out safely and his aircraft crashed off Oxfordness.

The orders given by Göring in his Luftwaffe Command Orders Staff 1A were in part put into action during the night. In this document Göring mentioned that the weather conditions expected in the next few days was cloud over much of Britain, and that the Luftwaffe must take full advantage of the situation;

"The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next few days must be exploited for [aircraft factories] attacks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the material supplies of the enemy Air Force by the destruction of the relatively small number of aircraft engine and aluminum plants. These attacks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried out by night. . . . It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations to allocate to units particular areas which they will come to know better during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result. . . . There can no longer be any restriction on the choice of targets. To myself I reserve only the right to order attacks on London and Liverpool."

But these amounted to only small raids, between twelve and fifteen He 111 bombers attacked Liverpool and the Merseyside Docks and some dropped more bombs in the Midlands on the way back. Damage was only minimal and one He 111 was shot down on the return journey over County Durham. These were some of the first bombs to be dropped on the City of Liverpool.

Over the Bristol area during the night, weather conditions improved enough to allow KGr 100, the only unit in the Luftwaffe to be equipped with the sophisticated X-Verfahren electronic navigation and bombing aid, to carry out their first precision attack under Luftflotte 3, the target being the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton. X-Verfahren was a complex system employing a main and three cross beams which gave the pilot aural indications 50 km, 20 km and 5 km out from the target. It's chief disadvantage, however, was that it was only able to operate in conjunction with specially-equipped aircraft manned by crews trained in its use.

The operation against Filton involved twenty-three He 111's which were dispatched from their newly established base at Vannes in Brittany flying along an approach beam radiated from the X-Beam transmitter at Cherbourg. Over Bristol it was a clear moonlit night up to 02.00 hours after which some cloud developed at 3000 metres. During the attack, which took place between 23.19 and 02.50 hours, the 16.65 tonnes of high explosive bombs and 576 incendiary bombs caused considerable damage to the works, in particular at No.4 Factory and No.11 Test Bed, and resulted in four people being injured. All the German aircraft, however, returned safely to base.

Losses: Luftwaffe 10: Fighter Command 5

 

[Njaco]

20 August 1940 Tuesday
UNITED KINGDOM: Activity was reduced due to deteriorating weather conditions with several reconnaissance raids made during the morning.

At about 1100 hours, Erpro 210 interfered with a convoy off Aldeburgh {East Coast} before striking sharply at Southwold's defences. Spitfires of RAF No 66 Sqd intercepted the Bf 110s as they attacked the airfield at Martlesham Heath.

At 1345 hours a formation of Do 17s was intercepted by Hurricanes from RAF No. 242 Sqd over the North Sea. One of the Hurricanes piloted by Midshipman P.J.Patterson was hit by returning gunfire from Do 17s and he went into a vertical dive and crashed into the sea some miles out of Winterton on the east coast.

The first large raid, of Do 17s and Bf 109s, arrived at 1430 hours over the Thames Estuary. The bombers were engaged by Hurricanes of RAF No 615 Sqd as they approached their target at Eastchurch airfield while Spitfires of RAF No. 65 Sqd fought off the Bf 109 escorts. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 destroyed a British Spitfire, bringing his kill total to five Allied warplanes.

At 1530 hours another raid was made on the airfield at Manston. Bombs were dropped and the airfield strafed by Bf 109's but these were driven back by the local ground defenses and Blenheims of RAF No. 600 Sqd. Damage was only minimal although a hangar was damaged, a couple of buildings hit by debris and a Blenheim aircraft of RAF No. 600 Sqd was damaged, but there were no casualties during the incident. RAF No. 65 Sqd (Spitfires) went in to intercept, but were attacked by the Bf 109 escorts in which one Spitfire was damaged by cannon fire and made a forced landing on Foulness Island. The Spitfire I (R6818 ) was badly damaged and written off but P/O K.G.Hart of RAF No. 65 Squadron escaped injury.

The oil tanks at Llanreath at Pembroke Docks which were still burning from the previous days bombing were again attacked. Defense was by anti-aircraft gunfire that failed to hit any of the German bombers, but they did manage to hit a Blenheim of RAF No. 236 Sqd, that although damaged, managed to return to base.

Later in the afternoon Hurricanes of RAF No. 302 Sqd (Polish), in action for the first time, attacked a Ju 88 off the Yorkshire coast on its way to bomb the airfield at Thornaby. Green Section "B" Flight, sighted the Junkers at 1910 hours, flying at 3,000 ft East between Hull and Spurn Point. The Section attacked and the Ju 88 crashed into the sea 6 miles S.W. of Withernsea. 4 prisoners were taken.

A Do 17 was shot down off Suffolk by Hurricanes of RAF No. 257 Sqd.

During the night very few raids were plotted around the country due to heavy cloud and poor visibility.

A Luftwaffe Focke Wulf FW 200C-1 Condor, coded "F8+KH" and assigned to I./KG 40, crashed at 1410 hours local on the lower slopes of Mount Brandon on the Dingle Penninsula in County Kerry, Ireland and became the first German crew interned in that country. This was the second Luftwaffe aircraft to crash in the country during World War II. The Condor had departed Abbeville, France, on a reconnaissance mission over northwestern Ireland and had been damaged by AA fire from a ship. All of the crew survived. A plaque commemorating this event is on the wall of O'Connor's Bar and Guest House in Cloghane, Co. Kerry. Some interesting relics of that and other aircraft can be seen in the bar of these premises. Exactly 48 years later, the pilot and a crewman returned to the spot and met an Irish woman who had helped them on this day.

The Luftwaffe lost fourteen aircraft damaged or destroyed, seventeen pilots and aircrew killed or missing and three wounded. The RAF lost three aircraft damaged or destroyed and one pilot killed. No 242 Squadron Hurricane P2976 Midshipman P.J.Patterson crashed into the sea off Winterton Norfolk at 13:45hrs. Patterson was reported missing, cause unknown.

While the action was taking place during the afternoon, Churchill was in Parliament and it was on this day that he delivered his speech that ended with. . .

"....The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

Even today, no one would disagree that no truer words have been spoken, and the speech was one of those that would go down as being one of Winston Churchill's famous speeches. But there was always the humorous side, as P/O Michael Constable-Maxwell chuckled;

"He must be thinking of our liquor bills."

GERMANY: The former Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 51, Hptm. Horst Tietzen, who was killed on 18 August, 1940, was posthumously awarded the Ritterkreuz.

 

[Njaco]

21 August 1940 Wednesday
UNITED KINGDOM: The weather, which was slowly getting worse from the previous day, was expected to continue. Fighter Command knew that large scale operations would be out, but they were not stupid enough to acknowledge the fact that the Luftwaffe would not attempt the occasional mission to possibly airfields and/or industrial targets, this form of raid becoming known as 'tip-and-run'. This was borne out just after midday when the days events started to unfold.

British radar picked up a small to medium formation out over the North Sea off Norfolk at 12:15 hours. The formation was tracked for a while before Fighter Command dispatched any aircraft. This was due to the possibility that the formation may have been on a reconnaissance mission and not causing any particular threat. The formation broke into two groups. One came inland and flew on a south-westerly course, the other continued north past the Wash and the Humberside region. Newly formed RAF No. 302 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 242 Sqd (Hurricanes) were instructed to intercept. The Dorniers were from KG 2 and headed towards Norwich crossing the coast near Great Yarmouth. The other formation also consisted of Do 17s and were from KG 3, continuing their flight path along the east coast towards Hull.

RAF No. 242 Sqd made first contact and threw the Dornier formation into disarray. As the bombers twisted and turned, Blue Section led by Fl/Lt G.F. Powell-Sheddon, tore into the front part of the formation and with two of his section hit one of the Dorniers. A Do 17 of KG 2 went down and crashed in flames in Norfolk. Many of the formation sought cover in the low cloud and aborted the mission. RAF No. 302 Sqd, a new Polish squadron, returned to base.

As the other portion of the formation, flying north-west, passed Hull, they were closer to the coast and Fighter Command released RAF No. 611 Sqd using new Spitfire IIs and interception was made just off the coast at Skegness. P/O J.W. Lund claimed first blood when he shot down a Do 17 of KG 3 that crashed into the sea killing all on board. P/O Lund then took a hit from gunfire from a Dornier and decided to return to base only to crash on landing with the pilot escaping any injury. The next casualty was one of the Spitfires of RAF No. 611 Sqd, when P/O M.P. Brown bore in to attack a Dornier, but as he pulled away his Spitfire was hit by gunfire from the Do 17 which damaged the tailplane and one of the ailerons on his starboard wing and he was forced to return to base with a very unresponsive Spitfire. More Spitfires got into the attack. F/O D.H. Watkins lined up a Dornier in his gunsight and gave it a five second burst. Smoke trailed from the stricken bomber and it went down crashing into the sea off Scott's Head killing all the crew. Within five minutes, his Spitfire was hit, but damage was only minor so he decided to return to base.

The combat action continued and moved off the coast at Skegness, the Dorniers having been foiled in their attempt in attacking a coastal convoy coming down the coast. Convoy 'CE9' ran the Dover Straits under shell-fire and high-level bombing. Low-level raiders were driven off by intense AA fire and the difficulty of flying through the convoys' kite-barrage. Many of the bombers tried to gain height and take cover in the cloud. Another Spitfire took a hit in the glycol system and also sustained damage to the hydraulic system, and returned to base. With RAF No. 611 Sqd losing half of its aircraft the rest attempted to block access to the cloud cover forcing many of the Dorniers to take evasive action.

In a desperate attempt to seek the safety of the clouds, one Do 17 collided with another receiving damage that forced the bomber to make a forced landing between Skegness and Maplethorpe. The crew were captured. The other Do 17 was immediately attacked by RAF No. 611 Sqd Spitfires and crashed in the vicinity of Maplethorpe.

In the south west, German bombers made several attacks targeting 10 Group airfields and oil installations. In Cornwall, a raid of Ju 88s was bombing the airfield at St. Eval, destroying six Blenheims of RAF No. 236 Sqd, as Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqd scrambled in pursuit. Two hangars at St Eval Aerodrome were set on fire and at Binbrook and Stormy Down aerodromes there was a certain amount of damage to buildings. At RAF Watton in Lincolnshire a Do 17Z completed half a circuit before dropping 20 bombs causing neither casualties nor damage. The line of craters was soon filled and the raider was shot down by fighters.

An attack was made on Brize Norton airfield and also at Middle Wallop. RAF No. 17 Squadron (Hurricanes) intercepted a formation of Ju 88s making the attacks. Intercepted off the Sussex coast and the Isle of Wight by the Hurricanes one Ju 88 was shot down, the Junkers crash landed at Earnley and the crew captured. RAF No. 17 Squadron sustained no casualties. One Blenheim bomber was damaged at Middle Wallop during the raid. At about 13:30 hours, Spitfires of RAF No. 234 Sqd engaged more Ju 88s off the Cornish coast. A Spitfire intercepted and attacked a Ju 88 and shot down by P/O R.F.T.Doe. The bomber crashed and burst into flames killing all on board. Between 17:30 hours and 18:30 hours two raids were made against the coastline. The first, by Ju 88s, was intercepted by Hurricanes of RAF No. 238 Sqd off Cornwall whilst the second, saw Hurricanes of RAF No. 56 Sqd attack Do 17s near Ipswich. F/O R.E.P.Brooker of No 56 Squadron destroyed a Do 17 when he was himself shot down by return fire from the rear gunner in a Do 17 over East Anglia, at 18:15 hrs. He was slightly injured during his force-landing in his Hurricane I (P3153).

During the night activity was low with only a few small raids plotted. Further German raids, mostly of single aircraft, were off Harwich, Aberdeen, the Humber, Firth of Forth and near Drem. Small-scale minelaying was from Kinnaird's Head to St Abb's Head, Humber to Yarmouth and Dungeness to Selsey Bill.

Losses: Luftwaffe 18: Fighter Command 13

WESTERN FRONT: Reichsmarschall Göring began the command changes among his pilots. Oblt. Gunther Lützow was appointed Kommodore of JG 3 in place of Oblt. Karl Vieck. Oblt. Lützow's place as Gruppenkommandeur of I Gruppe was taken by Oblt. Lothar Keller.

 

[B-17engineer]

Chris, its great to read that knowing the bomber for my BoB GB could've been one of the bomber in the formation that day , KG 3 its from Thanks for this! Its great!

 

[Glider]

Counple of things that I noticed about today. a) its the first combat of the Spit II and b) how effective the single MG's are in the German Bombers. I always thought that they were more effective than a lot of people thought, but I had not expected them to be this good.

 

[Njaco]

22 August 1940 Thursday
UNITED KINGDOM: The weather again was to be a deciding factor in the course of the day's events. Rain and strong winds that developed overnight would continue into the day. Heavy seas were to be expected in the Channel with winds reaching gale force at times. Most Luftwaffe units had been grounded for the day, although the RAF reported over 500 sorties. By day, the action was very light for the obvious reasons, but the Luftwaffe stepped up night bombing operations to a number of areas. But the first action of the day was during the morning.

A convoy code named "Totem" was battling heavy seas through the Straits of Dover when they reported that they were under attack. As it turned out, the convoy was under attack by German gun batteries based at Cape Griz Nez. German batteries shelled Dover during a cross-Channel duel which had lasted all day. Their first target was the convoy of ships edging up the English side of the Channel under Royal Navy escort. Then the guns turned on Dover. The Germans had installed 14-inch batteries with a 20-mile range along the coast from Boulogne to Calais as part of the plan to invade England. Those guns were used for the first time when shells sent water spouts 100 feet above the convoy. RN escorts laid smoke to conceal the convoy.The convoy later reported that most of the shells were wide and no damage was done to the ships. The convoy continued on after the eighty minute bombardment without any further enemy attack. But their position had been reported and with the weather postponing any air attacks on the English mainland, it presented a target for the Luftwaffe. With dusk, the guns turned on civilian targets in Dover. During a 45-minute barrage a shell burst through the stained glass window of a church and exploded near the altar. By nightfall the convoy, with its 50,000 tons of food and war material, was snug at anchor.

BBC - Archive - WWII: The Battle of Britain - News Report | Convoy Shelled in Straits of Dover

At 1230 hours British radar picked up a formation of thirty German aircraft coming across the Channel. The plot showed that it was heading towards convoy "Totem". 11 Group released RAF No. 54 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No. 615 Sqd (Hurricanes). Both RAF No. 54 Sqd and RAF No. 610 Sqd arrived over the convoy in time to see the raiders approaching. They went into action immediately, and just as they approached the Ju 88s, they were attacked by Bf 109s. They managed to turn the bombers back, but not before one of the RAF No. 54 Squadron Spitfires was shot down and crashed into the Channel off the coast of Deal. Sgt G.R.Collett was killed in his Spitfire I (R6708 ). One Ju 88 was damaged and crash landed in France. One of the RAF No. 615 Sqd Hurricanes was accidentally shot down by one of the Hurricanes of the same squadron but the pilot escaped without injury after making a forced landing near Deal.

With the afternoon over, the raids continued. At 1830 hours, a raid of thirty German aircraft crossed the coast near Deal. On a number of occasions, the Luftwaffe sent over waves of Bf 109 fighters, usually to strafe aerodromes and landing strips. This raid, seemed to be one of those. Once it was observed that the formation did not consist of any bombers, Fighter Command released only one squadron of Spitfires to intercept the Bf 109s crossing the coast near Deal and heading towards Manston. But in addition to a freie jagd by fighters, there was also a formation of Bf 110s of EprGr 210 escorted by Bf 109s from JG 26 heading for Manston airfield. RAF No. 616 Sqd drew the short straw on this occasion, and as usual with fighter to fighter combat, just a series of dogfights ensued, but not without casualties. Sgt M.Keymer of No 65 Squadron was shot down and killed in his Spitfire I (K9909) off Dover at 1935 hours. He was attacked by a Bf 109 of JG 26. F/O Hugh Spencer Lisle 'Cocky' Dundas was wounded in the arm and leg when he baled out of his Spitfire I (R6926) after combat with a Bf 109 at 1930 hours. EprGr 210 dropped approximately thirty bombs during the raid on Manston resulting in the destruction of two hangars and two Blenheim aircraft. Some buildings were damaged and the aerodrome was made unserviceable.

RAF No. 302 Sqdrn (Polish) conducted its second engagement. The squadron claimed 2 Ju 88s - one at sea and the other four miles from the coast at 12,000 ft. but both were unconfirmed.

An attack on Bristol at 2300 hours was conducted by Heinkels of KGr 100, the only unit in the Luftwaffe to be equipped with the sophisticated X-Verfahren electronic navigation and bombing aid. The heaviest attack came during the night when Ju 88s dropped more than sixteen tons of high explosive on the aircraft works at Filton seriously disrupting production. The operation against the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton involved twenty-three He 111s flying from Vannes, Brittany and all the aircraft returned safely. Two factory buildings were damaged and four people injured.

Possibly the most notable, and in a way controversial were the bombs that were dropped on the township of Harrow and the adjoining Wealdstone. Records have always shown that at 0330hrs on the morning of August 22nd 1940, the first bombs to be dropped on London were at Harrow. Geographically, in 1940 Harrow was in the county of Middlesex, the Greater London area did not extend as far as either Harrow or Wealdstone. But as far as the Civil Defense was concerned, Harrow was included and was within the boundaries of Civil Defense Area No.5 which was classed as the London area. To take the matter further, Harrow and Wealdstone also come under the jurisdiction of the London Metropolitan Police. Yet look in any gazetteer, and you will most certainly see Harrow and Wealdstone listed as being in Middlesex.

Losses: Luftwaffe 4: Fighter Command 5

SS 'Thorold' (1,689 GRT)a Canadian merchant ship, was bombed and sunk by Do-17 bombers, in the Irish Sea in position 51.46N, 005.38W. From her crew of 23, ten crewmembers were lost.

WESTERN FRONT: Another day of awards given to several Luftwaffe personnel. Major Adolf Galland was promoted to Kommodore of JG 26 in place of Major Gotthardt Handrick. Galland's place as Gruppenkommandeur of III Gruppe was taken by Hptm. Gerhard Schöpfel. Hptm. Rolf Pingel was appointed Gruppenkommandeur of I./JG 26 in place of Hptm. Kurt Fischer. Generalmajor Theo Osterkamp, formerly of JG 51 and now belonging to Jagdfliegerführer 1 was awarded the Ritterkreuz for his leadership as was Major Max Ibel, Kommodore of JG 27. Obstlt. Harry von Bülow-Bothkamp, Kommodore of JG 2 and a former Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 77 with a total of six enemy aircraft destroyed during World War I, was awarded the Ritterkreuz in recognition of his leadership during the early campaigns in Norway and France despite his not scoring a single victory in World War II.

Goring also took avantage of the brief respite caused by the weather to make some changes with his fighter forces. The three jagdgeschwader of Luftflotte 3 - JG 27, JG 2 and JG 53 were reassigned to Luftflotte 2 and began moving from Cherbourg to Calais.

In a British raid over Daedereide, Holland, S/Lt (A) R. L. G. Davies and Lt N. M. Hearle in a Swordfish of RAF No. 812 Squadron were shot down and made prisoners of war.

GERMANY: German propaganda radio station NBBS prophesises the destruction of London by,

'aerial torpedoes carrying many tons of high explosive and guided by radio.'

 

[Njaco]

23 August 1940 Firday
UNITED KINGDOM: The typical English summer was behaving in its usual unpredictable way which again meant that any major assault was out of the question. Reconnaissance only at first, with small raids developing as the day went on, raiders were attacking any convenient airfield or factory. Many of them tried to probe the London defences, jettisoning bombs indiscriminately if attacked. An occasional German patrol aircraft was detected off the coast, but Fighter Command was not going to waste time on these, and those enemy aircraft that did cross the coast and penetrate inland managed to avoid interception in the low cloud cover.

The afternoon was still clear of any enemy activity due to the inclement weather. A few single aircraft managed to cross the coast, but they stayed very close to the cloud base and they did little or no damage. Sgt H.J.Merchant of No 1 Squadron force landed a Hurricane I (P2980) at Withyham, Kent after running out of fuel. He hit some trees but was unhurt. Manston received 30 more bombs at 01:25 and three Ju 88s attacked Thorney Island. One He 111 was destroyed by fighters near Sumburgh. In the afternoon, nine raids of single aircraft, one of which was reported to be a meteorological flight, approached the coast between Selsey Bill and Lyme but turned away. Later, eleven individual aircraft penetrated inland and attacked scattered targets in Devon and Hampshire.

German activity was widespread during the night although not on the scale of the previous night. The largest of the raids were in the Bristol and South Wales area, with Cardiff receiving several visits. Raids were reported over East Anglia and northwards along the coast to Middlesborough, Harrogate and York. Kent was also visited. The Luftwaffe also dropped bombs on Aberdeen in Scotland. Adrian Hope Boyd of RAF No 145 Squadron (Hurricane) destroyed a He 111 over the Firth, 10 miles from Edinburgh.

In their Hurricanes, the pilots of RCAF No 1 Squadron had their first encounter with the Luftwaffe. The RCAF's No 1 (Fighter) Squadron was the only Canadian squadron that took part in the Battle of Britain.

Overnight, the Luftwaffe targeted Filton again and up to sixteen tons of high explosive fell on the airfield causing some damage, but although hangars and machine shops were hit it was not enough to put them out of action.

The 3 Staffel of KG 55 lost a He 111 to flak when it crashed at LeHarve, France returning from a mission raid on Southampton. The 2 Staffel also had a He 111 crash at LeHarve after being damaged by RAF fighters on a mission to attack aircraft factories at Yeovil. All three Gruppen of KG 27 engaged in missions against targets in the Bristol area. Just before 2300 hours twelve He 111s of the III Gruppe dropped their loads on the Bristol docks. At 2300 hours eleven He 111s of the I Gruppe raided the docks at Avonmouth. Twenty minutes after midnight eight He 111s of the II Gruppe bombed the Bristol docks for the second time.

Convoy OA 203 in the Moray Firth, was attacked and the streamers 'Llanishen' (5,035 grt) and the 'Makalla' (6,680 grt - pictured) were sunk by Luftwaffe He 115s based in Stavanger, Norway. Unlike previous attacks, they dropped torpedoes, sinking two fairly substantial ships.

Churchill had the name of the volunteer force changed to The Home Guard, a title with more purpose and dignity, reflecting the fact that these men would be the first line of defence in case of invasion. With the army re-equipped the Home Guard now received uniforms, weapons and ammunition.

P/O Petrus Hendrik Hugo, of RAF No. 615 Squadron was awarded the DFC, the citation reading,

"Pilot Officer Hugo has displayed great keenness to engage the enemy on every possible occasion. During June and July, 1940, he destroyed five enemy aircraft."

RAF No. 307 Sqdrn (Polish) was formed as a night-fighter squadron.

RAF No. 304 "Land of Silesia" Sqdrn (Polish) was formed at RAF Bramcote, from 185 men, including 31 Officers, most of whom saw action in Poland and France with 2nd Air Regiment (Kracow) and 6th Air Regiment (Lwow) and with the French Army. This became 304 Silesian Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander Bialy with Wing Commander WM Graham as its British adviser. It was attached to No 1 Bomber Group and was given 16 Fairey Battles for training purposes.

Hptm Hannes Trautloft took over as Geschwaderkommodore of JG 54 and Walter Oesau replaced him as Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 51. Leutnant Wolfgang Kosse was appointed Staffelkapitän of 5./JG 26.

Losses: Luftwaffe 5: Fighter Command 1

53 Grumman G-36a Martlet Is, and 6 Grumman G-36a Martlet IIIs were diverted from a French order which had not been delivered before the Fall of France in 1940 and delivered to the British Purchasing Commission on 23 August 1940 and transferred to the first FAA unit 804 squadron at Hatston, 778 squadron at Arbroath, 759 squadron at Yeovilton and 802 squadron at Donisbristle from September through to November 1940.

GERMANY: The propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels, worried by recent British successes, orders that ridicule of the English way of life must stop and the enemy's fighting spirit be stressed instead.

 

[Njaco]

24 August 1940 Saturday
UNITED KINGDOM: Since August 18th, things generally were relatively quiet, the lull of the last five days had allowed both sides to regroup and re-establish themselves. So far, all the Luftwaffe had been doing was to cause inconvenience to Fighter Command. The radar stations had been damaged, but in nearly all cases they were back in operation within 24 hours. Some airfields had been damaged, but again, the damage was not enough to make them non-operational. Both sides were losing both pilots and aircraft, and with the Battle of Britain now over two months old, the Luftwaffe had not yet achieved the advantage that it had hoped for, and Göring 's plan that the Royal Air Force would be wiped out in two weeks were hopelessly dashed.

Another directive was issued by Göring:

".......To continue the fight against the enemy air force until further notice, with the aim if weakening the British fighter forces. The enemy is to be forced to use his fighters by means of ceaseless attacks. In addition the aircraft industry and the ground organization of the air force are to be attacked by means of individual aircraft by night and day, if weather conditions do not permit the use of complete formations." Göring went on to add that concentrated attacks were to be made on Royal Air Force airfields. The tactic of trying to lure the fighters of Fighter Command into the air would continue, as "...these fighters must be destroyed if we are to succeed."

The bombers were to fly with a strong fighter escort, very close, in an attempt to lure the RAF fighters up to battle and hopeful destruction. German fighter pilots were still opposed to the fact that they were not being given 'free hunt' instructions and that they could fly above the bombers that they were escorting. The instruction to stay close to the bombers thus giving them full protection continued.

Because of the increasing bomber losses during those German attacks without any fighter escort, the fighters of Luftflotte 3 were redeployed to operate over South East England. But this change left a surplus of bombers in other areas who, without fighter escort, could not conduct daylight raids and decided to carry out night operations. The Luftwaffe also began to shift to the targeting of aircraft production plants and the inland fighter fields instead of coastal airfields although the clear weather of the next few days brought a concentration of bombers on the RAF Group 11 fighter bases, especially those surrounding London.

As Oberst 'Pips' Priller of 6./JG 51, who claimed a two Spitfires during the day, later commented;

"In such confused fighting, the claims for aircraft shot down and the loss ratios on both sides are misleading. It was no easy task over England in August 1940. Sometimes the youngsters were the victims of their inexperience and over-enthusiasm. There were times when we heard a plea from someone who was confused and disoriented, and nothing could be done about it. I remember one occasion when a lad who hadn't, as we used to say, tasted much English air, lost sight of our formation after some frenzied twisting and turning about the sky. But we could see him, he had dived steeply and was over the outskirts of London. He should have stayed with the Staffel instead of chasing off on his own. When he grasped the situation he called for help, "Come quickly! I'm on my own over London".

It seemed now, that it was going to be a battle of tactics. Previously, the bombing had become far more widespread. In the early stages bombing was only concentrated on the radar stations and some of the production factories in the Southampton and Portsmouth areas with an occasional attack on the midlands, but now destruction by bombing was getting far more intense. Most of the airfields had received some sort of damage, bombing was getting closer to London and in some cases the suburbs had been hit, inland towns and cities in the industrial midlands were now sustaining bomb damage. The Air Ministry and the War cabinet were very concerned at the close proximity the bombing was on the capital itself. Göring had issued instructions that London was not to be bombed except only upon his orders which was a directive that had been passed down from Adolph Hitler.

London was ringed by the Sector Stations that were there to protect it. These were Kenley to the south in the county of Surrey, Biggin Hill also in the south in the county of Kent both just a short drive away from London. Hornchurch to the east, which was a vital airfield because it protected the London Docks, the Thames and the Thames Estuary as well as the large factories at Dagenham and Tilbury. North Weald to the north-east protected much of the Home Counties as well as providing back up for the busy Hornchurch. Northolt in the west of London completed whatever protection London needed.

It was with a tired and exhausted German Air Fleet, that Göring unleashed a savage all out bombing attack on Britain. August 24th was to be the start of a campaign of sustained bombing, sending over the Channel more aircraft that the RAF could cope with. A major difference in tactics was the introduction of 'stepped' raids, with successive formations of aircraft at different altitudes from low level fighter-bomber groups to high-level bombers at 24,000 ft. As one formation sets off so another builds up behind Calais, and the raiders split off into feint attacks as they proceeded, making interception most difficult at all levels and positions.

At 0830 hours a formation of Luftwaffe aircraft developed off the coast of Calais. The formation consisted of over forty Do 17s and Ju 88s with about sixty or more Bf 109s as escort. 12 fighter squadrons went up to intercept and RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) made contact. The Spitfires had position and height, and dived into the middle of the formation making the bombers scatter and the Bf 109 escort initially had problems with acceleration because of the new orders in keeping with close contact with the bombers. There was no account of bomb damage in the area at the time and the formation was turned back on another unsuccessful mission. But the raid was a feint, and the real attack was timed to catch the British fighters on the ground as they refuelled.

Dover and Folkestone were shelled at approximately 1000 hours. Four shells fell near Hawkinge Aerodrome (Folkestone), but little damage reported otherwise. The interval between the shells fired was about 8 minutes.

At 1130 hours another German formation came across the Channel from Cape Griz Nez which consisted of Ju 88s and an escort of Bf 109s. RAF No. 264 Sqd (Defiants) had been deployed as was RAF No. 151 Sqd (Hurricanes) and RAF No. 501 Sqd (Hurricanes). Deploying the Defiant squadron was a devastating move, especially as RAF No. 141 Sqd (Defiants) had almost been decimated about a month previous. At the time, RAF No. 264 Sqd was at Manston and after so many attacks now was being used mainly as a refueling station rather than a base. RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) had been vectored to Dover, where they saw nothing for the first 40 minutes.

The Defiants made contact with the bombers who made their first attack on Manston airfield. Although they managed to claim one Ju 88 shot down and another damaged, they suffered in the usual way, even in combat with the Ju 88s. Three Defiants were destroyed while two others sustained damage. RAF No. 610 Sqd managed to intercept a flight of six Bf 109s, but they turned away and headed back towards France having a head start on the pursuing Spitfires. RAF No. 610 Sqd broke off the engagement, except for Sgt R.F. Hamlyn, who chased one Bf 109 back to France, despite orders not to chase enemy aircraft across the Channel. Another Spitfire from RAF No. 610 Squadron was shot down over Ramsgate by Hptm. Josef Fözö of 4./JG 51. Fw. Josef Oglodeck of 1./JG 51 was killed in action shortly after getting his second Spitfire at 1412 hours. Oblt. Josef Priller of 6./JG 51 destroyed two Hurricanes off Margate.

Although Manston had many tunnels and underground shelters, it was now rapidly becoming useless, the result of regular and constant bomb attacks. In three days, RAF No. 264 Sqd had lost some twelve Defiants, fourteen pilots and gunners including the Commanding Officer were killed with most of the others being wounded. Just as the Ju 87 was withdrawn from the Luftwaffe, Fighter Command decided that the end had now come for the Defiant as a front line fighter, and what was left of RAF No. 264 Sqd was transferred back to Kirton-on -Lindsay.

During the afternoon, more waves of bombers were detected heading towards London. But then a change in course, and the bombers took on a course that placed them in a straight line for the Sector Stations of Hornchurch and North Weald.

 

[Njaco]

(24 August 1940 continued....)

During the afternoon, more waves of bombers were detected heading towards London. But then a change in course, and the bombers took on a course that placed them in a straight line for the Sector Stations of Hornchurch and North Weald.

With many other squadrons attending skirmishes around the south eastern coastline and with the possibility of more to come, 11 Group was stretched to the limit. RAF No. 32 Sqd (Hurricanes) had been scrambled, as was RAF No. 54 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No.65 Sqd (Spitfires), RAF No. 151 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 264 Sqd (Defiants), RAF No.501 Sqd (Hurricanes), RAF No. 610 Sqd (Spitfires) and RAF No. 615 Sqd (Hurricanes). Park sent out a request for assistance from Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group and 12 Group sent in RAF No. 19 Sqd with their cannon armed Spitfires, while three squadrons at Duxford attempted to form a 'big wing', but by the time that they had reached the target area the German bombers were already on their way home leaving a trail of blazing fires around the Thames Estuary, some caused by hastily jettisoned bombs giving an indication as to the ferocity of the combat. Meeting this mass of British fighters were fighter schwarms from I(J)./LG 2, III./JG 3, I and III./JG 26, JG 51, II./JG 2 and I./JG 53.

Thirty Bf 109s bounced Spitfires of RAF No. 616 Sqd and shot down seven of the British fighters in less than 30 seconds. The Defiants of RAF No. 264 Sqd managed to draw away the escorting Bf 109s off of a Dornier bomber formation allowing more Hurricanes to attack the German bombers. During the battle the British lost four Defiants shot down with three British planes falling into the sea off Thanet killing all aboard. Other British fighters were lost when Sgt G.Hill from No 65 Squadron escaped injury when his Spitfire I was shot down off Margate at 15:35 hours. Sgt G.T.Clarke of RAF No 151 Squadron was shot down and wounded by Bf 109's over Ramsgate at 15:55 hours and crash-landed his Hurricane I (P3273). Two Bf 109s from II./JG 2 were destroyed with one pilot killed and the second pilot wounded upon crashing near Le Havre.

P/O W.J.Glowacki from Poland flew with the RAF's No. 501 "County of Gloucester" Squadron flying Hurricanes, became an "Ace in One Day". Flying Hurricane 1 V7234 Glowacki and the rest of his section pounced on a formation of enemy bombers which had just carried out a devastating attack on Manston. Glowacki tore into the Ju 88s and shot down two in quick succession plus one of the escorting Bf 109s. A few hours later he notched up his fifth kill of the day when he downed a Ju 88 near Greystone.

The combat action continued over the Thames Estuary and the north coast towns of Kent. Manston had taken the brunt of the attack, but a number of German bombers managed to get through to their targets of North Weald and Hornchurch where, although considerable damage was done, operations were not affected. But with this attack, and the other raids around south-eastern England, the toll once again began to mount. The RAF was to lose twenty aircraft and eighteen of those damaged were repairable, to the thirty-nine destroyed of the Luftwaffe. Friendly fire also claimed victims. P/O D.N.Woodger of No 235 Squadron and his gunner D.L.Wright were shot down and killed in error by a Hurricane of RCAF No 1 Squadron at 16:45hrs. Their Blenheim IV (T1804) crashed at Bracklesham Bay.

The day was not over yet. Most of the action during the morning was in the Dover, Ramsgate, Thames Estuary and East London area, but by mid afternoon although Ventnor Radar was not in operation, a formation of about fifty heavy bombers were detected east of Cherbourg. Another formation was also detected coming from the south-east. Several squadrons were scrambled, but only RAF No.609 Sqd (Spitfires) made contact with the Germans in most unpleasant circumstances. They spotted the bomber formation 5,000 feet above them, just as the AA coast guns started to fire at the bombers. It was like being caught between 'the devil and the deep blue sea' except in this case it was the thick cloud of a bomber formation and the chilly waters of a cold and bleak English Channel.

Numerous Luftwaffe fighter units were involved in the combat actions after 1500 hours and many Experten increased their scoreboards. Fw. Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 shot down a British Hurricane for his sixth victory of the war. Oblt. Herbert Ihlefeld of 2(J)./LG 2, Oblt. Erwin Neuerburg of 7./JG 3 and Oblt. Arnold Lignitz of 9./JG 51each shot down two British fighters. But JG 51 lost several pilots. Uffz. Hans Busch and Uffz. Walter Harheim of 2./JG 51 were killed when their Bf 109s collided over Ramsgate. Lt. Franz Achleitner of 9./JG 3 with five victories, was shot down and captured, becoming a prisoner of war.

The Spitfire of American, P/O Andy Mamedoff was hit and, fighting with broken controls, just managed to land the plane in a field. With only a single squadron against seventy plus bombers, it was too much to ask that RAF No. 609 Sqd force the bombers into retreat, and the formations continued on to the City of Portsmouth where they let loose over 200 250 kg bombs. This raid resulted in the largest amount of casualties so far in a single raid during the Battle of Britain. Over 100 people in the city were killed on that afternoon, and 300 sustained serious injuries. Houses, shops, factories, the Naval barracks and the dockyards were all seriously damaged, and for the first time, the newspapers had to print the grim reality of truth in their headlines. For months previously Britons were reading newspaper headlines, "144 down out of 1,000", "25 Spitfires stop 70 Bombers" and "115 Raiders out of 600 Destroyed" figures were very much exaggerated. Now the headlines were to read "Portsmouth Suffers Heavy Bombing", simply that, in an effort to maintain morale the amount of dead and injured was only placed in small print. The destroyer HMS 'Acheron' was damaged by German aircraft during the air raid on Portsmouth.

But the bad news was not to stop with the day raids. No sooner had the bombers began their return journey, another large formation was building up off the Cherbourg Peninsular. This was joined by another formation from the south east and radar tracked them across the Channel. But by this time darkness had fallen and it was an impossibility for any British squadron to be 'scrambled'. With the small amount of night fighters that Fighter Command possessed it would be a disaster to allow them to go up and fly the flag for the RAF. Instead, Britain's only defense for the oncoming bombers would be the searchlights and AA groundfire. This time, the target was London itself. A target that was not to be attacked unless ordered to do so by Göring himself from instruction direct from Adolph Hitler.

 

[Njaco]

(24 August 1940 continued....)

So far for the period of the war, Londoners although often hearing local gunfire, seeing vapor trails of dogfights in the sky and hearing about the war in newspapers and on the radio, the only experience of bombing was when Croydon was mistakenly identified as Kenley and just a couple of bombs dropped on nearby Croydon and Purley, the target here was naturally the aerodrome at Croydon. The other instance was earlier in the morning when bombs were dropped on the docks and outskirts of East London. But that was in daylight. This was to be a new experience, a frightful experience, for this was the first time that London would be bombed at night. London had never been bombed since the Gotha bombing raids of 1918, and this was to be far more frightening, and spectacular than anything Londoners had seen before. A formation of 170 He 111s were sent to attack an aircraft factory at Rochester and oil storage tanks at Thameshaven. Navigational errors caused the bombers to become lost and they inadvertently dropped their loads too far west. Bombs fell at Aldgate in the city, at Bloomsbury, Bethnal Green, Finsbury, Hackney, Stepney, Shoreditch and West Ham. Fires covered the whole of London's East End, the night sky glowed blood red, fountains of flame bellowed out of factory windows, and wall structures came crashing down. While most of the bombs landed in the dockland area of East and West Ham and others fell in North London and as far west as Esher and Staines, one of the Heinkels left his release of bombs far too late, and it was these that landed in Central London that was to have immediate consequences in the days following.

Although hardly anything was accomplished by the raid, British Prime Minister Churchill demanded a reprisal raid upon Berlin. Within twenty four hours Bomber Command was to launch its first attack on the city of Berlin. Whether this was a good move or not, the bombing of Berlin only provoked the Luftwaffe into a series of regular night raids on the British capital. This was to be the warning that the Blitzkrieg on London had now begun.

But the night wasn't over.

Unable to carry out daylight attacks, night operations were the obvious answer and accordingly Luftflotte 3's bombers were ordered to attack the next most important targets in Britain, the vital West Coast ports of Liverpool and Bristol. The first of the new night targets attacked was a raid on the harbour installations at Bristol. He 111s from I, II and III./KG 27 and Ju 88s from I and III./LG 1 totaling forty-four warplanes subsequently were over the City dropped 27.2 tonnes of high explosive bombs, 13 tonnes of Oil Bombs and 5364 incendiary bombs in a raid which lasted from 21.40 to 05.09 hours. The attack, however, was not a success and although the weather over the Bristol area was fine, low cloud impeded visibility, with the result that the majority of the bombs fell fairly harmlessly in North Somerset.

2nd Lt Ellis Edward Arthur Chetwynd Talbot (1920-41), Royal Engineers, carried a new and unpredictable type of German bomb to a safe spot on his shoulders. (Empire Gallantry Medal)

WESTERN FRONT: The III Gruppe of JG 51 received a new Gruppenkommandeur when Hptm. Walter Oesau was posted to replace Hptm. Hannes Trautloft.

The 3 Staffel of JG 77 was reformed as 12 Staffel of JG 51.