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…the people already rose in various parts of the country and proclaimed the formation of a democratic republic. Port of the soldiers of Finland's army already have sided with the new government, backed by the people."
The second order to U 35 has remained unanswered. As every radio message is made at various times on long and short wave, it is out of the question that the boat did not receive it. Either her radio is out of order or something has happened to her.
47 and 48 have also been ordered to report their fuel stocks. It is necessary to find out how far south they could still operate, as weather conditions off the Channel seem very unfavorable.
"A quiet day on the whole front... the air forces, on both sides, were completely inactive."
According to reports received U47 and U48 could still operate south of Finisterre for a few days. No decision can be reached until we see what the weather is like when they arrive off the Channel, not before 5.12. In itself it would be better to have them off the Channel, as they could operate there longer.
U 38, on her way back from Kola Bay, was ordered to occupy the Westfjord as operations area and to attack the ore exports to England, outside the 3 mile limit. There have been many reports of this traffic, which is fairly heavy. English ships take a large part. Apparently the ships do not sail individually, but assemble off Loedingen and sail together, escorted by English forces. It is not known whether close escort is provided or whether the escorting vessels merely remain in the vicinity.
The main difficulties of intercepting this traffic are:
1) the uncertainty as to when the ships sail. The attacking boat might have to wait a very long time.
2) The uncertainty as to whether the ships sail from or at what point they leave territorial waters.
The area off Westfjord is too large to be covered by one boat, especially in the long winter months. There is not much hope of success therefore with a single boat off the Westfjord. There are no further boats available in view of requirements in the other theatres of war It is therefore necessary to penetrate into the Westfjord. Permission to do this has only recently been received from Naval War Staff. It is stated that the whole of the fjord need no longer be regarded as territorial waters, as claimed by the Norwegians, but that here too Germany will only respect the 3 mile zone.
U 46 will be ready for operations within the next few days. She is to operate on the west coast of Portugal. At present this is the best area for U-boats operating against merchant shipping, as conditions in the winter are better. U 30 and U 32 will be ready to sail approximately on 10th December. I intend to give both boats minelaying operations. By their radius of action they are limited to the area around England, where weather conditions are at present unfavorable for torpedo operations, while the long nights assist minelaying close inshore. U 32 will lay mines off the Clyde with the large TMC's, which have meanwhile been finished (charge 1,000 Kg). U 30 will proceed to the Irish Sea, off Liverpool. I think this latter operation should be very successful because:
1) There is a great deal of merchant shipping traffic here.
2) So far no U-boats have appeared in this area.
The British radio announced the sinking of a German U-boat the crew of which had landed at a Scottish port. Similar reports by the enemy have so far been found to be correct. U 35 must be presumed lost. Nothing has been heard of U 28 or 29, which should by now have carried out their operations, and it is feared that something may have happened to them too. But it is also possible that they are waiting for the new moon to lay their mines. In that case they should report within the next few days.
U 43 reported that she was starting her return passage and added that a southwest gale was raging off the Irish Sea. U 47 and U 48, which will be arriving there soon, will hardly be able to do anything in such weather conditions. U 47 was ordered to report if weather made action impossible. In this case I intend to send the boats south of Finisterre in spite of the short time they will be able to remain there. Letters from captured members of her crew indicate that U 40 struck a mine. This is the first proof of mines in the Channel. Air reconnaissance of the Dover-Calais Straits has not so far been carried out. Buoys and lightships have been laid off the English coast, showing that minefields have been laid, but nothing certain is known of their position and type. I must now give up this route into the Atlantic; there must not be losses on passage. With so few boats, each loss means such a considerable reduction in strength that it outweighs the disadvantages of a long and fruitless passage. With regard to the boat's operations as such, I do not see any other way of conducting them if successes are not to decrease. It will be necessary to carry on in the same way as at present and accept the inevitable losses. It is only thus that the small U-boat arm, pitted against far superior forces, can hold its own as a part of the war as a whole.
ArrivalsC-in-C Navy paid a short visit to Group Headquarters and to B.d.U. U 26 entered port. She did not carry out her minelaying operation off Gibraltar as the weather there was too bad. She was afterwards in the Mediterranean, as ordered, but apparently struck a poor time for traffic. The result of her patrol is one steamer sunk. Very little for 44 days. The stormy weather is mainly to blame. The C.O. cannot be blamed for not carrying out the minelaying operation because he did not consider it possible in view of local conditions. These things can only be judged at the time. But he did not take long enough to make his observations; he should have at least made one more attempt in different weather conditions. It was a mistake to send U 25, U 26 and U 53 into the Mediterranean. U 25 had to return before she ever got there, U 53 did not get through and U 26 hardly encountered any shipping worth mentioning. This patrol shows all the disadvantages of a long outward passage. The boat can only operate for a few days and the operation is without success if she does not come upon any traffic in those few days.
He says that the Germans first abandoned the gun for the torpedo and had now dropped that for the mine."...the lowest form of warfare that can be imagined."
B.d.U. requested Naval War Staff to extend the limits within which darkened ships may be attacked without warning. This is desirable:
1) in view of U 38's present operation off and in the Westfjord. It is most probable that the English ships there are darkened. Nearly all of them are painted grey, to make them less visible, and are armed.
2) for U-boat operations in the Mediterranean and off the Portuguese coast. Returned boats say that they sighted darkened ships there and were never certain what to do. Action according to prize law is very difficult and dangerous for the boat especially near Gibraltar.
Naval War Staff would not give their approval, as there might be German ships off the Norwegian and Spanish coasts.
"…whose glorious fight against overwhelming odds deserves the respect and honour of the House [of Commons] and of the nation".