- Thread starter
-
- #721
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
"...similar instances will not be permitted to occur in the future."
1. Norway :
The Norwegian Government has issued en official statement from its unknown headquarters. It says:
"The Norwegian Government has learnt from the radio of the German Government » a statement on 26 April that it was at war with Norway. It must confirm that it has had knowledge of a state of war already since the night of 8 April."
Otherwise "the statement is directed against German operations and ends with the words: "The fight for freedom and independence goes on."
U 13, 14 and U 30 started on their return passage. The following are thus left in the operations area: U 25, U 65 NW and W of the Shetlands; U 24, 57, 58, 39 NE and E of the Shetlands and Orkneys; U 65 reported a convoy; she did not manage to attack, but this is nevertheless an indication of traffic in this area; U 13, 17, 34 and 52 entered port. U 34 was first off Trondheim, then off the Follafjord and finally west of the Shetlands. She sighted numerous targets off the Follafjord, but only seldom managed to attack because of strong anti-S/M forces. Certain success against a cruiser and a destroyer was frustrated in each case by torpedo failures. She attacked "Franconia" north of the Minch. See 26.4. U 52 penetrated into the Foldafjord as far as Andalsnes without encountering anything except a torpedo boat, which chased her. For the rest of the time she was in the area from the Romdalfjord to the Shetlands and had no opportunities to fire.
The following points were made:
1) Torpedo situation. Most urgent requirement: to master the depth keeping of the torpedo. To create a sure impact firing unit. The problems of torpedo failures were already known and C-in-C Navy has ordered most urgent steps to be taken to solve them.
2) Small number of boats makes concentration necessary. Secondary duties must be abandoned. Training necessary, otherwise the boats cannot be manned after 1.9. Request that transport operations be cancelled. C-in-C Navy decided that 2 U-boats should be withdrawn from transport at once (U 32 and U 101).
3) Analysis of numbers of U-boats up to 1.1.41, taking into account new construction and losses. C-in-C Navy's decision for large boats: Atlantic warfare.
4) Anti-S/M situation. B.d.U. emphasized that the development of a counter-measure to Asdic, which had already been stated in peacetime to a most urgent requirement, was essential to the success of future U-boat warfare. B.d.U. again requested that the best sonic technicians, chemists and physicists, be set to evolve a countermeasure. C-in-C issued orders accordingly.
5) B.d.U. reported that his opinion of the Norway operation, even after the event, was:
a) that the operational and tactical disposition was correct.
b) that anti-S/M activity was very strong, and weather conditions unfavorable (short nights, smooth sea).
c) that, of course, the slow boats have less chance of success against fast, escorted warships than against merchant ships, but that nevertheless the numerous opportunities to attack show that chances of success were not unfavorable.
d) that torpedo failures cheated the boats of certain successes, even after all doubtful shots and misses had been subtracted.
During an attacis on a carrier formation numerous bombs dropped close to the aircraft carrier. Result not observed. During another attack by the 2nd Group, 1st Dive-Bomber Wing one 250 kg. hit on the bow of an aircraft carrier. Smoke, fire were observed. 1 X 250 kg. hit on the stern of a cruiser (listing, fire). The battle cruiser RENOWN - one SG 1000 at the ship's side. A 250 kg. hit on the stern of a destroyer by the 2nd Gp, 1st Dive-Bomber Wing. The 9th Air Division carried out further aerial ML
along the east coast of England. h2 aerial mines were dropped.
Nothing to report.
The order to 'go east' was clear to the captain – doing such an action would return the trawler to a German-controlled coast and immediate captivity. Faced with such an unwelcome choice, Lieutenant Stannard chose instead to fire his trawler's gun at the German bomber. Amazingly the gunner managed to shoot the Luftwaffe aircraft down. The 'Arab', now with a damaged engine, then headed out to sea and managed to return to Britain. Lieutenant Stannard will receive the Victory Cross for his actions during the past five days."Go east or be sunk".
A British Army communique reports withdrawal of Allied forces' from the area south of Trondheim in view of German superiority. The British and foreign presses openly record the defeat of the Western Powers in Norway.
The success of the German occupation of Norway is put down to Norwegian treachery. The Allied action from the south against
Trondheim failed because "Germany had the air superiority and, in spite of the efforts made by Allied naval and air forces,
was in a position to send large reinforcements to Norway. Overwhelming advantages are still seen for the Western Powers.
German. naval losses : are so .'heavy that there is a radical change in the ratio of forces of the naval powers and thus a possibility of re-grouping the Fleets of the Western Powers. Hence a British and French battle Fleet is being transferred to the
Eastern Mediterranean.
Conference on the question of sending out the third aux cruiser (Ship; 21) . Naval. Staff thinks this is a favorable time to send her out, even if the risk is greater than when Ship "16" and Ship "36" made their break-through. For the followin reasons a 3rd aux cruiser should be sent into the Atlantic as soon as possible. Our own situation, which makes some easing of the situa-
tion in the Nth Sea theater of war highly' desirable, especially as without the cruiser LUETZOW one can only expect a slight diversionary effect from the presence; of Ship "16" and Ship "36" the two merchant, raiders at present on operations, and indeed from the nature of their task the effect will probably not become noticeable for a few weeks.
CNS agreed with the suggestion to send out Ship "21". The following orders have been given to Group West:
"Ship "21" 's break-through into the Atlantic is to utilize the May new-moon period. Naval Staff contemplates the break-
through approximately as follows: First, transfer to Bergen, there re-camouflage, further passage if weather conditions
favorable , so that she passes through the danger area as far as about 200 miles NW of Stadtlandet in poor visibility .
Investigate possibility of submarine escort on passage through said danger area".
ArrivalsU 13, 17, 23, 58 entered port and UA put into Trondheim. U 17 and U 23 have nothing special to report off Bergen and near the Shetlands. Reports from U 13 and U 58 show:
East of the Orkneys and Shetlands and east of Pentland Firth very infrequent shipping but very strong patrol and numerous DDs. Operation during the summer (short nights) promises little success and losses may be incurred.
West of Pentland Firth rather more shipping, including independently-routed, unescorted ships. U 13 succeeded in sinking 2 steamers there, including the 7,000 ton tanker "Scottish American". It would appear possible for small boats to operate in this area even at this time of year, if they are able to move away from the coast to rest the crews and charge their batteries. U 13 very probably sank a Tribal class DD nth of the Shetlands.
UA put into Trondheim after a record patrol. U 44 must be declared missing and with her one of the best commanding officers, Lieut.(s.g.) MATTHES, who sank 36,000 tons on his first patrol. This boat was off the Norwegian coast and west of the Shetlands before the Norway operation. There is no clue as to her fate.
Group Narvik is in a critical situation. The shelling from the sea on our positions in Beis Fjord, Narvik and Rombaken Fjord continues. The enemy has brought up frenh reinforcements and is attacking our defenses. French Alpine troops have been seen near Oestervik (Bog en) .
Our troops are at a disadvantage since they lack snowshoes; the enemy, aided by local inhabitants who know the mountains
well, has many opportunities of encircling them.
Group Narvik reports that it intends to hold Narvik and the Slvegaardsmoen region as long as possible', however, exploration of the mountains east of Rombaken and experiences in fighting so far hive shown that with present forces defense of a mountain
base against superior enemy forces cannot be guaranteed indefinitely. Maximum support from the Air Force Is requested.
U 24 and U 57 started on their return passage, U 58 entered port. U 58's observations confirm the view that operation east of the Shetlands is possible. U 7 and U 9, training boats, will have to be prepared for operations for case "GELB", in spite of my concern for the effect on their training. Other U-boats are not yet able to proceed after the Norway operation. Of the transport boats, U 32 and U 101 (both still at sea) will be withdrawn. These boats have the least petrol carrying capacity. UA, U 26, U 122 and later U 123 are also intended for transport duties.
By order of OKW, Group Narvik is to be placed under Group 21 as from midnight on II May. Supplies are to be brough up as soon as possible, using every available means and in cooperation with the 5th Luftflotte. The situation on land In the Narvik area is serious. After intensive preliminary gunfire, the enemy is attempting to outflank our forces on the right . As Group Narvik has no more forces to bring against this outflanking movement, it requests that a mountain infantry company, equipped with snowshoes, be sent by
air. Enemy DDs in Rombaken Fjord are preventing any supplies on the ore railroad. In view of the worthwhile targets air support is requieste; more ammunition is urgently required.
U 59 started on her return passage. U 29 and U 30 entered port, U 101 entered Trondheim. U 29 took material to Bergen and Trondheim, was heavily depth-charged in FROHAVET off Trondheim and on her way back made an attack which failed. U 30 was heavily bombarded by "Hipper" and "Eckholdt" in the approach to Trondheim, fortunately without results. She was then to operate off the Romsdal Fjord, but did not succeed in entering the fjord as there was strong anti-S/M activity and she frequently touched ground in badly charted waters. West of the Shetlands the boat found little patrol, but also no shipping. On her way there she had to abandon the attack on a convoy as, when she hauled ahead, the Shetlands were between her and the convoy. U 32, about whom considerable concern had been felt, reported her position. A few days ago she reported petrol gas in the boat, which proves that there is danger in transporting petrol, even in outer fuel tanks.