parsifal
Colonel
16 April 1940 (Part I)
Known Reinforcements
Axis
RaumeBoote MSW R-41
Known Losses
PV V-1703 (DKM 450 grt (est)) The vorpostenboot was torpedoed and sunk by Sub NARWHAL. She was later repaired and returned to service.
MV RUHORT (Ger 5026 grt) (date of loss uncertain, but she was lost 12-16 April): The cargo ship was captured in the Norwegian Sea off Vemoya, Norway on 12 April by Nor COMMONWEALTH, and TBS SLEIPNER and TRYGG. She was later abandoned and thereafter sunk by LW a/c
Steamer MERTAINEN (SD 4531 grt) whilst carrying iron ore from Narvik to Tees, the vessel was sunk by German bombing off Trondheim, but the crew was rescued and landed at Kristiansund (no casualties).
DKM War diary
Selected Extracts
UBOATS
Kriegstagebücher (KTB) - War Diary
At Sea 16 April 1940
U-3, U-5, U-6, U-7, U-9, U-10, U-13, U-14, U-17, U-19, U-23, U-24, U-25, U-26, U-30, U-34, U-37, U-38, U-43, U-46, U-47, U-48, U-51, U-52, U-56, U-57, U-58, U-59, U-60, U-61, U-62, U-65.
32 boats at sea
Known Reinforcements
Axis
RaumeBoote MSW R-41
Known Losses
PV V-1703 (DKM 450 grt (est)) The vorpostenboot was torpedoed and sunk by Sub NARWHAL. She was later repaired and returned to service.
MV RUHORT (Ger 5026 grt) (date of loss uncertain, but she was lost 12-16 April): The cargo ship was captured in the Norwegian Sea off Vemoya, Norway on 12 April by Nor COMMONWEALTH, and TBS SLEIPNER and TRYGG. She was later abandoned and thereafter sunk by LW a/c
Steamer MERTAINEN (SD 4531 grt) whilst carrying iron ore from Narvik to Tees, the vessel was sunk by German bombing off Trondheim, but the crew was rescued and landed at Kristiansund (no casualties).
DKM War diary
Selected Extracts
A radio appeal by the old Norwegian Government definitely shows that it has thrown in its lot with the Allies. Narvik and vicinity is said to have been recaptured; Norwegian pilots and officers are aiding the Western Powers' expeditionary corps; the people are asked to accept British and French money. It is the duty of all citizens to help the authorities and to report treachery and espionage.
The fact that the old Norwegian Government is still in a position to exercise certain functions, to influence the people and incite them to resistance, must be regarded as extremely regrettable. It was a definite mistake in the operation that we did not succeed by suitable preparatory steps in ensuring that the Norwegian Government was captured promptly and that a new and capable Government was set up right on the first day of the occupation.
The editor Ansaldo, who acts as a spokesman for Mussolini in certain affairs, gave a radio address to the Italian Army: "Events show that no nation can remain outside the conflict. War could come to Italy as it came to Norway. Italy is preparing herself for this and will choose the most favorable moment, which is perhaps nearer than is believed."
Russia has handed to Roumania an aide memo'ire on various frontier incidents. Tension between Russia and Roumania continues. The Russians are making military preparations. The German Ambassador considers the situation threatening, a point of view which the Army General Staff does not share to the same extent.
Admiral Tamm (Swedish Naval chief) in conference with German diplomatic staff confirmed the great anxiety about German operational plans which existed in Sweden before 9 April. These were regarded as definitely directed against Sweden. He promised
Sweden's strict legality of action and her readiness to conform with German wishes.
UBOATS
Kriegstagebücher (KTB) - War Diary
At 0410 a report was received from U 47 that she had found the transports at anchor in Bygden (Vaagsfjord). 4 misses! U 65 had already fired a double shot (most probably at close range therefore) without success. I am now beginning to suspect that even the use of impact firing is not preventing torpedo failures. Either the G7e is keeping a much greater depth than hitherto known or the pistol does not arm. A second report from U 47 confirms this idea: in a second attack on the transports another 4 torpedoes failed to fire. This means a total of 8 unsuccessful shots by our best U-boat commander. It is quite clear to me that these failures are responsible for the commanding officer's lack of success.
I requested immediate assistance from C-in-C Navy by telephone and made a corresponding T/P to Supreme Command of the Navy, giving a list of failures during the last few days. I requested the Director of the Torpedo Inspectorate to come to Wilhelmshaven tomorrow for a discussion. U 47's reports shows that it was right to leave the boats in the Vaagsfjord in spite of the high risks. It was only in the south of the Vaagsfjord that they were able to regain contact with the transports. But now that U 47's attack has failed and will be followed by a corresponding anti-S/M activity on the part of the enemy. It is necessary to get the boats out of this witches' cauldron and dispose them at the entrance to the Anden fjords.
Reports from U 25 and U 46 confirm my view that things are very difficult for the boats in the fjords, as they have no means of attacking destroyers; an "AZ" shot passes under the destroyers, and "MZ" shot detonates prematurely. The short, light nights and a sea as smooth as glass add to their difficulties. I am therefore withdrawing the U-boats from the Namses and Romsdale fjords as well as from the Vaagsfjord to positions off the fjords.
In reply to her radio message 2100/15/4, received 0948/16/4, U 46 has been ordered to return. The Trondheim position, which was not occupied yesterday, is occupied again. U 46 and U 51 are interrupting their return passage and have been given new positions as they still have torpedoes left.
Group FOELLA has joined the groups mentioned yesterday, between Lofoten and Narvik. U 57 has been ordered to the position off Scapa and further U-boats are to go there. After Kristiansand was occupied, I sent Lieut.(s.g.) Windler, the Flotilla Engineering Officer, with additional personnel, cypher material etc., to fetch U 21. U 21 is now fit to proceed and dive and can sail from Kristiansand today. Lieut.(s.g.) ROESING has inspected the Norwegian S/M's and reports that they are unfit for use either operationally or in the U-boat school. Further details remain to be seen; I have made the organization department responsible for finding and requisitioning Scandinavian S/M's. U 13 reported the sinking of a Tribal class destroyer N. of the Shetlands, so the "MZ" has worked in this area. This points to Zone setting O being being responsible for premature detonators. U 26 and U 43 are to be converted for patrol transport when they get back. U 32, UA, U 101, U 122 are already being adapted for this purpose.
At Sea 16 April 1940
U-3, U-5, U-6, U-7, U-9, U-10, U-13, U-14, U-17, U-19, U-23, U-24, U-25, U-26, U-30, U-34, U-37, U-38, U-43, U-46, U-47, U-48, U-51, U-52, U-56, U-57, U-58, U-59, U-60, U-61, U-62, U-65.
32 boats at sea
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