Tiger tank from aircraft thread;

[Shortround6]

Tiger was unquestionably a backward step for the resilience of german armoured formations. Whilst individually these vehicles were peerless engineering marvels, well protected and requiring an inordinate expenditure of resources to deal with the, their individual unit costs, on a real basis, was such that they contributed to the dilution of strength for each of the panzer formations. Tiger was never an easy tank to build, never an easy tank to use and limited in several areas (notably range and mobility) that damned it to mediocrity throughout its career.

Cost is the first demerit of the tank. There will always be massive disagreements as to the final unit cost of the tiger. Suffice it to say it was exorbitant. Massively so….some sources suggest that at least 30 T-34s could be had for the same cost as a single Tiger I. Tigers are known to have an exchange rate of about 10:1 in battle, but those odds shortened considerably if total losses are compared. Many tigers were lost to mechanical breakdowns running out of fuel as the hordes of T-3s simply bypassed them.

The second limitation affecting the Tiger was its very limited range….may 87 miles maximum. As suggested above, this led to many tigers simply being abandoned after running out of fuel and severely limited the type in any offensive roles

The third constraint affecting the type was its distinct lack of mobility. It had difficulty crossing may bridges, it suffered heavy losses in boggy terrain, it was never great in rough terrain

Other adverse issues was its slow turret traverse

The tiger was probably one of the best heavy tanks of the war, but was not suited to the impoverished german Army 1942-45. There were definite penalties to numbers as a result of the tigers introduction. Moreover, whilst everyone was toying with the concept of a super heavy tank they fell out of favour after the war almost immediately in favour of the "main battle tank" which favoured an all round compromise between the often competing demands of protection, firepower and mobility. Whilst heavy tanks might concentrate on one or two of these facets at the expense of the other(s), this was found to be less than ideal after the war. Tiger was no exception to that.

I know we have argued about this before but in some cases people apply post war (or even 1960s ) standards to the Tiger tank.instead of the standards of the day.

Roles for tanks changed and sometimes just classifying a tank by it's weight overlooks the intended role of a particular tank and the intended role sometimes is not the role it was actually used for.
Most armies in the 30s were stuck, at least somewhat, in the mindset of WW I and thought that tanks should be used to break through fortified positions or trench lines. There was also the penetration/deep raid/shoot up the rear areas role. WIth the technology of the time and the cost/weight limits one tank could seldom, if ever, perform both roles in the 1930s/early 40s.

Most large armies wanted "breakthrough" tanks (tanks that could breakthrough a defended position while absorbing/deflecting anti-tank fire up to a certain standard). Speed and range were not high on the list.
WW I Breakthrough tanks went around 5mph (if they were lucky) and ranged 35-50 miles. SO tanks that went 12-18 mph and ranged 50-90 miles looked pretty good.
Main argument here was, given budgets of the time, a few big breakthrough tanks or lots of little ones? The latter were often called Infantry tanks as their role was to accompany the infantry in the assault.
Some armies (French in particular) tried for both.
Due to the lack of speed and range armies also bought faster tanks with hopefully better range, but these were lightly armoured in order to keep weight down. The intended role being to go through the gap made by the assault tanks and accompanying infantry and drive on into the rear areas (which would hopefully have less AT guns) and shoot up the supporting artillery, headquarters/supply depots and such causing a general collapse of the front in that area. The British had cruiser tanks, the French had several categories of tanks for this role and the Russians were building the fast BT tanks by the thousands.
Please note the inted role was NOT reconnaissance or scouting (many prewar tanks didn't have radios) although many wound up doing that role.

Point of this very short and simplified background is that the requirement that lead to the Tiger tank was formulated in 1937 for a tank that would be 50% heavier than a MK IV (then at 18 tons) and armoured to withstand heavier guns. As with most projects weight grew substantially. But this project was never intended to replace the MK IV on the production lines but to be used for special purpose set piece battles. Which turned out not to happen at anywhere near the anticipated frequency that pre war generals thought. AT guns also got better faster than new tank chassis could be designed.

The Tiger was never a counterpart to the T-34 or Sherman or even the Cromwell. It was a counterpart to the KV, the US M6 and perhaps the Churchill.
US M6

The end of the war and post war super heavy tanks were intended for a somewhat different role. At least in the west they were biased more towards anti-tank work and were intended to engage in gunnery duals with the enemies heavy tanks in support of their own medium/standard tanks and not for bunker busting (although useful for that) or over running trench lines (the multiple auxiliary machine guns had disappeared.) as the heavy tanks were to rare (and expensive ) to used to take the point position in attacks on heavily defended areas.

The last of the superheavies didn't disappear until the guns on the "mediums" (that now weight 40-50+ tons) improved or were provided with ammunition that would defeat any practical amount of steel armor that could be put on a tank. Comparing a Centurion or M-60 with 105mm gun firing APDS to a superheavy with a 120mm gun firing full bore solid shot is not a fair comparison. Especially trying to back date it show the Tiger was a faulty concept.

Many tanks suffered from high numbers of breakdowns. Especially in retreat, when they cannot be recovered.
The French lost more Char B1s due to breakdowns and running out of fuel than they did to combat.

lost due to broken steering mechanism, French had equipped Char B1 units with tracked fuel carriers and armoured fuel trailers but that was not enough to overcome the short range and chaotic supply situation the French were caught in.

The Tiger was far from perfect but the idea that the German forces would have done significantly better without it may need a rethink. Cost in money is not always a good way to measure things as it includes labor and cost of tooling. I doubt very highly that you could build even ten 30 ton tanks for the cost in raw materials tha one 56 ton Tiger cost let alone 30 tanks.

Germans held on to the MK III and MK IV too long. Stugs are not true replacements for turreted tanks.

A better comparison to the Tiger than the T-34 was the KV tank. And please consider that the KV had some mobility issues that do not show up in a simple list of speed/s and range. Using the same engine and transmission as the T-34 (and the transmission was none too good on the early T-34s) the KV drivers often only used one or two gears out of the 4 speed transmission due to the difficulty in shifting. Running in 2nd or 3rd gear instead of 4th can cut the listed range considerably. Not to mention trying to drive on slopes. Clutch and brake steering systems may work on light tanks/vehicles but give lots of problems with large heavy ones. Russian KV tanks were also too heavy for most existing Russian road bridges and Russian Army temporary bridges/ferrying equipement.

The Panther might be a bit more suspect than is usually give credit and the Tiger II was simply all the bad points of the Tiger I amplified with few,if any, real advantages. (Yeah the long 88 was more powerful but if the short 88 could knock out well over 90% of it's opponents at most practical battle ranges, 2-3km shots being rarities, what was the point?) Using the same engine in a 75 ton tank that you used in a 56 ton tank sure doesn't solve any mobility problems.

 

[taly01]

I don't mind the resources spent on the Tiger I as it did perform a role very effectively, the Tiger II though was too much as you say, let alone the JagdTiger! The engineering time and development were more of a waste than pure material and labour on these. The german method of dovetailing armour plates also reached its limit with the big 100mm+ plates as they would buckle at the dovetail when hit.

I'm not a big fan of the Panther either, the Panther was a very high target with only 40mm side armour, okay on the open plains but very vulnerable if flanked. In Normandy wooded country the PzIV performed as well as the Panther and some preferred it as it was easier to hide it.

 

[parsifal]

I know we have argued about this before but in some cases people apply post war (or even 1960s ) standards to the Tiger tank.instead of the standards of the day.

In many ways, particularly in the west, the development of armoured warfare concept atrified after the war. The Germans were ahead of everyone in armoured warfare theory in 1942, took a bit of a hit 1943-5, but were still ahead of everyone even at the end. The only area where I think the Americans were ahead was in the formalised ideas around Combat Commands, as compared to the more adhoc arrangements used by the germans in their formations of Kampfgruppen. Americans in theory at least were ahead in their ideas of all arms teams, from the perspective of that formal division of units into flexible combat teams, but in reality were less well developed than the germans. Had the war been still contested in 1960, and extrapolating what the western allies did with the lessons they learned, the german advantages would have been even more pronounced.

Roles for tanks changed and sometimes just classifying a tank by it's weight overlooks the intended role of a particular tank and the intended role sometimes is not the role it was actually used for.

The MBT classification is not just a function of its weight. Leopard II for example is one of the heaviest tanks by weight but easily meets the tenets underpinning the MBT classification. The Soviet T-10 (a derivative of the IS series) do not. To be classified an MBT, you need a blend of three components, mobility, firepower and protection. They need to be a balanced compromise……if you have a design that is clearly lacking in any of these areas you cannot call the weapon system an MBT. It might be a Light Tank, or it might be a Heavy Tank.
The classification of MBT didn't exist in WWII, but that does not mean that there weren't tanks that fulfilled the role. Tanks that could be classified as MBTs (in a contemporary application of the term, might include…….Pzkpfw Mk III (for early war), Mk IV, Panther (for late war), Somua (early war), Shinhoto Chi Ha (early war), Sherman, Grant, Comet, Cromwell. Some of these tanks weren't particularly good, but they do fit the criteria for MBT in the time context of their design.
Tanks that fall outside these classifications have some usefulness, but fall short in the classic roles for armour. Tigers are very much in that category.

Most armies in the 30s were stuck, at least somewhat, in the mindset of WW I and thought that tanks should be used to break through fortified positions or trench lines. There was also the penetration/deep raid/shoot up the rear areas role. WIth the technology of the time and the cost/weight limits one tank could seldom, if ever, perform both roles in the 1930s/early 40s.

The nations that mattered were not "stuck" in this way. Germany developed concepts on armoured warfare that continue to form the basis of modern armoured breakthrough warfare even today. The concepts of mobility, concentration of force dislocation of rear areas, remains as valid today as it ever was when first formulated. Guderians genius was that he married concepts from some very diverse sources to create a thoroughly modern concept of armoured warfare. He combined the ideas of fully integrated armoured/Infantry/ artillery together, threw in direct air support and provided radio communications that are still to this day the essentials of armoured combat. It is no accident that men like Rommel, Manteuffel, Guderian, even Manstein dismissed the Tiger philosophy as a wasted effort, they all considered mobility to be the single most important element of tank design.
Other nations were far less well developed in terms of armoured warfare, but neither is at all true that they were preparing to fight the next war according the tenets of 1918.
Both Britiain and the US were probably the least well developed, but even they were envisaging their breakthrough battles being fought in the manner prescribed by JFC Fuller. In France nothing could be further from the truth that they intended to fight the next war according to the 1918 principals. The French army was probably the second most advanced nation on mobile warfare in the world. They had 10 fully motorized Infantry divisions, something nobody else had, 4 armoured divs (DCRs), 4 Mech Cav Divs (DLMs) 5 armoured Cav Divs (DLCs) and over 60 autonomous armoured support bns for the Infantry, backed up by a further 45 reserve bns equipped with a rather depressing array of WWI equipment. Unlike the Germans, very little importance was given to air support, radio control 9in the C&C mix). Whereas the Germans measured their rapid responses in a matter of hours, the French measured their ideas on mobile warfare as a matter of days delay. Compare this to the weeks or months delays factored into one of Fochs or haigs "big pushes" and the invalidity of comparing the early WWII efforts becomes readily apparent.
The Russians prewar also had some very unique concept on what armoured warfare might need to be like. The purges kinda killed the Soviet efforts to develop a workable concept on armoured warfare. But in any event their prewar concepts on armoured warfare had to be massively adapted to suit the unique conditions the Russians faced. In the west, the general trend was towards the formation of all arms teams, focusing on a balance of mobility, firepower and protection, with the armoured spearheads a supported by integrated teams of armour infantry and backed up by airpower. For the Red army, with its acute, and never solved shortages of trained leaders and experience, this all arms concept was tried at ther beginning of the war and failed because the Red Army lower and middle leadership lacked the experience to make it work…….so the Red Army adapted the model to suit their own capabilities. Therer greenhorn officers were given simplified TOEs with which to work….rifle brigades were often just that, as were the so-called submachine gun bns. With or two wepon systems to get a handle on, this simplified the battle problem considerably. Later as experience levels improved the Soviets were able to reform formations with more of an all arms capability
All of the armies that went to war 1939-1941 had given some thought to fighting wars differently to the way the campaigns in 1918 had been fought. Some were more successful than others at it.

Most large armies wanted "breakthrough" tanks (tanks that could breakthrough a defended position while absorbing/deflecting anti-tank fire up to a certain standard). Speed and range were not high on the list.
WW I Breakthrough tanks went around 5mph (if they were lucky) and ranged 35-50 miles. SO tanks that went 12-18 mph and ranged 50-90 miles looked pretty good.
Main argument here was, given budgets of the time, a few big breakthrough tanks or lots of little ones? The latter were often called Infantry tanks as their role was to accompany the infantry in the assault.
Some armies (French in particular) tried for both.

True that most armies toyed with the concept but there are enough significant exceptions to challenge the validity of the basic positioning of this statement. The main Brekthrough Tank of the heer was the MkIII. This had a range of 110-165 miles and a normal speed of up to 25 mph. the mk IV is often touted as its heavy support, but in fact the Mk IV was designed for Infantry support, to provide HE capability at the rear of the schwerpunkt. As far as emphasis not being on speed and range, in the case of the germans, this is absolutely untrue. Downright misleading actually. Guderian from the early 30's always considered mobility THE most important facet of tank design. And this included range and speed both.It is true that those with more of an Infantry based emphasis were less concerned about this element of design and purpose, but these proponent s were ultimately proven wrong. Even so some designs did acknowledge the need and importance for range. The Somua S-35 had a range of between 95miles (offroad) and 150miles (off road) and 150 (on road), T-34s, designed prewar, had a design range 150-200 miles, increased later to nearly 300 miles with the external fuel tanks fitted.
Breakthrough tanks were not the priority for the most advanced armoured nations. It is simply untrue to claim that.

Due to the lack of speed and range armies also bought faster tanks with hopefully better range, but these were lightly armoured in order to keep weight down. The intended role being to go through the gap made by the assault tanks and accompanying infantry and drive on into the rear areas (which would hopefully have less AT guns) and shoot up the supporting artillery, headquarters/supply depots and such causing a general collapse of the front in that area. The British had cruiser tanks, the French had several categories of tanks for this role and the Russians were building the fast BT tanks by the thousands.
Please note the inted role was NOT reconnaissance or scouting (many prewar tanks didn't have radios) although many wound up doing that role.

Most nations developed concepts of breakthrough tanks and support tanks, the T-34 and KV series being a prime example. The Germans were not ardent fans of this concept, but their reliance on training vehicles, Mk Is and IIs forced the ideas of a support element supporting the lighter tanks (generally MkIIIs supporting Mk Is and IIs) has a lot ot truth to it. The difference between these early renditions and the later insertion of Tigers in the support role is that whereas the mkIII as a support tank retained a good degree of mobility so that it could keep up with an advance, a tiger could not. It would generally either break down, run out of fuel couldn't get into position or simply was too slow to support a blitz style breakthrough.

Point of this very short and simplified background is that the requirement that lead to the Tiger tank was formulated in 1937 for a tank that would be 50% heavier than a MK IV (then at 18 tons) and armoured to withstand heavier guns. As with most projects weight grew substantially. But this project was never intended to replace the MK IV on the production lines but to be used for special purpose set piece battles. Which turned out not to happen at anywhere near the anticipated frequency that pre war generals thought. AT guns also got better faster than new tank chassis could be designed.

Tiger tanks were very much conceived in the light of the "support tank" concept. That much I agree with. But it was a concept that was changed so much and so completely failed to take into account the wishes of the front line commanders and most importantly failed to take into account or retain some of the most essential components of a true assault support weapoin system as to make the argument that it was responding to prewar dictates, a nonsense basically. It is certainly true that the germans wanted a proper support tank, but as guderian repeatedly said, what was needed was a tank that was agile and long legged enough to keep up with the advance. The design of the tiger ignored those repeated requirements. Faced with the crisis that arose from the early encounters with the t-34 (and also the KV) the Germans panicked and designed a tank, at hitlers insistence that was at once the biggest, meanest, most heavily armed and armoured weapon system on the battlefield. That this weapon system was nearly useless because it could hardly move, and therefore was hardly of any use in mobile warfare, got lost in that panic.

The Tiger was never a counterpart to the T-34 or Sherman or even the Cromwell. It was a counterpart to the KV, the US M6 and perhaps the Churchill.
US M6

It was a failure in this support role because it was a static line weapon…..nearly useless in mobile operations. Most support weapons of other armies also suffered some loss of mobility but not nearly as badly as the Tiger

Many tanks suffered from high numbers of breakdowns. Especially in retreat, when they cannot be recovered.
The French lost more Char B1s due to breakdowns and running out of fuel than they did to combat.

Tigers and Panthers (the early panthers at any rate) suffered the same problems……for the panther 206 went into action at Kursk, about 25 were destroyed in battle, 108 were sent to rear workshops where all but 7 were captured by the advancing Russians. During the Ardennes, of the 40 or so tiger IIs used in the advance to the US fuel dumps, they were all lost, but nearly all of them to fuel and breakdowns. l

The Tiger was far from perfect but the idea that the German forces would have done significantly better without it may need a rethink. Cost in money is not always a good way to measure things as it includes labor and cost of tooling. I doubt very highly that you could build even ten 30 ton tanks for the cost in raw materials tha one 56 ton Tiger cost let alone 30 tanks.

Very few of the general officers renowned for their skill in armoured operations supported the tiger concept. Those that expressed opposition to its development and existence included Guderian, Manteuffel, Rommel, and Manstein. These officers all considered the type lack of mobility to be a fatal and major drawback. In the case of Rommel and guderian they went further, the unit cost of the tiger and its reliability issues were both considered in very adverse terms. Rommel after his recall to Europe favoured the total abandonment of turreted AFVs in favour of Tank destroyers, which on average were 40% cheaper to build. Guderian wanted heavy tank production to remain focused on Mk IV improvements and he too later favoured tank destroyers over tanks…..the so called "Guderians Duck". For the officers that were there and were in the best positions to know, none of them favoured the tiger tank. Even some of the SS idiots that called themselves officers were not great fans. During the Ardennes offensive, when offered the choice of any tank to equip his KG, Peiper xhose the Panther (which by late '44 was finally starting to catch up to the t-34 reliability wise) over the tiger. .

Germans held on to the MK III and MK IV too long. Stugs are not true replacements for turreted tanks.
And yet the MkIII/IV combination remained the mainstay on the eastern front well into 1944, achieving exchange rates with the Russians at least equal to thos touted for the tiger overall. The exchange rate, incidentally exceeded 7:1. As far as the stugs issue is concerned, both Guderian 9at the end) and Rommel (somewhat earlier) advocated replacement of turret AFVs with these weapon systems. Turrets represented a major chokepoint in out for the Germans, some sources claim that availability could have been boosted by as much as 40-50% if a full changeover to Stugs had been accepted. There is little or no evidence to support the often quoted notion that were at some disadvantage against turret tanks. Perhaps so in fully offensive mobile operations, but not in the kind of defensive situations Germany was being forced in to from 1944 onward

 

[The Basket]

Reality or theory?

 

[parsifal]

You will have to clarify a bit please

 

[Ivan1GFP]

I am somewhat curious as to where your information is coming from.
First of all, as I commented on in the thread that spawned this one, the range of the Tiger was actually pretty comparable to other German tanks. They all had ranges from about 120 to 150 miles on roads and about 1/2 to 2/3 that cross country.
The Tiger wasn't really all that bad on soft ground because of its wide tracks and relatively low ground pressure.
It wasn't really significantly slower than any of the German medium tanks with the exception of Panther.
They were all around 25 MPH plus or minus a couple MPH. None were fast nor did they have particularly good cross country performance. The slowest of the bunch actually appears to be the Panzer III.
The biggest problem was the weight and size (mostly the width) of the vehicle which made a lot of road bridges unusable.

As for all the German Panzer Leaders wanting fast and mobile tanks, I am curious as to what was actually ever built that fit into that category. The only real tanks I can think of would have been the Lynx and the Panzer II and those were typically carrying guns no larger than 20 mm and armour that would not stop anything bigger than perhaps a heavy machine gun. That is hardly useful in armoured combat. Perhaps the Czech T-38 was a little better but it was still a light tank with no great firepower or armour.

If the Panzer IV had exchange ratios similar to Tiger in actual combat, that would be quite amazing.
It never really had particularly good armour protection or speed.
It started with a 75 mm L/24 (?) which was useful only for throwing high explosive shells in support of infantry attacks.
It didn't have enough velocity to do much against real armour.
The L/43 was better but came along a bit later as did the final L/48.
They would have been great if they had been available in 1941 but didn't make it into a Panzer IV until 1942 and then only in fairly small numbers. I believe the L/48 didn't make it into the Panzer IV until about 1944 and that was a bit late.
Against the Soviet 76 mm guns, they were certainly better, but a bit underpowered compared to a Soviet 85 mm that was eventually mounted on the T-34 and KV or the bigger stuff carried by their other heavy tanks.
Against the frontal armour of a Soviet heavy, they really were not effective except at well under 500 yards or perhaps not at all.
The Panzer III with just a 50 mm or a short 75 simply had no chance other than a mobility kill or shooting through some thin side or rear armour.

THAT was the next step down from the Tiger or Panther: vehicles with inferior armour, mobility, speed, and firepower.

 

[The Basket]

My concern is the usual German over engineered fantastic wonder weapons Vs 1300 unreliable tanks.

Part of tank warfare was the recovery of wrecked or broke down tanks after the battle and the only thing that could recover a tiger was another tiger.

If tigers were perfect then that's the theory of the tank but 1300 tanks over the size of the fronts was not going to work.

 

[parsifal]

I am somewhat curious as to where your information is coming from.
First of all, as I commented on in the thread that spawned this one, the range of the Tiger was actually pretty comparable to other German tanks. They all had ranges from about 120 to 150 miles on roads and about 1/2 to 2/3 that cross country..

And your source material is at odds with some rather weighty reference materials. There are numerous references that could be used. I cross referenced against 2....Millers "Tanks of the World"; Groves "WWII Tanks" and did a bit of cross referencing to one or two on line references.

Some sources do specify a nominal range for the tiger of 120 miles, but that is highly misleading That is a reference to the types "road transit range".....how far it can travel whilst on roads and not in combat. Grove quotes a combat range of 62 miles in open terrain which accords pretty closely to what happened at Kursk ((based on the account given by Barber in his book "Kursk"). Miller quotes the same combat range. For comparison, Miller quotes the combat range of the mk IV as 135 miles for the earlier marks and 190 miles for the later types. Both references give lower values for the mk III, but they are still generally 1.5 to twice the range for the tiger.

The Tiger wasn't really all that bad on soft ground because of its wide tracks and relatively low ground pressure.
It wasn't really significantly slower than any of the German medium tanks with the exception of Panther.

Miller states " The tanks weight proved a severe limitation. Its range and battlefield speed were severely limited and its power to weight ratios were poor". Most other sources corroborate this position.
As far as your critiques of the german mainstay tanks and the opinioons held by some very eminent german tank specialists, you will have to take up your pet positions with them im afraid. Facts are these. Mk IV had vastly superior mobility to the tiger, greater reliability and overall achieved exchange rates with Soviet tanks that overall were better than those achieved by the tiger. Various tank specialists rejected the Tiger when offered to them, and most considered it to be an overall waste of resources for the heer .

 

[parsifal]

My concern is the usual German over engineered fantastic wonder weapons Vs 1300 unreliable tanks.

Part of tank warfare was the recovery of wrecked or broke down tanks after the battle and the only thing that could recover a tiger was another tiger.

If tigers were perfect then that's the theory of the tank but 1300 tanks over the size of the fronts was not going to work.

I see your point and don't disagree. Tigers are among the most overrated pieces of junk in the German inventory. that should make my position pretty clear I think



Kellys heroes tigers are a piece of junk - Bing video

 

[The Basket]

Not junk
But typical of the German wonder weapons. All smoke and mirrors.
In attritional warfare is the Tiger a luxury or a genius weapon of war. If it was perfect then one can allow it's issues but it wasn't.
How Germany could have done anything else is a good question but tanks should be designed with been disposable so spending too much or money or too much time on a object with a very limited life span has to be questioned.

 

[soulezoo]

Say what you want about the Tiger I, Franz Staudegger at Kursk showed what the Tiger was capable of. I'll bet ol' Franz was pretty happy with it.

Unreliable, yes. Expensive and hard to produce, yes. Universally feared by opposing tanks and troops whenever they happened across one? Also yes. That is a quality that few implements of war achieve and has an unquantifiable value.

 

[Ivan1GFP]

And your source material is at odds with some rather weighty reference materials. There are numerous references that could be used. I cross referenced against 2....Millers "Tanks of the World"; Groves "WWII Tanks" and did a bit of cross referencing to one or two on line references.

.......

Miller states " The tanks weight proved a severe limitation. Its range and battlefield speed were severely limited and its power to weight ratios were poor". Most other sources corroborate this position.
As far as your critiques of the german mainstay tanks and the opinioons held by some very eminent german tank specialists, you will have to take up your pet positions with them im afraid. Facts are these. Mk IV had vastly superior mobility to the tiger, greater reliability and overall achieved exchange rates with Soviet tanks that overall were better than those achieved by the tiger. Various tank specialists rejected the Tiger when offered to them, and most considered it to be an overall waste of resources for the heer .

Hello Parsifal,
Keep in mind that I am not saying that Tiger I was great. I just say that they were the best that was available because of a lack of follow-ons in German medium tanks. Panther was great but had its problems as well and was much heavier than a typical medium and came along a bit later.

No argument that weight and width was a limitation on mobility and transport. The comment about underpowered is interesting because the power to weight ratios of the Tiger and Panzer IV were pretty comparable. The Tiger weighed a bit over twice what a Panzer IV did but also had 700 HP to the 300 HP of Panzer IV. (Comparison is Tiger I Ausf E versus Panzer IV Ausf H.)
There were probably other mobility issues, but simple power to weight wasn't it.

As for gun power, it isn't hard to confirm (or dispute) my assertion that the Panzer III was pretty much worthless in a Tank v Tank battle regardless of which gun it carried and the Panzer IV with 75 mm L/43 was pretty marginal by mid-war on the Eastern front and (even the L/48) was not sufficient against the Soviet heavy tanks.
One has to wonder how far tactics can go to compensate for lack of speed, armour protection and firepower when compared to the opposition.
To deal with them, bigger guns as found on Tiger, Panther and Sturmgeschutz were needed.

- Ivan.

 

[mikewint]

The Wehrmacht's original heavy tank was the PzKpfw NbFz V, a multi-turreted design from the mid-1930s. To mask its production, which was a clear violation of the 1919 Versailles Treaty's ban on German offensive weaponry, Berlin designated the machine the Neubaufahrzeug or 'New Construction Tractor'. It was built by Rheinmetall and although it never reached full production, three prototypes did see action during the German Invasion of Norway. Trundling along at around 10 mph (16 km/h), the Neubaufahrzeug was the embodiment of the 'land battleship' – an enormous heavily armored vehicle designed to dominate the battlefield. The Neubaufahrzeug had a large main turret that mounted the same 75-mm short-barreled gun that was later fitted to the Panzer IV, as well as two smaller secondary turrets – borrowed from the production line of the Panzer I – mounted fore and aft.

Now let's look at the Tiger I. The average cost for a Tiger I ran between 250,000-300,000 Reich Marks (RM); if a Tiger I in 1943 had cost 300,000RM, it would cost just over $1.2M in USD. By comparison, a Sherman in 1942 cost $33,000 to produce- adjusted for inflation, it would cost just over $500,000 in 2017 USD to build. This meant that the Tiger cost six times what it cost to build a single Sherman- it was even far more expensive than other German tanks. The Panzer III cost 96,000RM, the Panzer IV cost 103,000RM, and the Panzer V "Panther" cost 117,000RM. What was more, the mechanical complexity of the Tiger and the constant aerial bombardment of German industrial targets by Allied bombers meant that production of German armor, and the Tiger in particular, was stunted. It reportedly took 300,000 man hours to produce a Tiger I, twice the amount of time required to build a Panther. Kassel, Germany, a site of Tiger production, was attacked 40 times over the course of the war by Allied bombers- on one occasion in October 1943, an RAF raid caused substantial damage to Henschel's facilities and killed a large number of workers, delaying production. Production of the Tiger maxed out in April 1944, with 105 tanks produced that month. Final production of the Tiger I totaled 1,347 vehicles for the entire war. In comparison Sherman tank production averaged over 1,200 tanks per month. Over the course of the war over 49,000 Shermans were built.

The Tiger was built with combat performance in mind; everything else was a secondary consideration. This made it a firm favorite with Panzer crews, but an object of hatred for mechanics. The problems with the Tiger's design came not just from its complexity, but also from the lack of thought that was given to how a component could be removed for repair or maintenance. Take the Tiger's wheels for example. Each suspension arm held an axle with three wheels on either side. These combined to form two interleaved courses, known as a schachtellaufwerk, supporting each track. If one of the inner wheels became damaged, mechanics had to remove as many as nine wheels from the outer course (undoing 54 bolts in the process) before they could access the damaged inner wheel. Furthermore, not all the wheels were the same, so service personnel had to carefully label each one as they removed it to make sure it was reattached in the correct position. Imagine if you will, doing this while standing ankle deep in mud or snow in a field maintenance depot somewhere in the Soviet Union.
During the winter, mud and snow would pack into the tracks and freeze up, thus jamming the tracks. When the Russians realized this, they timed their attacks for the early morning before the snow/mud could thaw out.
The original Tigers were also underpowered. The first versions were fitted with a Maybach V12 engine with a 21 litres capacity. This was later increased to 24 litres capacity in December 1943.

Bad though the Tiger was for maintenance teams, it could have been much worse. While evaluating the prototypes, then known as the Henschel VK4501H, Berlin considered going with Ferdinand Porsche's competing VK4501P design. Instead of the Tiger's Maybach V-12 engine, the Porsche tank had two highly temperamental V-10 gasoline engines, which sat side-by-side in a cramped and poorly ventilated engine compartment. Overheating was a common problem and the cramped design made for difficult maintenance access. Worse, neither of the engines directly drove the wheels. Instead, they were connected to a pair of generators that ran two electric motors. These in turn powered the drive wheels. More than 70 years before it was really technically feasible, Porsche had designed a hybrid.
VK4501Ps broke down constantly during trials and some even caught fire. Nonetheless, it was enough of a contender for the heavy tank contract that Porsche still felt it was worth committing himself to a production run of 90 vehicles. When the VK4501P was not selected, Porsche was forced to come up with a variety of unconventional uses for his surplus hulls including the Ferdinand tank destroyer and the Rammtiger, a turretless ram used for knocking over buildings. (It was as stupid an idea as it sounds).

Sources differ on the exact date of the Tiger's battlefield debut (although it was probably sometime between Aug. 19 and Sept. 22, 1942). It is generally agreed that Tigers first saw combat somewhere near the town of Mga (about 70 km southeast of Leningrad). Four machines from the 1st Company of the newly formed 502nd Heavy Panzer Battalion were reportedly involved in the action. Moving up to the frontline over swampy ground, two of the new Tigers became bogged down and were unable to take part in the attack. The remaining pair fired several rounds in support of the infantry, but encountered no enemy tanks and withdrew without incident. Afterwards, one of the immobilized Tigers was pulled from the mud by a recovery vehicle; the other was completely stuck. The tank stayed where it was until November, when the commander of the 502nd – worried that it might be captured by the Red Army – ordered it to be destroyed with demolition charges. But on January 12th, 1943, four Tiger's , with eight MKIII's, faced 24 Russian T34's near Leningrad. The ground was frozen solid which greatly aided maneuverability. 12 T34's were destroyed and the other 12 retreated. Given the correct terrain to fight on, the Tiger easily proved its fighting worth.

Many losses such as these were attributed to the unnecessary haste with which the Tiger was rushed into service. Many crews had no more than a week or two of familiarization with the enormous vehicle before heading into the field. Inexperienced Tiger crews frequently blundered into impassible terrain and became stuck. This premature deployment gifted the Red Army a fully functional Tiger, hull number 250427, when it became stuck in a marsh near Leningrad in January 1943. The captured Tiger proved to be an invaluable resource for Soviet intelligence.

The Tiger's ability to terrorize enemy troops tends to be somewhat exaggerated. Many stories of British or American tankers refusing to engage Tigers reflect different tactical doctrines, rather than fear. Allied fighting vehicles were simply not supposed to engage Panzers in gunnery duels; that was the artillery's job. If a Sherman crew sighted a Tiger, they were trained to radio the position to the artillery and get the hell out of there. Furthermore, with the Tiger being such a rare sight on the battlefield avoiding confrontations with them was a sound strategy. Allied troops just had to keep their heads down and hope that the Tiger didn't do too much damage before it ran out of fuel and returned to base.
There were undoubtedly occasions when tank crews fled or abandoned their posts to escape Tigers, sometimes endangering their comrades in the process, but this was not an endemic problem. Typically, Allied commanders had more of a problem with excessive bravery – Shermans or T-34s launching doomed charges against Tigers – than they did with fear or cowardice.

According to a report compiled by Fort Knox from reports of 100 US tank commanders, engagements with other armored vehicles, especially tanks, were relatively rare-an estimated 15%. This was even more evident on the Western Front, which at least initially did not see an abundance of German armor. A German estimate puts the number of tanks and armored vehicles in France on D-Day at 2,000-2,400 vehicles, though postwar figures put that number much lower at 1,200 tanks and 800 assault guns. These numbers were not equal to those deployed on the Eastern Front. As a consequence, Allied tank casualties were not caused primarily by tanks but by anti-tank guns. A postwar survey of US, British and Canadian tank losses during the war found that of the 12,140 destroyed or knocked-out tanks sampled, 54% were lost to gunfire from tanks or anti-tank guns. Of those tanks lost to gunfire, 86% were lost to 75mm and 88mm guns. The survey also notes that of the losses inflicted by 88mm guns, most were caused by dual-purpose guns operating in the anti-tank gun role- not by tanks. The report further notes that 88mm guns armed only a limited number of vehicles.
The vast majority of the damage done by the 88mm gun was caused when this gun was on its antitank or dual-purpose mount. German production figures clearly indicate that only a limited number of tanks mounting the 88mm gun, or 8 percent of the total, were being produced in the summer of 1944.

The Tiger appeared more commonly on the Eastern Front, and even then was never present in anything even approaching the numbers of the T-34 and Sherman. It seems likely that the tank acquired its reputation as a result of anecdotes of the Tiger's seeming imperviousness and Allied inability to destroy them with anything less than overwhelming numbers. Coupled with this was the Tiger's ability to destroy targets at much greater ranges than its adversaries with its 88mm gun. Such was the fear of the 88 that the survey notes that US soldiers believed that "every heavy-caliber flat-trajectory weapon that fired at him was an "88"…" This was in spite of evidence that 75mm guns in the ETO caused 40% of the destruction of the surveyed tanks.

Data on German tank casualties is more limited. Reports on the subject are incomplete and do not provide a full picture. The survey estimates that of the German tanks inspected, 44% had been lost to "miscellaneous causes, of which non-enemy causes accounted for over 98 percent. Mechanical or terrain causes knocked out about 10 percent of the miscellaneous total. Coming in just below losses to miscellaneous causes is losses to Allied gunfire, which amounted to 43%. Though greatly feared by German tankers, USAAF and RAF fighter-bombers are estimated to have caused only 8% of armor losses, and these were mainly due to direct hits from rockets. While these records are not complete, they do seem to substantiate German accounts of being forced to abandon vehicles to mechanical losses.

 

[Shortround6]

The MBT classification is not just a function of its weight. Leopard II for example is one of the heaviest tanks by weight but easily meets the tenets underpinning the MBT classification. The Soviet T-10 (a derivative of the IS series) do not. To be classified an MBT, you need a blend of three components, mobility, firepower and protection. They need to be a balanced compromise……if you have a design that is clearly lacking in any of these areas you cannot call the weapon system an MBT. It might be a Light Tank, or it might be a Heavy Tank.
The classification of MBT didn't exist in WWII, but that does not mean that there weren't tanks that fulfilled the role. Tanks that could be classified as MBTs (in a contemporary application of the term, might include…….Pzkpfw Mk III (for early war), Mk IV, Panther (for late war), Somua (early war), Shinhoto Chi Ha (early war), Sherman, Grant, Comet, Cromwell. Some of these tanks weren't particularly good, but they do fit the criteria for MBT in the time context of their design.
Tanks that fall outside these classifications have some usefulness, but fall short in the classic roles for armour. Tigers are very much in that category.

To get a MBT of a certain weight you need a certain level of mechanical technology. And be willing to to spend the money to acquire that design in numbers. Both conditions changed over the years and from country to country. It is not just engine power. Transmissions/steering gear and suspensions/tracks for the desired weight and speed are needed.
For most countries in WW II the MBT was the one called a medium tank. Most of the time they weren't the best at any one thing but were general all round units.
The Tiger was a bit slow and short of range but with 600hp trying to move 56 tons it really wasn't that far off 265-300hp trying to move 23-25 tons (later MK IVs). Obviously 28-35 ton tanks with 400-600hp engines have a huge advantage in mobility.
The Tiger did have combat persistence. Enough ammo to keep it in the firing area for a longer period of time than some other larger tanks (Like any of the Russian 122 armed vehicles).

The nations that mattered were not "stuck" in this way. Germany developed concepts on armoured warfare that continue to form the basis of modern armoured breakthrough warfare even today. The concepts of mobility, concentration of force dislocation of rear areas, remains as valid today as it ever was when first formulated. Guderians genius was that he married concepts from some very diverse sources to create a thoroughly modern concept of armoured warfare. He combined the ideas of fully integrated armoured/Infantry/ artillery together, threw in direct air support and provided radio communications that are still to this day the essentials of armoured combat. It is no accident that men like Rommel, Manteuffel, Guderian, even Manstein dismissed the Tiger philosophy as a wasted effort, they all considered mobility to be the single most important element of tank design.
Other nations were far less well developed in terms of armoured warfare, but neither is at all true that they were preparing to fight the next war according the tenets of 1918.
Both Britiain and the US were probably the least well developed, but even they were envisaging their breakthrough battles being fought in the manner prescribed by JFC Fuller. In France nothing could be further from the truth that they intended to fight the next war according to the 1918 principals. The French army was probably the second most advanced nation on mobile warfare in the world. They had 10 fully motorized Infantry divisions, something nobody else had, 4 armoured divs (DCRs), 4 Mech Cav Divs (DLMs) 5 armoured Cav Divs (DLCs) and over 60 autonomous armoured support bns for the Infantry, backed up by a further 45 reserve bns equipped with a rather depressing array of WWI equipment. Unlike the Germans, very little importance was given to air support, radio control 9in the C&C mix). Whereas the Germans measured their rapid responses in a matter of hours, the French measured their ideas on mobile warfare as a matter of days delay. Compare this to the weeks or months delays factored into one of Fochs or haigs "big pushes" and the invalidity of comparing the early WWII efforts becomes readily apparent.

You are overstating the case for the French just a bit. Of the 4 DCRs only two (one?) existed over the winter of 1939/40. The 3rd may not have been created until after the germans attacked and never fully equipped and the 4th was even later in timing and was basically an ad hoc formation thrown together. Not trying to take anything away from their bravery of fighting skill.
However the actual role envisioned for the DCR divisions was not the same as the German Panzer divisions.
We may be getting hung up on the word "breakthrough" and confusing it with break out? The French DCRs were intend to facilitate/effect the breakthrough, but not to exploit it. The Units that would go through the gap created by the DCRs (and the infantry) were the Mech Cav and Armored Cav divisions and they would do the exploiting/deep penetration.
That is what I mean by set piece battles and WW I thinking. In WW I both sides kept large reserves of horse cavalry on standby for years waiting for the big breakthrough, By WW II nobody really expected the Horse Cavalry to perform that role anymore. It was to be done by the Mech Cavalry or armoured cavalry.(with motor rifle divisions/units?)
For the French the DCRs had the Char B1 tanks and the Renault R-35s while the Souma 35s were in the Cavalry divisions along with the faster Hotchkiss light tanks.
Due to the late formation of the French armoured divisions at least one had NO infantry units attached.

The Germans, by design or circumstance, didn't intend to send their tanks against heavily fortified positions but instead to find weak spots, and send the tanks (and accompanying infantry and artillery) through the weak spots/gaps into the rear areas leaving the traditional foot infantry and artillery to mop up the cutoff strong points. This may have been reinforced when the German 4th Panzer division tried to attack Warsaw and suffered heavy losses. The vast majority of German tanks in 1939/early 1940 had armour of only 15-20mm on the sides and rear so overrunning positions that had any sort of antitank weapons no matter how crappy was a risky proposition. The Germans had also given at least some thought to armored support for direct attack of defended positions as in 1938-39 projects were started for derivatives of both the MK I and MK II with 80mm frontal armor and 50mm side armor and while initial orders were for 100 or more of each, production priorities and poor test results would up with severally limited production and late service.
The Germans would go on to kudge together small quantities of specialized vehicles for urban or assault fighting.

True that most armies toyed with the concept but there are enough significant exceptions to challenge the validity of the basic positioning of this statement. The main Brekthrough Tank of the heer was the MkIII. This had a range of 110-165 miles and a normal speed of up to 25 mph. the mk IV is often touted as its heavy support, but in fact the Mk IV was designed for Infantry support, to provide HE capability at the rear of the schwerpunkt. As far as emphasis not being on speed and range, in the case of the germans, this is absolutely untrue. Downright misleading actually. Guderian from the early 30's always considered mobility THE most important facet of tank design. And this included range and speed both.It is true that those with more of an Infantry based emphasis were less concerned about this element of design and purpose, but these proponent s were ultimately proven wrong. Even so some designs did acknowledge the need and importance for range. The Somua S-35 had a range of between 95miles (offroad) and 150miles (off road) and 150 (on road), T-34s, designed prewar, had a design range 150-200 miles, increased later to nearly 300 miles with the external fuel tanks fitted.
Breakthrough tanks were not the priority for the most advanced armoured nations. It is simply untrue to claim that.

The MK III was bit of a late comer (under 100 used in Poland?) but yes, it was intended to be the main equipment of the Panzer division. However the MK IV was not intended for infantry support but support of the MK III (or Czech tanks or MK IIs ) few, if any being attached to infantry units. The early MK IVs had painfully thin armor to accompany infantry in the assault. when supporting the lighter panzers it was not only with HE but with smoke shells, much like many British units had 2-4 smoke firing tanks out of every 16 or so tanks in a company or squadron. 37mm and 50mm guns (and British 40mm) fire lousy smoke shells. The Early German light tanks were lucky if they managed 100 miles on the road without refueling. The MK IVs,once past the first 35, were good for 40-42kph and about 200-210km on the road (hard road?) The MK III wasn't even that good (160-165km?)figures may be hard to come by as later versions may just copy early numbers despite gaining 3 tons (15%) in weight over the early (37mm) tanks.

The Stug III (at least the early ones) were the infantry support vehicles but often not in the way imagined by many war gamers.

Frontal armor was 50mm when most MK III and Mk IVs had 30mm or less. However there was no direct gun sight, gun was aimed by a periscopic artillery sight through the roof. Every battery of 6 stugs had an armoured half track as a forward artillery observer vehicle. Not the ONLY machine gun on the vehicle is the one being maned by the soldier on the left who may be the loader for the main gun. A 37mm armed MK III tank held 4500 rounds of machine gun ammo for it's hull gun and turret MGs.

Break though tanks may not have been a priority for many nations but they were not being ignored either.

Most nations developed concepts of breakthrough tanks and support tanks, the T-34 and KV series being a prime example. The Germans were not ardent fans of this concept, but their reliance on training vehicles, Mk Is and IIs forced the ideas of a support element supporting the lighter tanks (generally MkIIIs supporting Mk Is and IIs) has a lot ot truth to it. The difference between these early renditions and the later insertion of Tigers in the support role is that whereas the mkIII as a support tank retained a good degree of mobility so that it could keep up with an advance, a tiger could not. It would generally either break down, run out of fuel couldn't get into position or simply was too slow to support a blitz style breakthrough.

Here is part of our disagreement. The T-34 was not really a breakthrough tank, It was a breakout tank or tank to exploit a breakthrough with. The KV wasn't a very good support tank in that it often did not have a more powerful gun than the T-34. It was more resistant to gun fire and held more ammo. But was slower and shorter ranged.

An early MK III could support the lighter German tanks with gun fire due to it's larger gun (and/or greater ammo capacity) but in the early versions was just as vulnerable to side and rear hits as the lighter tanks so it should not be put in a position where it would take hits from the side or rear.

It was a failure in this support role because it was a static line weapon…..nearly useless in mobile operations. Most support weapons of other armies also suffered some loss of mobility but not nearly as badly as the Tiger

You might want to check the range and speed of the Churchill tanks and go over that statement again. The Churchill tank was rather useful for attacking prepared positions, It sucked at doing deep penetrations of enemy territory or pursuing an enemy force and yet they built around 5,600 of them. It was actually rather good at handling obstacles at low speed.

 

[fliger747]

The USA could have fielded the Pershing much sooner in Europe but my understanding was that Patton didn't want it. Somewhat the same with regards to the 75 mm gun on the M4. The British adaption of the 17 Pounder on the "Firefly" was a fairly effective modification for tank vrs tank combat.

Perhaps not a mature armored strategy in some ways, but good enough to win by one means or another.

 

[parsifal]

Firstly, I am kidding when I say that the tiger was 'junk". Its not junk, but neither was it a solution in any sense to the problems facing Germany at the time

Unquestionably the existing tank park in the heer was beginning to show its age. Mk IIIs were up against it in combat when pitted against the t-34, and the mk IV was thinly armoured a starting to show its limits in terms of off road capability The Mk IIs were outright obsolete by 1941. Despite this obsolescence, the Panzerwaffe was still enjoying massively one sided exchange rates on all fronts. What was defeating them was that re-supply rates were simply not keeping up with attrition.

Adoption of the Tiger and the Panther did not substantially alter the exchange rates for the panzerwaffe. In fact for these two types in particular, the exchange rates took a decided turn for the worse, due, in my opinion, to the appalling reliability and limited mobility of both types. When I say mobility, I mean it in the broad sense………with its limited range, high BAR (breakdown adjustment rating) inability to deal with certain types of terrain, it suffered appalling attrition rates outside the battlefield, as witnessed by the massive losses it incurred immediately after Kursk. Pretty much the same deal for the Panther, though at least the panthers problems could be partially solved.

Despite attempts to correlate a need to introduce the Tiger/Panther as an answer to the obsolescence of the Panzer arm, this is not in fact the case. Far from solving the panzerwaffes reliance on obsolete equipment, it increased that reliance. There were so few of the wunder tanks and they were so often non operational that the tank arm was simply forced to continue its reliance on these older types. Even as late as Fenruary 1944, the main type on the eastern front, by a wide margin, was the Mk III.

Clearly this was an unsatisfactory situation, but instead of trying to make unreliable and mismatched types do a job that they were not ready for, all the while whilst the heer was being hammered by unrelenting blows from her enemies. Surely, given the choice between types that were not working and arriving in insufficient numbers anyway, to obsolete (but still effective) types in greater numbers that had demonstrated reliability, range, mobility and lethality, the obvious better alternative is the latter. I will call it option B for convenience at this point.

There are issues with both options. Historically the germans went for a bet each way, mainting some production of older types, whilst at the same time trying to introduce a range of new heavy tanks and AFVs. The results were a disaster for the heer, with a handful of unrelaiable heavy tanks, and a massively outnumbered cadre of reliable obsolete types unable to win the attritional war that Germany by that stage had no choice but to fight. Nobody was more aware of these limitations than the Germans themselves. Their socalled Entwicklung series called for the wholesale redesign of the Panzerwaffe. By the time it was adopted, it was far too late, but it demonstrates that the germans were aware of the strategic blind alley they had driven into by the adoption of the heavy tank concept. There earlier motorisation rationalisation plan (the Schnell plan) was an earlier attempt that was only ever partially implemented because of German complacency.

See Entwicklung series - Wikipedia

Germany needed to adopt a rationalisation plan far earlier than they did and they needed to remain true to the pre-war tenets of mobility being pre-eminent in the blitzkrieg formula for them to win the changed battlefield conditions they faced after 1942. One short term solution may have been to divert SG production to the panzers, but here again the jealous "fiefdom" mentality that permeated nearly every aspect of german decision making at this time is evident. It would have been logical to divert assault guns to the Panzerwaffe to provide much needed firepower immediately and at very low cost. This never happened until way too late. Assault guns were under the control of artillery arm, who refused to pass their control to the Panzer truppen. It is debatebale as to just how much real effect this had, but a divided command, with divided training and procurement priorities could not have helped.

 

[Shortround6]

The Tiger was only produced in one factory at the rate of about 25 tanks per month (?)to start and averaged about 54-55 tanks per month over the production life.
Obviously this is nowhere near high enough production to equip more than a few units and keep up with attrition.
No other factory was brought in. The Tiger was recognised fairly quickly (if they ever thought otherwise) as a special purpose tank.
Perhaps i don't read enough books (or the right ones) but I have never seen where the Germans planned to replace larger numbers of MK IIIs & IVs with Tiger tanks.

It is the Panther that seems to have screwed things up as being a bit too ambitious. It was intended to replace the MK III & IV as a general issue tank. It seems to have been too large and complicated to really be able to do that and many divisions had one Battalion of each which may have hampered movement on long Marches.
I am not trying to claim they should have stuck with the Tiger but the Panther actually used a bigger cartridge case for its 75mm than the Tiger used for it's 88mm gun. Tiger carried 92 rounds compared to the 79-81 in the Panther or the 87 rounds in a MK IVH. Granted due to german supply problems they rarely had full ammo racks in the last year or two of the war but............... Tiger held a bit more mg ammo than the Panther.
Had the Panther used a smaller gun the whole tank could have been smaller, lighter and placed less stress on the drive train ( or been able to use a smaller engine?)

 

[Shortround6]

The USA could have fielded the Pershing much sooner in Europe but my understanding was that Patton didn't want it. Somewhat the same with regards to the 75 mm gun on the M4. The British adaption of the 17 Pounder on the "Firefly" was a fairly effective modification for tank vrs tank combat.

Perhaps not a mature armored strategy in some ways, but good enough to win by one means or another.

Patton was only one general in the middle of 1944 and not in the best position to be deciding anything until the late summer or fall of 1944. Generals higher up than Patton (or in different parts of the army) made those decisions.

The Firefly was a mixed bag as a tank. While the gun was certainly powerful the ammo was of such size that the ammo capacity was cut to 42 rounds and that is after the hull gunner was replaced by an ammo rack. Due to the size of the ammo in part the rate of fire of the 17pdr was about 1/2 the rate of fire of the US 76mm gun so if your target was NOT the front plate of a Panther tank???????

 

[parsifal]

Sorry, but Tigers for a time were expected to form a significant component of the rebuilt panzer forces after 1942. Later this was modified to incorporate Panthers as the Panzer mainstays. in both cases these efforts proved futile.

After his appointment to the Panzer Forces inspectorate, Guderian produced a report which advocated every panzer division contain as a permanent assignment, at least one battalion of tigers. Obviously the plan came to nothing, but it wasn't for lack of trying or lack of resources being poured into the program. Somewhere I have a report that states nearly 40% of the procurement budget for heavy armoured components (and this in turn was a massive proportion of the overall budget) were being diverted to tiger production. it is simply untrue to try and claim that the germans never entertained ideas of making the tiger their MBT for 1943 or were not really trying. They made extraordinary efforts to try an make it so.....the fact that those efforts failed is not 'proof" that didn't expend large amounts trying to achive it.

They were trying alright, and wasting massive amounts of money in making that attempt. . They poured in massive resources to try and make that a reality. Those resources were largely wasted.


As a proportion of actual production achieved, the tiger program was significant, but highly wasteful. The mainstay tanks 1943 were tigers, Panthers and mkivs. Im not including spgs in this straw poll. In the period 1942-5, MkIV production ran at something like 4500, Panther was about 6000 and tiger production was 1800 tanks. unfilled orders for the tiger were at least twice that number

 

[Shortround6]

Can you please give some sources for the 1800 tiger tank production as that looks like it includes the Tiger II.
Most sources give around 1340 Tiger 1s.
Or that unfulfilled orders for the Tiger went to 3600 vehicles (unless that includes some grandiose scheme for Tiger IIs in 1945 to go with thousands of jets)

One sources gives 69 Tiger 1s delivered in 1942. and a further 549 in all of 1943. Peak months were Oct with 82 delivered, Dec with 80, Aug with 63 and July with 53, all other months were 49 tanks or under. This includes command vehicles and rebuilds.
Nov saw only 34 tanks delivered but that may be because the RAF dropped 1800 tons of bombs on Kassel on Oct 22/23 damaging the Henschel works and killing, wounding some of the workforce.

If the Germans were actually trying to equip every panzer division this would be an epic fail (production in the first 6 months of 1944 averaged 87 tanks per month before winding down in the July and Aug))

From Wiki so..........
"Tigers were usually employed in separate heavy tank battalions (schwere Panzer-Abteilung) under army command. These battalions would be deployed to critical sectors, either for breakthrough operations or, more typically, counter-attacks. A few favoured divisions, such as the Grossdeutschland, and the 1st SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Das Reich, and 3rd SS Totenkopf Panzergrenadier Divisions at Kursk, had a Tiger company in their tank regiments. The Grossdeutschland Division had its Tiger company increased to a battalion as the III Panzer Battalion of the Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland. "

Intentions and what actually happened are two different things but only one division ever got a battalion of Tigers of it's own.

and " The Tiger was originally designed to be an offensive breakthrough weapon, but by the time it went into action, the military situation had changed dramatically, and its main use was on the defensive, as a mobile anti-tank and infantry gun support weapon.[67] "
the foot note is for
Wilbeck, Christopher (2004). Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II.


for such a massive effort to build a Tiger Battalion for every Panzer Division it seems more than a bit strange that only one factory was ever tooled up (or produced a Tiger tank) and that factory didn't seem to work a full 2nd shift? (production of 2nd shift was about 50% of first shift?)