Tiger tank from aircraft thread;

[Shortround6]

German tank production was less than ideal almost from the start. And some things just don't seem to fit together well.

German MK IV production was 211 prewar and another 45 tanks for the rest of 1939? 268 in 1940, 467 in 1941 and 994 in 1942 (870 with the long 75) but 1943 sees a jump to 3822 chassis with 3023 of them being gun tanks. This is despite the start of Tiger Production in 1942 and Panther production in 1943.

MK III production was 157 in 1939, 1054 in 1940, 2213 in 1941, 2958 in 1942 and 3379 in in 1943, This is Chassis production.

Increase in MK III & MK IV production did not come because of a falling off in MK I & Mk II production. MK Is had ceased being made in or by 1938 (except for a few dozen odd balls)
and MK II chassis production for SP guns stayed almost constant in 1942-43 with 848 in 1942 (302 gun tanks) and 807 in 1943 (77 gun tanks) while 38(t) production also went up.
653 chassis in 1942 and 1008 in 1943.

What were the German tank factories doing in 1942? Were they really expanded that much between 1942 and 1943 or had they been operating at less than full capacity in 1942?
MK IV production had increased about 4 fold from 1942 to 1943, could you really get an additional 150% production on top of that (total 5 1/2 times 1942 production) by stopping the Tiger (factory already tooled up) and canceling the Panther? (change tooling to additional MK IV tooling?

I am not say the Tiger was cheap or easy to build but sometimes just money or man hours doesn't convert real well, especially in the short term. You need some sort of tanks to handle the T-34s and KVs of 1942. The MK III won't do. The short barreled MK IV won't do. You need as many long barreled MK IVs as you can get (and they have few deficiencies) and yu have a small production line already tooled up and building Tigers in small quantities. Try to raise tiger production or shut it down and retool for MK IVs and take the loss of several months production of no tanks from that factory (or at best no more K IVs than Tigers until they get up to speed).


A bit too much is sometimes made of Russian simplicity (and American), not that complexity is good but sometimes the Russians increased production by leaving certain items that were in short supply out of the tank, like periscoped/vision devices and radios which reduced operating efficiency and resulted in needed more tanks to get the same combat effect but at the cost of higher crew casualties.

All round vision cupolas have several things against them, cost (money/manhours) increased height/silhouette and often a weak point as they are often not armoured as well as the rest to the turret. on the flip side is "if you can't see it you can't hit it" if the commander and gunner cannot see the target (tank or bunker or dugout) they can't hit it or at best, it takes much longer to hit the same number of targets and the cost of the cupola becomes minimal if not a true force multiplier.

 

[parsifal]

Changing over to the uber tank parks was a massive impact on AFV outputs.

The step up of outputs in 1943 is a function of the germans finally mobilising, not a vindication of their production choices. Using 1939 as a base index of 60, Ive seen studies that rate the 1943 mobilisation index at 190, that's more than 3 times as great. In 1942 the index was 110 compared to the 1939 index.

A good surrogate measure for hardware (far from perfect, but its something at least) is to look at cost and man hours. In 1942 the cost of a tiger relative to a MkIV (and comparing costs of the same country for similar hardware is not quite as dangerous and inaccurate as comparing different pieces of hardware and /or different nationalities). A 1942 Tiger cost about 5.5 time that of a MkIV. It came down (a lot) as time progressed (as did the unit costs for Mk IVs), but at the critical time of 1942-3 it was soaking up bucket loads of resources and time to produce a few unreliable tanks that were no better operationally than the types they were displacing. A lot worse actually, due to the reliability problems they were suffering.

In terms of man hours, it was a little better, with the tiger soaking up approximately 3.5 time the man hours to produce.

Im not saying incidentally that the Germans did not need to update their designs. By 1945 the MkIV was starting to show its obsolescence and only remained competitive because the opposing forces had not opted to update their tank parks much either. But it's the timing that is the problem. In 1943 the germans needed numbers, and the mkIV was more than good enough to achieve exchange rates at that time of around 7:1. They did not need a bevy of unreliable tanks that were playing havoc on their logistics.

There is nothing wrong with designing a new tank in advance, but the problem is the rushed service entry. And further the over complication and size of the design. Tigers were over engineered, far too complex and too large to be considered suitable for German industry at the time. A complete overhaul of their tank manufacturing base was urgently required, or the germans needed to amend what they were ordering into production so that the product being produced was more suited to the capabilities of the factory infrastructure available to them. No thought was given to these constraints until it was far too late. This is what the Russians did and what the germans didn't do.

I think it very revealing that the germans themselves recognized the shortcomings of production choices. The E-series production plan was mostly about simplification of the designs to make them more suitable for mass production as consumer items. It is very telling that the 1945 version of this plan intended to phase out tiger tanks completely, and to massively simplify the Panther production. Judging by these decisions it is very apparent that the germans themselves were realising that production of the Tiger (and the overcomplicated nature of the panther) had led them down a strategic blind alley

 

[mikewint]

reduced operating efficiency and resulted in needed more tanks to get the same combat effect but at the cost of higher crew casualties.

As if that was ever a concern for either the Russians or Americans. There was always another tank and/or crew available. It was a simple question of Quantity versus Quality. Let the Germans kill 10:1 it really made little or no difference

 

[Glider]

Tiger and Panthers are obviously very different from each other. As a result claims about the vulnerability of one should not be taken as being equal to the other. A Tiger had 80mm f armour on its side and rear turret and as such the standard 75mm would find it very difficult to penetrate it. A Panthers side armour was much less and it was quite possible for a 75mm to penetrate.
The idea that an M8 could do this with a 37mm gun is fantasy.

Tigers were needed on the Russian front as the ground often favoured long range combat and for that reason alone were worth building. Pz IV and Stug III with a 75mm L48 would find an IS2 an almost impossible target. Tigers were not needed against the US and UK tanks.

 

[mikewint]

M8 could do this with a 37mm gun is fantasy.

Russian anti-tank gunners with 37mm cannon learned the lesson I posted earlier. You DON'T have to penetrate a tanks armor to effectively "knock it out".
A disabled tank, unable to move, is effectively a dead tank. The 37mm gunners concentrated their fire, not on the armor, but on the more vulnerable tank treads, wheels, sprockets, and engine compartment. Break the tread and the tank is going nowhere fast

 

[parsifal]

Tigers were needed on the Russian front as the ground often favoured long range combat and for that reason alone were worth building. Pz IV and Stug III with a 75mm L48 would find an IS2 an almost impossible target. Tigers were not needed against the US and UK tanks.

There is no appreciable difference overall to the survivability of a mkIV on the eastern Front, to the survivability of a tiger or at least to support that it was vastly more vulnerable. Obviously the heavier armour of the tiger made a difference in actual combat, but the short range, slow speed and inability to use all bridges or negotiate boggy ground made them vulnerable outside the battlefield.

In 1941, the Russians lost approx20,500 AFVs, approx2,300 of which were T-34s/KV. no Tigers and no Panthers. The Germans lost approx2,500 AFVs on the Eastern Front, resulting in a 8:1 loss ratio in the Germans' favor. Many of the Russian losses in 1941 were operational ones, meaning that they represent tanks that broke down and had to be abandoned, or tanks captured intact by the enemy. In addition, a large proportion of the Soviet tank fleet in 1941 were obsolete models (T-26, BT-5, etc). While the Russians also had significant numbers of T-34s and KV-1s, they only made a small portion of the Russian tank fleet.

In 1942, the Russians lost approx15,000 AFVs, including approx6,600 T-34s. Meanwhile, the Germans lost approx3,500 AFVs, resulting in a 4.3:1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor. This time, most of the Russian losses were combat ones (the true fighting had begun in earnest). very few of the tanks were tigers but most of the mkIVs were now the f series I believe

In 1943, the Russians lost approx23,500 AFVs, including a staggering approx14,700 T-34s. Meanwhile, the Germans lost approx8,700 AFVs on the Eastern Front, resulting in a 2.7:1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor. Tigers and Panthers were beginning to account for a significant proportion of the tank park, Russians were still mostly equipped with 76mm armed tanks

In 1944, the Russians lost approx23,800 AFVs, including approx13,000 T-34s. Meanwhile, the Germans lost approx9,500 AFVs on the Eastern Front, resulting in a 2.5:1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor. levelling off,, qualitatively worth noting that the majority of Soviet tanks were upgunned by this time. Very few IS series as yet.

In 1945, it's very hard to come up with reliable kill ratios since most German tank losses were tanks surrendered at the Armistice in May 1945. Most historians estimate a 1.2 or 2 to 1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor in 1945. Significant numbers of IS-2 coming into play

Out of all of those destroyed tanks, how many were destroyed by actual enemy tanks?
Not exactly sure. Some sources estimate that about 50% of combat losses (ie: excluding tanks breaking down or getting bogged down in mud) resulted from "gunfire". Gunfire can mean anything from an enemy tank to an AT gun or an anti-aircraft gun firing AP shells. The main source of gunfire losses seems to have been towed AT and AA guns (approx20%), followed by self-propelled-guns (approx20%) and tanks (approx10%). Keep in mind that these figures are rough estimations and are hotly debated to this day

Germans claim that their 2000 odd tigers destroyed 10000 Russian tanks alone, but this statistic can be proved and to me does appear a bit suspect.

 

[GrauGeist]

The idea that an M8 could do this with a 37mm gun is fantasy.

And, yet it happened.

"During the Battle of St. Vith in the Battle of the Bulge, on 18 December 1944, an M8 armored car from Troop B, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company A, was able to destroy a German Tiger I heavy tank from 1st SS Panzer Division. The M8 fired three 37 mm rounds through the relatively thin rear armor of the Tiger from only 25 yd. (23 m), setting it on fire.

Despite the fact that M8 Greyhound was not an adversary for German tanks, statistics and specifications do not determine the result of the battles. The M8 Greyhound was considered fast, sufficiently reliable and armed and armored well enough for reconnaissance missions. Its speed was key to success in this engagement with the panzer.

The armored car had been in a concealed position near the boundary of Troop B, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and Company A, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, when the Tiger approached the lines at right angles to move along a trail in front of the main line of resistance. As the tank passed the armored car, the latter slipped out of position and started up the trail behind the Tiger, accelerating in an attempt to close. At the same moment the German tank commander saw the M8, and started traversing his gun to bear on it. It was a race between the American, who was attempting to close so that the 37mm gun would be effective on the Tiger's thin rear armor, and the German, who was desperately striving to bring the 88 to bear. Rapidly the M8 closed to 25 yards, and quickly pumped in three rounds; the lumbering Tiger stopped and shuddered; there was a muffled explosion, followed by flames which billowed out of the turret and engine ports, after which the Greyhound returned to its position.

This action was reported to Major Donald P. Boyer, Jr., S3, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, by Captain W. H. Anstey (commanding Company A, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion) who witnessed the engagement."

Source:
The Battle at St. Vith, Belgium, 17-23 December 1944: An Historical Example.
U.S. Army Armor School. Merriam Press, 1998

 

[Tieleader]

This was series of lectures by two authors on Kursk and costs of production dated 2013.

I found the most interesting bit starts around the 25th minute of the clip




The man hours attributed to T-34 production are probably overstated. According to Steven Zaloga, in "Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II", the number of man-hours required to produce a T-34 was never more than 10,000 and declined significantly over time. In early 1943, Plant No. 183 at Nizhni-Tagil needed as few as 3,719 man-hours to make a T-34.


The book "Soviet Economy and the Red Army: 1930 - 1945" doesn't give absolute numbers of man-hours but states that between 1941 and 1943, the labor cost of producing a T-34 was reduced by 51%. So whatever the real, comparable number was, there can be no doubt that by 1943, the T-34 man-hour was only a tiny fraction of that of the Tiger.

There is a claim of 300,000 man-hours to produce a WW2 Tiger 1 tank. Its a reasonable question to ask where this came from. This claim about a Tiger tank's man-hour seems to have originated from the official Tiger's manual (Tigerfibel). In that book, the Germans brag that a single Tiger tank required 300,000 man-hours and about 800,000 Reichsmarks to produce. The Tiger's manual stated that 300,000 man-hours was equivalent to one week of hard work from 6,000 workers (I did the math: 6,000 workers * 8.5 hours a day * 6 days a week = 306,000 man-hours. According to one source, the t 800,000 Reichsmarks price tag was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 workers.

I notice that it is claimed that only a single tank factory in germany was engaged in Tiger production. Seems fairly innocuous, but then again there were only 7 major tank factories in germany at this time.....Kinda pulls that statistic back into reality a bit.....

Excellent video. The second speaker really put a great perspective on the costs and production bases. I think that a lot of people just forget all the incredible difficulties for getting a tank from the design boards to the battlefield. Most fans I think focus on "how good was ____ compared to____" or "could ___ have changed the course of the war". The logistics chain is probably the most overlooked aspect of any weapons system, past or present.

 

[Milosh]

The rear armour of the Tiger was 80mm (3.14") thick.

 

[tyrodtom]

The rear armour of the Tiger was 80mm (3.14") thick.

But where was that at ?
Rear of the turret ?
Rear of the fighting compartment ?
Or rear , behind the engine ?

 

[GrauGeist]

In another account that was a bit more detailed, the Greyhound was firing it's 37mm point-blank into the Tiger's rear engine compartment armor.

 

[parsifal]

Excellent video. The second speaker really put a great perspective on the costs and production bases. I think that a lot of people just forget all the incredible difficulties for getting a tank from the design boards to the battlefield. Most fans I think focus on "how good was ____ compared to____" or "could ___ have changed the course of the war". The logistics chain is probably the most overlooked aspect of any weapons system, past or present.

I found it very informative. Parshall co-wrote "Shattered Sword" which is one of the best analyses of any on any subject that I know of. He is a systems analyst, so this issue is exactly what he is trained to look at.

In terms of gun power and protection the tiger was very dangerous, and its optics were probably the best in the world. Despite all that it was not the right tank for Germany because of how badly it wrecked their logistics system

 

[Peter Gunn]

*SNIP*

The idea that an M8 could do this with a 37mm gun is fantasy.

*SNIP*

I wouldn't say that, we all know that ANYTHING in warfare is possible. I read an account (wish I could remember where) of an M4 Sherman that was reversing away from a Jagdtiger and a 128 mm round hit the back of the Sherman's turret and bounced off. It hit a small bump square on that was in the casting to hold an earlier model antenna which was no longer needed, but the bulge was still in the casting for the turret. So if the back of a Sherman turret can bounce a 128 mm shell at close range ( less than 200 meters I believe but don't quote me ) a 37 mm should be able to pen a Tiger at point blank range, why not?

 

[Tieleader]

I wouldn't say that, we all know that ANYTHING in warfare is possible. I read an account (wish I could remember where) of an M4 Sherman that was reversing away from a Jagdtiger and a 128 mm round hit the back of the Sherman's turret and bounced off. It hit a small bump square on that was in the casting to hold an earlier model antenna which was no longer needed, but the bulge was still in the casting for the turret. So if the back of a Sherman turret can bounce a 128 mm shell at close range ( less than 200 meters I believe but don't quote me ) a 37 mm should be able to pen a Tiger at point blank range, why not?

Saw that in an episode of Greatest Tank Battles".

 

[Peter Gunn]

Saw that in an epsiode if Greatest Tank Battles".

THAT'S IT!!! I give you bacon for your excellent memory.

 

[Tieleader]

Actually own the DVDs. So not that not excellent...
And yes , VERY lucky people in that Sherman.

 

[Glider]

I surrender the point that the exceptional one off situation could be applied to any combat example. After all the first Me109 shot down by the RAF was shot down (I think) by a Battle. But you take your M8 and I will take the Tiger or a T34.

 

[Milosh]

But where was that at ?
Rear of the turret ?
Rear of the fighting compartment ?
Or rear , behind the engine ?

http://www.amm34.com/sites/amm/asse...es/upload/ckfinder/Armor_Scheme_Tiger1(1).png

 

[The Basket]

I read that Germans lost large numbers of tanks to fuel starvation.
Remember reading Speer was getting talked to by Hitler about tank production and Speers reply was we don't have the petrol!

The T-26 was the most numerous tank in 1941 in the USSR. So that's the base line and the Panzer I got its baptism in the Spanish civil war and was shown to poor.

 

[Milosh]

The Panzer I was only to be training tank.