Tiger tank from aircraft thread;

[GrauGeist]

OK, so in retrospect, what should the Germans have done to replace the PzKfw IV.

As terrible as the Tiger was, it sure seemed to cause a great deal of concern not only with the ground forces that had to face it, but with the various leaders.
When the Soviets captured a Tiger in '42, it brought about a decision to create a new heavy tank, which led to the development of the IS series.

When a piece of captured equipment dictates a new threat upgrade, there must be merit to that enemy's machine, certainly?

 

[parsifal]

This was series of lectures by two authors on Kursk and costs of production dated 2013.

I found the most interesting bit starts around the 25th minute of the clip




The man hours attributed to T-34 production are probably overstated. According to Steven Zaloga, in "Armored Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II", the number of man-hours required to produce a T-34 was never more than 10,000 and declined significantly over time. In early 1943, Plant No. 183 at Nizhni-Tagil needed as few as 3,719 man-hours to make a T-34.


The book "Soviet Economy and the Red Army: 1930 - 1945" doesn't give absolute numbers of man-hours but states that between 1941 and 1943, the labor cost of producing a T-34 was reduced by 51%. So whatever the real, comparable number was, there can be no doubt that by 1943, the T-34 man-hour was only a tiny fraction of that of the Tiger.

There is a claim of 300,000 man-hours to produce a WW2 Tiger 1 tank. Its a reasonable question to ask where this came from. This claim about a Tiger tank's man-hour seems to have originated from the official Tiger's manual (Tigerfibel). In that book, the Germans brag that a single Tiger tank required 300,000 man-hours and about 800,000 Reichsmarks to produce. The Tiger's manual stated that 300,000 man-hours was equivalent to one week of hard work from 6,000 workers (I did the math: 6,000 workers * 8.5 hours a day * 6 days a week = 306,000 man-hours. According to one source, the t 800,000 Reichsmarks price tag was equivalent to the weekly wages for 30,000 workers.

I notice that it is claimed that only a single tank factory in germany was engaged in Tiger production. Seems fairly innocuous, but then again there were only 7 major tank factories in germany at this time.....Kinda pulls that statistic back into reality a bit.....

 

[parsifal]

OK, so in retrospect, what should the Germans have done to replace the PzKfw IV.

Copy either the Sherman, and/or the t-34. Instead of building tanks like they were a piece of art, the germans should have built tanks like they were a toaster, just like the US and USSR were doing.

And as the preceding talks do show, the Germans were better placed to do that thasan the Russians, and had less worldwide commitments than the US, thus allowing them to concentrate theior efforts more effectively, if they had possessed the nouse to do that. instead they decided to p*ss their advantages up the wall producing a ludicrously complicated and unreliable vehicle unsuited to their operational doctrines.

 

[Shortround6]

See this site for some information.
Tiger I Information Center | PanzerKampfwagen VI: The Legendary Tiger I
3 pages on the factory. including
"The factory employed a total of 8000 workers for tank production. They worked in two 12 hour shifts and the night shift was said to have only 50% of the output of the day shift. "
and
"The total time to complete a Tiger, including the various machining processes, was estimated to be 14 days. An average of 18 to 22 tanks were carried at any one time in the hull assembly line and approximately 10 tanks were carried in the final assembly line "

Raw Hull and turrets were subcontracted out to Krupp, Dortmund-Hoerder Huettenverein and Wegmann und Company

Trying to figure out the cost, in either man hours or marks/rubles might be mildly entertaining but without some very careful analysis become meaningless real quick.
Are the people doing the figuring including the guns, where are the engines and transmissions coming from?
can you really build a dozen (or more) 4/1 speed transmissions (or 5/1) for the same effort and materials as a single 8/4 transmission? Or a dozen or more 500hp V-12 diesels for the same effort/materials as a single 700hp V-12 gas engines? a dozen 76.2 cannon for one 88mm cannon?

Cost for the Tiger 1 was calculated when? when they were building 30-40 a month in the beginning or over 80 a month in the last 6 months with no major change in plant space or work force.?

I would also note that Henschel was making Panzer IIIs well into 1942 (I don't know about 1943 ) and also produced some of the early Panther Ds.

 

[Shortround6]

Copying the Sherman would have too little too late.
Sherman doesn't see action until late Oct 1942. The Tiger I is already in production and the Panther D goes into production in Jan of 1943 which means most of the design work was already done and indeed a mild steel prototype was running in Sept of 1942.

The early T-34 wasn't really a very good tank. It's paper stats look good but it's ergonomics and usability in combat were horrible. Which is one reason the Germans were able to defeat hundreds of T-34s (and KVs) in 1941 using MK IIIs and MK IVs with short barreled guns.

Nick Moran makes a point about a t-34 that took 23 hits (?) from a German tank before being knocked out. It is certainly an example of toughness but his point was why didn't the T-34 shoot back and destroy it's attacker with it's superior gun? Possibilities include that due to lousy vision (number and type of vision devices) they never spotted the unit shooting at them!

The Germans would have wanted a new turret at the least and that may have involved a new hull top (or higher turret?) and so on.

Heinz Guderian wasn't appointed (or accepted) the position of Inspector General of Armoured Troops until 1 March 1943, which is a little late to cancel either the Tiger 1 or Panther programs and start over with a new design/program. Unless it is a modification of the Pz IV nothing started at this time would make it into service until sometime in 1944.
He could disagree all he wanted with the Tiger 1 and Panther programs but he was sort of stuck with them. Especially as the Stug III production and use was taken away from him.
He needed the Tiger 1s and Panthers, even at low production until they could come up with something else, which for whatever reason, didn't happen.
Changes in the German tank Programs needed to made in late 1941 or early 1942 in order to have any real effect even in the beginning of 1943.

 

[Glider]

I think there is one factor that is missing from the debate and that is the importance of tactics. The reason why early T34's and KV1's were destroyed in large numbers by less powerful guns was the tendency to attack the Germans in large formations but without recce units. Vast numbers ran into mines and swamps and had to be abandoned.
In the early stages the T34 was a very formidable tank horrible to use by our standards but formidable, and the KV1 was close to invincible, 37mm and 50mm L42 guns could barely scratch it and the 50mm L60 was just about good enough. What saved the Germans in 1941/2 were the poor tactics and exceptionally poor logistics in the Russian forces.

The Germans noted that by July 1942 there were far fewer T34 and KV1 tanks on the battlefield but they were far more dangerous since they were now fully armed and fueled.

As an aside German tank losses in 1942 were approx. 3,000 of which about 570 were lost in the Middle East. It one of those what if's but had the Germans not fought in the Desert the Russians would have had a very difficult time

 

[Peter Gunn]

I am of the opinion that the Germans could have upgraded the Pz IV and mass produced it. While it does suffer from the typical German "Box Tank" syndrome, a little thicker armor, the long 75 mm and a more powerful engine may have helped alleviate German panzer issues mid war. It's easier said than done I know, but the Pz IV would have been a pretty good departure point for something to counter the larger numbers of Sherman's and T-34's.

Also as far as the Sherman, it was intended as an infantry support tank, not to go head to head with enemy armor on a consistent basis. That it could and did speaks pretty highly of its initial design and upgrades. Also the 75 mm was kept (too long in my opinion) because of durability and it had a very respectable HE round good v infantry. Although in my research I find crews really liked the 105 mm equipped models for the upgraded firepower, albeit at the cost of number of rounds carried.

Just my $.02.

 

[parsifal]

Im siding with the experts and the positions they very clearly demonstrated in that video. Germany was better placed than the USSR to adopt better production techniques, but failed to do so. Parshall in that lecture, an expert in the field if ever there was one, demonstrates very clearly that the germans made conscious choices in the way they went about producing tanks that ultimately destroyed their chances of winning.

it could have been very different as Parshall shows.

The decision to build tanks like the tiger and Panther made it worse, not better. A lot worse

And the Tiger was about the worst production choice the Germans, with the inherent limitations they CHOSE to adopt, could opt for.

Seldom in the annals of modern warfare has such stupidity been displayed by such key people for so long.....

Watch the video....

 

[GrauGeist]

The one thing that the Germans did get right, was the StuG III/IV
Easy and inexpensive to manufacture, modest maintenance requirements, good deployment qualities and very effective in both anti-tank and assault roles.

 

[Shortround6]

I am of the opinion that the Germans could have upgraded the Pz IV and mass produced it. While it does suffer from the typical German "Box Tank" syndrome, a little thicker armor, the long 75 mm and a more powerful engine may have helped alleviate German panzer issues mid war. It's easier said than done I know, but the Pz IV would have been a pretty good departure point for something to counter the larger numbers of Sherman's and T-34's.

Also as far as the Sherman, it was intended as an infantry support tank, not to go head to head with enemy armor on a consistent basis. That it could and did speaks pretty highly of its initial design and upgrades. Also the 75 mm was kept (too long in my opinion) because of durability and it had a very respectable HE round good v infantry. Although in my research I find crews really liked the 105 mm equipped models for the upgraded firepower, albeit at the cost of number of rounds carried.

Just my $.02.

A lot of this is not quite as simple as it seems. The MK IV was getting pretty close to maxed out as it was. The first 200 or so went 19 tons or under. and the H went 25 tons.
Wider track is heavier track, a more powerful engine will burn more fuel. The Mk IV J added fuel by taking out the power traverse for the turret. There isn't any more volume inside the hull for more powerful power plants (the engine may not be much bigger but you need bigger radiators/fans)
I am not sure the MK IV suspension was really that good for high speed.
Turret was already cramped with the L/48 gun.

Yes a few things could have done but the MK IV was an old tank.

Some of these comparisons get a little simplistic. The Sherman for all it's simplicity and standardization used 5 different engines ( Ok one of them was not that common). It used welded hulls and cast hulls and hybrid hulls some of which came in two different lengths depending on engine, it used three different transmission housings (nose piece) and two different hull fronts even on the welded hulls. Two different suspensions and several different turrets and/or gun mounts.
I would also note that the 105mm versions had the power traverse system removed due to space considerations.

And here we hit a difference of opinion. Shermans are considered good infantry support tanks and they held almost twice the amount of machine gun ammo as a MK IV tank and ten times the amount of machine gun ammo as a Stug III (and twice the cannon ammo) and yet the Stug III is considered by fans to be a good infantry support vehicle. On the MK IV and Sherman
There are two machine guns that can be fired from within the vehicle unlike the Stug.
The Stug was a good self propelled AT gun with the long barrel, it was not a tank.

 

[GrauGeist]

Interestingly enough, the StuG started out as mobile artillery for infantry support. By the start of Barbarossa, they transitioned to both mobile Artillery and Ad-Hoc Anti-tank roles.
The value was seen in the StuG's ability to engage enemy tanks as a supplement to the armored units, so the transition was made.
With the StuG IV, it did receive a 7.92 MG34 and was up-gunned with the PaK42 and there was provisions for more ammunition storage.

The Stug (both versions) have an impressive kill record for not being an actual tank, not many mobile artillery vehicles can match that record.

 

[parsifal]

I don't have any argument that the mkIV was approaching obsolescence, as was the Sherman, T-34, Churchill and bunch of other tanks. However against the opposition it was facing the MkIV was good enough in 1943-4, ie when it mattered, to achieve exchange rates of over 7:1 . That means a number of things. One of them is that at the time of decision it was still good enough to win battles. Moreover the exchange rate of the MkIV versus its opposition, to the later supposedly more advanced types like the panther and tiger, the mkIV was no more vulnerable than either of those later tanks. The reason for that is because of the poor reliability of the uber tank park.

Parshall mentions that T-34s were built to a low standard of finish because of the short life span of these tanks….perhaps 6months I think he mentions, with a few days life expectancy once in battle. I can accept that, and I note he makes no attempt to look at the life expectancy of German tanks. He does say that the Germans spent a lot of time and resources on the quality of the finishes, which can only be justified if the expectation was that their tanks would have a relatively long shelf life. There is no complete study to determine what the shelf life of German tanks actually was, but anecdotally it doesn't seem to be very long, which suggests that this mania on QA was a wasted effort. If the tank is going to be lost in a short space of time, what is the port about worrying how well it is finished. The standard of finish is irrelevant if the tank is only going to last a few months at most.

The anecdotal evidence that I can think include the following…..during the opening months of Barbarossa, the Germans crossed the border with 3500 MBTs (which at that time included a large number of obsolete light tanks) Within 60 days according to Christian Ankerstjerne, ran to somewhere between 15 and 22% unrecoverable losses ….say 18%, or 10% of the force structure per month.

During Kursk, to the 23 August, , German tank losses amounted to 1200 AFVs from a total of 3500 committed. A loss rate of 21% per month. However the losses amongst the Uber tank formations were much higher than compared to the overall sample.

During the fighting at Metz in late 1944, US forces discovered that the tanks that they had destroyed (Panthers) were less than a fortnight old

Tigers used in the Ardennes were not more than a month old when committed. The majority of these tanks ended up lost or abandoned.

 

[Peter Gunn]

A lot of this is not quite as simple as it seems. The MK IV was getting pretty close to maxed out as it was. The first 200 or so went 19 tons or under. and the H went 25 tons.
Wider track is heavier track, a more powerful engine will burn more fuel. The Mk IV J added fuel by taking out the power traverse for the turret. There isn't any more volume inside the hull for more powerful power plants (the engine may not be much bigger but you need bigger radiators/fans)
I am not sure the MK IV suspension was really that good for high speed.
Turret was already cramped with the L/48 gun.

Yes a few things could have done but the MK IV was an old tank.

Some of these comparisons get a little simplistic. The Sherman for all it's simplicity and standardization used 5 different engines ( Ok one of them was not that common). It used welded hulls and cast hulls and hybrid hulls some of which came in two different lengths depending on engine, it used three different transmission housings (nose piece) and two different hull fronts even on the welded hulls. Two different suspensions and several different turrets and/or gun mounts.
I would also note that the 105mm versions had the power traverse system removed due to space considerations.

And here we hit a difference of opinion. Shermans are considered good infantry support tanks and they held almost twice the amount of machine gun ammo as a MK IV tank and ten times the amount of machine gun ammo as a Stug III (and twice the cannon ammo) and yet the Stug III is considered by fans to be a good infantry support vehicle. On the MK IV and Sherman
There are two machine guns that can be fired from within the vehicle unlike the Stug.
The Stug was a good self propelled AT gun with the long barrel, it was not a tank.

I never said the Mk IV was a panacea, but sticking to a proven design might have alleviated some of the issues Germany's panzer forces faced. I'm well aware of the Pz IV's shortcomings, I just maintain an extra several thousand of them would have been a better bargain than a thousand Tigers.

Re: the Sherman, yes, it had welded and cast hulls, Chrysler Multibank's, Continental R-974's, General Motors GM-6046's, Ford GAA's and Wright RD-1820's. It had different suspensions and lengths as you say, not to mention different hatch placement and size. I say that was the brilliance of the initial designers/engineers either by luck or choice that the design could be adapted to changing technology and still be mass produced.

I'm not sure where we have a difference of opinion (your last paragraph). I totally agree, the Sherman was an excellent infantry support tank (it should be, that was what it was designed for). And the removal of the power traverse system for the 105 mm equipped model was cause for a major complaints from combat crews, but in today's vernacular... Dat 105 yo'.

I'd also note that although the Sherman indeed did have different hulls, hatches, guns, suspensions, engines etc., it was still incredibly reliable/dependable/useful and in my humble opinion, qualifies as one of the best tanks of WWII.

 

[Shortround6]

Interestingly enough, the StuG started out as mobile artillery for infantry support. By the start of Barbarossa, they transitioned to both mobile Artillery and Ad-Hoc Anti-tank roles.
The value was seen in the StuG's ability to engage enemy tanks as a supplement to the armored units, so the transition was made.
With the StuG IV, it did receive a 7.92 MG34 and was up-gunned with the PaK42 and there was provisions for more ammunition storage.

The Stug (both versions) have an impressive kill record for not being an actual tank, not many mobile artillery vehicles can match that record.

The long barreled Stugs didn't show up until March of 1942 and the short barrel ones were pretty crappy AT weapons.
The ability to move from one threatened area to another or to rapidly shift firing positions compared to towed AT guns was huge advantage. The low silhouette and thicker armor than the open topped SP AT guns was also an advantage.
Only the Russians really built comparable vehicles in any numbers. The US going off on it's own tangent of turreted tank destroyers.

A fair number of mobile artillery vehicles didn't carry guns suitable for anti-tank work. And anti-tank guns don't make very good general artillery support weapons. As partially shown by the German production of around 1200 10.5CM Sturmhaubitze 42s. (Stugs with 105mm howitzers) Requirement came out in 1941. due to delays (and the need for SP AT guns?) production only really got under way in March of 1943.

 

[Shortround6]

I don't have any argument that the mkIV was approaching obsolescence, as was the Sherman, T-34, Churchill and bunch of other tanks. However against the opposition it was facing the MkIV was good enough in 1943-4, ie when it mattered, to achieve exchange rates of over 7:1 . That means a number of things. One of them is that at the time of decision it was still good enough to win battles. Moreover the exchange rate of the MkIV versus its opposition, to the later supposedly more advanced types like the panther and tiger, the mkIV was no more vulnerable than either of those later tanks. The reason for that is because of the poor reliability of the uber tank park.

Parshall mentions that T-34s were built to a low standard of finish because of the short life span of these tanks….perhaps 6months I think he mentions, with a few days life expectancy once in battle. I can accept that, and I note he makes no attempt to look at the life expectancy of German tanks. He does say that the Germans spent a lot of time and resources on the quality of the finishes, which can only be justified if the expectation was that their tanks would have a relatively long shelf life. There is no complete study to determine what the shelf life of German tanks actually was, but anecdotally it doesn't seem to be very long, which suggests that this mania on QA was a wasted effort. If the tank is going to be lost in a short space of time, what is the port about worrying how well it is finished. The standard of finish is irrelevant if the tank is only going to last a few months at most.
.

Tanks in general have lousy service lives, at least without constant repair. To pick on the British (mainly because I can remember a few stories) the Matilda II sometimes burned out it's steering clutches in 600 miles. It was considered a near miracle (or at least worthy of note) when some Valentines in NA made 1500 miles on one set of tracks. ANd that was with one of more links taken out because the track (all metal) had stretched beyond the capability of the track tension system to take up the slack.

The Russians had a different mind set. To them the tanks (and some other weapons) were semi disposable because they felt it was easier to build new ones than repair old ones in the field. Tanks were recovered/repaired but not to the extent the Germans/British/Americans did at a unit level (depending on the size of the unit) This may have reduced the need for technical specialists to be spread over a number of units with the accompanying repair equipment.
The Germans and the Russians had different logistics than the US and British (except for the Germans in NA) in that they could load broken down tanks on rail cars and ship them to rear areas (in not the original factories ) for overhaul/repair. This may have helped overload teh rail system but I don't think the rail cars were operating at 100% capacity leaving the front.
For the US and British trying to return broken down tanks to the original factories required multiple moves including ships.

In NA there was considerable importance placed on who held the battlefield at the end of the fighting as that side got salvage their broken down/mildly damaged vehicles to return them to service for the next round of combat while the side that retreated did not get that advantage and all losses form what ever cause had to made up by resupply.

Most tanks/vehicles have a certain amount of stretch (or capacity to be overloaded?) and a late model MK IV at 25 tons was 30% heavier than the early ones. Shermans and T-34s at 28-30 tons were just starting out and as later development showed, where capable of operating (being stretched) to 35-39 tons. Although some of the post war Sherman modifications only kept the hull and replaced almost everything else.

Planning and actual use in combat often get complicated by what the enemy does or does not do. The Russians, due to circumstances, failed to improve the T-34 very quickly (more in the areas of vision and turret ergonomics than engines/guns/armor) which kept the T-34 from performing anywhere near it's theoretical potential. This enabled the Germans to fight it with tanks/vehicles that weren't as good as may have been possible.
The two man turret being a major handicap.
After their experiences in Poland and later France the Germans placed great store in visibility and tried to put cupolas with multiple vision blocks on many AFVs Early stugs do not have them, later ones do. No cupola is as good as having the head out the hatch but having 6-8 vision blocks beats trying to turn a periscope around in circles trying to keep up with the tactical situation. Stugs had a driver, a gunner, a commander and a loader. The T-34 had a driver, a hull gunner/radio man? and in the turret the commander was either the gunner or the loader (there was some swapping back and forth between certain models) which meant when the gun was firing the commander was not commanding the tank, that is selecting the next target, spotting threats or telling the driver where (and how) to move. It took until 1943 to get a turret with a cupola for the commander so the tank wasn't driving around near blind if the hatches were shut.
I would note that the British had cupolas on their early tanks and then stopped using them for several years in the interest of low silhouette (or railroad loading gauge?) and the early Shermans didn't have one either although the smaller hatch cover/s made things easier for the commander than the T-34 hatch.

How long the Germans could depend on the Allies to use tanks with crappy vision/command capability is certainly subject to question.

 

[mikewint]

The inferiority of American tanks led to some of the worst setbacks of the war, prolonging it in Europe. US tankers ultimately prevailed, but over 60,000 armored division soldiers were killed and wounded;

According to British historian Sir Max Hastings, "no single Allied failure had more important consequences on the European battlefield than the lack of tanks with adequate punch and protection." The Sherman, he added, was one of the Allies' "greatest failures."
How could American and British industries produce a host of superb aircraft, an astonishing variety of radar equipment, the proximity fuse, the DUKW, the jeep, yet still ask their armies to join battle against the Wehrmacht equipped with a range of tanks utterly inferior in armor and killing power?

The distinguished American historian Dr. Russell Weigley made a similar argument.
"Perhaps the most questionable element in American ground fighting power was the American tank," he wrote. "[The Sherman] was inferior to the German Panther as well as to the heavier Tiger in always every respect save endurance, including armament and defensive armor."
Dr. Weigley noted that the US, went all through the Second World War refusing "to develop, until too late to do much good, heavier tanks comparable to the German Tigers and Panthers, let alone the Royal Tiger or the Russian Stalin."

After debacles like Sidi-bou-Zid, Kasserine Pass and El Guettar, General Dwight Eisenhower admitted in a private February 1943 letter to U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, that "we don't yet know exactly how to handle the Mark VI [Tiger] tank."

The US military was stuck in a doctrinal debate over the role of tanks: Were tanks to focus on "soft" targets in the enemy's rear, like trucks and light armor, using hit and run tactics? Were they slow rolling pillboxes, used to support infantry assaults? Or should American tanks go looking for a fight, boldly seeking out the enemy's heavy armor to slug it out one-on-one?

In November 1943, even after disasters in North Africa and Tunisia, Chief of Army Ground Forces, General Leslie McNair insisted that the Sherman would deliver victory.
"I see no reason to alter our previous stand…that we should defeat Germany by use of the M4 series of medium tanks," he wrote. "There have been no factual developments overseas, so far as I know, to challenge the superiority of the M4 Sherman."

But tank crews actually fighting in the Sherman knew better. The Battle of the Bulge exposed deficiencies in the M4 so glaringly obvious, what became known as the Sherman Tank Scandal would be splashed across front pages all over the Allied world.

"Whoever was responsible for supplying the army with tanks is guilty of supplying material inferior to its enemy counterpart for at least two years or more," one an angry armored cavalry lieutenant told the New York Times in March 1945. "How anyone can escape punishment for neglecting such a vital weapon of war is beyond me."
The young officer didn't stop there:
I am a tank platoon leader, at present recovering from wounds received during the Battle of the Bulge. Since I have spent three years in a tank platoon doing everything, and at one time or another held every position and have read everything on armor I could get my hands on during this time, I would like to get this off my chest. No statement, claim, or promise made by any part of the Army can justify thousands of dead and wounded tank men, or thousands of others who depended on the tank for support.

To Corporal Francis Vierling of the U.S. Second Armored Division, "the Sherman's greatest deficiency lies in its firepower, which is most conspicuous by its absence." He continued:
Lack of a principal gun with sufficient penetrating ability to knock out the German opponent has cost us more tanks, and skilled men to man more tanks, than any failure of our crews- not to mention the heartbreak and sense of defeat I and other men have felt when we see twenty-five or even many more of our rounds fired, and they ricochet off the enemy attackers. To be finally hit, once, and we climb from and leave a burning, blackened, and now useless pile of scrap iron. It would yet have been a tank, had it mounted a gun.

Yet for top Allied commanders, the official position was that the M4 Sherman was the right tank at the right time. It seemed that at the highest political and military levels, the fix was in.
"We have nothing to fear from Tiger and Panther tanks," insisted British general Bernard Montgomery, even as Allied troops in the summer of 1944 were stricken by the "Tiger Terror" in Normandy. "We have had no difficulty in dealing with German armor."

Later, when the Ardennes Offensive led by German Panzers forced the Sherman Tank Scandal onto the front pages of the nation's newspapers, the U.S. Army's Chief of Ordnance, General Lewin Campbell, doubled down on the whitewash.
"We need not only have no apology for any item of American ordnance in comparison with that of the enemy," he stated in February 1945, "but we're leading them all the way."

At Aberdeen Proving Ground, Colonel George Jarrett, one of the U.S. Army's most respected ordnance experts, was often in "hot water" for his refusal to "toe the line" and lie to the civilian press about how American tanks stacked up against the enemy's. Privately, he damned the army bureaucracy's "refusal to realistically face tank facts…our blind refusal to face the truth of the situation," in spite of what he called an ongoing "sales program" of propaganda.
"We are little better off than at El Alamein," he wrote in early 1945.
While German tank technology had advanced as the war progressed, to Colonel Jarrett, the U.S. effort was "always the same story."
"I've seen this day by day," he fumed. "We never beat Jerry, but catch up to last year's model, next year."

Quantity vs. quality — Allied factories produced nearly 50,000 Shermans during World War Two and the Russians produced over 35,000 T-34s, over 23,000 T-34-85s and over 3,000 KV-1s and 4,000 IS-2s. By comparison, Germany manufactured just 6,000 Panthers, 1,300 Tigers and just 500 Tiger IIs.

Certainly, the Sherman was a decent design, simple to build in large numbers and maintain, easily transported, adaptable to multiple roles and mechanically reliable. But in the three most basic requirements of a decent tank — firepower, armor protection, and mobility — it fell down in two out of three.
"We were never able to build a tank as good as the German tank," recalled General Lucius Clay, "But we made so many of them, it really didn't matter."

As a German officer noted, "I was on this hill with six 88mm antitank guns…Every time they sent a tank, we knocked it out. Finally we ran out of ammunition, but the Americans didn't run out of tanks."

In the end QUANTITY triumphed. German kill ratios were inconsequential. At 20:1 the Germans still lose the war of production.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Amazon product ASIN 0811704246
Just a suggestion, more grounded in fact than ancedotes.

Also this link is a quick analysis of the book. Sound and Fury: A Review of Armored Thunderbolt by Steven Zaloga — Unity of Command

No, the Sherman wasn't perfect and yes indeed had flaws, comparing it to a Tiger (which it rarely saw) or a Panther is misleading, vs a Pz IV, that's a different story, not to mention tactics, spotting and who's doing the attacking.

 

[Shortround6]

Tanks are never going to be invulnerable to all the enemies weapons, at least not for very long.

My opinion is that there is some element of truth of both sides of the Sherman question. It was a very good tank in some ways, however nobody else was standing still and for the Sherman to be thought sufficient in the fall of 1944, two years after it's combat debut again shows that they depending on the enemy NOT to develop better tanks or still thinking the tank destroyer doctrine actually worked.

The use of the tank destroyer doctrine also relies (somewhat) on the enemy doing what you expect/want him to do which is hardly a realistic expectation. Speed is not armor and ripping most of the armor off a Sherman chassis doesn't give you enough speed to amount to anything anyway. The gun in the M-10 was only bit better than the one in the MK IV or Stugs or any other tracked German 75mm AT gun.

There was technically no reason that large numbers of Sherman's could not have been built with 76mm guns and the better turret that went with it. There was no technical reason that an HE shell of similar performance to the one in 75mm gun could not have been used at a similar velocity to the 75mm gun, it required a different aiming mark in the sight and a bit more training.
They built two different M-36 tank destroyers, one of which used a Sheman hull with the 90mm turret dropped into the turret ring. So the possibility of building a closed top turret with the 90mm gun existed.

In Korea there were two different opinions on the M4 and the M26/46. When the North Koreans had T-34/85s the bigger tanks were preferred. Once the supply of T-34/85s was reduced to tiny numbers the M4 was prefered for it's better mobility.

being the tank of choice when the enemy doesn't have tanks is not very high praise.

 

[parsifal]

Tanks in general have lousy service lives, at least without constant repair. To pick on the British (mainly because I can remember a few stories) the Matilda II sometimes burned out it's steering clutches in 600 miles. It was considered a near miracle (or at least worthy of note) when some Valentines in NA made 1500 miles on one set of tracks. ANd that was with one of more links taken out because the track (all metal) had stretched beyond the capability of the track tension system to take up the slack.

The Russians had a different mind set. To them the tanks (and some other weapons) were semi disposable because they felt it was easier to build new ones than repair old ones in the field. Tanks were recovered/repaired but not to the extent the Germans/British/Americans did at a unit level (depending on the size of the unit) This may have reduced the need for technical specialists to be spread over a number of units with the accompanying repair equipment.
The Germans and the Russians had different logistics than the US and British (except for the Germans in NA) in that they could load broken down tanks on rail cars and ship them to rear areas (in not the original factories ) for overhaul/repair. This may have helped overload teh rail system but I don't think the rail cars were operating at 100% capacity leaving the front.
For the US and British trying to return broken down tanks to the original factories required multiple moves including ships.

In NA there was considerable importance placed on who held the battlefield at the end of the fighting as that side got salvage their broken down/mildly damaged vehicles to return them to service for the next round of combat while the side that retreated did not get that advantage and all losses form what ever cause had to made up by resupply.

Most tanks/vehicles have a certain amount of stretch (or capacity to be overloaded?) and a late model MK IV at 25 tons was 30% heavier than the early ones. Shermans and T-34s at 28-30 tons were just starting out and as later development showed, where capable of operating (being stretched) to 35-39 tons. Although some of the post war Sherman modifications only kept the hull and replaced almost everything else.

Planning and actual use in combat often get complicated by what the enemy does or does not do. The Russians, due to circumstances, failed to improve the T-34 very quickly (more in the areas of vision and turret ergonomics than engines/guns/armor) which kept the T-34 from performing anywhere near it's theoretical potential. This enabled the Germans to fight it with tanks/vehicles that weren't as good as may have been possible.
The two man turret being a major handicap.
After their experiences in Poland and later France the Germans placed great store in visibility and tried to put cupolas with multiple vision blocks on many AFVs Early stugs do not have them, later ones do. No cupola is as good as having the head out the hatch but having 6-8 vision blocks beats trying to turn a periscope around in circles trying to keep up with the tactical situation. Stugs had a driver, a gunner, a commander and a loader. The T-34 had a driver, a hull gunner/radio man? and in the turret the commander was either the gunner or the loader (there was some swapping back and forth between certain models) which meant when the gun was firing the commander was not commanding the tank, that is selecting the next target, spotting threats or telling the driver where (and how) to move. It took until 1943 to get a turret with a cupola for the commander so the tank wasn't driving around near blind if the hatches were shut.
I would note that the British had cupolas on their early tanks and then stopped using them for several years in the interest of low silhouette (or railroad loading gauge?) and the early Shermans didn't have one either although the smaller hatch cover/s made things easier for the commander than the T-34 hatch.

How long the Germans could depend on the Allies to use tanks with crappy vision/command capability is certainly subject to question.

This rather misses the point....

Tanks were a consumer item for all the combatants. Germany had numerous deep seated problems in their production apparatus that were not easily solved, but at the same time they had the greatest industrial potential (with the exception of the US), and yet failed to capitalise on that. moreover the inherent weaknesses in their industrial base related to the poor layout of their factories....small size, bad design, inadequate machinery and tooling. Weakneses that were yelling at the top of their collective lungs...."simplified design!!!!!!". Make stuff that was simple, with relatively easy production, and then you can use your antiquated factory system to its best and fullest capacity. Germany ignored all that. Instead of settling on simple easy to produce designs, they opted for the most complicated hard to produce designs. Which took an already antiquated, inefficient vehicle manufacture base and made it even worse.

Furthermore, all nations suffered heavy attrition in their tank parks. There was no appreciable difference that I can see for the finely finished German products and the Russian models. A tank was doing well, from any nationality, if it remained in service for 6-12 months depending on nationaility. Tanks that had some reliability issues, like the tiger, tended to have high losses to attrition (as a percentage of the forcer structure) .

There is no appreciable difference in the Kill/loss ratios of MkIVs and the Kill/loss ratios of other heavier tanks. Overall, those newer experimental types suffered heavier losses overall due to attrition. The simple math should make it bleedingly obvious......if the MkIV could kill just as many tanks as the Tiger, was 4 times as easy to build, about twice as reliable, where on earth is the justification for switching or prioritising the Tigers production. Add to that diabolical mix the german mania to build Mercedes standard AFVs when Ford standard was all that was needed, and the ridiculousness of the German build choices sheets home very forcefully. in a word, they blew it......

The second part of the problem is this mania to worry about tomorrow when the crisis was today. When you are up against it and have an immediate crisis, you don't go off on a tangent, designing and building the vehicles that you MIGHT need in two or three years time. You worry about the crisis at hand here and now. That is precisely what the Russians did, and it saved them. It is precisely what the Germans didn't do, and they lost the war because of it. It wasn't just in Tank production, but tanks were one of the worst areas that they performed in. In 1942-3, concentrating on making improvements to existing designs was far better than going off on a tangent to build a new range of tanks (same for aircraft), that proved to be failures just at the time they were needed to make a difference. If in 1942, the Germans had concentrated solely on the MkIV and SGIII, they would have had many more tanks with which to fight than they did. They had diverted resources for 206 Tigers (they didn't get 206 tigers) and 400 Panthers 9again they didn't get 400 Panthers). If those same resources had remained allocated to mkIV production, it is quite reasonable to extrapolate an additional 1600 tanks for Kursk alone....more than enough to defeat the Russians, turn back the allies in Sicily and prevent the Soviet counteroffensives as well. More than enough to meet the various threats that confronted them at the time of Kursk. more than enough to fight and win the attritional battle they needed to fight in 1942-3. Once the front had been stabilised and the Russians fought to .a standstill there may then have been a bit of time in which to think about improved designed, or better yet, discussing peace terms

Arguing that the Tiger was justified on the basis of what the Russians might have in the pipeline is unsupportable. Russians, US and even the British all opted for standardised designs, churning out the same product for long production runs. Compare this to the German effort. In the case of the Tiger, there were no less than 157 major changes to the design, most of them carried out whilst on the line. moreover the gradual improvements were not done in block production.....an instruction would be received, caling for such and such a change, forcing production to a halt whilst the changes in the production lines were worked out and in many cases retrofitted. 157 detail changes averages out at a change every 6th or 7th tank, . And for what????? Im willing to bet the bank those detail changes made no measurable difference to the combat performance of the basic product. Compare that with the way the Russian or the Americans went about prioritorising their production, then compare the relative performance of each production model. A lot is made of the high attrition inflictyed on the Russians and the US forces, yet as a percentage of their force structures, neither of these armies suffered the catastrophic attrition to the same extent as the heer in '43-'44. Plain and imple it gets down to the numbers. Germany was never going to win the numbers game on a one on one basis, but then she didn't need to. An armoured force designed around the MkIV would achieve exchange rates of around 7:1 in 1943, whilst a force structure designed around a force of tigers will achieve an exchange rate of about the same....the difference is the numbers. A force structure for MkIV/Tigers at 70/20, would be replaced by an all mkIV force structure exceeding 150 vehicles . The killing ability of the 70/20 model might be 630 enemy AFVs, whilst the all MkIV structure has a potential killing ability of over 1000.....

 

[GrauGeist]

To add to Parsifal's post, when Germany restarted their tank program in the mid-30's, the two companies that were excluded from the Bidding process were Ford Germany and Opel, both of whom had the best ability to mass produce a product.
Several companies that were awarded contracts had never built tanks before, either.