Tiger tank from aircraft thread;

[parsifal]

An interesting quirk of history
MkIV, StugIII and other ex-german AFVs in the 1967 battle for the Golan heights

Panzers in the Golan Heights

Edit:

Amazingly, according to the above link, German built Hummels were apparently deployed in the 2014-2016 Syrian Civil war by some of the rebels. if that is the case, it makes the vehicle one of the oldest military vehicles in the world to be still in active service

 

[Tieleader]

THAT'S IT!!! I give you bacon for your excellent memory.

Did a little digging for you. This is the bit I remember. Skip to 30:50 mark for the story.


Hope that helps.
Probably the luckiest Sherman crew in the history of US tank crews of WW2.

 

[Milosh]

An interesting quirk of history
MkIV, StugIII and other ex-german AFVs in the 1967 battle for the Golan heights

Panzers in the Golan Heights

Edit:

Amazingly, according to the above link, German built Hummels were apparently deployed in the 2014-2016 Syrian Civil war by some of the rebels. if that is the case, it makes the vehicle one of the oldest military vehicles in the world to be still in active service

Didn't the Syrians also have Panzer 4 turrets mounted on pill boxes?

 

[Fighterguy]

I've pointed this out before, but here we go again. Wars are won through logistics. The German Tiger and Panther, along with many of their Wunderwaffe pursuits, were a significant drain on resources. Mechanized warfare requires huge amounts of spare parts and supplies. Without them, they become expensive paper weights, and lose combat effectiveness. It doesn't matter that the Tiger and Panther were better individually (on paper) versus their adversaries if they lack crucial "soft" stats.

 

[GrauGeist]

Didn't the Syrians also have Panzer 4 turrets mounted on pill boxes?

Stalin had a considerable amount of German armor built into a southern line across Bulgaria and they remained intact for decades.
The Bulgarian Army started recovering them several years ago, when it was discovered that these panzers (either complete or just turrets) were being stripped for scrap and in a few cases, some being stolen intact to be sold to collectors.

 

[parsifal]

Didn't the Syrians also have Panzer 4 turrets mounted on pill boxes?

According to that link I posted, the Syrians possessed a number of non-operational Mk IVs, some of which they deployed in hull down configuration as hastily dug in strong points. Whether they took the time to remove the turrets from the hull, or had spare turrets to start with is a possibility, but not fully documented. We would be speculating to say otherwise.

The article finishes off by saying that the 6 Day War the obsolescence and futility of deploying WWII era technology in a cold war environment was sheeted home in spades. I don't fully agree with that. The IDF showed how older equipment could be used if properly upgraded.and used intelligently. There upgraded Super Shermans were able to overcome all of the Arab armour types pitted against them, including IS-3s, T-54s, T-55s and Jordanian M-48s. The difference, technology wise was that the IDF made sure their older armour was kept up to date, particularly regarding armament and mobility. Most of f their operational tanks had been upgunned to use the L7 105mm gun, in many instances re-engning and installing better transmissions as well. I am of the opinion that had it been the IDF using the MkIV and Stug III instead of the Arabs, they would have done as well with those German designs as they did with the ex-british and ex-US hardware

There were a few quirks on the Israeli side. The IDF is believed to have deployed a single Hotchkiss H-35 Tank, for what purpose I have no idea. They also had on strength, and may have used, a few M-22 Locust air transportable tanks

The stand out tank of the 6 day war has to be the Centurion, technically a piece of WWII kit. When the Six-day War broke out in 1967, the IDF had 293 Centurion in active service out of a total of 385 and even manage to grow this number by capturing 30 Jordanian Centurions (out of 44). The Battle of "The Valley of Tears" on the Golan Heights in the 1973 Yom Kippur War really consecrated the Israeli development of the Centurion (the so called "Sho'ts") as one of the most deadly tanks ever, when less than 100 tanks of the IDF 7th Armoured Brigade single-handedly defeated the advance of some 500 Syrian T-55s and T-62s, knocking out some 250 before the rest fled. There were many factors contributing to this victory……including a combination of carefully planned positions on the heights with gun-down positions, the 105 mm long-range accuracy compared to the 100 mm of the soviet-built Syrian tanks (which also crucially lacked the elevation required to target the Israeli tanks on the heights when closing up), and expert long-range marksmanship due to intensive training on part of the Israeli tankers. But the new technology grafted into the old design was also critical, with this design still front line material in the IDF well into the 1990s

 

[Tieleader]

Always thought a picture is worth a thousand words (or reichmarks!).
From "Germany's Secret Weapons Of World War Two" by Roger Ford. Not sure about where he got the figures from.

 

[taly01]

He seems to be using the bare cost of a Panther from a quick search, funny how wrong numbers sometimes get carried over for years. (Like B5N2 kate with 2 x 7.7mm in nose).
117,100 RM (Without weapons, optics, or radio)
176,100 RM(combat ready)

The other numbers seem about right.....
Tiger I 299,800 RM
Panther 176,100 RM
PzIV 115,962DM
StuGIII 82,500DM

So simplified math 2 Panthers + 2 PzIV = 2 Tigers

or 5 PzIV = 2 Tiger

or 7 StuGIII = 2 Tiger

Now I can see why some recommended StuG priority!

 

[parsifal]

One of the problems about quantifying costs is the timing of the cost estimate. production costs tended to go down as time went by. A T-34 built at the end of 1942 was 51% less expensive than a t-34 built in June 1941. A T-34 at the end of the war was about one sixth the cost. A Tiger built in 1942 was on average about RM700000, whilst one built in 1944 was well below RM320K. Its not invalid to compare costs, but these figures and others like them need a good dose of caution when reading them.

 

[mikewint]

The Soviet T-34 is the most overrated weapon of WW2.
The T-34 main gun was crudely made, inaccurate, and hard to use except at close range.
The T-34 employed sloped armor in the front, the sides and the back of the vehicle but this choice armored "air" and seriously diminished the internal space of the T-34.

The limited space not only affected crew performance but turned the T-34 into a deathtrap. A US study from the Korean War (based on the T-34/85) concluded that due to the limited internal space a penetration by an A/T round usually led to the destruction of the tank and loss of 75% of the crew. In the Sherman the figure was only 18%.

The turret also suffered from a lack of space. It was so cramped that it affected movement.

There were fuel tanks in the engine compartment and at the sides of the hull. The presence of fuel tanks inside the fighting compartment made any penetration of the tank likely to lead to the complete loss of the vehicle. Apart from the limited internal space there were two more serious design flaws.

One was the lack of turret basket (a rotating floor that moves as the turret turns) for the loader. This meant that the person loading the shells had to follow the movement of the gun and at the same time keep an eye on the floor so he doesn't trip on the spent casings.

The other major issue was the two-man turret which forced the commander to also act as the gunner. This drastically limited combat performance as the commander could not focus on leading the tank but instead had to engage targets.

A three-man turret was finally introduced with the T-34/85 in March '44.

The armor of the T-34 had a high Brinell rating. This was advantageous in defeating antitank rounds of caliber equal or lower to the armor's thickness but had the disadvantage that it could lead to spalling. Combined with manufacturing flaws in the construction of the tank this meant that the T-34's crew was often in danger even when hit by tank rounds that did not penetrate the armor.

The Christie suspension used on the T-34 had the advantage that it allowed for high speeds on road. Its disadvantages were that it took a lot of internal space and it had poor stability in rough terrain.
The Christie suspension was a technological dead-end and the Aberdeen evaluation says: 'The Christie's suspension was tested long time ago by the Americans, and unconditionally rejected'.

Another major problem was the gearbox. It had poor reliability and it needed excessive force to change gears, leading to driver fatigue. The study 'Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank' says:

'Rough steering due to the use of clutch and brake steering control, and difficulty in shifting due to the use of a spur gear clash-shift transmission (no synchronizers, no clutches) and a multi-disc dry clutch, undoubtedly made driving this tank a difficult and very fatiguing job.'

Initially the V-2 engine (500hp) could not be used to the fullest due to the 4-speed gearbox. Changing gears required excessive force on behalf of the driver. The T-34 could use the 4th gear only on a paved road, thus the max speed over cross-country was theoretically 25 km/h but in practice it was only 15km/h because changing from 2nd gear to 3rd required superhuman strength.
On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox which allowed for a cross country speed of 30 km/h. However it seems that even vehicles built late in the war were not guaranteed to have the new 5-speed gearbox. The tanks given to the Polish People's Army in late 1944/early 1945 and those used by the North Korean Army in 1950 had the old 4-speed setup.

The initial version carried the L-11 76mm main gun but this was quickly replaced with the F-34 76mm and the T34/85 had the ZiS S-53 85mm.
While the caliber numbers look impressive Soviet tank guns suffered from low velocity leading to poor penetration and accuracy at long ranges.
For example the initial round velocity using the standard A/T round was: 612m/s, F-34 – 655m/s, ZiS S-53 – 792m/s. The comparable German stats were: KwK 38 L/42 – 685m/s, Kwk 39 L/60 – 835m/s, Kwk 40 L/43 – 740m/s, Kwk 40 L/48 – 790m/s, and Kwk 42 – 925m/s.
The KwK 40 75mm used by the Pz IV and Stug from mid 1942 had far better penetration performance and accuracy than the F-34 and the Panther's KwK 42 was also superior to the ZiS S-53 85mm in the same areas.

Initially only the unit commander's tank had a radio. In the course of the war radio was used more widely but even in 1944 many tanks still lacked a radio set. The lack of radio meant that Soviet tank units operated with little coordination.

German combat reports show that T-34 tanks had serious difficulties in navigating terrain and identifying targets. The problem was that the vision devices made it hard for the driver and the gunner to see what was happening.

The T-34 '1941 version' lacked the vision cupola found on German tanks. The poor quality of Soviet optics combined with the limited visibility from inside the tank affected combat performance. A German unit that used the T-34/76 model '43 in combat noted:
'The gun sights in Russian tanks are far behind the German designs. The German gunners need to be thoroughly accustomed to the Russian telescopic gunsights. The ability to spot a hit through the gunsight is very limited.' The commander's vision is limited to five very small and narrow slits.'
'Safe driving and sure command of both the T 43 and SU 85 can't be achieved with the hatches closed. On the first day in combat in the Jassy bridgehead, four Beute-Panzer (captured T-34s) got stuck in the trench system and couldn't get free with their own power. The same thing happened on the second day.'

1941–1942 T-34's were generally built by totally unskilled workers (often juveniles) employing primitive tools. For example, a T-34 sprocket would be made by pouring molten steel into a sand mold then "shaping" the sprocket by hand with a metal file (a twelve year old might have been trusted to do this task).

The T-34 is often portrayed as a simple and rugged vehicle that seldom broke down, unlike the more complex German tanks that supposedly broke down often. The concept of the T-34 as a reliable tank is another myth of WWII. The majority of T-34s, in 1941, that were lost were due to equipment malfunction. The same reliability problems continued during the period 1942-44. The evacuation and relocation of industrial facilities combined with the loss of skilled workers continued to decrease reliability.

In 1941 T-34 tanks often had to carry a spare transmission strapped on the back to counter equipment failures. In 1942 the situation worsened since many vehicles could only cover small distances before breaking down. In the summer of 1942 the following Stalin order was issued to units:
'Our armored forces and their units frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical problems. Many of the tanks were abandoned on the battlefield. Similar instances can be observed on other fronts. Since such a high incidence of mechanical defects is implausible, the Supreme Headquarters sees in it covert sabotage and wrecking by certain elements in the tank crews who try to exploit small mechanical troubles to avoid battle.'
Henceforth, every tank leaving the battlefield for alleged mechanical reasons was to be gone over by technicians, and if sabotage was suspected, the crews were to be put into tank punishment companies or "degraded to the infantry" and put into infantry punishment companies.'

The constant complaints from the front forced the authorities to investigate the problems with T-34 production. In September 1942 a conference was held at the Ural tank factory by the Commissariat of tank industry. The conference was headed by Major General Kotin, People's commissar of the tank industry of the USSR and chief designer of heavy tank 'Kliment Voroshilov'. In his speech he said:
''Now ... there are a lot of complains about the T-34. You all know the reasons for flaws in the tanks. The first reason –inadequate visibility from the tank; the second reason, and this is the weak link that always accompanies our vehicle in the Army – final drive. And third, the main issue that we have today – insufficient strength of the idler wheel's crank. These issues are the major defects of the T-34 today. Having considered these issues from engineering and technological points of view I would like to discuss another issue, the one that directly resulted solely from our production deficiencies. They are: negligence during production of combat vehicles in the factories, carelessness of assembly and quality control of vehicles. As a result during combat employment our tanks sometimes cannot reach the front lines, or after getting to the territory occupied by the enemy for conducting combat operations, sometimes they are forced to remain on enemy's territory because of some little things... We have to make sure that as a result of this conference all shortcoming will be uncovered and following this conference all corrections in the tank will be implemented in the shortest possible time...

The situation continued to be problematic even in 1943-44.

There were constant problems with the gearbox and the engine filters. The Aberdeen evaluators noted:
'On the T-34 the transmission is also very poor. When it was being operated, the cogs completely fell to pieces (on all the cogwheels). A chemical analysis of the cogs on the cogwheels showed that their thermal treatment is very poor and does not in any way meet American standards for such mechanisms.'

The same problems were identified in a T-34/85 built in 1945. The US study 'Engineering analysis of the Russian T34/85 tank' noted:
'Wholly inadequate engine intake air cleaners could be expected to allow early engine failure due to dust intake and the resulting abrasive wear. Several hundred miles in very dusty operation would probably be accompanied by severe engine power loss.'
'The transmission had by American standards already failed, although with extreme care it could have been used further. Teeth ends on all gears were battered as the result of clash shifting. Many pieces of gear teeth had been broken off and were in the transmission oil. The failure is due to inadequate design, since excellent steel was used through the transmission.'

The idea that T-34s could travel hundreds of kilometers without stopping is fantasy.

Soviet tests on newly built T-34's showed that in April 1943 only 10.1% could complete a 330km trial and in June '43 this went down to 7.7%. The percentage stayed below 50% till October 1943 when it rose to 78%, in the next month it dropped to 57% and in the period December '43 - February '44 the average was 82%.
Preliminary inspection of tanks built at the Ural tank factory No 183 (largest producer of the T-34) showed that in 1942 only 7% were free of defects, in 1943 14% and in 1944 29.4%. In 1943 the main problem was damage to the gear teeth

The V-2 engine had serious reliability problems. Depending on the source in 1941 it supposedly lasted for 100 hours on average. This figure went down in 1942 since some T-34's could not travel more then 30-35 km.
The T-34 tested at the Aberdeen center was built at the best factory using materials of superior quality but its engine stopped working after 72.5 hours. This was not due to American interference as there was a Soviet mechanic (engineer Matveev) charged with maintaining it. Still it was much better than the standard tanks since it covered a distance of 343km. According to the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army N.Fedorenko, the average mileage of the T-34 to overhaul during the war, did not exceed 200 kilometers.

The 5th Guards Tank army in 1943 lost as much as 31.5% of its tanks during its march to Prokhorovka. In August '43 the 1st Tank army lost 50% of its tanks due to malfunction. As late as the second half of 1944 tank units tried to replace engines with more than 30 hours of operation before a major attack.

There is also the question of standardization. Spare parts from Nizhny Tagil could not be used on a T-34 from Gorky.

Another myth is that there were hordes of T-34's attacking the German formations. A simple look at the Soviet tank strength at various points in the war shows that the T-34 was not the most important tank. The light tanks T-60 and T-70 and the tank-destroyer SU-76 made up the majority of AFV's in 1941-42 and even in 1943-45 the T-34 comprised roughly half of the Soviet frontline AFV force. In summer 1941 there were only 967 T-34's in the total strength of 22,000 tanks.

About 45,000 T-34's were lost during WWII. Total Soviet AFV losses in 1941-45 were 96,6The PzIV was the main German tank in the period 1943-45. It weighed 25 tons and was equipped with a 75mm gun. During the war it was upgraded with more armor and a better gun.
The PzIV made up 13% of German tank strength at the start of operation Barbarossa. The model used was equipped with a low velocity 75mm gun effective against infantry but not armored targets. From mid 1942 the PzIV was equipped with the longer 75mm gun KwK 40 that could destroy the T-34 from 1,000m. The basic armor was also increased to 50mm (from 30mm) plus 30mm bolted on and in 1943 80mm standard (for the front hull).

The upgraded PzIV was superior to the T-34 in internal layout, firepower, turret basket, optics, commander's cupola, radio in every vehicle and its frontal hull armor could withstand the T-34 rounds. A Soviet study in 1943 admitted that the Pz IV was superior to their tank, assigning it a combat value of 1.27 to the T-34's 1.16 (with the Pz III being the base 1.0).

The T-34/85 that appeared in mid 1944 was a harder opponent due to its new gun but the PzIV still had an edge in the 'soft' factors mentioned above. Moreover the heavier 85mm rounds limited the number that could be carried to 56 compared to the Pz IV's standard load out of 87. The 85 mm rounds were not stored in a safe manner since 16 of the 56 rounds were in the turret This allowed the loader to use them quickly but it had the downside that a penetration of the turret led to the explosion of the shells and loss of the tank.

The T-34 superiority reputation is/was due to both Soviet and German wartime propaganda. The Russians had every reason to build it up as the best tank of WWII. The Germans also overstated its performance in order to explain their defeats.
If the T-34 was as good as propaganda made it out to be then it should have led to great Soviet victories in 1941-42. Instead what we see in that period is the poor performance of Soviet armored formations. In 1943-45 the T-34 was becoming outdated as the Germans used updated versions of the Pz IV and Stug III equipped with the powerful Kwk 40 75mm gun and of course they introduced the Tiger and Panther.

The 'best tank of WWII' suffered horrific losses against those tanks and even the updated version T-34/85 could not bridge the gap. According to a Soviet report in the period summer 1943 - March 1945 the probability of the T-34's armor being penetrated if hit was from 88-97%, thus any round that managed to hit the tank was practically certain to penetrate the armor.

The T-34 looked good on paper but in the battlefield its 'soft' flaws led to huge losses. Meanwhile Western tanks like the M4 Sherman and Pz IV may have lacked sloped armor or wide tracks but they were better combat systems overall.

 

[parsifal]

And yet, at approximately 1/30th the cost of a tiger, it achieved exchange rates of about 10% against the tiger, and probably a lot less. at minimum that makes it a design at least 3x more efficient to the tiger.

Overall German tanks achieved Kill/loss ratios of about 2.5:1. Since the majority of Soviet tanks in the red army tank park were either T-34s, KVs (some modified to IS configuration) or T-70 chassis, we can extrapolate a bit and say the overall Kill loss ratio for the t-34 was about 2.5:1 at the end of the war. Given that it could by then be turned out like veritable hot cakes, that makes it the best tank of WWII.

Ive seen the mostly American cold War Era report about the shortcomings of the T-34. They all fail in reality to take into account the shelf life of a T-34. Once in combat it could usually be measured in hours. Why go to the expense and trouble of building durability into a design that was never going to last long anyway. According to Parshall, the average life span of a t-34 was less than 6 months, the average track life under 1500 KMs. These are all very concerning statistics, but in reality it is exactly how a tank for an army like the red Army needed to be designed…..an item of high disposability and with ease of production by unskilled labour the most important considerations. With an industrial base potential in 1938 about one seventh that of Germany, the Russians had no choice other than to design and produce their tanks as consumer items. It proved to be a war winning recipe. The recipe at the bottom of the pile was the german production model….producing tanks like they were hand crafted pieces of art, to be concerved and retained at all costs and costing a bomb to build

the worst is probably the tiger......


I can only repeat the statistics Ive posted before.....

"In 1943, the Russians lost approx23,500 AFVs, including a staggering approx14,700 T-34s. Meanwhile, the Germans lost approx8,700 AFVs on the Eastern Front, resulting in a 2.7:1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor. Tigers and Panthers were beginning to account for a significant proportion of the tank park, Russians were still mostly equipped with 76mm armed tanks

In 1944, the Russians lost approx23,800 AFVs, including approx13,000 T-34s. Meanwhile, the Germans lost approx9,500 AFVs on the Eastern Front, resulting in a 2.5:1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor. levelling off,, qualitatively worth noting that the majority of Soviet tanks were upgunned by this time. Very few IS series as yet.

In 1945, it's very hard to come up with reliable kill ratios since most German tank losses were tanks surrendered at the Armistice in May 1945. Most historians estimate a 1.2 or 2 to 1 kill ratio in the Germans' favor in 1945. Significant numbers of IS-2 coming into play

Some sources estimate that about 50% of combat losses (ie: excluding tanks breaking down or getting bogged down in mud) resulted from "gunfire". Gunfire can mean anything from an enemy tank to an AT gun or an anti-aircraft gun firing AP shells. The main source of gunfire losses seems to have been towed AT and AA guns (approx20%), followed by self-propelled-guns (approx20%) and tanks (approx10%). Keep in mind that these figures are rough estimations and are hotly debated to this day. If only 10% of those total losses were due to enemy tank fire, where on earth are the economies of building a superior more longer lived tank than the t-34/ I will go out there and say it plainly.....there is no justification. the german 'qualitative edge" model was tried and proven to be a failure In a war like the eastern front of WWII it was always all about the numbers.

 

[parsifal]

Some of the hard economic statistics of Britain, Russia and Germany:

Steel (1942):
UK - 12.9 million tons
USSR - 8 million

total: 20.9 million

Germany - 31.9 million

Pig Iron (1942)
UK - 7.7 million tons
USSR - 4.8 million tons

total: 12.5 million tons

Germany - 24.9 million

Machine tool production (1940-1944)
UK: 374,000 (The Economics of WW2, page 59)
USSR: 115,400

total: 489,400

Germany: 813,400

The Soviet Union easily was the weakest of the three European powers engaged. The US dwarfed them all it has to be said

The mazing outcome of the USSR outproducing the Germans should start to sheet home along with the sheer brilliance in the production choices made for the T-34.


A good source to look at this issue in more detail is;

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e039/7d742101be41fed2589e0dff628b6af63d61.pdf

 

[mikewint]

Yup, Michael, as I've posted several times now QUANTITY versus QUALITY. The Germans beat themselves with their own superior weapons

 

[Peter Gunn]

Did a little digging for you. This is the bit I remember. Skip to 30:50 mark for the story.


Hope that helps.
Probably the luckiest Sherman crew in the history of US tank crews of WW2.

Appreciate the effort Tie, that made my morning, sat in my office and watched the whole thing. So to be totally glib (or corny)... many tanks...

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The attached paper reviews the performance of the US 76 MM and does not paint a rosy picture

 

[Tieleader]

Saw this on You Tube and liked Ralf's opinions. Skip the to 7:10 mark for the Tiger / Panthers bit or just watch the whole thing for fun!

 

[parsifal]

Very useful video in my opinion

 

[GrauGeist]

Tiger tanks were extremely rare. So, the chances of a Sherman actually meeting a Tiger were very slim. Only about 1500 Tiger I tanks were made. A large part was used on the Eastern Front. Probably not more than 500 Tigers would ever be in Western Europe and most likely even fewer. In comparison, some 50.000 Shermans were made. So there's at least 100 times as many Shermans than there are Tigers on the Western front. So the odds of seeing and/or engaging one had to be quite slim.
Then add to that the tactical considerations of the Germans and the American Sherman tanks were even less likely to engage Tigers.

The first Tigers were used in Tunesia and those were all knocked out by British forces. The British forces at that time were considered by the Germans to be more dangerous, as they were highly experienced, and thus the Tigers were used against them.

Two Tiger battalions were sent to Normandy. Both were again used against the British forces. In this case, because the northern region, where the British army was deployed, was relatively open, and thus suitable for tank warfare. The southern region, where the Americans were deployed, had the bocage landscape, (pastureland divided into small hedged fields interspersed with groves of trees) which was a natural barrier against tanks. It could be defended very efficiently with infantry armed with panzerfaust, with anti-tank guns, and by tank destroyers. Only a small part of the German tank force was used there, and no Tiger tanks were employed.

After the breakout of Normandy, the German tank forces got trapped in Falaize, and were destroyed by artillery and air bombardment. No Tigers left in the West, until the Tiger II appears in the Battle of the Bulge. And those mostly got stuck on the small roads in the valleys of the Ardennes. Very few ever had a chance to get into battle.

As a result, American Shermans would hardly ever have engaged Tiger tanks. There are only 4 confirmed engagements of the US Army with Tigers. (Of course, it is difficult to confirm everything, so there were certainly were more than four engagements… but it does give an indication of how rare they were.) And this is entirely consistent with the usage of the Tigers by the Germans. The few there were, were used against the British. The handful of Tiger IIs in the Ardennes, were used against the Americans, but they hardly saw any combat at all due to the terrain and lack of fuel.

So considering all those stories of American tankers engaging Tigers and the actual rarity of the Tigers, it is almost certainly a PzKpfw-IV that was actually engaged by the Shermans. The Tiger and PzKpfw IV look very similar from the front. It's just like all the anecdotal tales about '88mm guns, almost certainly they were Pak40 75mm guns.

The British Shermans certainly did engage a few Tigers. Luckily, they had the Sherman Firefly conversion, so they also had the ability to kill Tigers quite efficiently.

I meant to touch on this a while back, as there seems to be a little bit of confusion.

There were Tigers in France after the invasion, one such Tiger was the one belonging to the Imperial Japanese, but was commandeered by Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 101, it's fate is unknown.

There was certainly a wide range of German AFVs, such as StuGs, PzKfw Mk.IVs and armored cars. For heavy German armor: Panthers, Tiger Is and Tiger IIs were involved.

A short list here:
Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 653, 1st company/3rd Company: Jagdtiger.
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 301: Tiger I
Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506: Tiger II
Panzer Lehr Division: Panther, PzKfw Mk.IV, Jagdpanzer IV/70
2. Panzer Division: Panther, PzKfw Mk.IV, StuG III
9. Panzer Division: Panther, PzKfw Mk.IV
116. Panzer Division: Panther, PzKfw Mk.IV, Jagdpanzer IV
SS Panzer Brigade 150: StuG, Panther, American, Polish and Russian equipment.
SS Schwere Panzerabteilung 501 (formerly SS-sPzAbt 101): Tiger I, Tiger II

There's more, but this helps to put an end to the idea that there were "no Tigers in the west".

For a great read on the Ardennes and U.S. actions against the Tigers, I'd suggest this: https://history.army.mil/html/books/022/22-2-1/CMH_Pub_22-2-1.pdf

And I'll toss this pic in...it's a Tiger knocked out near Oberwampach during the Ardennes offensive.