I know we have argued about this before but in some cases people apply post war (or even 1960s ) standards to the Tiger tank.instead of the standards of the day.
In many ways, particularly in the west, the development of armoured warfare concept atrified after the war. The Germans were ahead of everyone in armoured warfare theory in 1942, took a bit of a hit 1943-5, but were still ahead of everyone even at the end. The only area where I think the Americans were ahead was in the formalised ideas around Combat Commands, as compared to the more adhoc arrangements used by the germans in their formations of Kampfgruppen. Americans in theory at least were ahead in their ideas of all arms teams, from the perspective of that formal division of units into flexible combat teams, but in reality were less well developed than the germans. Had the war been still contested in 1960, and extrapolating what the western allies did with the lessons they learned, the german advantages would have been even more pronounced.
Roles for tanks changed and sometimes just classifying a tank by it's weight overlooks the intended role of a particular tank and the intended role sometimes is not the role it was actually used for.
The MBT classification is not just a function of its weight. Leopard II for example is one of the heaviest tanks by weight but easily meets the tenets underpinning the MBT classification. The Soviet T-10 (a derivative of the IS series) do not. To be classified an MBT, you need a blend of three components, mobility, firepower and protection. They need to be a balanced compromise……if you have a design that is clearly lacking in any of these areas you cannot call the weapon system an MBT. It might be a Light Tank, or it might be a Heavy Tank.
The classification of MBT didn't exist in WWII, but that does not mean that there weren't tanks that fulfilled the role. Tanks that could be classified as MBTs (in a contemporary application of the term, might include…….Pzkpfw Mk III (for early war), Mk IV, Panther (for late war), Somua (early war), Shinhoto Chi Ha (early war), Sherman, Grant, Comet, Cromwell. Some of these tanks weren't particularly good, but they do fit the criteria for MBT in the time context of their design.
Tanks that fall outside these classifications have some usefulness, but fall short in the classic roles for armour. Tigers are very much in that category.
Most armies in the 30s were stuck, at least somewhat, in the mindset of WW I and thought that tanks should be used to break through fortified positions or trench lines. There was also the penetration/deep raid/shoot up the rear areas role. WIth the technology of the time and the cost/weight limits one tank could seldom, if ever, perform both roles in the 1930s/early 40s.
The nations that mattered were not "stuck" in this way. Germany developed concepts on armoured warfare that continue to form the basis of modern armoured breakthrough warfare even today. The concepts of mobility, concentration of force dislocation of rear areas, remains as valid today as it ever was when first formulated. Guderians genius was that he married concepts from some very diverse sources to create a thoroughly modern concept of armoured warfare. He combined the ideas of fully integrated armoured/Infantry/ artillery together, threw in direct air support and provided radio communications that are still to this day the essentials of armoured combat. It is no accident that men like Rommel, Manteuffel, Guderian, even Manstein dismissed the Tiger philosophy as a wasted effort, they all considered mobility to be the single most important element of tank design.
Other nations were far less well developed in terms of armoured warfare, but neither is at all true that they were preparing to fight the next war according the tenets of 1918.
Both Britiain and the US were probably the least well developed, but even they were envisaging their breakthrough battles being fought in the manner prescribed by JFC Fuller. In France nothing could be further from the truth that they intended to fight the next war according to the 1918 principals. The French army was probably the second most advanced nation on mobile warfare in the world. They had 10 fully motorized Infantry divisions, something nobody else had, 4 armoured divs (DCRs), 4 Mech Cav Divs (DLMs) 5 armoured Cav Divs (DLCs) and over 60 autonomous armoured support bns for the Infantry, backed up by a further 45 reserve bns equipped with a rather depressing array of WWI equipment. Unlike the Germans, very little importance was given to air support, radio control 9in the C&C mix). Whereas the Germans measured their rapid responses in a matter of hours, the French measured their ideas on mobile warfare as a matter of days delay. Compare this to the weeks or months delays factored into one of Fochs or haigs "big pushes" and the invalidity of comparing the early WWII efforts becomes readily apparent.
The Russians prewar also had some very unique concept on what armoured warfare might need to be like. The purges kinda killed the Soviet efforts to develop a workable concept on armoured warfare. But in any event their prewar concepts on armoured warfare had to be massively adapted to suit the unique conditions the Russians faced. In the west, the general trend was towards the formation of all arms teams, focusing on a balance of mobility, firepower and protection, with the armoured spearheads a supported by integrated teams of armour infantry and backed up by airpower. For the Red army, with its acute, and never solved shortages of trained leaders and experience, this all arms concept was tried at ther beginning of the war and failed because the Red Army lower and middle leadership lacked the experience to make it work…….so the Red Army adapted the model to suit their own capabilities. Therer greenhorn officers were given simplified TOEs with which to work….rifle brigades were often just that, as were the so-called submachine gun bns. With or two wepon systems to get a handle on, this simplified the battle problem considerably. Later as experience levels improved the Soviets were able to reform formations with more of an all arms capability
All of the armies that went to war 1939-1941 had given some thought to fighting wars differently to the way the campaigns in 1918 had been fought. Some were more successful than others at it.
Most large armies wanted "breakthrough" tanks (tanks that could breakthrough a defended position while absorbing/deflecting anti-tank fire up to a certain standard). Speed and range were not high on the list.
WW I Breakthrough tanks went around 5mph (if they were lucky) and ranged 35-50 miles. SO tanks that went 12-18 mph and ranged 50-90 miles looked pretty good.
Main argument here was, given budgets of the time, a few big breakthrough tanks or lots of little ones? The latter were often called Infantry tanks as their role was to accompany the infantry in the assault.
Some armies (French in particular) tried for both.
True that most armies toyed with the concept but there are enough significant exceptions to challenge the validity of the basic positioning of this statement. The main Brekthrough Tank of the heer was the MkIII. This had a range of 110-165 miles and a normal speed of up to 25 mph. the mk IV is often touted as its heavy support, but in fact the Mk IV was designed for Infantry support, to provide HE capability at the rear of the schwerpunkt. As far as emphasis not being on speed and range, in the case of the germans, this is absolutely untrue. Downright misleading actually. Guderian from the early 30's always considered mobility THE most important facet of tank design. And this included range and speed both.It is true that those with more of an Infantry based emphasis were less concerned about this element of design and purpose, but these proponent s were ultimately proven wrong. Even so some designs did acknowledge the need and importance for range. The Somua S-35 had a range of between 95miles (offroad) and 150miles (off road) and 150 (on road), T-34s, designed prewar, had a design range 150-200 miles, increased later to nearly 300 miles with the external fuel tanks fitted.
Breakthrough tanks were not the priority for the most advanced armoured nations. It is simply untrue to claim that.
Due to the lack of speed and range armies also bought faster tanks with hopefully better range, but these were lightly armoured in order to keep weight down. The intended role being to go through the gap made by the assault tanks and accompanying infantry and drive on into the rear areas (which would hopefully have less AT guns) and shoot up the supporting artillery, headquarters/supply depots and such causing a general collapse of the front in that area. The British had cruiser tanks, the French had several categories of tanks for this role and the Russians were building the fast BT tanks by the thousands.
Please note the inted role was NOT reconnaissance or scouting (many prewar tanks didn't have radios) although many wound up doing that role.
Most nations developed concepts of breakthrough tanks and support tanks, the T-34 and KV series being a prime example. The Germans were not ardent fans of this concept, but their reliance on training vehicles, Mk Is and IIs forced the ideas of a support element supporting the lighter tanks (generally MkIIIs supporting Mk Is and IIs) has a lot ot truth to it. The difference between these early renditions and the later insertion of Tigers in the support role is that whereas the mkIII as a support tank retained a good degree of mobility so that it could keep up with an advance, a tiger could not. It would generally either break down, run out of fuel couldn't get into position or simply was too slow to support a blitz style breakthrough.
Point of this very short and simplified background is that the requirement that lead to the Tiger tank was formulated in 1937 for a tank that would be 50% heavier than a MK IV (then at 18 tons) and armoured to withstand heavier guns. As with most projects weight grew substantially. But this project was never intended to replace the MK IV on the production lines but to be used for special purpose set piece battles. Which turned out not to happen at anywhere near the anticipated frequency that pre war generals thought. AT guns also got better faster than new tank chassis could be designed.
Tiger tanks were very much conceived in the light of the "support tank" concept. That much I agree with. But it was a concept that was changed so much and so completely failed to take into account the wishes of the front line commanders and most importantly failed to take into account or retain some of the most essential components of a true assault support weapoin system as to make the argument that it was responding to prewar dictates, a nonsense basically. It is certainly true that the germans wanted a proper support tank, but as guderian repeatedly said, what was needed was a tank that was agile and long legged enough to keep up with the advance. The design of the tiger ignored those repeated requirements. Faced with the crisis that arose from the early encounters with the t-34 (and also the KV) the Germans panicked and designed a tank, at hitlers insistence that was at once the biggest, meanest, most heavily armed and armoured weapon system on the battlefield. That this weapon system was nearly useless because it could hardly move, and therefore was hardly of any use in mobile warfare, got lost in that panic.
The Tiger was never a counterpart to the T-34 or Sherman or even the Cromwell. It was a counterpart to the KV, the US M6 and perhaps the Churchill.
US M6
It was a failure in this support role because it was a static line weapon…..nearly useless in mobile operations. Most support weapons of other armies also suffered some loss of mobility but not nearly as badly as the Tiger
Many tanks suffered from high numbers of breakdowns. Especially in retreat, when they cannot be recovered.
The French lost more Char B1s due to breakdowns and running out of fuel than they did to combat.
Tigers and Panthers (the early panthers at any rate) suffered the same problems……for the panther 206 went into action at Kursk, about 25 were destroyed in battle, 108 were sent to rear workshops where all but 7 were captured by the advancing Russians. During the Ardennes, of the 40 or so tiger IIs used in the advance to the US fuel dumps, they were all lost, but nearly all of them to fuel and breakdowns. l
The Tiger was far from perfect but the idea that the German forces would have done significantly better without it may need a rethink. Cost in money is not always a good way to measure things as it includes labor and cost of tooling. I doubt very highly that you could build even ten 30 ton tanks for the cost in raw materials tha one 56 ton Tiger cost let alone 30 tanks.
Very few of the general officers renowned for their skill in armoured operations supported the tiger concept. Those that expressed opposition to its development and existence included Guderian, Manteuffel, Rommel, and Manstein. These officers all considered the type lack of mobility to be a fatal and major drawback. In the case of Rommel and guderian they went further, the unit cost of the tiger and its reliability issues were both considered in very adverse terms. Rommel after his recall to Europe favoured the total abandonment of turreted AFVs in favour of Tank destroyers, which on average were 40% cheaper to build. Guderian wanted heavy tank production to remain focused on Mk IV improvements and he too later favoured tank destroyers over tanks…..the so called "Guderians Duck". For the officers that were there and were in the best positions to know, none of them favoured the tiger tank. Even some of the SS idiots that called themselves officers were not great fans. During the Ardennes offensive, when offered the choice of any tank to equip his KG, Peiper xhose the Panther (which by late '44 was finally starting to catch up to the t-34 reliability wise) over the tiger. .
Germans held on to the MK III and MK IV too long. Stugs are not true replacements for turreted tanks.
And yet the MkIII/IV combination remained the mainstay on the eastern front well into 1944, achieving exchange rates with the Russians at least equal to thos touted for the tiger overall. The exchange rate, incidentally exceeded 7:1. As far as the stugs issue is concerned, both Guderian 9at the end) and Rommel (somewhat earlier) advocated replacement of turret AFVs with these weapon systems. Turrets represented a major chokepoint in out for the Germans, some sources claim that availability could have been boosted by as much as 40-50% if a full changeover to Stugs had been accepted. There is little or no evidence to support the often quoted notion that were at some disadvantage against turret tanks. Perhaps so in fully offensive mobile operations, but not in the kind of defensive situations Germany was being forced in to from 1944 onward