Time Machine Consultant : Maximizing the Bf-109 in January 1943

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I'm laughing so hard I can barely type, but honest to God, that's EXACTLY what would have happened: Adolf Hitler would have gotten all confused and shot Kurt Tank and the folks at Focke Wulf!

But seriously, how "the fat man" Goring avoided a firing squad in 1940 is absolutely beyond me. I can't remember the name of the Luftwaffe's Chief of Intelligence (Ic) during the Battle of Britain, wasn't it Oberst Joseph Schmid, good old Beppo. Anyway I would have shot THAT guy twice and he became a Major General(dramatically under-estimating the Soviet Union's pre-Barbarossa military strength and aircraft manufacturing potential and commanding the Herman Goring Division along the way.)

Bronc
 
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HeY Civettone:

Since when does an improved two-stage supercharger on a DB-605 change the center of gravity to anything? That's what the DB-628 was: an improved two-stage supercharger on a DB-605.
I have seen the drawings of the Bf 109 with DB 628 and it required a couple of changes. Which then resulted in another change, and then another and another and ... and it ended up as the BV 155. The guys at B&V concluded that the Messerschmitt design was seriously flawed and needed much more changes.


As to the catastrophic effects of the Bf-109's undercarriage, the narrowness of it leading to about 50% of ALL accidents causing unserviceability, I can find the cite for you. I mean, I can embarrass you completely and thoughoughly on the list over this, or maybe I will let it drop to be nice to you and all, but I guess it's up to you dude...
Go for it!


Why does the Me-155 need the DB628 engine? Just use the same DB605 engines which historically powered the Me-109G and Me-109K.
So what do you get then? A standard Bf 109 with bigger wings? That's pretty much taking away its main advantage. The aircraft will be slower, have lesser roll rate and will be inferior in the vertical. Climb rate will only be better in a sustained climb but not in instant climbs which were far more important in combat. And all of that for some more armament and a wider landing gear.

Kris
 
I really think everyone is missing the point. What killed the Luftwaffe was thier total lack of offensive cabability.

If they could, by means of better fighter escort, go on strong offensive of attacking England proper, everything changes.

The British and U.S, rather than spending all of thier time, efforts, thoughts, and equipment on attacking the Germans, now have to also figure out how to defend. Possibly move airfields further away, which would again be advantageous to the Luftwaffe.

We can talk about which plane is faster, better, whatever. But if the Germans could put together an effective strategic bombing campaign, the whole war is changed. At least against the British and Americans.

I am not so sure the existance of a longer range fighter escort would help them against the Russians. I think the Russians could just keep moving thier production East as they did during the war.
 
The Germans simply didn't have the numbers for a strategic bombing campaign against Britain after 1941.

If you look at July 1943 as an example, the RAF had, in the UK, excluding reserves:

960 heavy bombers
1500 SE fighters
570 TE fighters
approx 400 medium and light bombers

The entire Luftwaffe, deployed not just in W Europe but also in the Med and East, had just 1,849 fighters of all types and 1,663 bombers. The RAF based in the UK was larger than the entire Luftwaffe.

As to making changes to the 109 in 1943, it was all too late. As Williamson Murray says in Strategy for Defeat:

Unfortunately for Trautloff and Germany's cities, there was no method that could
produce enough machines or pilots ; the battle for air superiority was lost because
the battle of production had been lost in 1940, 1941, and 1942-not 1944 .
 
It's better to keep it simple guys.

In January 1943 the Bf 109G-5/6 was on its way so let's start from there.
Its main problem was the aerodynamical picture. They were partially solved at the end of 1944. These changes could possibly have been introduced much sooner. An aerodynamical hood instead of the bulges. A retractable tail wheel with a long strut.
One more option is adding wheel bay covers which would make the aircraft substantially faster.

Another main shortcoming was the 1.3 ata level of the DB 605. Daimler Benz should make it priority nr 1 to at least bring the ata level back to the level of the DB 601.

These simple changes would bring the max speed of the Bf 109G to at least 670 kmh. Also range would be improved.

Other changes are the Erla Haube and the standard fitting of the cheap MK 108 cannon.

Good post, Civettone, and I agree completely.

Introducing new types is not easy, both production and operational-wise, and I think many underestimate the problems involved. The thesis of this thread is that the Germans know what is coming at them in 1944, so they have a year to try to come up with a solution for this.

Regarding the aerodynamic changes, these were quite simple, and ready to be implemented by mid-1943 the latest. The streamlined cowling was ready, the retractable tailwheel and the wheel well doors (the latter actually already proposed before the Bf 109G, hence the squarish wheel bays) were known. Priority should have been given to fix some of the minor mechanical problems with these improrements, which alone would yield some 20-30 km/h speed increase.

I guess you could not do anything about the DB 605A, DB had a hand on the lubrication problems, and solved these completely between June and September 1943. Since the problem was the engine's mechanical endurance, until the lubrication problem was solved, MW 50 boosting is not possible (since the engine cannot yet take these loads).

I don't think the complete replacement of the 109G with FW 190A is a good solution, for two reasons: 109s could be produced in 2/3rd the time that it took to produce a FW 190.

Secondly, since the RLM knows that for 1944, requirements will be to for fighting at higher altitudes, ca 8km against American bomber streams, they will require a good performance high altitude fighter, which the FW 190 cannot fill, even with the FW 190D with its medium altitude engine.

So IMHO the correct decision would be:

- Priority for aerodynamic improvements for Bf 109G, introducing these on all present aircraft before waiting for the Bf 109K (whichs development BTW started in early 1943, so kinda mirrors it. The failing was the lacking of energetic introduction of these developments into production sooner)

- Most importantly, since we know that the 1944 fights will be about fighting at high altitude, cease production of DB 605A engined Bf 109Gs and produce only fighters with the DB 605AS. This is easily done since in effect it only means fitting existing DB 605A's with a DB 603 supercharger and results in a fighter that is comparable if not superior to any known foreign types at altitude.

- Cancel Me 410 production alltogether. This plane is simply not needed, and its roles can be fullfilled by other types, namely the Ju 88/188. The surplus production capacity at Mtt can be used to produce more 109s, and the surplus DB 603A engines to produce a FW 190D equivalent with the DB 603A (note that DB 603A and Jumo 213 were both interchangable, and of very simimilar output).

- Cancel He 111 production, the type should be replaced by Ju 88. Its a superflous type, as again the Ju 88 can fullfill any of its roles, as well as useful as a night fighter airframe.


Regardless of all the above, by far the most important task would be a large scale expansion of the training programme, which was of far greater concern to the Germans - who never really had a lack of available aircraft - than the lack of pilots.

Simply to put, IF we know that 1944 will be about large defensive fights (and this was not too hard to predict by 1943, with the USAAF starting to deploy in Europe, and giving an edge to the Allied air offensive, which was until then rightfully ignored due to the rather impotent nature of RAF 'probing raids' in France.) the correct strategic decision should have been drawn in 1943, and to tailor the production and the Luftwaffe force to a defensive nature. Fighter production should have received priority, as well as fighter training programmes, instead of waiting with all that until mid-1944.

IMHO there was a fairly good chance to reverse or at least, largely mitigate the devastating air superiority that the USAAF have won, albeit at a great cost in the spring of 1944, largely due to insufficient German fighter forces in the West. That was simply an air war of attrition, and the Luftwaffe, not having sufficient fighters to maintain air superiority on all three fronts, lost the numbers game. With sufficient number of fighters and fighter pilots, they had a fairly good chance to make these offensives so costly that their effects would be largely reduced, either over the Reich or over the battlefields of Normandy. Of course damage would be still done, but given the peaking out of the armament industry in 1944, it would be probably tolerable for them.
 
The Germans simply didn't have the numbers for a strategic bombing campaign against Britain after 1941.

If you look at July 1943 as an example, the RAF had, in the UK, excluding reserves:

960 heavy bombers
1500 SE fighters
570 TE fighters
approx 400 medium and light bombers

Source...? What units do these include, first line or second line or both?
What about servicibility rates?

The entire Luftwaffe, deployed not just in W Europe but also in the Med and East, had just 1,849 fighters of all types and 1,663 bombers. The RAF based in the UK was larger than the entire Luftwaffe.

Your figures seem to be largely incomplete on the Luftwaffe side.

As of 30 June 1943, the Luftwaffe had
1849 SE fighters (vs 1500 RAF fighters, which were largely composed of obsolate types btw),
554 night fighters (vs ca 570 RAF TE fighters, again mostly obsolate types),
1663 level bombers and 523 dive bombers and attack aircraft, ie. a total ca 2186 bomber types vs some 1300 RAF heavy, medium and light bombers.

Take note that several types are not included, ie. daylight Zestorer units, which had about 150 heavy fighters at this point.

The complete first line strenght of the Luftwaffe as of that date, not counting a large array of secondsry purpose planes (ie. liason, transport etc.) at this date was 7089 aircradft, not including secondary and reserve units. According to your data, the RAF at this point had about 3430 similiar combat types...

A more complete view on Luftwaffe strenght can be gleaned from the RLM strenght reports. These, as of July 1943, show the following strenght (both 1st and 2nd line units, but not including reserves):

Recon 1237
Bomber 2579
Stuka&Schlacht 975
Transport 908

Zerstörer (daylight TE F) 160
Nachtjagd 688
Tagjagd (daylight SEF) 2018

Grandtotal: 8565, incl. 2nd line units
 
I guess you could not do anything about the DB 605A, DB had a hand on the lubrication problems, and solved these completely between June and September 1943. Since the problem was the engine's mechanical endurance, until the lubrication problem was solved, MW 50 boosting is not possible (since the engine cannot yet take these loads).

Just to clarify . MW50 is not anything that increases boost . It was a system that was used to allow for the increase of boost . It was a knock preventative . N2O could be considered a boost additive
 
surely if you are arriving in jan 1942 the first thing you would want to do is stop Barbarossa this will give you the entire luftwaffe to turn loose on britain again
 
...
As of 30 June 1943, the Luftwaffe had
1849 SE fighters (vs 1500 RAF fighters, which were largely composed of obsolate types btw),
554 night fighters (vs ca 570 RAF TE fighters, again mostly obsolate types),
...

Any detailed overview of RAF's 'obsolete' fighters in 1943, both SE and TE? Plus, how do you rate the radars of 1943 era night figters (= the 50% of an night fighter)?
 
Kurfurst, I agree on your proposals for the Bf 109 and also on focusing production on the Ju 88. In another thread I suggested focusing everything on the Me 410 instead of on the Ju 88 but the reason is the same: less projects and more production.
But I have some reservations against your comment on the 605AS. As you know it did produce a little bit less power at sealevel because of inertia of the bigger compressor. Especially on the Eastern front combat was at low altitude. Perhaps it wasn't as important as the Reichsverteidigung but no reason to give up on it.
So perhaps continue production until the ASM engine becomes available in numbers in the Spring of 1944 and then ;ake the AS standard ?

Personally I trust the aircraft engineers of Messerschmitt over the shipyard engineers of Blohm Voss. 8)
I don't know if you are serious on this.
But if you are, let me just say that Mtt was seriously overstretched and had done a hasty job on the Me 155. RLM ordered the project to be transferred to B&V. Mtt was to cooperate with B&V but refused to do so. They had told the RLM that the conversion would have been simple and refused to acknowledge that this was simply not true. And that's probably why they didn't want B&V to continue on the project.

One can write a book on how Mtt was more into power games than into actually winning the war. He only wanted one thing and that was a monopoly on the entire aircraft order book. Even when he had the order for the first jet fighter he started to advocate the Me 209 as an alternative to the 262 just so FW wouldn't get an order for the 190D. In the end Mtt had so many programs running it was becoming counterproductive. And still Mtt kept on bidding for new assignments and taking on new projects.

Kris
 
The "shipyard engineers" had only brought 6 different designs of powered aircraft to flight status by the time they took over the "155" project.

If not quite as many as the "aircraft engineers of Messerschmitt" it is not like they didn't have some idea of aircraft design and construction.:rolleyes:
 
Okay, that took all of about three minutes... Denying that the Bf-109 had a critical / fatal / unacceptable landing gear design that resulted in catastrophic problems for the Luftwaffe is like denying that the sun came up this morning...

The wide-tracked, inward-folding gear on the Me-155 was the solution and I would have shot those stupid ship engineers over at B&V

1) "The most notorious aspect of the Bf-109 was it's appalling takeoff characteristics. An estimated 3,000 aircraft were lost [destroyed] during takeoffs in which the pilot lost control. Landing characteristics were also challenging..." [appalling]
-- Air Warfare Boyle pg. 410

2) "At least 10% of all Bf 109s were lost [destroyed] in takeoff and landing accidents, 1,500 of which occurred between 1939 and 1941 ."
-- Boyle pg. 25-26

{The number of aircraft made temporarily unserviceable in takeoff/landing accidents was significantly higher. See below...}

3) "11,000 of the 33,000 built were lost or damaged during takeoff and landing accidents - (1/3) one third of the number built by Germany."
-- FLIGHT JOURNAL magazine

4) From a 2008 post by HoHun on this forum...

Finnish use of the Bf-109

Total war-time losses: 61 aircraft
Losses at landing: 9 aircraft
Losses at take-off: 10 aircraft

31% of the Finnish Bf-109 losses were due to take-off/landing accidents

5) Go to Luftwaffe in Norway
(The Luftwaffe in Norway and scan the damage/loss reports for landing accidents. The numbers are absurd.)

6) In truth, the Bf-109 owes its reputation more to force majeure and the ability of some outstanding pilots than to any intrinsic quality of the airplane itself. The Fw-190 was an airplane that was better than the Messerschmitt on all qualities other than altitude performance; for combat above 24,000 feet - which is where the Battle of Germany took place between 1943-45 - the Luftwaffe didn't have anything else it could use. In fact, more pilots were killed in the 109 from landing and takeoff accidents than were lost in combat, and nearly as many 109s were lost due to its vicious takeoff characteristics and difficult landing technique as were shot down in combat. Gunter Rall, the number-three ranking Luftwaffe experte once told me that there were only two kinds of Messerschmitt 109 pilots: those who had survived a ground loop and those who hadn't. The landing gear was weak, the wing had an unfortunate tendency to come off in high-g combat maneuvering, and the design of the cockpit forced the pilot to close the canopy on startup, which severely restricted his view during the two most dangerous parts of a flight in the fighter - takeoff and landing. The Bf-109 became famous in spite of itself.
--Scott Van Aken

It's fairly obvious that 10% of ALL Bf-109's were destroyed by it's landing gear/landing/takeoff characteristics and over 30% were made varying degrees of unserviceable by the same problem. So we either bolt the Me-155 wing on the thing or we cancel the whole program. That the Luftwaffe tolerated this insanity is almost beyond belief...

Bronc
 
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my advice would be to start shooting people just like Stalin did. Stalin didn't have to put up with long development and production delays when it came to weapons. First you got a letter urging you (and the team) to hurry up. Then you got a letter warning you to hurry up. And when you didn't hurry up and deliver then you, and everyone that even remotely looked like you, got shot.
:shock: :shock: :shock: :shock:


Otto von Bismarck Quotes
Anyone who has ever looked into the glazed eyes of a soldier dying on the battlefield will think hard before starting a war.

Be polite; write diplomatically; even in a declaration of war one observes the rules of politeness.

No civilization other than that which is Christian, is worth seeking or possessing.

The secret of politics? Make a good treaty with Russia.
 
Okay, that took all of about three minutes... Denying that the Bf-109 had a critical / fatal / unacceptable landing gear design that resulted in catastrophic problems for the Luftwaffe is like denying that the sun came up this morning...

We can also use the maxim that a little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. I'll bet most accidents with P51's Spits and the like occurerred during the landing or take off phase . Whats funny is the Spit undercart is 6" narrower them the 109
 
10 % seems about ok... I thought you were talking about a much higher number.
Listen Bronc, I appreciate it a lot that you went through the effort of looking this stuff up. Many people come here and just make broad statements without backing them up. You do the effort!

But be adviced ... on this forum we have had several or even damn many discussions about the Bf 109 landing and take off accidents. For instance: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/me-109-vs-fw-190-take-off-landing-accidents-12879.html which shows that the Fw 190 suffered about similar landing and take off accident numbers.
I am more than willing to argue further with you about this but google this forum a bit because much has already been said...

You should also ask yourself how much of these accidents were caused by badly trained pilots? How much was the result of the tail wheel strut? Or the result of bad airfields on the Russian front ??

That being said, 10 % of aircraft lost to landing and take off, others repairable, ... I am not really impressed by such a figure because of the reasons I already mentioned. It is also important to realize that these accidents usually did not result in the death of the pilot which was definitely the most important element of the aircraft.
To build a new aircraft because of this? No thanks.

The "shipyard engineers" had only brought 6 different designs of powered aircraft to flight status by the time they took over the "155" project.

If not quite as many as the "aircraft engineers of Messerschmitt" it is not like they didn't have some idea of aircraft design and construction.:rolleyes:
How many aircraft did Messerschmitt develop before the Bf 109? :D
B&V was lead by Richard Vogt, and that, my friend, was no ship builder...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Vogt_(aircraft_designer)

Kris
 
Messerschmitt had done fewer powered aircraft when he/they did tthe 109 but I was refering to the time at which B&V took over the 155 project. By that time Messerschmitt or his enginers had had worked on more designes, some of them quite steller, like the Bf 161 and 162:lol:

Maybe I was too subtle, I was trying to point out that the peaple at B&V were not exactly the novices at aircraft design and construction that the term "shipyard engineers" portrayed them to be. :)
 

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