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wuzak
Captain
From that reort:
"classified survivability issues" - would that be stealth issues?
"classified survivability issues" - would that be stealth issues?
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1.1 Operational Assessment OT-HE Report Topics
The operational test team conducted an operational assessment from June 1, 2010, to June 1, 2011, to assess the F-35's progress toward operational effectiveness suitability, and mission capability/ The team also assessed the program's progress toward readiness for operational test and evaluation (OT&E).
Air-to-Surface Attack: The OA OT-HE report cited unsatisfactory progress towards meeting performance requirements for the air-to-surface (A/S) attack mission capability and survivability. The chief concern cited in the report was the lack of a legacy-quality night vision capability, predicated on the lack of progress in the helmet mounted display (HMD), as well as certain classified survivability issues. The report also expressed significant concerns with aircraft performance characteristics, particularly transonic roll-off buffet, as well as manoeuvring performance. Finally, the report noted that recent design changes should improve thermal management within the cockpit but certain operating environments were likely to stress that capability. The QLR confirmed that, although progress had been made against these issues, each remains a source of concern for concurrency risk.
Close Air Support (CAS): Although the test report described progress in this mission area, the report expressed concern with the lack of certain legacy aircraft CAS capabilities on the F-35, as well as some flaws in HMD symbology. The QLR considered a wide range on legacy (non-ORD) requirements and none were sources of concurrency risk.
Air Warfare: The operational tests cited unsatisfactory progress and the likelihood of severe operational impacts for survivability, lethality, air vehicle performance, and employment. These conclusions were driven by certain classified issues, critical performance criteria for the helmet mounted display, air vehicle performance, and air-to-air weapons employment. While the QLR did not consider weapons employment requirements for the UK's Advanced Shot Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM), the team did find concurrency risks for both the helmet mounted display and air vehicle performance, particularly for structural loading.
Electronic Attack (EA): The OA report cited specific concerns related to EA performance for suppression and defeat of enemy air defences as well as classified lethality and survivability issues. The QLR team evaluated the classified concerns and determined that while program plans were in place to address those risks, the aforementioned concerns with the HMD and aircraft manoeuvrability still held.
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Reconnaissance: The operational testers reiterated concerns about aircraft manoeuvrability and survivability as well as certain non-ORD data transfer requirements but the QLR team did not identify additional concurrency risks in these areas.
Deployability/Mission Generation/Training/Fleet Support: The report concluded with an assessment of the F-35's system's readiness to forward base, deploy, and retrograde; to generate missions in the intended operating environment; to train pilots and personnel; and support flight operations. Chief among their concerns were the readiness of the ALIS and its multiplicity of configurations; the thermal management system; the integrated power package (IPP); the overall logistics footprint and systems interoperability; progress on the HMD; and low observable (LO) maintenance. While it did not explicitly review the F-35 logistics footprint, the QLR found sources of concurrency risk in several of these area.
This just is plain silly that the media thinks this is such a showstopper.
"For example, the naval variant is now incapable of landing or carriers due to the inability of the arresting hook to capture an arresting cable on the carrier deck. And, there are more hard to conceive deficiencies, including airframe buffeting at different angles of attack."
If you look closer to the issue, it stems from the fact that the tail hook on the single engine F-35 is closer to the main gear than on two engine planes. Thus the bounce latency of the cable from main gear run-over to arrestor hook is too long and the hook often misses it. A major redesign to the airplane? Not even remotely likely. In fact, they might even be able to fix off airplane (e.g., higher tension in the cable). Or perhaps a greater spring constant/hydraulic pressure in the arrestor hook.
It seems the previous "serious problems" have gone away and some are just looking for more "serious problems" for an excuse to bag the whole program despite the USAF version having success.
Success? Because some have been delivered?
I don't know what your point is with regards to the F-35. Kaman and Lockheed-Martin are two different companies. Perhaps the RAN should have looked into a different airframe rather and relying on a design that has been stretched as far as it could!The Australian Navy received some Seasprites 7 or 8 years ago. They still don't work properly. The remainder of the contract was cancelled. But they were delivered, so is that success?
Can you be specific? Is it the F-35A, B or C or are we talking about export or license built versions?The F-35s delivered so far would, in years gone by, be considered YF-35s. They haven't got all the software, for one, of teh definitive version, because the code hasn't been written yet, and won't be completed for another few years.
The report is assessing the risks involved in continuing production alongside prototype testing and evaluation. While the production numbers are small it it shouldn't be too much of an issue, but when production numbers start getting large any fixes required will take more time and money.
The report basically states that there are a number of moderate and high risks but none that require the termination of concurrent production. If they did find issues that do, their recommendations would have been to stop concurrent production until the issues had been overcome. It would not be to recommend teh cancellation of the program, just that testing with prototypes continue but production held off until the fixes have been made.Does anybody know how many have been built? I think I saw 300, but I don't know where I saw it.
Yes success - because those delivered (The USAF Version) are performing as ordered. The problems with the Marine birds are being fixed. Yes success!
I don't know what your point is with regards to the F-35. Kaman and Lockheed-Martin are two different companies. Perhaps the RAN should have looked into a different airframe rather and relying on a design that has been stretched as far as it could!
Can you be specific? Is it the F-35A, B or C or are we talking about export or license built versions?
The media here is looking at that as meaning "cancellation."
And the same report contradicts itself several timesAre they? It seems from the report that the flight regime hasn't been anywhere near fully explore yet.
Agree. In the mean time look at the performance milestones the aircraft is meeting as the bugs are worked out of it.The point is that just because the aircraft have been delivered to the USAF doesn't make the program or aircraft successful. I think the prgram can be judged successful when the testing phase is out of the way and the F-35 enters operation.
I was talking about the F-35s delivered to the USAF.
The code is constantly being written and updated. Obviously software can be more easily updated than hardware. But my understanding is that the software suite is still a couple of years away from completion. Until that happens the F-35 will not be fully functional. I also understand that the software is common to all variants.
The code is constantly being written and updated. Obviously software can be more easily updated than hardware. But my understanding is that the software suite is still a couple of years away from completion. Until that happens the F-35 will not be fully functional. I also understand that the software is common to all variants.
Are you even remotely familary with large programs with software deliverable milestones leading to system programmatic success? I'm quickly concluding that you are reading quotes from journalism majors who have no idea what entails a successful systems engineering program.
Actually, I disagree. Minor fixes to airframe issues are far easier to develop and test than "a simple software patch". IMHO.
Humorous wuzak, but that is the real difference between real software/systems engineering. Few people have a grasp of the complexity of such a program. Configuration management. Quality assurance. High to low level system/software requirements trace, regression testing, etc.
Armchair engineering only exposes one's 'Internets' ignorance. I won't defend the F-35 as the be all, end all of program exellence. But I must roll my eyes when some argue about the curled edged tea leaves of system engineering.
Maybe I didn't explain myself very well.
I meant that it is easier to upload the latest software version to an airframe than it is to replace or fix some airframe components.