Top 11 Misconceptions of World War 2 #Eurocentric Edition

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So we are agreed, 97% of the Strategic bombing of Europe was a waste of time, blood, money etc. they should have gone after the oil to begin with. Which they probably could have done with Mosquitoes.

Neither the RAF (in 1939-1943) or the USAAF (in 1942-43) had the capability to attack oil plants with sufficient accuracy and weight of bombs to have much of an affect on oil production early in the war.

The RAF heavy bomber force started to have the capability in mid 1943 with the introduction of navigation aids, master bombers and path finders. But even then the navigation aids had range restrictions due to the altitude at which the bombers could fly. If they were directed at oil plants with sufficient frequency, the German war may have suffered earlier. That said, I believe that RAF attacks against the Ruhr had an effect on synthetic oil production, due to problems with moving the raw material (coal) to the plants. This effect would be replicated with the Transport Plan in 1944.

Some plants were beyond the reach of the RAF, such as Ploesti.

The USAAF did not have the strength for a sustained campaign against Oil until 1944. Before then attacks on oil would have been sporadic, as it would take time for the USAAF to build up enough strength for another raid. And experience from 1944 showed that it took frequent raids to reduce oil production for sustained periods.

Much as I love the Mosquito, and knowing that they were able to knock out a couple of oil facilities in 1944, they would not be able to get the job done against oil. The majority of facilities were beyond the Mosquito's range. Also, because of the need for other variants, the production of bomber Mosquitoes was not sufficient for the task. And the striking power of the Mosquito was best from 1944, when it could carry the 4,000lb bombs (HC or MC) as an alternative (the Mosquito raids against oil used either 6 x 500lb each - which could have been done prior to 1944, or a single 4,000lb bomb, or a mixture of both).

Basically, an effective attack on oil was, in reality, beyond the Allies before 1944.
 
Well, first of all - I was kind of kidding, I just thought the narrator of that video was a little too definitive in his conclusions. I thought his own numbers gave lie to his statement in that particular case about Strategic bombing. I think he's wrong about several other things too, or at least wrong to sound so certain.

Second, this is a strongly held belief of mine but I wouldn't pretend I know it could have worked out better if they targeted the oil a lot earlier, but I am personally convinced that is the case. Many of the German strategic commanders were also mystified as to why we didn't go after the oil sooner.

Certainly, with the assets available, it would have been tough to achieve, and costly. But so was the approach they took wasn't it? How many losses did bomber command suffer? I think it was 55,000 men, 44% of the aircrew who served were killed right? That's pretty grim. 8th AF lost 26,000 killed, a lower percentage at 7.4% but also quite a grim number. How many centuries old cities (and not just German ones) were reduced to rubble and ash by indiscriminate bombing? How many civilians were killed?

Of course hindsight is 20-20, I'm just suggesting that maybe they could have done better. Maybe the oil should have been the focus, because that is one industry which is probably hardest to decentralize into dozens of small workshops. Maybe they should have made a lot fewer four-engined heavy bombers more aircraft like the Mosquito, the A-26... the various longer ranged fighter bombers, and used those to target the oil as early as they could, because once the oil was gone the Germans were really hampered, a lot more than they were by hitting any ball bearing plants, sub pens or Messerschmitt factories.

There were a few other designs for fast strike aircraft or heavy fighters which could have perhaps been developed instead of being cancelled (Gloster F.9) or developed sooner (de Havilland Hornet, F7F, A-26) which might have been better suited for attacking Ploesti. But I really think the Mosquito could have done it.

I also don't think you need 4,000 lb bombs to destroy targets like oil refineries. I think you just need precision - to hit the target in other words. I believe bomb tonnage and giant bombs were helpful in some cases but highly overrated in others. If you miss by a half a mile it really doesn't matter how big the bomb is unless it's nuclear.
 
Well, I agree navigation is a challenge, especially when attacking at night (which might be best for targets like Ploesti), but day or night there were a variety of fast two-person (and two engine) aircraft with room for a navigator. Better a guy with a sextant than that useless Norden bombsight... You can still have designated pathinders (which were often Mosquitoes anyway) in a raid with smaller, faster strike aircraft. And the radio direction finding devices etc. were coming on line regardless, I don't think you had to have to sacrifice all those aircrew in the 4 engine heavies to develop those systems.
 
Well, I agree navigation is a challenge, especially when attacking at night (which might be best for targets like Ploesti), but day or night there were a variety of fast two-person (and two engine) aircraft with room for a navigator. Better a guy with a sextant than that useless Norden bombsight... You can still have designated pathinders (which were often Mosquitoes anyway) in a raid with smaller, faster strike aircraft. And the radio direction finding devices etc. were coming on line regardless, I don't think you had to have to sacrifice all those aircrew in the 4 engine heavies to develop those systems.
The Mosquito could not and did not carry a maximum bombload over the same distances as 4 engine bombers. You would have needed 4 or 5 Mosquitoes to Achieve the same bomb carrying results of 2 or 3 Lancasters over a long distance. Pathfinders were good in a tactical capacity (provided you had aerial superiority) but to drop bombs at altitude you were not flying at top speeds and were vulnerable to fighters, let alone taking away the Mosquitos best asset, speed. I think the fastest you're dropping bombs at altitude (without losing effectiveness) using a pathfinder was something like 300 mph IIRC. Fast bomb run speeds for B-17s were something like 200 mph IIRC. And whether you were using a Norden or other high altitude bomb aiming device, the results were not going to be much different

Even though the Mosquito was a great precision bomber, you were still "bombing by hand" with a minimal bombload at high risk. Strategic Bombing involved many aircraft lobbing huge amounts of bombs on your enemy like dropping rocks from a freeway overpass. For the technology of the time, the later was more effective.
 
The Mosquito could not and did not carry a maximum bombload over the same distances as 4 engine bombers. You would have needed 4 or 5 Mosquitoes to Achieve the same bomb carrying results of 2 or 3 Lancasters over a long distance. Pathfinders were good in a tactical capacity but to drop bombs at altitude you were not flying at top speeds and were vulnerable to fighters, let alone taking away the Mosquitos best asset, speed. I think the fastest you're dropping bombs at altitude (without losing effectiveness) using a pathfinder was something like 300 mph IIRC. And whether you were using a Norden or other high altitude bomb aiming device, the results were going to be much different

Ploesti was going to need to be a low altitude strike, I don't think you would want to drop bombs at altitude. But that didn't mean it needed to be approached at low altitude. The approach would be whatever was best to avoid being shot down. Level bombing is never going to be precision bombing in WW2, unless they are using guided weapons or something.

Most of the bombs carried by those Lancasters never hit their targets. One Mosquito (or A-26, or P-51) acutally hitting a refinery is a vast improvement over 20 Lancasters that drop their bombs 3 miles away from it.

Even though the Mosquito was a great precision bomber, you were still "bombing by hand" with a minimal bombload at high risk. Strategic Bombing involved many aircraft lobbing huge amounts of bombs on your enemy like dropping rocks from a freeway overpass. For the technology of the time, the later was more effective.

I dispute that, I think it was a huge waste of blood and treasure. They had the ability to make precision strikes, even at fairly long range. They hit prisons, gestapo HQs, warships, nuclear plants, dropped a French flag on the Arc de Triumph in occupied Paris, even used Lancasters to take out dams. I think they could have made much better use of those Mossies, not just for the special raids, but for general purpose. They should have had the Americans making some.

Strategic bombing was basically a failure, not only in WW2 but in other subsequent wars. They tried it in Korea and Vietnam too. Pulverized damn near every building in North Korea, all it did was create an even nuttier bunch of commies. Fighter bombers were and are much more effective. Every once in a while even today there is still a use for a B-52, but it's pretty rare.

I would argue that P-47s and Typhoons did more damage to the enemy war effort than B-24s heavy bombers and Lancasters. (now B-24 as an ASW aircraft, that's a different story...)
 
Well, I agree navigation is a challenge, especially when attacking at night (which might be best for targets like Ploesti), but day or night there were a variety of fast two-person (and two engine) aircraft with room for a navigator. Better a guy with a sextant than that useless Norden bombsight... You can still have designated pathinders (which were often Mosquitoes anyway) in a raid with smaller, faster strike aircraft. And the radio direction finding devices etc. were coming on line regardless, I don't think you had to have to sacrifice all those aircrew in the 4 engine heavies to develop those systems.

Ploesti was out of range for aircraft based in Britain.

It was only accessible by B-24s flying from North Africa with light bomb loads until the Allies had invaded Italy.

RAF navigation aids were able to be used for targets as far as the Ruhr, but not much further. So many of the oil installations were beyond its capability. And using dead reckoning and celestial navigation early in the war the RAF would often not be within 5 miles of their target.
 
Yeah I'm well aware of the problems with night time navigation. The Luftwaffe had the same kind of issues.

I would see Ploesti strikes as coming from the Med.
 
The Mosquito could not and did not carry a maximum bombload over the same distances as 4 engine bombers. You would have needed 4 or 5 Mosquitoes to Achieve the same bomb carrying results of 2 or 3 Lancasters over a long distance.

Certainly Mosquitoes could lug the 4,000lb bomb to Berlin. The Lancaster probably 2-2.5 times that, the B-17 about 1.5 times.


Pathfinders were good in a tactical capacity (provided you had aerial superiority) but to drop bombs at altitude you were not flying at top speeds and were vulnerable to fighters, let alone taking away the Mosquitos best asset, speed. I think the fastest you're dropping bombs at altitude (without losing effectiveness) using a pathfinder was something like 300 mph IIRC. Fast bomb run speeds for B-17s were something like 200 mph IIRC. And whether you were using a Norden or other high altitude bomb aiming device, the results were not going to be much different

5 Group RAF developed a system where the pathfinder aircraft (usually Mosquitoes) would drop to low level to lay down their markers (in good visibility).

8 Group dropped theirs from altitude, usually with the navigation aids.

These were techniques for bombing at night, marking the aiming area so it could be seen by the main force with their visual bomb sights.


Even though the Mosquito was a great precision bomber, you were still "bombing by hand" with a minimal bombload at high risk. Strategic Bombing involved many aircraft lobbing huge amounts of bombs on your enemy like dropping rocks from a freeway overpass. For the technology of the time, the later was more effective.

With OBOE I think that the bombs would release automatically, or if "bombing by hand" it was done by the signal, not visual aiming.
 
I dispute that, I think it was a huge waste of blood and treasure. They had the ability to make precision strikes, even at fairly long range. They hit prisons, gestapo HQs, warships, nuclear plants, dropped a French flag on the Arc de Triumph in occupied Paris, even used Lancasters to take out dams. I think they could have made much better use of those Mossies, not just for the special raids, but for general purpose. They should have had the Americans making some.
Mosquito was not going to saturate huge industrial areas with the same amount of bombs at low altitude, compare the bombloads and ranges of US and RAF heavy bombers and the distances they were able to fly with them, again you would have needed twice or three times the amount of Mosquitoes to accomplish the same missions and the Mosquito would have been range limited. It was a great strike aircraft and precision bomber but to use it in any other capacity would have diminished it's effectiveness
Strategic bombing was basically a failure, not only in WW2 but in other subsequent wars. They tried it in Korea and Vietnam too. Pulverized damn near every building in North Korea, all it did was create an even nuttier bunch of commies. Fighter bombers were and are much more effective. Every once in a while even today there is still a use for a B-52, but it's pretty rare.
Again, you're not considering the technology of the day. Fighter bombers became more effective once the technology was there to deliver a precision strike better than a high altitude bomber. You can say strategic bombing was basically a failure in WW2 in hindsight but again at the risk of repeating myself, look at the technology of the day
I would argue that P-47s and Typhoons did more damage to the enemy war effort than B-24s heavy bombers and Lancasters. (now B-24 as an ASW aircraft, that's a different story...)
That is 100% not true. As ineffective as we may look at the Allied bombing campaign by today's standards, it was that effort that crippled the German war machine to the point where a tactical campaign (using your P-47s and Typhoons) was able to be accomplished.
 
Certainly Mosquitoes could lug the 4,000lb bomb to Berlin. The Lancaster probably 2-2.5 times that, the B-17 about 1.5 times.
My point - and lugging that 4,000 pound bomb to Berlin was not going to happen at 400 mph, the return trip obviously a different story
 
I also don't think you need 4,000 lb bombs to destroy targets like oil refineries. I think you just need precision - to hit the target in other words. I believe bomb tonnage and giant bombs were helpful in some cases but highly overrated in others. If you miss by a half a mile it really doesn't matter how big the bomb is unless it's nuclear.

Oil refineries covered a lot of area. With a lot of separate targets. So precision might not be the easiest thing to achieve.

The RAF bombed oil refineries less than the USAAF, but they generally used bigger bombs (4,000lb and 1,000lb against 1,000lb, 500lb and even down to 100lb).

The smaller bombs cause small amounts of damage in lots of places, the large bombs cause a large amount of damage in a few places.

Using the smaller bombs the USAAF had to visit refineries more frequently, since the damage was easier for the Germans to repair. The refineries would return to partial or full capacity quickly, which meant the race was between the Germans fixing the damage and the USAAF bombing the refinery again.

The idea behind using a large number of smaller bombs is that the chances of one hitting something vital were increased.

The large bombs were far more destructive. The effective radius of their blast was much wider than for the smaller bombs. So even if they missed the target they may still cause significant damage. And if they did hit, the damage would be much worse. And harder to repair. So the RAF had to return less frequently.

The frequency of visiting these sites is important, since they were some of the most heavily defended targets in the Reich. I'm sure the crews were happy to visit them less often.
 
My point - and lugging that 4,000 pound bomb to Berlin was not going to happen at 400 mph, the return trip obviously a different story

No, but high speed cruise of 350mph was possible with a Mk.XVI fitted with Merlin 76/77s. When fitted with 72/73s the cruise was a bit less.
 
No, but high speed cruise of 350mph was possible with a Mk.XVI fitted with Merlin 76/77s. When fitted with 72/73s the cruise was a bit less.
1. Even at 350 you're opening yourself up to interception
2. At what stage of the war would the Mk.XVI been made available in numbers to be used in a strategic capacity?

Again - take that Mk.XVI with the 4,000 pound bomb and drop it on a high value precision target at low level.
 
Sicily, southern Italy, Malta maybe?
Depending when you're planning this raid, Sicily was invaded between July and August, 1943. Operation Tidal Wave occurred August 1, 1943. Malta wasn't stabilized until late 1942. Benghazi to Ploesti is about 50 miles longer than from Malta.
 

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